





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History
of
The Peninsular War.

BY

ROBERT SOUTHEY, ESQ. LL. D.

POET LAUREATE,

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
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HISTORY

OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

CATALONIA. MEQUINENZA AND TORTOSA TAKEN. EXPEDITIONS ON THE COASTS OF BISCAY AND OF ANDALUSIA. GUERRILLAS.

WHILE Lord Wellington detained in Portugal the most numerous of the French armies, defied their strength and baffled their combinations, events of great importance, both military and civil, were taking place in Spain.

The command in Catalonia had devolved upon Camp-Marshal Juan Manuel de Villena, during the time that O'Donell was invalidated by his wound. He had to oppose in Marshal Macdonald a general of higher reputation and of a better stamp than Augereau. Augereau had passed through the revolutionary war without obtaining any worse character than that of rapacity; but in Catalonia he manifested a ferocious and cruel temper, of which he had not before been suspected. Every armed Catalan who fell alive into his hand was sent to the gibbet: the people were not slow at reprisals, and war became truly dreadful when cruelty appeared on both sides to be only the exercise of vin-

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.

*Marshal
Macdonald
succeeds
Augereau.*

CHAP. dictive justice : it was made so hateful to the better part of the
 XXXIII. German soldiers, and to the younger French also, whose hearts
 1810. had not yet been seared, that they sought eagerly for every opportunity of fighting, in the hope of receiving wounds which should entitle them to their dismissal, or, at the worst, of speedily terminating a life which was rendered odious by the service wherein they were engaged.

Von Staff,
 296.

Siege of
Mequi-
nenza.

The force under Macdonald's command consisted of 21,000 men, including 2000 cavalry, and of 16,500 employed in garri- sons and in the points of communication ; the army of Aragon also, which Suchet commanded, was under his direction. They could not in Catalonia, as they had done in other parts of Spain, press forward, and leave defensible towns behind them : it was necessary to take every place that could be defended by a re- solute people, and to secure it when taken. After Lerida had been villainously betrayed by Garcia Conde, Tortosa became the next point of importance for the French to gain, for while that city was held by the Spaniards, the communication between Valencia and Catalonia could not be cut off. Tarragona and Valencia were then successively to be attacked, but Mequinenza was to be taken before Tortosa was besieged. This town, which was called Octogesa when the Romans became masters of Spain, which by the corrupted name of Ictosa was the seat of a bishop's see under the Wisigoths, and which obtained its present appellation from the Moors, was at the present juncture a point of considerable importance, because it commanded the navigation of the Ebro, being situated where that river receives the Segre. It was now a decayed town with a fortified castle ; the works never had been strong, and since the Succession-war had received only such hasty repairs as had been made, at the urgent representations of General Doyle, during the second siege of Zaragoza. These preparations had enabled it to repulse the enemy in three several

attempts after the fall of that city. It had now, by Doyle's exertions, been well supplied with provisions, but every thing else was wanting; the garrison consisted of 700 men, upon whose discipline or subordination the commander, D. Manuel Carbon, could but ill rely. He himself was disposed to do his duty, and was well supported by some of his officers.

Six days after the betrayal of Lerida the French Colonel Robert was sent with three battalions to commence operations against this poor fortress; he tried to force the passage of a bridge over the Cinca, which was so well defended, that it cost him 400 men. Between that river and the Ebro, Mousnier's division approached so as to straiten the place, and a bridge of boats was thrown across the Ebro, and a *tete-du-pont* constructed to cut off the besieged from succour on that side. The operations were conducted with little skill or success, till at the expiration of a fortnight Colonel Rogniat came to direct them. Carbon then found it necessary to abandon the place, and retire into the Castle; to this he was compelled less by the efforts of the enemy than by distrust of his own men, who now becoming hopeless of relief, took every opportunity of deserting. His only armourer had fled, so had his masons, his carpenters, and his medical staff, the latter taking with them their stores. Four of the iron guns had burst, . . . two brazen ones were rendered useless; and the Castle, which the people looked upon as impregnable, was not only weak in itself, but incapable of long resistance, had it been stronger, for want of water: there was none within the works; it was to be brought from a distance, and by a difficult road. The governor represented to the captain-general that his situation was truly miserable; that the best thing he could do, were it possible, would be to bring off the remains of the garrison; but they were between the Ebro and the Segre, and the

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1810.

May 18.

June.

CHAP. banks of both rivers were occupied by the enemy. A force of
 XXXIII. at least 3000 men would be required to relieve him... whereas
 1810. 500 might have sufficed if they had been sent from Tortosa in
 June. time.

*Mequinenza
 taken.*

June 8.

*Lili ap-
 pointed to
 the com-
 mand in
 Tortosa.*

*Vol. i.
 731-735.*

Tortosa.

This dispatch was brought to Villena by a peasant who succeeded in swimming the Segre with it; and an attempt accordingly was made to relieve the Castle, but it was made too late. General Doyle, whom the Junta of Tortosa had addressed entreating him to continue his services to Mequinenza, asked and obtained the command of the succours, and was on the way with them, when they were met by tidings that the garrison had surrendered. The course of the Ebro from Zaragoza was now open to the enemy, and they prepared immediately to besiege Tortosa. If Suchet had known the state of the city at this time, he might have won it by a coup-de-main. The suspicions of the people had been re-inflamed by the betrayal of Lerida; the fall of Mequinenza excited their fears; and an insurrection was apprehended, to prevent which Villena requested Doyle to hasten thither, and act as governor till the Conde de Alache, D. Miguel de Lili y Idiaquez, should arrive. This nobleman had displayed such skill and enterprise in the painful but fortunate retreat which he made with a handful of men after the wreck of the central army at Tudela, that it was thought no man could be more adequate to the important service for which he was now chosen.

Tortosa stands upon the left bank of the Ebro, about four leagues from the sea; it is on the high road by which Catalonia communicates with the south of Spain. Before the Roman conquest the Ilercaones had their chief settlement here, and the place was called after the tribe Ilercaonia; Dartosa was its Roman name, which either under the Goths or Moors passed into

the present appellation. It was taken from the Moors * by Louis le Debonnaire, during the life of his father Charlemagne, after a remarkable siege, in which all the military engines of that age seem to have been employed. The governor whom he left there revolted, called in the Moors to his support, and they took it for themselves. It was conquered from them by Ramon Berenguer, Count of Barcelona, in the middle of the twelfth century; and in the year following was saved from the Moors by the women, who took arms when the men were almost overpowered, rallied them, and animated them so that they repulsed the entering enemy: in honour of this event a military order was instituted, and it was enacted that the women of Tortosa should have precedence of the men in all public ceremonies. During that revolt of the Catalans which was one of the many and great evils brought upon Spain by the iniquitous administration of Olivares, Tortosa declared early for the provincial cause; but it was reduced to obedience soon and without violence, and the city, which then contained 2000 inhabitants, was secured against any sudden attack. Marshal de la Mothe besieged it in 1642, and effected a breach in its weak works: he was repulsed in an assault with considerable loss, and deemed it necessary to raise the siege. Six years afterwards the French, with Schomberg for their general, took it by storm, . . the bishop and most of the clergy falling in the breach. It was retaken in 1650. In the Succession-war this place was gladly given up to the allies by the people, as soon as the capture of Barcelona by Lord Peter-

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.
July.

* The importance which was at that time attached to it led the Archbishop Pierre de Marca to remark *cujus momenti sit Tortosa in bello Hispaniensi; quæ cum sita sit in trajectu Iberi, latam aperit viam ad faciendam irruptionem in reliquas Hispaniarum regiones, unde ex hujus urbis deditone ingens Maurorum Sarracenorumque metus.* Marca Hispanica, 294.

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1810.

July.

borough enabled them to declare their sentiments. The Duke of Orleans took it in 1708 by a vigorous siege, and through the want of firmness in the governor; had it held out two days longer, the besieging army must have retired for want of supplies. Staremborg almost succeeded in recovering it by surprise a few months afterwards; and in 1711 he failed in a second attempt. From that time the city had flourished during nearly an hundred years of internal peace; the population had increased to 16,000; the chief export was potash; the chief trade in wheat, which was either imported hither or exported hence, according as the harvest had proved in the two provinces of Catalonia and Aragon. But during this long interval of tranquillity, while the city and its neighbourhood partook the prosperity of the most industrious province in Spain, the fortifications, like every thing upon which the strength and security of the state depended, had been neglected, and were falling to decay.

*Prepara-
tions for the
siege of that
city.*

This place, which could only have opposed a tumultuous resistance if the French had immediately pursued their success, was soon secured against any sudden attack by Doyle's exertions. He had given up his pay in the Spanish service to the use of this province, and the confidence which was placed in him by the people and the local authorities, as well as by the generals, gave him influence and authority wherever he went. Every effort was made for storing and strengthening the city, while the enemy on their part made preparations for besieging it in form. Mequinenza was their depot for the siege: from thence the artillery was conveyed to Xerta, a little town two leagues above Tortosa on the Ebro, which they fortified, and where they established a tete-du-pont: another was formed at Mora, half way between Mequinenza and Tortosa; the navigation of the river was thus secured. The roads upon either bank being only mountain paths, which were practicable but for beasts of burthen, a military road was

constructed from Caspe, following in many parts the line of that which the Duke of Orleans had formed in the preceding century. A corps of 5000 infantry and 500 horse was to invest the city on the right bank, while another corps of the same strength watched the movements of the Catalan army. One division Suchet had left in Arragon, where the regular force opposed to it had almost disappeared in the incapable hands of D. Francisco Palafox. He had as little to apprehend on the side of Valencia; neither men nor means were wanting in that populous and wealthy province, but there prevailed a narrow provincial spirit, and General Caro remained inactive when an opportunity was presented of compelling the French, who were on the right bank, to retire, or of cutting them off. The other part of the besieging army was not left in like manner unmolested, for O'Donell had by this time recovered from his wound, and resumed the command.

On the 4th of July the enemy appeared on the right bank, and occupied the suburbs of Jesus and Las Roquetas; they took possession also of the country-houses which were near the city on that side, but not without resistance. On the 8th they attacked the *tete-du-pont*, expecting to carry it by a sudden and vigorous attempt; they were repulsed, renewed the attempt at midnight, were again repulsed, and a few hours afterwards failed in a third attack. They were now satisfied that Tortosa was not to be won without the time and labour of a regular siege. They had seen also a manifestation of that same spirit which had been so virtuously displayed at Zaragoza and Gerona. For the Tortosan women had passed and repassed the bridge during the heat of action, regardless of danger, bearing refreshments and stores to the soldiers; two who were wounded in this service were rewarded with medals and with a pension. They enrolled themselves in companies to attend upon the wounded, whether in the

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1810.

July.*The enemy
appear be-
fore the
place.*

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1810.

July.

hospitals or in private houses. There was one woman who during the whole siege carried water and cordials to the troops at the points of attack, and frequently went out with them in their sallies; the people called her La Titaya, and she was made a serjeant for her services. The men also formed themselves into companies, and it was evident what might be expected from the inhabitants, if their governor should prove worthy of the charge committed to him. Velasco, who held the command till the Conde de Alache should arrive, was incapacitated by illness for any exertion. The garrison, encouraged by their success in repelling the enemy, made a sally on the 10th with more courage than prudence, and lost about 100 men; the next day the French began their regular approaches.

*O'Donell
visits the
city.*

O'Donell's first care upon resuming the command of the army was to strengthen Tortosa and provide it against the siege, which if he could not prevent he would use every exertion to impede and frustrate. Lili arrived there in the middle of July, and a convoy of provisions with him: Velasco then left the place, and retired to Tarragona, broken in health. Stores and men were introduced till the magazines were fully replenished, and the garrison amounted to 8000 effective men. On the night of the 21st the enemy made another attack upon the tete-du-pont, as unsuccessfully as before. Some days afterwards O'Donell came there to inspect the place; he thanked the inhabitants for the good-will which they were manifesting, and the readiness with which they had cut down their fruit-trees and demolished their villas in the adjoining country, sacrificing every thing cheerfully to the national cause. He directed also a sally, which was made with good effect, some of the enemy's works being destroyed: Lili was present in this affair, and was wounded. Having seen that every thing was in order here, and promised well, the general returned to his army.

Aug. 3.

But O'Donell deriving no support from either of the neighbouring provinces, had on the one hand to impede Suchet's operations, and on the other to act against Macdonald. Before that Marshal could take any measures in aid of the besieging army, he had to introduce a convoy into Barcelona. Having effected this object, and baffled the force which endeavoured to prevent it, he moved upon the Ebro; by this movement O'Donell was compelled to withdraw the division which kept in check the French corps upon the left bank; and Suchet, seizing the opportunity, passed that corps across the river, and advanced against the Valencian army, with which Caro had at last taken the field, . . . only to make a precipitate retreat when it was thus attacked, and leave the enemy without any interruption from that side. Macdonald meantime easily overcoming the little resistance that could be interposed entered the plain of Tarragona, and took a position at Reus, with his whole disposable force, raising contributions in money and every kind of stores upon that unhappy town, while his troops pillaged the surrounding country. Tarragona was at this time but weakly garrisoned, and some apprehension was entertained that it might be his intention to lay siege to it. Campoverde's division, therefore, was immediately removed thither from Falset, and O'Donell himself entered the place, and occupied the height of Oliva and the village of La Canonja, endeavouring by activity and display to make the most of his insufficient force. Before daybreak this latter post was attacked by the French in strength, . . . the Spaniards fell back till O'Donell came to their support; he supposed the enemy's object was to reconnoitre the place, and this he was desirous to prevent. Captain Buller, in the *Volontaire* frigate, was near enough distinctly to hear and see the firing; immediately he sent his launch and barge with some carronades in shore, and anchored the ship with springs in four fathoms water, to support

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1810.

August.*Macdonald
enters the
plain of
Tarragona.**Aug. 21.**Affair near
Tarragona.*

CHAP. the boats, and act as circumstances might require. These boats
 XXXIII. acted with great effect upon the right flank of the French; and
 1810. the frigate bringing its guns to bear upon the enemy's cavalry,
August. which was forming upon a rising ground, dislodged them; so
 that they retreated to their position with the loss of about an
 hundred and fifty men. On the same day Captain Fane, in the
 Cambrian frigate, and some Spanish boats, performed a like
 service at Salou, driving from thence, with the loss of some forty
 men, a detachment of the enemy who had gone thither to plunder
 the place. On the fourth day after this affair the French re-
 treated, leaving 700 sick and wounded in the hospital at Reus,
 and 200 at Valls. Their rearguard was overtaken in the town of
 Momblanch, and the plunder which they had collected there was
 recovered: but a Spanish general was put under arrest for not
 having improved the advantage which he had gained. They
 suffered also a considerable loss by desertion. Nearly 300 Ita-
 lians deserted from Reus, and 400 more during the expedition.

*Macdonald
retires.
Aug. 25.*

*O'Donell
surprises
the enemy
at La Bis-
bal.*

Suchet with 3000 men had moved down upon Momblanch, to cover a retreat which was not made without danger. This movement left Tortosa for a while free of access, and large supplies were promptly introduced. Macdonald now took a position near Cervera, as a central point, from whence he could cover the besieging army before Tortosa, and threaten the rear of the Spaniards upon the Llobregat, and where he could occupy an extent of country capable of supplying him with provisions. But this afforded opportunity to O'Donell for renewing that system of warfare which he had carried on successfully against Augereau. He embarked a small detachment at Tarragona, provided with artillery, which sailed under convoy of a small Spanish squadron and of the Cambrian frigate. On the 6th of September he put himself at the head of a division at Villafranca, having directed the movements of his troops so as to make the French infer that

it was his intention to interpose between them and Barcelona. Leaving Campoverde to throw up works near La Baguda, and secure that pass, he proceeded to Esparraguera: from thence he reconnoitred El Bruch and Casamasanes, and leaving Eroles to guard that position, ordered Brigadier Georget to take post at Mombuy, close by Igualada, and Camp-Marshal Obispo to advance by a forced march from Momblanch, and place himself upon the heights to the right and left of Martorell. This was on the 9th: that same night he ordered Campoverde to march the following morning and join him at S. Culgat del Valles, sending a battalion to reinforce Georget, but letting no one know his destination. The whole division reached Mataro on the 10th, Pineda on the following day; from thence a party under the Colonel of Engineers, D. Honorato de Fleyres, was dispatched to take post at the *Ermida* of S. Grau, while O'Donell proceeded to Tordera. Before he left Pineda he received intelligence that the squadron had commenced its operations auspiciously. Doyle had landed at Bagur, taken forty-two prisoners there, and with the assistance of the Cambrian's boats destroyed the battery and carried off the guns. Being now about to leave the garrison of Hostalrich in his rear, O'Donell sent off a detachment towards that fort, and another toward Gerona, that they might lead the French in both places to suppose he was reconnoitring with a view to invest them. On the 13th he reached the village of Vidreras, falling in on the way thither with an howitzer and a field-piece which had been landed for him at Calella. At Vidreras the two last detachments which he had sent off rejoined him, having performed their service with great success, the one party bringing off nine prisoners from the suburbs of Hostalrich, whom they had taken in the houses there, the other eleven from under the walls of Gerona.

This long movement had been undertaken in the hope of

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.
September.

CHAP. cutting off the French who occupied S. Feliu de Guixols, Pa-
XXXIII. lamos, and La Bisbal. The larger force was at La Bisbal under
1810. General Schwartz; and that he might have no opportunity to
September. reinforce the two weaker points, it was O'Donell's intention to
attack him there, at the same time that Fleyres, dividing his de-
tachment, should attack both the other garrisons. From Vi-
dreras to La Bisbal is a distance which in that country, where
distances are measured by time, is computed at eight hours, the
foot-pace of an able-bodied man averaging usually four miles in
the hour; but at this time much depended on celerity. At day-
break on the 14th he renewed his march with the cavalry regi-
ment of Numancia, sixty hussars, and an hundred volunteer in-
fantry, who thought themselves capable of keeping up with the
horse. The regiment of Iliberia followed at a less exhausting
pace; and the rest of the division, under Campoverde, went by
way of Llagostera to post itself in the valley of Aro, as a body
of reserve, and cut off the enemy in case they should retire from
the points which they occupied. O'Donell proceeded so ra-
pidly that he performed the usual journey of eight hours in little
more than four, the infantry keeping up with the horse at a brisk
trot the whole time. As soon as they reached La Bisbal, Bri-
gadier Sanjuan, with the cavalry, occupied all the avenues of
the town, to prevent the enemy, who upon their appearance had
retired into an old castle, from escaping; some cuirassiers who
were patrolling were made prisoners; the Spanish infantry took
possession of the houses near the castle, and from thence and
from the church tower fired upon it. They rung the Somaten,
and the peasants who were within hearing came to join them.
O'Donell perceiving that musketry was of little avail, and that
Schwartz did not surrender at his summons, resolved to set
fire to the gates; but in reconnoitring the castle with this ob-
ject, he received a musket-ball in the leg, the sixteenth which

had struck him in the course of this war. Just at this time a detachment of an hundred foot, with two-and-thirty cuirassiers, came from the side of Torruella to aid the garrison. Sanjuan charged them with his reserve; the cuirassiers fled toward Gerona, all the infantry were taken, and a convoy of provisions with its escort fell into the hands of the Spaniards. The regiment of Iliberia, quickening its march when it heard the firing, now came up; at nightfall the enemy were a second time summoned, and Schwartz, seeing no means of escape, was then glad to have the honours of war granted him, upon surrendering with his whole party, consisting of 650 men and 42 officers.

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.
September.

Fleyres meantime leaving S. Grau at two on the morning of the same day, divided his force, and directed Lieutenant-Colonel D. Tadeo Aldea, with 300 foot and 20 horse, against Palamos, while he with the same number of horse and 250 foot proceeded against S. Feliu de Guixols; 150 men being left as a reserve for both parties upon the heights on the road to Zeroles. Both were successful. The Spaniards were not discovered as they approached S. Feliu till they were within pistol-shot of the sentinel; and the enemy, after a brisk but short resistance, surrendered when they were offered honourable treatment in O'Donell's name. Thirty-six were killed and wounded here; 270 men and eight officers laid down their arms. At Palamos the enemy had batteries which they defended; but there the squadron co-operated, and after the loss of threescore men, 255, with seven officers, surrendered. Seventy more were taken on the following day in the Castle of Calonge. The result of this well-planned and singularly fortunate expedition, which succeeded in its full extent at every point, was the capture of one general, two colonels, threescore inferior officers, more than 1200 men, seventeen pieces of artillery, magazines and stores, and the destruction of every battery, fort, or house which the enemy

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1810.

September.

*The ene-
mies' bat-
teries on
the coast
destroyed.*

had fortified upon the coast as far as the Bay of Rosas. The British seamen and marines had exerted themselves with their characteristic activity and good-will on this occasion; and Captain Fane, though suffering under severe indisposition at the time, had landed with Doyle, and put himself forwards wherever most was to be done. O'Donell, to mark the sense which was entertained of their services, ordered a medal to be struck for the officers and crew, with appropriate * inscriptions.

The Spaniards had only ten men killed and twenty-three wounded; but O'Donell was disabled by his wound, and a General who had displayed so much ability, and in whose fortune the soldiers had acquired confidence, could ill be spared. The system of maritime enterprise which had been thus well commenced was actively pursued. Upon General Doyle's representation it was resolved to attack the batteries which the enemy had erected upon the coast between Barcelona and Tarragona, and by means of which, with few men, they kept the maritime towns in subjection; they were placed always in commanding situations, . . . boats with supplies lay at anchor under them all day, in safety from the cruisers, and under cover of the night crept along shore toward their destination. Doyle embarked for this service, and with the aid of Captain Buller, in the *Volontaire*, effectually performed it, destroying every battery, and carrying off the artillery and stores. The same service was performed a second time upon the coast between Mataro and Rosas, where the enemy had re-occupied stations; the batteries were again destroyed, their coasters taken, and the Spanish Lieutenant-Colonel O'Ronan, who embarked in the *Volontaire* with authority from the

* On the one side *La España reconocida a la intrepidez Britanica*, on the other *Alianza eterna*.

provincial government, collected the imposts and levied contributions upon those persons who traded with France, or were known partizans of the French. He had the boldness to enter the town of Figueras with twenty-five men, and draw rations for them in sight of the enemy's garrison; but in this cruise the *Volontaire* suffered so much in a gale of wind, that it was necessary to make for Port Mahon.

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.
October.

The British ships rendered essential service to the Catalans at this time, and were at all times useful in keeping up their hopes, and rendering it more difficult for the enemy to obtain supplies. The spirit of the people was invincible; and under such leaders as Manso, and Rovira, and Eroles, they were so successful in desultory warfare, that a land convoy for Barcelona required an army for its escort, and the French government was informed, that precarious as the supply by sea was, they must mainly trust to it. Indeed no inconsiderable part of the provisions which were sent by sea found its way to Barcelona after it had fallen into the hands of the British squadron. The cargoes were sold by the captors at Villa Nova, where there were persons ready to purchase them at any * price: . . . these persons were agents for the enemy; and when the magazines were full, a detachment came from Barcelona and convoyed the stores safely to that city, which is not twenty miles distant. The indulgence also which was intended for the Spaniards in Barcelona, in allowing their fishing-boats to come without the mole, was turned to the advantage of the garrison. There were about 150 of these boats, and upon every opportunity they received provisions and

*Captured
provisions
purchased
for the
French in
Barcelona.*

* They gave four dollars for the measure of rice (for example), which at Port Mahon would have produced only half a dollar.

CHAP. stores*, which they carried in for some time without being
XXXIII. suspected.

1810.

October.

*Lili's pre-
parations
for defence.*

Sept. 7.

Suchet meantime could make no progress in the siege of Tortosa; though the Valencians left him undisturbed on their side, he could undertake no serious operations till the other part of his army could be brought down to complete the investment of the place, and till Macdonald should be in a situation to cover the besieging force, which that General could not do till he received reinforcements, his strength being wasted by the losses which he was continually suffering in detail, and by the numerous desertions which took place. Doyle's address to the foreigners in the French service, in their respective languages, had produced no inconsiderable effect; copies of it were fired from the town in shells, and by that means scattered among the besiegers. As soon as it was known that the enemy's heavy guns had arrived at Xerta, Lili issued a proclamation to the inhabitants, requesting that all who were not able to take arms and bear an active part in its defence would withdraw, while a way was yet open; the place, he said, had no shelter for them when it should be bombarded, nor could provisions be afforded them. But the invaders, he added, deceived themselves if they supposed that his constancy was to be shaken by the fears and lamentations of old men and children and of a few women, or if they expected to find another Lerida in Catalonia; for he and his garrison had sworn, and he now repeated the vow, that Tortosa should not be yielded up till it had surpassed, if that were

* When this practice was discovered, and some of them searched in consequence, a mortar was found in one of them. These boats had forfeited all claim to indulgence, in the first year of the war, when they boarded a British prize, and carried her in.

possible, the measure of resistance at Zaragoza and Gerona. He issued an order also that as soon as the first gun should be discharged against the place, the door of every house should be open day and night, and vessels of water kept there in readiness for extinguishing fires, . . . and lights during the night.

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.
October.

Buonaparte's birthday recurred about this time, and the French general sent a letter into the city, informing the governor that it would be celebrated in due form with a discharge of cannon. Lili corresponded to this courtesy by sending a similar communication on the eve of Ferdinand's anniversary; at the same time he sent the official notice which had reached him that the yellow fever had broken out in certain ports of the Mediterranean, and that some ships were infected with it: this information, he said, was given as humanity required, in order that the enemy might take all possible precautions against the contagion in those parts of the country which were occupied by their troops. The holiday was observed with its usual solemnities and pageants, as if there had been no hostile encampment without the walls: in the morning there was service in the churches; in the afternoon the holy girdle, a relic of which Tortosa boasted, was carried in procession, a masque of giants going before it, accompanied by persons performing a provincial sword-dance, and followed by all the corporate bodies, civil and ecclesiastical, and by the military, with music, and banners displayed. Bull-fights with young animals who were neither tortured with fire-works (as is the manner in the serious exhibitions of that execrable sport) nor slaughtered, were held in the streets, and the day concluded with a ball, a banquet, and an illumination.

*Ferdinand's
birthday ce-
lebrated in
Tortosa.*

Oct. 14.

The next communication of Lili to the French general was not received so courteously by Harispe, who at that time was left in command of the besieging army. The Spaniards sent him copies of the decree issued by the Regency in consequence of

*Conduct of
the French
general con-
cerning
Marshal
Soul's de-
cree.
See vol. ii.
p. 699.*

CHAP. Soult's infamous edict against the Spanish armies, both edicts
XXXIII. being printed on one sheet, in parallel columns; Lili sent them
1810. with a flag of truce, saying it was his duty to put the French
October. general and his commander-in-chief in possession of this royal
decree. Harispe replied, that he should always receive the
Spanish commander's messengers with pleasure, when they were
the bearers of decent and useful communications; but in the
present instance he must detain them prisoners of war, inasmuch
as they seemed to have no other object than that of scattering
satirical writings. If this reply had not been accompanied by
an act in violation of the laws of war, it would have been sa-
tisfactory to the Spaniards; for the French general could not
more plainly have shown the opinion which he entertained of
Marshal Soult's decree, than by thus affecting to believe that it
was spurious. The besieging army, however, had given some
examples of that merciless system upon which the intrusive go-
vernment required its generals to act; . . . for the bodies of some
peasants were taken out of the river, with many bayonet wounds
about them, and their hands tied: they were interred in the city,
where the circumstance and the solemnity made a strong im-
pression upon the people. There was a Piemontese, who, having
resided more than twenty years in Tortosa, went over to the
French, and rendered them all the service which his know-
ledge of the place and the country enabled him to perform.
This treason on the part of a naturalized foreigner excited a
strong desire for vengeance; some peasants watched his move-
ments, laid wait for him, surprised him, and carried him prisoner
into the city, where he was tried, and condemned to be shot in
the back, under the gallows; that mode and place of death being
chosen as the most ignominious, there being no hangman there.
The besieged were gratified by another act of vengeance. An
officer in the French army, before the serious business of the

siege began, amused * himself, from a favourable station, with bringing down such individuals as came within reach of his gun. At length a deserter gave information that this unseen marksman's stand was in a house called *la Casilla Blanca*, upon which the commandant of artillery, D. Francisco Arnau, went with his piece to a good station on the bank of the river, and getting aim at him while he was engaged in his murderous sport, had the satisfaction of seeing him fall.

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1810.

October.

Though the enemy had established two bridges with a tete-du-pont to each between Mequinenza and Tortosa, they had not been able to render the passage of the river secure. Their boats were sometimes intercepted and sometimes sunk; and everywhere a system of war was carried on by which the armies of Macdonald and Suchet were so harassed, that the operations of the siege were impeded during five months. Some brilliant achievements were performed in the Ampurdan by Baron Eroles, an officer who rendered himself so obnoxious to the enemy by the activity and success with which he discharged his duty to his country, that there was an order in the French army to hang him as soon as he should fall into their hands. The German troops in Catalonia had at this time been reduced by deaths, captures, and desertions, to such a state of inefficiency, that the few survivors were permitted to leave Spain, and stationed on the south coast of France; there, in the enjoyment of rest and a benign climate, to recruit their broken health, before they returned to their respective countries. Some troops only were left in the garrisons of Lerida and Barcelona, . . the remainder, a few hundreds only of as many thousands, gladly departed from a country in which they had committed and suffered so many

*Successes of
Eroles.*

* *Se preciaba de buen tirador, y se divertia en esto.* Diario de Tortosa.

CHAP. evils. Their place in the Ampurdan was supplied by a rein-
XXXIII. forcement of 5000 French, under General Clement ; the new ge-
1810. neral, to signalize his entrance, entered Olot with 3000 men,
December. and got possession of the stores which were deposited there,
Dec. 6. with which, and with the spoils of the town, he departed early
on the second day, having thus far successfully effected his pur-
pose. Eroles was at Tornadis at this time, where he had col-
lected his troops ; and they were receiving their rations when
intelligence was brought him that the enemy had left Olot, and
were on their way to Castellfullit. A cry arose from the Cata-
lans that they did not want their bread and their brandy then ;
what they wanted was cartridges, and to kill the French. The
men knew their commander, and he knew his people, for what
kind of service they were fit, and how surely they might be relied
on in that service. The enemy had had two hours' start, but they
were impeded with artillery and plunder, and apprehending
no danger, had made no speed : the Catalans had the desire of
vengeance to quicken them, and performing in less than an hour
and half what is estimated at a three hours' journey, they came
up with the rearguard at Castellfullit, attacked and routed
it. The French rallied, took a position on the plain of Polligé,
where they were protected by the cavalry and their guns, and
thus awaited for Eroles to attack them. His dispositions, how-
ever, as soon as he had reconnoitred the ground, were made for
turning both their flanks ; and when to prevent this they at-
tacked his centre, their cavalry were repulsed, the attempt wholly
failed, and they retreated to another position near S. Jayme.
From thence they were driven, and fell back upon a battalion
which had now formed in the plain of Argalaguer, and were pro-
tected by the buildings in that village ; but supposing the few
horse which Eroles then brought forward to be part of a greater
force, Clement withdrew his men to a near wood, on the other

side of a stream. Encouraged by success, the Catalans attacked them there also, drove them successively from thence and from Besalu, and did not give up the pursuit till night closed. In this affair Clement lost more than a thousand men, the Spaniards twenty-five killed and fifty wounded: scarcely any prisoners were taken; the French were persuaded that no quarter would be given, and in that persuasion some had run upon the bayonets of the Spaniards, and some had thrown themselves down a precipice near Castellfullit. The whole detachment would have been destroyed if Eroles had had his cavalry, but they had been detached before he knew of the enemy's movements, and the utmost exertions did not suffice to bring them up in time. The Baron observed with satisfaction, in his dispatches, that they had been favoured with this victory by the patroness of Spain, on the * festival of whose conception it had been won.

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.
December.

Such, indeed, was the spirit which the French found in Catalonia, and such the exasperated temper on their part which this unexpected and brave resistance had occasioned, that they said it would be necessary to exterminate one-half the Catalans in order to intimidate the other. They found a similar spirit in Aragon; but there the country had not the same natural strength, nor was there a single fortress to afford protection to the people. The army, however, under D. Joze Maria Carvajal, was again in activity; and though, owing to the incapacity of their commanders in the first years of the war, and the want of means in the utter destitution wherein it was afterwards left, it was never fortunate enough to perform any splendid or signal service, it

* Major Von Staffe (340-2) dates this affair in November, instead of the following month. If there could be any doubt between his authority and that of Eroles's dispatch, this circumstance would determine it.

CHAP. deserved this praise, that for patience and constancy under the
 XXXIII. most trying circumstances, this of all the Spanish armies was
 1810. that which during the contest deserved most highly of its country.

*Edict
 against the
 Junta of
 Aragon.*

The severest means were used to intimidate the Aragonese, but in vain. Suchet, as governor-general of that kingdom for the intrusive government, published a decree, saying, it had come to his knowledge that a set of senseless men, who had the ridiculous audacity to style themselves the Junta of Aragon, had fixed themselves in the village of Manzanera, from whence they endeavoured to disturb the tranquillity of the Aragonese, by their incendiary libels, and despotically took possession of the public revenues and stores: he gave orders, therefore, that they should be pursued, delivered over to a military tribunal, and be sentenced within twenty-four hours: that the people of Manzanera, or of any other place to which they might betake themselves, should drive them out, or, failing so to do, receive an exemplary punishment, the Ayuntamiento and the parochial priest being responsible in their goods and persons for the behaviour of the inhabitants in this point: every place which received them was to be punished irremissibly, and the authorities to suffer ignominious death by the gallows. The Junta of Aragon, to show how they regarded this decree, printed it in their own Gazette, well knowing that nothing could contribute more to keep up that feeling in the nation which it was their duty to encourage and to direct. They called attention also to the important circumstance, that this decree was issued not in the name of Joseph the Intruder, but in that of the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, of whose intention to include Spain, if he could, among the states subjected to him, no equivocal indication was here afforded. The intrusive government, however deceitful in its promises, was always sincere in its threats. Of this every province had abundant proofs, and none more than

that in which Suchet commanded. The city of Molina de Aragon in an especial manner provoked the vengeance of the invaders by the disposition which the inhabitants manifested, who, as often as the French entered it, took refuge in the woods and mountains: the enemy at length set fire to it on all sides, and three parts of the city were consumed. But acts of this kind, which proved the intention of the invaders to reduce Spain to a desert rather than leave it unsubdued, served only to confirm the Spaniards in that resolution which rendered their subjugation impossible.

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.

*Molina de
Aragon
burnt by the
French.
Nov. 1.*

While Carvajal impeded Suchet's operations from the side of Aragon, some efforts were made from Valencia; a province where, with ample means, little exertion had been found, and less ability to direct it. The Regency relied upon the unexhausted resources which existed there, believing that if the Valencian force were well employed, even though it should not undertake any grand operations, Tortosa could not be taken by less than 30,000 men. But when Bassecourt arrived to take the command there, he found the army in a miserable condition both as to equipments and discipline, which might have made him hopeless of success in any other warfare than that desultory one, wherein inexperienced troops may be trusted, and in which nothing is lost if they find or fancy it necessary to disperse and provide every man for his own safety. Some field-pieces had been sent from Valencia to the army of Aragon: the French obtained intelligence of this, and a strong detachment under the Polish General Chlopisky entered Teruel to intercept this artillery, when General Villacampa, for whom it was intended, was at Alfambra, six hours distant: . . . the officer in charge of the guns endeavoured to retreat with them, but was pursued and overtaken at Alventosa, and the whole fell into the enemy's hands. After this success Chlopisky sought to inflict another

*Bassecourt
takes the
command in
Valencia.*

Oct. 31.

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1810.

November.

Nov. 12.

Defeat of
the Valen-
cians at
Ulldecona.

Nov. 26.

blow upon Villacampa's division, and an affair took place between Villel and La Fuensanta, which the Spaniards considered as a victory on their part, because, though compelled to retire from the ground, they had not been pursued, nor had any dispersion taken place. Somewhat better fortune attended a maritime expedition from Peñiscola, which was planned by General Doyle and executed by his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel San Martin; by this force the strong tower of S. Juan, which commanded the Puerto de los Alfaques, was surprised, and immediately garrisoned and stored; and thus the enemy were deprived of a port in which their corsairs and coasters found protection. A land expedition, undertaken at the same time in the hope of cutting off a French detachment at Trayguera, failed altogether; the French had withdrawn in time, and receiving a timely reinforcement, compelled the Spaniards in their turn to retreat. No loss was sustained in this attempt. General Bassecourt was less fortunate in an enterprise of greater moment; he projected an attack upon Suchet's army, which, if it succeeded, should have the effect of breaking up the siege; . . this general had not yet learnt how little either his men or officers were to be relied on in any combined or extensive operations; in full expectation * that every thing would be executed as exactly as it had been planned, he left Peñiscola at night, put himself at the head of his central division, and reaching the bridge over the Servol, beyond Vinaroz, halted there to give time for the movements of his right, under Brigadier Porta,

* *No era imaginable frustrase mis calculos, atendida la circumspeccion con que se formaron, la exactitud de los datos, y el valor de las tropas; pero casualidades funestas, que no pueden entrar en la prevision de un gefe superior, que fia una parte de sus esperanzas á la suerte, y á manos subalternos, hicieron inutilis mis tareas.* Thus he expresses himself in his official dispatch.

which took the road of Alcanar. Having, as he supposed, allowed a sufficient interval for this, he proceeded towards Ulldecona, and halted a little before five in the morning at a place called Hereu. Here he inspected his troops, and promised them a speedy triumph, when a messenger arrived from Porta, requesting that the signal for attack might be delayed, inasmuch as his division had not been able to get forward with the speed which they had calculated on. Bassecourt waited impatiently a full hour till day began to break; then, as success depended in great measure upon surprising the enemy, he sent his advanced parties forward to attack the French outposts, and directed his cavalry to gallop into the town as soon as the gun should be fired and the rocket discharged that were the signal for attack. General Musnier's division was quartered here; Bassecourt's made three attempts to force its position, but not hearing any firing either to the right or left, he perceived that on both sides his combinations had failed, and deemed it therefore necessary to retreat. He succeeded in reaching Vinaroz, . . . there Porta joined him with the right column; there he halted to give the harassed troops some rest, and to obtain some intelligence of his left; . . . and there the enemy surprised him. The men instantly took to flight, and all that his personal exertions could effect, was to keep a few of the better soldiers together, and, under protection of his cavalry, reach Peñiscola with them.

The disgrace of this affair was greater than the loss, which the French estimated at 3000 men. They were more elated by an advantage which they obtained shortly afterwards against an enemy over whom it was seldom that they had any real success to boast. The boats of the English squadron attacked a convoy of eleven vessels laden with provisions for Barcelona, and lying in Palamos Bay, the French having re-occupied that town. The batteries which protected them were destroyed, the maga-

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.
November.

*Captain
Fane taken
at Palamos.*

Dec. 13.

CHAP. zines blown up, two of the vessels brought out, and the rest
 XXXIII. burnt, . . and our men, having completely effected their object,
 1810. were retiring carelessly, when two Dutchmen, who were in the
December. British service, went over to the enemy, and told them that the
 sailors had but three rounds of ammunition left. The French
 were at this time joined by a party from S. Feliu, and the
 English, instead of retreating to the beach, where the ships
 might have covered their embarkation, took their way toward
 the mole, through the town, not knowing that it had been re-
 occupied. The boats made instantly to their assistance, and
 suffered severely in bringing them off, the loss amounting to
 thirty-three killed, eighty-nine wounded, and eighty-six pri-
 soners, Captain Fane among the latter. The enemy behaved
 with great inhumanity in this affair; they butchered some poor
 fellows who had stopped in the town and made themselves de-
 fenceless by drunkenness; . . and they continued to fire upon a
 boat after all its oars were shot away, in which a midshipman
 was hoisting a white handkerchief upon his sword, as the only
 signal that could be made of surrendering, till of one-and-
 twenty persons who could neither fight* nor fly, all but two
 were wounded, . . when another boat came to their assistance,
 and towed them off.

*Trenches
 opened be-
 fore Tor-
 tosa.
 Dec. 15.*

Macdonald now, whose army had been reinforced, took a
 position at Perillo and at Mora, to cover the siege against any
 interruption on the side of Tarragona, the only quarter from
 whence an effort in aid of Tortosa could be apprehended; and

* The French officers who went on board the frigate after this affair to propose
 an exchange walked along the main deck, where some of the wounded were lying
 between the guns for the sake of the air, and with a spirit perfectly worthy of the
 cause in which they were engaged, and the character they had acquired in it, asked
 them insultingly when they would be pleased to pay them another visit on shore!

Suchet, secure from all farther attempts either from Valencia or Aragon, passed twelve battalions across the river at Xerta to the left bank, and in one day completed the investment of the place. The besiegers had great difficulties to overcome, the soil being every where rocky, ... so that the engineers were obliged to form parapets and sacks of earth, and in many places to work their way in the trenches by means of gunpowder. The trenches were opened on the night of December 20; and the siege from that hour was carried on with an alacrity and skill in which the French are never wanting. On the twelfth night the enemy had established themselves at the bottom of the ditch; they had then bombarded the city for four days, ... two days they had been engaged in mining, and there were three breaches in the body of the place: but there were nearly 8000 troops within the walls; there was a brave and willing people, and there were the examples of Zaragoza and Gerona. They were in no danger of famine, for the place had been abundantly provided; there was no want of military stores, and the besieging army did not exceed 10,000 men.

Meantime O'Donell had concerted a bold and hopeful enterprise for its relief. He knew that there were provisions and ammunition sufficient for two months' consumption in the city; he had full reliance upon the disposition of the people, and the whole conduct both of the garrison and the governor from the time that the enemy appeared before the walls had given him reason to confide in both. With his own force he was aware that nothing could be done against the besieging army, covered as it was by Macdonald; but he proposed that Bassecourt should supply 3000 foot and 500 horse from the Valencian army; that the central army should detach 4000 foot and 200 horse; that these should unite under Carvajal with such forces as Aragon could furnish, make demonstration upon the Ebro as if their in-

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.
December.

*O'Donell's
plan for re-
lieving the
place.*

CHAP. XXXIII. 1810. December. attention was to succour Tortosa, but there turn off from the most convenient point, and by forced marches proceed to Zaragoza, whither O'Donell would at the same time detach 4000 foot and 400 horse by way of Barbastro. It was believed that the French at this juncture had not more than 4000 men in the whole of Aragon, and the garrison of Zaragoza consisted almost wholly of convalescents and invalids. Bassecourt assented heartily to this well-devised plan; from the central army a refusal was returned, .. perhaps it could not then have mustered even the small force that was required from it; but upon receiving this reply Bassecourt dispatched an officer to the Empecinado, and that intrepid and excellent partisan cheerfully engaged to co-operate. Carvajal held himself in readiness; and at no moment during the war was it so probable that a great success might be obtained with little hazard. For it was not doubted that Suchet would precipitately break up the siege of Tortosa, rather than allow the Spaniards time to strengthen themselves in Zaragoza; that they could enter it was certain, .. and no other possible event could have diffused such joy throughout all Spain. All arrangements having been concluded between the Empecinado, Carvajal, and Bassecourt, O'Donell's aid-de-camp, who waited for this at Valencia, set off instantly for Tarragona by sea; contrary winds delayed him a little while on the passage, .. and he arrived a few hours after the commander-in-chief had received intelligence that Lili had surrendered at discretion.

*Tortosa
surrendered.
1811.
Jan. 2.*

*Sentence on
the Go-
vernors for
surrender-
ing it.*

There was no treason here, as there had been at Lerida, but there was a want of honour, of principle, and of virtue. Seven thousand eight hundred men, not pressed by famine, not debilitated by disease, with a brave and willing population to have supported them, laid down their arms and surrendered at discretion to ten thousand French. The enemy indeed affirmed that the garrison could not have continued the defence an hour

longer without being put to the sword: the people of Spain thought otherwise; they remembered Palafox and Alvarez; they remembered that at Gerona a French army, not inferior to this of Suchet's in number, lay ten whole weeks in sight of an open breach which they did not venture to assault a second time, though it was defended only by half-starved men, who would have come from the hospitals to take their stand there. They remembered this, and therefore they thought that the governor who under such circumstances had hung out the white flag, ought himself to have been hung over the walls. Accordingly sentence of death was pronounced in Tarragona against the Conde de Alache for having, it was said, infamously surrendered a city which he ought to have defended till the last extremity; and his effigy was beheaded there in the market-place.

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.

The fortress at Col de Balaguer, which commanded a strong pass about half way between Tortosa and Tarragona, was yielded a few days after Lili's surrender, by the treachery or cowardice of the men entrusted with its defence. Tarragona was now the only strong place that remained to the Catalans; it had been the seat of government since the fall of Mequinenza, the Provincial Congress, which was to have assembled at Solsona, having then been summoned thither, as the only place of safety; now its land communication with Valencia and the rest of Spain was cut off; and Suchet immediately prepared to follow up his success by investing it, with less apprehension of any obstruction from the Catalan army, because the wound which O'Donell had received at La Bisbal compelled him at this time to retire to Majorca. The Marquis de Campoverde, being second in command, succeeded him. In O'Donell the Catalans lost a commander who had raised himself by his services, and whose conduct had justified the public opinion, in deference to which he had been promoted. But the spirit of the people was not shaken:

Col de Balaguer surrendered.

CHAP. they relied upon the strength of their country, even though
 XXXIII. the fortresses were lost, . . . upon their cause, and their own in-
 1810. vincible resolution ; and they lived in continual hope that some
 effectual assistance would be afforded by England to a province
 which so well deserved it. The little which had been given had
 been gratefully received, and it had shown also how much might
 and ought to have been done.

*Commodore
 Mends de-
 stroys the
 batteries on
 the north
 coast.*

Maritime co-operation of a similar kind had been carried
 into effect on the northern coast of Spain. About midsummer
 Commodore Mends of the *Arethusa* frigate consulted with the
 Junta of Asturias, who engaged to put what they called the
 armies of that province, and of the *Montañas de Santander*, in
 motion, if he would take Porlier and 500 men on board his
 squadron and beat up the enemy's sea-quarters. This it was
 deemed would draw the French troops toward the ports in their
 possession, calling them from the frontiers of Galicia, which they
 were then threatening, give the mountaineers opportunity to
 act with advantage, and favour the *Guerrillas* in Castille, whom
 the French were endeavouring to hunt down. The Commodore
 had no instructions for an expedition of this kind, but he saw
 that it offered a reasonable prospect of advantage, for if the
 Junta should fail in their part of the undertaking, or be disap-
 pointed in their hopes, he might nevertheless destroy the enemy's
 sea-defences, and cut off the supplies which they received coast-
 ways. Accordingly Porlier with his men embarked, and the
 squadron sailed from Ribadeo. The wind serving for Santona,
 they landed on the beach to the westward of that place. The
 garrison there, some 120 in number, retired with the loss of
 about thirty men ; and the French commander at S. Sebastian
 feared that it was their intention to establish themselves there,
 in a post which might easily have been rendered defensible,
 and would afford good anchorage during the prevalence of the

westerly gales upon that coast: the utmost efforts therefore were made to prevent this; and on the second day after the landing, from seven to eight hundred French attacked them on the isthmus. This body was repulsed with considerable loss; but finding that the enemy were collecting in greater force, the Commodore re-embarked his men on the following day, having destroyed the fortifications. Pursuing his object, he demolished all the batteries upon the coast between S. Sebastian's and Santander (those at Castro alone excepted), carried off or threw into the sea above an hundred pieces of heavy cannon, and laid that whole extent of coast bare of defence, without the loss of a single man; and having made about two hundred prisoners and taken on board three hundred volunteers, all for whom room could be found, the squadron returned to Coruña.

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1810.

The injury which had thus been done to the enemy was not easily remedied, because artillery could be carried only by sea to these places, the roads being so bad, and the country so mountainous, as to render the land carriage of heavy guns almost impossible. The people of the country were encouraged by the sight of their allies, and by hearing of a success which was reported every where, and every where exaggerated: and to profit by their disposition Porlier, who was one of the ablest partisans that this wild species of warfare produced, was again landed from the British squadron. The bay of Cuevas, between Llanes and Rivadesella, was chosen for the disembarkation, and arms and stores were landed with him, in large supply, and safely deposited, before he entered upon his operations. While this true Spaniard moved with rapidity from place to place, disappointing all the efforts of Bonnet to overpower him, surprising the enemy where they were weak, and eluding them where they were strong, it was determined by the Spanish government to avail themselves once more of the British squadron, and occupy

*Expedition
to Santona
under Re-
novales.*

CHAP. XXXIII.
 1810. Santona; and Renovales, who had now the rank of Camp-Marshal, was sent from Cadiz to Coruña, to command the force appointed for this service. It consisted of 1200 Spanish and 800 English troops, four English frigates and one Spanish, three smaller ships of war, with twenty-eight transports of all sizes. Part of the plan was, that he should co-operate with Porlier in an attack upon the French at Gijon, 600 in number. Porlier and Brigadier Castañon collected their forces at Cezoso, and were on the heights in sight of Gijon when the squadron appeared; the enemy, after some skirmishing, withdrew from the town when they saw that Renovales was disembarking; the plunder which they endeavoured to carry with them was taken in their flight, the stores from the arsenal were put on board the Spanish transports, and the guns thrown into the sea. Before General Bonnet could collect a force to bring against the Spaniards the object had been effected; and when he arrived, and thought to have surprised Porlier by a night attack, the Asturians had retreated to Cezoso, and he found only the fires which they had kindled in their encampment for the purpose of deceiving him.

Oct. 16.

Nov. 2.

The weather which had delayed the ships on their way to Gijon became more unfavourable after their departure from that place; and though they reached Santona, and remained five days at anchor there, it was impossible to land; the Spanish gun-boats suffered so much that it was necessary to take out the crews and destroy the vessels. To remain there was impossible, and it was deemed a fortunate deliverance when the expedition got into the port of Vivero. While they were laying there the wind recommenced, a heavy sea from the N.N.E. drove right into this insecure harbour, and in the violence of the storm the Spanish frigate parted from its cable and driving on board the Narcissus frigate completely dismasted it. The masts of the

Spanish ship were left standing, so that it was driven clear ; otherwise both must have perished, not having any other anchors to let go. Owing to the darkness and the tempest, it was impossible to afford any relief: the Spanish frigate was thrown upon the sand at the head of the harbour; when day broke, the beach appeared strewn with the wreck, and of nearly 500 souls on board, there were but two survivors. This was the fate of the Magdalena: the Spanish brig Palomo was wrecked at the same time, only the captain and nine men escaped out of two hundred; and some of the other vessels also were lost during the same dreadful night. The Estrago gun-boat had parted some little time before from an English brig which had taken it in tow, and with great difficulty made the coast at Bermeo. Seeing that the French were there, the Commander, Lieutenant Aguiar y Mella, preferred all hazards to the evil of falling into their hands, and proceeded along the coast to Mundaca, where a like danger awaited him. Standing off again, he took a desperate course, among shoals and islets; and escaping from shipwreck in a manner which excited his own wonder, anchored in the bay of Lanchove; where one of the crew swam to shore, and brought off a little boat, by means of which the men were just landed before their vessel went to pieces. Not knowing which way to bend their course, they past the night upon the mountains; and on the morrow, having been directed by a peasant, when they reached Sornoza, they learnt that forty of the enemy's cavalry were in pursuit of them. They kept together, however, and, choosing the most unfrequented ways, travelled by night, in that inclement season, by Uncaya and the mountains of Leon, Santander, and Burgos; till, at the end of five weeks, the Lieutenant brought his whole party safe to Ferrol, and presented himself, with them, to the Commandant of the marine; giving thus an example of fidelity and resolution, for which they were

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.
November.

*The Mag-
dalena
wrecked.*

CHAP. rewarded with a gratuity by the Government, and an honourable
XXXIII. mention in the Regency Gazette.

1810.

November.

*Expedition
under Lord
Blayney.*

*Mountains
of Ronda.*

*Ortiz de
Zarate.*

This expedition was frustrated by circumstances against which no human prudence could have provided. An enterprise of greater moment, on the south coast, was attempted about the same time, and failed from other causes, but mainly because the information upon which it was undertaken proved to be fallacious. The French had experienced less resistance in Andalusia than in any other part of Spain. They were, however, far from being unmolested there; and in the mountains of Ronda the national character was well displayed, by the incessant hostilities which the people carried on against their invaders. The man who struck the spark there had been Professor of Mathematics at Alicante; Don Andres Ortiz de Zarate was his name. In the early days of this dreadful revolution, he had taken an active part in the national cause, and afterwards was employed in service that required no slight degree of ability, by General Doyle; but perceiving from the mismanagement which prevailed in every department, civil or military, that the south of Spain would be overrun, as the north had been, he removed his family to Gibraltar, where, as a professional teacher, he could have supported them respectably, if he had not regarded the deliverance of his country more than his own concerns. But no sooner had the French taken possession of the kingdoms of Andalusia, than he obtained a supply of arms from the Governor of Gibraltar; and going among the villages, hamlets, and huts in the mountains of Ronda, roused a people who required only some moving spirit to put them in action: in the course of a fortnight 6000 men placed themselves under his orders. For himself he sought neither honours nor emolument; and when General Jacome y Ricardos, who was at that time Commandant at the Camp of St. Roque, would have obtained rank for him from

the Government, he declined it, saying, it would be time enough to receive the reward of his services when the country should be free. He soon became so popular among these mountaineers, that when he entered a town or village he was received with military honours, and the streets were decorated with hangings by day, and illuminated at night, as at the greatest festivals. This popularity might not have been obtained, if it had been necessary for him to levy contributions upon the people; but he commenced his operation in happy time, when the enemy had collected their first harvest of exactions, most or all of which fell into his hands, and was by him delivered over to the public service. The enemy, who had expected no such warfare, suffered severely in it; they lost some thousands, and *El Pastor*, as, for some unexplained reason, Ortiz de Zarate was then called, had become a celebrated name, when his career was impeded by some of those intrigues and jealousies which so frequently injured the national cause. He retired, in consequence, to Gibraltar, leaving General Valdenebro to command a people who were now no longer unanimous in any thing except their unabated hatred of the invaders. A deputation followed him there, accompanied by three hundred persons, and the Commandant of St. Roque's prevailed upon him to return; but he would only go in the capacity of secretary to a military officer. Finding then that things were going ill, and that half the force which he had raised and organized was dispersed, he repaired to Cadiz, to inform the Government of the state of affairs, and require the repayment of what he had expended in the service, which was the whole of his own means, and some allowance for the prizes which he had taken from the enemy. His personal enemies had been embarked with him, and no sooner had he entered that city than he was arrested, put in irons, and thrown into a dungeon. The Spaniards had so long been accustomed, not to an absolute

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*Ld. Blayney
sails from
Gibraltar.*

Oct. 14.

*He lands
near the
castle of
Frangerola.*

merely, but to an arbitrary Government, that even those authorities whose intentions were truly equitable were continually committing unjust and arbitrary acts. After twelve months' imprisonment, Ortiz de Zarate, who had thus been treated as a criminal, was acquitted of all the charges which had been preferred against him; his honour, loyalty, and patriotism, were fully acknowledged, and he received payment of his claims in part. It was of importance to encourage the mountaineers whom he had put in action, and a plan therefore was formed for getting possession of Frangerola, a castle on the coast, between Marbella and Malaga, about twenty miles from the latter place. The castle was understood to be a place which might easily be taken by a coup-de-main; its capture would open a communication with the inhabitants of the Sierra, and hopes were entertained that it might lead also to the expulsion of the enemy from Malaga, where they were represented as being in no strength: the guns on the mole there were said to have been removed, and the citadel to be in a defenceless state. In consequence of these representations, an expedition sailed from Gibraltar, under the command of Major-General Lord Blayney; it consisted of four British companies (amounting to 300 men), and 500 German, Polish, and Italian deserters. They proceeded to Ceuta, and there took on board the Spanish regiment of Toledo. This regiment was said to be perfectly equipped; but upon examination it was found that there was a deficiency of 148 firelocks, and that they had been embarked without a single round of ammunition. These deficiencies were supplied; the squadron soon anchored in a small bay, called Cala de Moral, and there the troops landed on a sandy beach, without any to oppose them.

It had been proposed to Lord Blayney that he should disembark near Malaga, and that while he called off the enemy's attention on the land side, the squadron should alarm the city from

the eastward, and the boats push for the mole, and land a party to assist the inhabitants, who, it was confidently expected, would take the opportunity of rising against their oppressors. But Lord Blayney properly distrusted the information upon which this advice was founded, and he had little confidence in the motley assemblage under his command; being not without apprehension that the confusion of their tongues might affect their movements in the hour of action. He chose to begin, therefore, with the castle of Frangerola, which is about two leagues east of the bay in which he landed. Upon arriving before it, he found it to be a large square fort, occupying the whole hillock on which it stands, strongly built, commanding every part of the beach where boats could land, and in a state of defence very unlike what he had been led to expect. When he sent in a summons to surrender, a resolute refusal was returned; the fort opened its fire upon the gun-boats, sunk one, and occasioned some loss in others. Lord Blayney advanced close to the works, for the purpose of drawing the enemy's attention from the water; here he was contending with musquetry against grape-shot and stone walls. Major Grant was mortally wounded in this unequal engagement, and several men killed; but the riflemen did their part well; the enemy's guns were for a time silenced, the boats took their stations, and he withdrew the troops. He now directed the Spaniards to the summit of a hill, with a ravine in front, which would have been a sufficient protection from any sudden attack; but the Spanish Colonel objected that it was Sunday, and that it was not the custom of his countrymen to fight upon that day. These Spaniards were not in good humour with their allies, nor perhaps with the service, for which they had been taken from their comfortable quarters at Ceuta: by a misarrangement arising from mere inattention, they had been served in the transport

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CHAP. with meat on a meagre day ; and they were discontented also
 XXXIII. because there was no priest embarked with them. Lord Blayney,
 1810. however, prevailed upon the Commandant to detach four com-
October. panies, for the purpose of occupying a pass near Mijas, and
 preventing the enemy in that town from sending assistance to
 the fort. An hundred Germans were added to this detach-
 ment ; the English officer who conducted this service was per-
 suaded by the Spaniards to attack the town, though his orders
 were to act on the defensive ; the consequence was, that he was
 repulsed, and obliged rapidly to fall back on the main body.

*Failure of
 the expedi-
 tion.*

Oct. 15.

During the night, the men were exposed, without shelter, to
 a continual heavy rain, such as is common at that season in those
 countries, and is never seen in our climate, except sometimes
 during the short duration of a thunder-storm. It was accom-
 panied with thunder now. But the night was actively employed
 in landing artillery ; which could not be done by day, because the
 guns of the castle completely commanded the beach. Soldiers and
 sailors exerted themselves heartily ; and before day-break a bat-
 tery for one thirty-two pound carronade was completed on the
 shore, and another for two twelve-pounders and a howitzer, on
 a rocky hill, 350 yards from the castle. Though the artillery
 could not make impression upon the solid old masonry of the
 walls, it destroyed part of the parapet, and the musquetry did
 such execution, that Lord Blayney entertained good hope of
 success ; when, to his surprise, he learnt that the garrison had
 been reinforced before his arrival, that it was in sufficient
 strength for him to expect that a sortie would be made, and that
 Sebastiani was on the way from Malaga with 4700 foot, 800
 horse, and sixteen pieces of artillery ; .. his own force amounted
 only to 1400 men, and the four guns which had been landed.
 These he could not re-embark under the fire of the castle, and he
 would not abandon ; and at this time, just as he was about to

strengthen his position, by occupying a ruined tower, the Rodney, and a Spanish line-of-battle ship, appeared off the coast, with the eighty-second regiment, 1000 strong, to reinforce him. Boats were sent off to assist in landing them, and Lord Blayney was about to station gun-boats so as to rake the beach; but before either object could be effected, some 600 infantry, and sixty horse, sallied from the castle. It was a complete surprise; the British troops were in front, taking provisions; the enemy made their attack on the Spaniards and the foreigners on the left: these men took to flight, and abandoned the battery. At this moment the troops had pushed off from the ships, and Lord Blayney, trusting in them and in the strength of his position, formed the few British soldiers who were with him, and retook the guns by the bayonet, but not before part of the ammunition had been blown up. A doubt was now entertained whether some troops who were moving toward them upon the left were friends or foes; some said they were Spaniards; the German deserters declared them to be French. The hesitation and delay which this doubt occasioned enabled the enemy, for enemies they were, to approach without opposition; and when Lord Blayney, having ascertained the truth too late, charged them, the conflict ended in his being made prisoner, with about 200 men, some forty having been killed. This was the fate of the English soldiers; most of the deserters went over to the enemy. The men who were in the boats had then no course left but to return to the ships, fortunate in having thus seen the termination of an ill-planned expedition, without being farther engaged in it.

It had not been supposed that Sebastiani could bring together so large a body of men as he had put in motion on this occasion. Some movement was expected from the inhabitants of Malaga, but with little reason; for the individuals who had exerted themselves most in resisting the entrance of the enemy

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October.*Lord Blay-
ney and the
British
troops
taken.**Defeat of
General
Blake.*

CHAP. into that city were, such of them as escaped from the slaughter,
 XXXIII. at this time in prison, with their leader, Colonel Avallo, upon
 1810. some of those vague charges which, in Spain, under any of
October. its Governments, were deemed sufficient grounds for throwing
 men into a dungeon, and leaving them there. It had been intended also that Sebastiani's attention should have been called off in a different direction, by Blake, with the central army. That army was too slow in its movements to produce any effect in favour of Lord Blayney's attempt; its head-quarters at this time were at Murcia, and its advance at Velez el Rubio. It was not till a fortnight after the failure at Frangerola, that the French thought it necessary to take any measures against this ill-disciplined, ill-appointed, ill-constituted body. The enemy's troops were so distributed, that a considerable force could be assembled, within twenty-four hours, at any point where their presence was required; but before Sebastiani could reach Baza, General Rey, with one regiment of dragoons, a regiment of Polish lancers, and a detachment of infantry, had routed an army which was exposed in a place without protection, and was completely broken at the first charge*. Between 1000 and 2000 were killed, and some 1200 taken; the officers here behaved better than the men, for the latter threw down their arms, and cried for quarter; while, of the former, all who were made prisoners had received sabre wounds. The prisoners were in a miserable condition, appearing half starved and half naked; a large portion of them consisted of old men and boys, and those who could not keep pace with their escort were shot upon the way.

Nov. 3.

* No account (as far as I can discover) of this disgraceful action was published by the Spanish Government. There was no longer the same magnanimity in relating its misfortunes as in the days of the Central Junta.

Not discouraged by these repeated losses and multiplied disgraces, the Spaniards continued to pursue that system of hostility which was carried on wherever the French were nominally masters of the country; a mode of war destructive to the invaders against whom it was directed, but dreadful also in its effect upon the people by whom it was waged. The Junta of Seville had, from the beginning of the struggle, perceived that the strength of Spain lay in her people, and not in her armies. The Central Junta also had early acknowledged the importance of that irregular and universal warfare for which the temper of the Spaniards and the character of the country were equally adapted; and they attempted to regulate it by a long edict, giving directions for forming *Partidas* of volunteers, and *Quadrillas*, which were to consist of smugglers, appointing them pay, enacting rules for them, and subjecting them to military law; but it is manifest that these restrictions would only be observed where the Government had sufficient authority to enforce them, which was only where they had armies on foot, and that, when thus restricted, little was to be done by it. They spoke with a clear understanding of the circumstances in which Spain was placed when they proclaimed a Moorish war*, and bade the Spaniards remember in what manner their fathers had exterminated a former race of invaders. The country, they said, was to be saved by killing the enemies daily, just as they would rid themselves of a plague of locusts; a work which was slow, but sure, and in its progress would bring the nation to the martial pitch of those times, when it was a pastime to go forth and seek the Hagarenes. They reminded them of the old Castilian names, for skirmishes†, ambushments, assaults, and stratagems, the neces-

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Irregular
war.

See Vol. i.
p. 306.

* *Guerra de Moros contra estos infideles.*

† *Escaramuzas, celadas, rebatos, ardides,—son nombres castellanos de la antigua milicia, la mas necessaria en la guerra domestica.*

CHAP. sary resources of domestic warfare, and told them that the nature
XXXIII. of the country and of the inhabitants rendered Spain invincible.

1810. — This character on the part of the Spaniards the war had now assumed in all parts of Spain. The French were no sooner masters of the field, than they found themselves engaged in a wearing, wasting contest, wherein discipline was of no avail, and by which, in a country of such extent and natural strength, any military power, however great, must ultimately be consumed. In any other part of Europe, they would have considered the conquest complete after such victories as they had obtained; but in Spain, where army after army had been routed, and city after city taken, . . . when Joseph reigned at Madrid, and Soult commanded in Seville, . . . when Victor was in sight of Cadiz, and Massena almost in sight of Lisbon, . . . when Buonaparte had put all his other enemies under his feet, and in the height of his fortune, and plenitude of his power, had no other object than to effect the subjugation of the Peninsula, . . . the generals and the men whom he employed there were made to feel that the cause in which they were engaged was as hopeless as it was unjust. They were never safe except when in large bodies, or in some fortified place. Every day some of their posts were surprised, some escort or convoy cut off, some detachment put to death; dispatches were intercepted, plunder was recovered, . . . and, what excited the Spaniards more than any, or all other considerations, vengeance was taken by a most vindictive people for insupportable wrongs. In every part of Spain where the enemy called themselves masters, leaders started up, who collected about them the most determined spirits; followers enough were ready to join them; and both among chiefs and men, the best and the worst characters were to be found: some were mere ruffians, who if the country had been in peace would have lived in defiance of the laws, as they now defied the force of the intrusive Government;

others were attracted by the wildness and continual excitement attendant upon a life of outlawry and adventure, to which, in the present circumstances of the nation, honour, instead of obloquy, was attached; but many were influenced by the deepest feelings and strongest passions which act upon the heart of man; love of their country which their faith elevated and strengthened; and hope which that love and that faith rendered inextinguishable; and burning hatred, seeking revenge for the most wanton and most poignant injuries that can be inflicted upon humanity.

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These parties began to be formed immediately after Buonaparte swept the land before him to Madrid, and from that time they continued to increase in numbers and activity, as the regular armies declined in reputation and in strength. The enemy made a great effort to put them down after the battle of Ocaña, and boasted of having completely succeeded, because the guerrillas disappeared before them, dispersing whenever they were in danger of being attacked by a superior force. There was nothing in their dress to distinguish them from the peasantry; every one was ready to give them intelligence or shelter; they knew the country perfectly; each man shifted for himself in time of need; and when they re-assembled at the appointed rallying place, so far were they from being dispirited by the dispersion, that the ease with which they had eluded the enemy became a new source of confidence. They became more numerous and more enterprising after it had been seen how little loss they sustained, when, for a time, the intrusive Government made it its chief object to extirpate them; their escapes, as well as their exploits, were detailed both in the official and provincial Gazettes; and the leaders became known in all parts, not of Spain only, but of Europe, by their own names, or the popular appellations which had been given them indicative of

CHAP. their former profession or personal appearance. *El Manco*, the
 XXXIII. man with a maimed arm, commanded one band; the Old Man of
 1810. Sereña another. There was *el Frayle*, the Friar; *el Cura*, the
 Priest; *el Medico*, the Doctor; *el Cantarero*, the Potter; *el Cocinero*, the Cook; *el Pastor*, the Shepherd; *el Abuelo*, the Grandfather. One chief was called *el Chaleco*, from the fashion of his waistcoat; he won for himself a better reputation than might have been expected from such an appellation: another obtained the name of *Chambergo*, from his slouched hat. Names of worse import appear among them; there was the *Malalma*, the Bad Soul, de Aibar, and the *Ladron*, the Robber, de Lumbier.

A large portion of the men who engaged under these leaders were soldiers who had escaped in some of the miserable defeats to which the rashness of the Government and the incapacity of their generals had exposed them; or who had deserted from the regular army to this more inviting service. Smugglers also, a numerous and formidable class of men, now that their old occupation was destroyed, took to the guerrilla life, and brought to it the requisites of local knowledge, hardiness and audacity, and the quick sense of sight and hearing which they had acquired in carrying on their dangerous trade by night. But the greater number were men who, if circumstances had permitted, would have past their life usefully and contentedly in the humble stations to which they were born; labourers, whom there were now none to employ, . . . retainers, who partook the ruin of the great families to which they and their ancestors had been attached; . . . owners or occupiers of land, whose fields had been laid waste, and whose olive-yards destroyed; and the whole class of provincial tradesmen, whose means of subsistence were cut off, happy if they had only their own ruin and their country's quarrel to revenge, and not those deeper injuries of which dreadful cases were continually occurring wherever the enemy

were masters. Monks, also, and friars, frocked and unfrocked, were among them: wherever the convents were suppressed, and their members forbidden to wear the habit on pain of death, which was done in all the provinces that the French overran, the young took arms, the old employed themselves in keeping up the spirit of the people; and the intrusive Government paid dearly for the church property, when those who had been previously supported by it exchanged a life of idleness for one of active exertion in the national cause, some to preach a crusade against the invaders, others to serve in it. These whom oppression had driven out from the cloister were not the only religioners who took arms. Not a few in the parts of the country which were still free took the opportunity, precious to them, of escaping from the servitude to which they were bound, disgusted with the follies of their profession, sick of its impostures, or impatient of its restraints. Public opinion encouraged them in this course; the multitude ascribing their conduct to a religious zeal for their country, while those who wished for the reformation of the abuses which had prepared the way for all this evil, were glad to see this disposition manifest itself in a class of men whom they justly regarded as one of the pests of Spain. The General of the Franciscans applied to Mendizabal to deliver up a friar who had enlisted in his army; but the application was so little in accord with the spirit of the times, that Mendizabal's answer was read with universal approbation by the Spaniards. "The head of the Franciscans," said that commander, "must have forgotten what Cardinal Ximenes de Cisneros did when he commanded the army which took Oran. If that prelate in those days thought of nothing but destroying the Koran, and substituting the Gospel in its stead, what would he do now, when the religion of our fathers and our mother country is in danger? I have taken a lesson from his Eminency. Let the present head

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Rocca, 240.

*State of the
guerrilla
warfare.*

Andalusia.

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of the order send me a list of all the brethren capable of bearing arms, not forgetting himself, if he is fit for service, and we will march together and free our religion and our country. Inspire then your friars, that they may be agents in this noble work, putting away all kind of sloth; and let no other cry be heard than that of 'War against the tyrant, freedom for our religion, our country, and our beloved Ferdinand!' " While this course was taken by the monks and friars, it is related of the nuns in the subjected parts of the country, that they past the nights in praying for the success and deliverance of their countrymen, and the days in preparing medicines and bandages for the sick and wounded French.

Fewer guerrilla parties appeared in Andalusia than in any other province, although more had been expected there, from the fierier character of the people, and the local circumstances; the land being divided between the cathedrals, a few convents, and a few great proprietors, and the greater part of the inhabitants day-labourers, who were likely to be tempted by the prospect of a predatory life. But Andalusia seemed as if its generous blood had been exhausted in the first years of the war; and at this time the mountaineers of Ronda were the only part of its population who opposed a determined resistance to the intrusive Government. Their general, Valdenebro, tendered his resignation because the Regency had made him subordinate to the Marques de Portago, who commanded at the Campo de S. Roque; he had performed good service there; and it was stated in the Cortes, as an example for imitation, that one or two patriots, and one or two priests who possessed local knowledge, and were of ordinary rank, but of extraordinary courage, composed his adjutants, his aides-de-camp, and his whole staff. The orator did not bear in mind that Valdenebro was at the head, not of an army, but of an irregular force. Forest-flies these mountaineers were called,

to express the pertinacity with which they annoyed the enemy, and the facility with which they eluded him. Ready themselves to endure all privations, to encounter all dangers, to make any sacrifices in the national cause, they regarded submission in such a cause, when it proceeded from weakness, as little less odious than the conduct of those traitors who accepted office under the intrusive Government; and because the city of Ronda had made no resistance to the French, they looked upon the name as disgraced, and called their mountainous region the *Serrania de Fernando VII.*, to mark their indignation against the conduct of its capital. If the spirit of such a people could have been subdued, the enemy were neither wanting in activity nor in inhumanity for effecting their purpose. They had light pieces of artillery for mountain service, two of which were carried by a mule, one on each side, balancing each other; the carriages and ammunition-boxes were made portable in the same way: and their attacks were so frequent, that in the course of two years there was one village which they entered forcibly fifty times. Sebastiani, in whose military command this district was comprised, was a person who betrayed no compunction in carrying the abominable edict of M. Soult into effect; and scarcely a day past in which several prisoners were not put to death in Granada in conformity to that decree. Among the instances of heroic virtue which were displayed here during the continuance of this tyranny, there are two which were gratefully acknowledged by the national Government. Lorenzo Teyxeyro, an inhabitant of Granada, who had performed the dangerous service of communicating intelligence to the nearest Spanish general, was discovered, and might have saved his life if he would have named the persons through whom the communication was carried on; but he was true to them as he had been to his country, and suffered death contentedly. The other instance was attended with more tragic circumstances.

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CHAP. Captain Vicente Moreno, who was serving with the mountaineers
XXXIII. of Ronda, was made prisoner, carried to Granada, and there
1810. had the alternative proposed to him of suffering by the hangman,
or entering into the Intruder's service. Sebastiani showed much solicitude to prevail upon this officer, having, it may be believed, some feeling of humanity, if not some fore-feeling of the opprobrium which such acts of wickedness draw after them in this world, and of the account which is to be rendered for them in the next. Moreno's wife and four children were therefore, by the General's orders, brought to him when he was upon the scaffold, to see if their entreaties would shake his resolution; but Moreno, with the courage of a martyr, bade her withdraw, and teach her sons to remember the example which he was about to give them, and to serve their country, as he had done, honourably and dutifully to the last. This murder provoked a public retaliation which the Spaniards seldom exercised, but . . when they did . . upon a tremendous scale. Gonzalez, who was member in the Cortes for Jaen, had served with Moreno, and loved him as such a man deserved to be loved; and by his orders seventy French prisoners were put to death at Marbella.

So wicked a system as that which Buonaparte's generals unrelentingly pursued could nowhere have been exercised with so little prospect of success, and such sure effect of calling forth a dreadful vengeance, as among the Spaniards. Against such enemies they considered all means lawful; this was the feeling not here alone, but throughout the body of the nation; the treacherous commencement of the war on the part of the French, and the systematic cruelty with which it had been carried on, discharged them, they thought, from all observances of good faith or humanity towards them; and upon this principle they acted to its full extent. The labourer at his work in the fields or gardens had a musket concealed at hand, with which to mark

the Frenchman whom ill fortune might bring within his reach. Boys, too young to be suspected of any treachery, would lead a party of the invaders into some fatal ambushade; women were stationed to give the signal for beginning the slaughter, and that signal was sometimes the hymn to the Virgin! Not fewer than 8000 French are said to have been cut off in the mountains of Ronda.

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*Rocca, 225,
226. 212.*

There, however, it was more properly a national than a guerrilla warfare; the work of destruction being carried on less by roving parties than by the settled inhabitants, who watched for every opportunity of vengeance. There were more bands in Extremadura than in Andalusia, but there were not many; for Extremadura was not in the line for convoys, which always offered the most inviting prey. The most noted leader in the province was D. Toribio Bustamente, known by the name of *Caracol*, who had been master of the post-office at Medina del Rio Seco; among the other horrors which were committed in that unhappy town after Cuesta and Blake were defeated by M. Bessieres, the wife of this man had been violated and murdered, and his son also, a mere child, had been butchered. From that hour he devoted himself to the pursuit of vengeance, and many were the enemies who suffered under his hand for the crimes of their countrymen, till, after a career of two years, he fell at the pass of Miravete with the satisfaction of a man who, in the performance of what he believed to be his sacred duty, had found the death which he desired. Bustamente's men acquired a good character, as well for their behaviour to the inhabitants, as for the courage and success with which they harassed the enemy; but there were other parties in Extremadura, who inflicted more injury upon their countrymen than upon the French. This was the case in La Mancha also; the Government, with a vigour which it seldom exerted, arrested some of the banditti leaders, and brought them to justice; but

*Extrema-
dura.*

*D. Toribio
Busta-
mente.*

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Francisco
Abad, the
Chaleco.

such examples were too few to deter other ruffians from pursuing the same course, while the authority of either Government, national or intrusive, was so ill established, that there was no other law than that of the strongest. One adventurer, however, in this province raised himself to respectability and rank by his services, though known by the unpromising appellation of *El Chaleco*. Francisco Abad Moreno was his name: he began his career as a common soldier, and escaping from some rout, joined company with two fugitives of his own regiment, and began war upon his own account. Their first exploit was to kill an enemy's courier and his escort; and shortly afterwards having added two recruits to his number, he presented to the Marques of Villafraanca, at Murcia, five carts laden with tobacco, quicksilver, and plate, which he had taken from the French, and the ears * of thirteen Frenchmen who had fallen by their hands! His party increased as his name became known; and he cut off great numbers of the enemy, sometimes in Murcia, sometimes in La Mancha, intercepting their convoys and detachments. Showing as little mercy as he looked for, and expecting as little as he showed, he faced with desperate or ferocious courage the danger from which there was no escape by flight, swimming rivers when swoln by rain, or employing any means that might give him the victory. On one occasion he broke a troop of the French by discharging a blunderbuss loaded with five-and-thirty bullets; it brought down nine of the enemy, according to his own account, and he received so severe a contusion on the shoulder from the recoil, that it entirely disabled him for a time; but the party was kept together under his second in command, Juan de Bacas, and its reputation enhanced by greater exploits.

* The Chaleco states this fact himself in the *Relacion de sus Meritos*, which he published at the end of the war!

One service which Bacas performed diffused a general feeling of vindictive joy through La Mancha and the adjacent provinces. D. Benito Maria Ciria acted for the intrusive Government as governor and *corregidor* of La Mancha. He was a man of information and singular activity, who might have obtained for himself an honourable remembrance, if he had displayed the same zeal in the cause of his country which he exerted for its oppressors. From the beginning he was suspected of favouring the Intruder, and had been apprehended on that suspicion before the French forced the passes of the Sierra Morena; the military Junta of La Carolina spared him, and upon the first appearance of the enemy, he proved that his intentions had not been mistaken, by joining them. From that time Ciria served them with the rancorous alacrity of a true traitor, insomuch that he was called the Nero of La Mancha. This evil celebrity drew on him its proper punishment. Bacas was on the watch for a favourable opportunity, and as soon as it occurred, he entered Almagro at the head of his guerrillas, and seized him in the streets of that city: the people called out for his punishment upon the spot, but Bacas felt that the solemnity of a judicial sentence would make the example more impressive; he carried his prisoner therefore to Valencia de Alcantara, and delivered him there to the arm of the law, under which he suffered as a traitor. A victory could not have occasioned greater exultation throughout La Mancha; if Bacas and his party, it was said, had performed no other service than that of bringing this offender to justice, they would have deserved well of their country for that alone.

It would have been well for humanity, and honourable for Spain, if those who were engaged with right feelings in their country's cause had always shown this regard to order and the course of law; but the Spaniards had, under long misrule,

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1810.

*Ciria, the
Nero of La
Mancha.*

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1810.

become a lawless nation; the great trampled upon the laws, and by the people murder was scarcely regarded as a crime; in their vindictive feelings they were unrestrained by any religious awe, or any apprehension of earthly punishment. A squadron of the La Manchan Crusaders entered this very city of Almagro; they sacked the house of the traitor who collected the revenues for the Intruder; and because his wife in her rage reviled them, professed her attachment to King Joseph, and threatened them with vengeance in his name, they killed her; and Ureña, a priest, who commanded the party, related the circumstance with perfect complacency in his official dispatch. The heart of the nation was already hard, and the little which might have been done by the legitimate Government for correcting the national inhumanity, and inducing, or at least endeavouring to induce, a more christian, a more civilized, a more human spirit, was neglected.

*New
Castille.
D. Ventura
Ximenez.*

New Castille swarmed with guerrillas, among whom were some of the most distinguished chiefs. D. Ventura Ximenez made himself formidable in the parts about Toledo, till one day in action his horse carried him into the enemy's ranks; his people rescued him, but not till he had received two sabre wounds and a pistol-shot. They carried him to Navalucillos, where he died. A price had been set upon his head; his body therefore was disinterred by the French, and the head carried to Toledo, that the dragoon who had shot him might receive the reward. In this province there were some of the vilest depredators who under the name of guerrillas infested Spain. For as in times of pestilence or earthquake, wretches are found obdurate enough in wickedness to make the visitation a cover for their guilt, and enrich themselves by plunder, so now, in the anarchy of Spain, they whose evil disposition had been restrained, if not by efficient laws, yet in some degree by the influence of settled society,

*Guerrilla
banditti.*

abandoned themselves, when that control was withdrawn, to the impulses of their own evil hearts. These banditti plundered and murdered indiscriminately all who fell into their hands. The guerrilla chief, D. Juan Abril, caught a band of seven, who made Castille the scene of their depredations; and he found in their possession gold and silver bars, and other property, to the amount of half a million reales. A ruffian belonging to one of these bands was taken by the French, and in order to save his life, offered to show them the place where his comrades had secreted their booty; accordingly a commissioner from the criminal junta of Madrid, with two alguazils, and an escort of forty horse, was appointed to go with him. The deposit was in the wood of Villa Viciosa, eight leagues from the capital, and there they found effects to the value of more than 700,000 reales. But D. Juan Palarea, the Medico, from whose party the bandit had originally deserted, had obtained intelligence of their movements, and intercepted them on their return; five only of the escort escaped, six were made prisoners, the rest were killed; and the commissioner was put to death, as one whose office precluded him from mercy, and even from commiseration.

Of the wretches whom this dissolution of government let loose upon mankind, the banditti were the boldest, but not the worst. A more extraordinary and flagitious course was chosen by José Pedrazuela, who had been an actor at Madrid. He assumed the character of a commissioner under the legitimate Government, and being acknowledged as such in the little town of Ladrada in Extremadura, condemned and executed, under a charge of treason, any persons whom for any motive he chose to destroy: the victims were carried at night to a wood, where their graves had been made ready, and there their throats were cut, or they were shot, or beaten to death. The people supposing him to be actually invested with the authority which he assumed,

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.

*Crimes of
José Pedra-
zuela and
his wife.*

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1810.

submitted to him in terror, as the French had done to Collot d'Herbois and the other monsters whom this Pedrazuela was imitating. His wife, Maria Josefa Garcia della Valle, was privy to the imposture, and if possible exceeded him in cruelty. Before they could withdraw, as they probably designed to do when they had sufficiently enriched themselves, Castaños heard of their proceedings, and instantly took measures for arresting them in their career of blood. They were brought to trial at Valencia de Alcantara; thirteen of these midnight murders were proved against them: it was said that in the course of three months they had committed more than threescore. The man was hanged and quartered, the woman strangled by the *garrote*. The Spaniards had not brought upon themselves the guilt of revolution, but they were visited by all its horrors!

The alcalde
of Bri-
huega.

The better guerrilla chiefs maintained order where they could, and whenever any of the banditti fell into their hands, ordered them to summary execution. There was another class of criminals whom they took every opportunity of bringing under the laws of their outraged country, . . . those Spaniards who took an active part in the Intruder's service. The alcalde of Brihuega was notorious for his exertions against those who were suspected of corresponding with the national Government, or in any way aiding it; his wife was passionately attached to the same cause, and the Empecinado one day intercepted a dispatch from her to the nearest French commander: he entered the town, and made her and her husband prisoners. The dispatch had provoked a barbarous spirit in the men, for they cut off the woman's hair, shaved her eyebrows, tarred and feathered her, and in that condition paraded her through the streets; after which they delivered them both to the Junta of the province for judgement. The Empecinado seems to have had an especial pleasure in pursuing traitors of this description. He had set intelligencers upon one

Rigo, who, having affected great zeal in the national cause, fled afterwards to the capital, obtained a considerable appointment there, and became a persecutor of all who carried on any communication with the Government or the armed Spaniards. This man was keeping his marriage-day at a house a little way from Madrid, when, during the wedding-feast, the Empecinado entered the court-yard at the head of a sufficient band, and demanded that Rigo should be delivered up, saying no injury should be offered to any other of the party. Flight or resistance were alike impossible; the miserable traitor was surrendered into his hands, and sent immediately under a trusty escort to Cadiz; the officer into whose charge he was given being enjoined not to depart from that city till he should have seen him put to death in the great square. Joseph himself narrowly escaped a similar fate from the same daring adventurer. He was dining at La Alameda, six miles from Madrid, on the road to Guadalaxara, with Gen. Belliard, and a festive party, when their entertainment was interrupted by an alarm that the Empecinado was approaching, and they fled hastily towards the capital, for not a moment was to be lost. The Intruder had a second escape on the road from Guadalaxara: the Empecinado knew his movements, and six days after the French had boasted of having totally defeated him, and dispersed his band of brigands, he took post at Cogoludo, and pursued Joseph so closely that more than forty of his rear-guard were cut off at Torrejon and El Molar, before they could come within protection of the garrison of Madrid. So little indeed had that garrison the command of the surrounding country, that a whole party which had been sent out from thence were one day taken and hung by the way side, within a short distance from the walls.

In this dreadful warfare blood called for blood; cruelty produced retaliation, and retaliation was retaliated by fresh cruelties.

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XXXIII.
1810.

Rigo.

Joseph's
escape from
the Em-
pecinado.

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.

*Desertion
of the Jura-
mentados.*

Eight of the Empecinado's men were taken in the Guadarrama mountains, and nailed to the trees there, for the purpose of intimidating their fellows: such a spectacle had the sure effect of exasperating them, and the same number of Frenchmen were soon nailed to the same trees, in the same spirit of inhuman vengeance. A lieutenant of his party, Mesa by name, went over to the French, and engaged to bring them the head of this dreaded partizan; his interest was so good, and his proposals so plausible, that they gave him the rank of captain in one of the Spanish regiments which the Intruder was raising, and sent him with a company of 200 Spanish cavalry to perform his promise; when they came near Guadalaxara, the men put him to death, and joined their countrymen in arms. Such an example might have taught Joseph and his ministers how little they could depend upon the Spaniards, who by misery, or severe usage, were forced into his service. Half naked and ill fed, kept in miserable prisons, or at the hardest work, upon the canals, where such work was at hand, winter and summer, sometimes up to the middle in water, they enlisted with the determination of making their escape. In the course of five months not less than 12,000 entered with this purpose; and on the first opportunity that offered, whole companies, including the officers, deserted, with arms and baggage. The celebrity of the Empecinado encouraged them to these attempts, and his movements in the vicinity of Madrid facilitated their escape. Like the other distinguished guerrilla leaders, he soon obtained rank from the national Government, but he looked to it neither for pay nor supplies. The Junta of Guadalaxara used the utmost exertions to assist him; the members of this Junta performed their duty with perfect fidelity in a situation where they were continually in extreme danger, from the vicinity of a strong enemy's force. They were as often in the woods and wilds as in human habita-

*Junta of
Guada-
laxara.*

tions, and yet they collected stores, clothing, and money for the armies, while in this state of outlawry under the intrusive Government; and they circulated a newspaper which they printed in the mountains near the sources of the Tagus.

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1810.

The Empecinado was supposed to have 500 horse under his command, and 2,200 foot; but this force was perpetually varying in number, according to the chance of war; and the guerrillas generally acted with better success in small parties. The Medico's party was estimated at 300 horse. This leader, joining with the band of D. Casimero Moraleja, fell in with 140 of the enemy's troops, escorting a convoy from Madrid, about four leagues from Toledo, near Yuncles. Some twenty *Juramentados*, as the Spanish recruits were called because of the oath which was administered to them when they entered the Intruder's service, immediately laid down their arms; the others, of whom fourscore were French grenadiers under the *Chef-d'escadron* Labarthe, took possession of an *Ermida*, and refused to surrender when they were summoned, little apprehending the horrible alternative. The Spaniards set fire to the building on all sides; no mercy was shown to those who endeavoured to escape from the flames; eight persons only were happy enough to be made prisoners in time; the bodies* of all the rest were left in the smoking ruins.

The Medico.

Fourscore
French
burnt in a
chapel.

Naylies,
275.

These details were published in the Regency's Gazette; there was nothing revolting to the public mind in such horrors, because the Spaniards had been accustomed to cruelties, by the history of their American conquests (wherein the enormities of the conquerors have not been concealed), and by the Inquisition: and if

Cruelties
and retaliation.

* Lord Blayney saw them there; victims of retaliation he calls them, and says that the French General and his officers, who were conducting him prisoner to Madrid, could not help expressing their detestation of the barbarous manner in which the war was carried on.

CHAP. the heart of the nation had not thus previously been hardened,
 XXXIII. the nature of this war must have hardened it. The decree of the
 1810. intrusive Government for putting to death every Spaniard who
 should be taken in arms had not indeed been carried into effect;
 too many had been taken to render this possible in a christian
 country; ministers and generals, who might have braved the
 guilt, shrunk from the odium of enforcing such a measure; and
 it may be deemed certain, that if the French troops had been
 commanded to enforce it, they would not have obeyed. But
 toward the guerrillas the soldiers could entertain no feeling either
 of honour or humanity: they put to death all who were taken
 in arms and not in uniform; not regarding, or probably not con-
 sidering, that a great proportion of the regular troops were in
 that condition! It was not to be expected that they should ask
 themselves on which side the provocation was given, and with
 whom the cruelty began. And yet, barbarous as Buonaparte's
 predatory system of war necessarily made them, and with all
 the irritation which the guerrillas occasioned, they were less
 barbarous than those who were in authority over them: pri-
 soners whom they spared in the field were, in obedience to rigid
 orders, shot if they lagged upon their march into captivity; and
 even after they had entered France, numbers were thus put to
 death in cold blood. All who were regarded as brigands, who
 acted in the provincial Juntas, or against whom any proof ap-
 peared of acting under the Juntas, or giving intelligence or
 assistance to the guerrillas, were executed by the summary
 sentence of some arbitrary tribunal. Heads were exposed on
 poles, bodies left hanging upon the gallows, or the trees; and
 in the market-place of large towns, the wall against which the
 victims were shot was pierced with bullets, and the ground
 blackened with blood! Nowhere was this system of terror pur-
 sued more unrelentingly than in Old Castille, and yet nowhere

Naylies,
274.

Lord
Blayney,
i. 487.

Old
Castille,

were the guerrillas more active or more formidable. In ten parties, under known leaders, their numbers were estimated at 1,300 horse, and 2,500 foot. D. Geronimo Merino, the priest of Villabrau, known by the name of *El Cura*, was the most remarkable of them for the ferocity with which he acted against enemies who were made ferocious by the dreadful circumstances in which they were placed. It was not to be expected that the Spaniards should make this allowance for their invaders; but they did not claim it for themselves; they proclaimed for admiration and example actions at which humanity should shudder: it became a matter of praise among them, as in the days of Pizarro and Garcia de Paredes, to possess the qualities of a ruffian; and if the appearance* corresponded to the manners and character, the popular hero was perfect in his vocation. Yet mercy appears to have been more frequently shown by the guerrillas than extended to them. They obtained consideration with their own Government, and with the English, by bringing in prisoners, and were encouraged so to do; whereas the French soldiers knew that if an armed Spaniard were taken he would be put to death, and might consider it merciful at once to slay a fallen enemy, rather than deliver him over to execution. The guerrillas also, by conveying their prisoners to one of the Spanish fortresses, or to a part of the country where the allies were in force, obtained a respite, for the time, from that life of incessant vigilance and

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.
The Cura.

* Thus this Merino is described as *el terror de la comarca; y su caracter feroz está indicado en lo fiero de su semblante, y en lo membrudo y velloso de su cuerpo. Este es el Cura decantado.* But it should be added, that the man who is thus described spared his prisoners, and conducted them to Alicant. The general appearance of the guerrillas is described by a British officer as "horribly grotesque; any thing of a jacket, any thing of a cap, any thing of a sword, pistol, or carbine, and any thing of a horse."

CHAP. insecurity, exertion and exposure, which, without some such
 XXXIII. occasional relief, no bodily strength could have long supported.
 1810. It was by the peasantry that the greatest cruelties were com-
 mitted upon such miserable Frenchmen as fell into their hands,
 Rocca, 145. and by the women, who are said to have sometimes vied with the
 worst American savages in their unutterable barbarities.

Aragon.

There were fewer of the roving guerrillas in Aragon, because something with the name of an army was kept on foot there, and in such a state that the regular service differed little from the course of life to which the adventurers were reduced. In no other part of Spain was the intrusive Government administered with greater ability and vigilance, nor more in the spirit of remorseless oppression and rapacity. The whole yearly revenue which had been raised in that province, before the invasion, amounted to from ten to twelve millions of *reales*: the French exacted twelve per month as the ordinary contribution; they called for extraordinary payments when they pleased; and after these official exactions, the Aragonese were not exempted from the common lot of their countrymen in being at the mercy of every plunderer. What guerrilla parties there were in this part of the country were less heard of, because on all sides there were chiefs whose reputation, founded upon repeated successes, drew to their parties the men who would otherwise have been dispersed in smaller bands. Anicio Algere, the Potter, whose scene of action was about Jaca, was the only one who obtained any degree of celebrity here. But along the great line of communication for the French armies, and especially the high road from the Bidassoa to Madrid, where it was of most importance for the enemy to secure the ways, and where most precautions were taken for securing them, there the guerrillas were most active and most daring. At the entrance of the villages houses were fortified with ditches, parapets, embrasures for field-pieces,

The Cante-
 rero.

and loop-holes for musquetry, and ditches and parapets across the roads. These stations served a double purpose; for here at every step the sick and wounded, who were on their way to France, were inspected with a vigilance so severely exercised, that it seemed as if the persons in authority, who could not escape from this hateful service, found a malignant satisfaction in disappointing others of their expected deliverance. They sometimes remanded men who had past at several posts; and there were cases in which the wound or the malady (aggravated, perhaps, by so cruel a disappointment) proved fatal at the very place where the sufferer had been refused permission to proceed, upon the plea that he was not sufficiently disabled!

Every where, but more especially at Irun and all the frontier places, accounts were kept for the guerrillas of the troops who past through, both of those who were entering the country, and of invalids on their way from it. Every artifice was used to delay the enemy when it was desired that one of these parties should have time to come up for attack, or for securing a retreat. For this purpose the priest or the alcalde would officiously prepare refreshments, while some messenger, with all the speed of earnest good will, conveyed the necessary intelligence. This would have occurred in ordinary wars; but the treachery with which they had been invaded, and the cruelties which were continually practised against them, made the Spaniards regard any vengeance, however treacherous, as an act of justice. An alcalde and his son were put to death at Mondragon for having at different times assassinated more than two hundred Frenchmen. When they were led to execution, they exulted in what they had done, accounting it among their good and meritorious works: and they said to their countrymen, that if every Spaniard had discharged his duty as well as they had done, the enemy would ere then have been exterminated, and the land been free.

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.

Naylies,
328.

Alcalde of
Mon-
dragon,

Lord
Blayney,
i. 389.

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XXXIII.

1810.

Asturias.

Porlier.

*D. José
Duran.*

Nov. 20.

It was in this part of Spain that the most noted guerrilla leaders appeared, the Empecinado only excepted; the most mountainous and rugged country being most favourable to their mode of warfare. There were many bands in Asturias; the most numerous was that which Porlier had raised; but Porlier was a man of family, who had rank in the army, and his people had more of the feeling and character of soldiers than was commonly found in such companies. There were many also in the Montaña where Longa obtained a good name. The French endeavoured to counteract this system of national hostility, in the province of Soria, by forcing the men into their own service: with this view they ordered a conscription, and the alcalde of Valdenebro was put to death by them in Burgo de Osma, for not having enforced it in obedience to their authority. They called for all single men from fifteen to forty years of age, and all married ones whose marriage was not of earlier date than the year on which this dreadful struggle was begun. D. José Duran, an old officer who had grown gray in the regular service, and whom the Junta of Soria had appointed to the command there and in Rioja, impeded the execution of this scheme, by his enterprises and his edicts: he threatened such of the inhabitants as were disposed to obey the orders of the enemy, lest their own safety might be compromised; and he interdicted the use of the word in that acceptance, saying it was their religion and their liberty which were compromised by such obedience, and that no Christian and true Spaniard could incur the guilt of such a compromise. He forbade any inhabitant of the province to enter Soria while the enemy kept a garrison there, on pain of being regarded as a traitor, whatever motive or excuse he might allege. He declared that every person obeying an order of the intrusive Government should be put to death, . . . every village burnt, . . . so that nothing might exist in Spain which had contributed towards its subjugation.

tion. Whenever the enemy approached a village, the inhabitants were enjoined to leave it, driving all their cattle into the mountains; and they were commanded not to leave provision of any kind in their houses, unless it were poisoned; to the end that, either by want or by poison, the enemy, who were employed in destroying an unoffending people, might be themselves destroyed. The state of feeling may be understood in which such an edict could be issued by a provincial Junta who lived in hourly peril, and whose dearest connexions were the victims of foreign barbarity; but when the edict itself was sanctioned by the national Government—for sanctioned it was by being allowed to appear in the Regency's Gazette unannulled and uncensored—it became a national disgrace.

When the guerrillas of Asturias, the Biscayan provinces, Soria, or Rioja, were closely pressed by the enemy, they usually sought refuge in Navarre, or the higher parts of Aragon: here they had their chief strength. The French, indeed, complained, in their intercepted dispatches, that these bands gave the law in Navarre, levied contributions there, and even collected the duties at the frontier custom-houses. For this superiority they were beholden to Xavier Mina. His career was short, but remarkable not less for the signal successes which he obtained, than for his hair-breadth escapes. On one occasion he and his little party were driven to seek refuge on a rock near Estella, where they defended the only accessible side till night-fall, and escaped during the darkness by letting themselves down the precipice by a rope. In the course of five months after his first appearance in the field, his celebrity was such that he might have raised an army from among the youth of Navarre and Upper Aragon, if there had been means to arm, and officers to discipline them: owing to the want of these, and chiefly of officers, he never had more than 1,200 under his command;

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1810.

Xavier
Mina.

CHAP.
XXXIII.

1810.

*Xavier
Mina made
prisoner.*

greater numbers would have embarrassed him, these he was capable of directing: voluntary rations were provided for them by the villages, and for ammunition and money he looked to the enemy, calling the wood of Tafalla his powder-magazine and his mint. As a farther resource, he levied the duties of which the French complained, and he collected the rents belonging to the convents and churches, as having in this extremity reverted to the nation; and from these funds he was enabled to pay liberally and regularly for intelligence. The wisdom of his measures, not less than the chivalrous spirit of enterprise which he displayed, made him so formidable to the enemy, that his capture was considered by them as more important than a victory, when accident threw him into their hands. Chance had delayed the advance of a convoy for which he was waiting: he was informed of the delay, but proposed to wait still; and went himself on horseback with only one companion, by moonlight, to reconnoitre the ground. The enemy, who would have thought no precautions necessary against a Spanish army at that time, stood in such fear of Mina, that they had formed a double line of outposts, and sent out patrols; by some of whom he and his comrade were surprised, dismounted, and taken. It is remarkable that he was not put to death as soon as identified, for he had been proscribed as a leader of banditti, and his capture as such was exultingly announced; but some person of more generosity than those who thus reviled him must have interfered; and where so little that has the character of honour or humanity can be recorded, it must be regretted that we know not to whom this redeeming act should be ascribed.

*Espoz y
Mina
elected to
succeed
him.*

When Mina's followers had thus lost their leader, disputes arose concerning the command; and there being no one whose personal qualifications were generally acknowledged, it was resolved to choose his uncle for his name's sake, for in that name

there was a strength. His uncle, Francisco Espoz y Mina, was born in 1781, in the village of Ydozin, upon a little farm, the sole patrimony of his family, to which he succeeded on his father's death. His education consisted in having merely been taught to read and write; and husbandry had been his only occupation, till under the impulse of the general feeling he took arms against the oppressors of his country; and having, according to his own account, done to them all the hurt he could as long as he remained in his own house, he enlisted as a volunteer in Doyle's battalion. Soon afterwards, using that freedom which the times allowed, he joined his nephew's guerrilla, and on the evening after the young hero's capture, he left the band apparently with the intention of betaking himself to some other course of life; a deputation of seven persons followed him, and urged him to take the command, which having against his will accepted, he began to exercise with a strength of character that never halted in half measures. One of his first acts was to put down those who resisted the authority which he claimed as commander-in-chief of the guerrillas of Navarre, and in which the Junta of Aragon confirmed him. A certain Echeverria had aspired to this rank; he had some 800 men in his company, consisting mostly of German deserters, who inflicted more evil upon the peasantry than upon the French. Espoz y Mina with about half that force, surprised and arrested him, had him shot with three of his principal comrades, and incorporated the men in his own band. A gang of forty ruffians, with a woman by name Martina for their leader, infested Biscay and Alava, and committed so many murders, that the cry of the land went forth against them; he dispatched a party, who surprised half these banditti with their execrable mistress at their head, and they were sent to summary execution. Espoz y Mina himself narrowly escaped from the treachery of another adventurer, who

CHAP.
XXXIII.
1810.

CHAP. for his evil countenance was known by the appellation of
XXXIII. Malcarado. This man had been a shepherd, and afterwards a
1810. serjeant in Mina's troop. He, too, intended to make war upon
his own account; but finding that this would not be permitted
by the new guerrilla chief, who suffered no banditti to exercise
their vocation within his reach, he deemed it better to make
terms with the French than be exposed to danger on both sides;
feigning, therefore, to serve under Espoz y Mina, he gave
general Pannetier information of his movements, . . . and drew off
the advanced guard from before the village of Robres, so as to
give a French detachment opportunity to enter while the chief
was in bed. The alarm roused him but just in time; he de-
fended himself at the entrance of the house with the bar of the
door for want of any other weapon, till his faithful follower,
Luis Gaston, came to his assistance and brought a horse.
Enough of his people collected to make head against the enemy,
rout them, and rescue their prisoners. Immediately he pursued
Malcarado, and having what was deemed sufficient evidence of
his treason, ordered him to be shot, and the priest of the village
and three alcaldes to be hanged, side by side, as his accom-
plices.

A leader who acted always thus decisively, in disregard of
forms, upon the apparent justice of the case, inspired his fol-
lowers with confidence, and obtained submission every where.
Where his orders were not executed with the alacrity of good-will,
they were obeyed for fear. The alcaldes of every village were
required to give him immediate information whenever they re-
ceived orders from the French for making any requisition: it was
at the hazard of their lives to do this; but so surely as they
failed to do it, they were seized in their beds and shot. The
miserable people were thus continually placed between two
dangers; but their hearts were with Mina; they were attached

to him by self-interest as well as by national feeling, for he encouraged them to trade with France, receiving money from the rich traders for passports, by which means he was enabled both to pay his men, and to reward his spies liberally: and thus also he obtained many articles which it would otherwise have been difficult to procure. Circumstances having forced him into a way of life which he would not have chosen, he devoted himself to it with his whole heart and soul; and his strength both of constitution and character were equal to their trials. It is said that two hours sleep sufficed for him; when he lay down it was with his pistols in his girdle, and the few nights which he slept under a roof were past with less sense of security than he felt in the wilds, although his first care was to secure the doors, and guard against a surprisal. He was not encumbered with baggage; the nearest house supplied the wardrobe when he changed his linen; and he and his men wore sandals that they might more easily ascend the heights in the hair-breadth adventures to which they were exposed. His powder was made in a cave among the mountains; sometimes he obtained it from Pamplona, notwithstanding the vigilance of the enemy. His hospital was in a mountain village; when the French more than once endeavoured to surprise it, timely intelligence was given, and the villagers carried the sick and wounded in litters, upon their shoulders, into the fastnesses. He kept no man in his troop who was known to be addicted to women, lest by their likeliest means he might be betrayed. No gaming was allowed among his men, nor were they permitted to plunder; when the fight was over every one might keep what he could get; but woe to him who should lay hand on the spoil before the struggle was at an end, and the success had been pursued to the utmost!

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Sem. Patr.
No. 82,
p. 338.

In such enterprises as those of the two Minas and the other guerrilla chiefs, the Timours, the Babers, and Khouli Khans of Eastern history, were trained; but neither men nor officers were likely to be formed in them for the operations of regular war. The restraints, the subordination, the principle of obedience which the soldier is compelled to learn, of the necessity of which his understanding is convinced, and to which, if his disposition be good, he conforms at last morally as well as mechanically, these in no slight degree counteract the demoralizing tendencies of a military life, and compensate for its heart-hardening ones. The good soldier becomes a good citizen when his occupation is over; but the guerrillas were never likely to forego the wild and lawless course in which they were engaged; and, therefore, essential as their services now were, thoughtful men looked with the gloomiest forebodings to what must be the consequence of their multiplication, whenever this dreadful struggle should be ended; they anticipated the utter ruin of Spain. The course of events, however, was not to be controlled; circumstances had produced this irregular force, and there was now no possibility of defending the country without it. Lord Wellington had felt how hopeless it was to act in concert with a Spanish army, wherein good intentions were frustrated by obstinate counsels, and courage rendered unavailing by insubordination; but he felt at this time of what importance it was to have a nation in his favour, and how materially the movements of the enemy were impeded and their difficulties increased by the guerrilla parties who acted along their whole line, from the Pyrenees to the frontiers of Beira. Massena's situation became every day more trying; the French in Spain were so little able to feed his army, that he was obliged to have his biscuit from France, when it had to be

escorted 800 miles through a hostile country! It was as difficult for him to send dispatches as to receive supplies; and the first intelligence which Buonaparte obtained of his situation after he advanced to the lines of Torres Vedras, was brought from London, by persons employed in smuggling guineas to the continent.

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CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE CORTES. PLAN WHICH THE JUNTA HAD ADOPTED
ALTERED BY THE REGENCY. FIRST PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CORTES. NEW REGENCY.

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*Schemes of
the intrusive
Government.*

WHILE the Peninsula in every part, from the Pyrenees to the Pillars of Hercules, was filled with mourning, and with all the horrors of a war carried on on both sides with unexampled cruelty, the Madrid gazette spoke of public diversions, and public projects, as if the people of that metropolis, like the Parisians, were to be amused with plans of imaginary works, and entered into the affairs of the theatre and opera regardless of the miseries of their country. Needy as the intrusive Government was, it kept these places of amusement open, in the spirit of Parisian policy, taking its erroneous estimate of human nature from man in his most corrupted state: but the numbers of the audience, and the accounts of the theatres, were no longer published as in other times. Schemes of education were hinted at, and for the encouragement of literature, . . the unction which such men as Cabarrus and Urquijo laid to their souls. Canals were projected, when couriers were not safe even at the gates of the capital; and the improvement of agriculture was announced, while circulars were sent to the generals and military governors, urging them to prevent the destruction of the vines and olive trees by the troops; and promising that this ruinous course should not be continued, if the peasants would be careful always to provide fuel of their own cutting.

Spain also, like Italy, was to be despoiled of its works of art. Joseph gave orders that a selection of the best pictures should be sent to the Napoleon Museum at Paris, as a pledge of the union of the two nations. This robbery did not excite so much indignation as a decree, directing that the bones of Cortes and Cervantes, and other famous Spaniards who were buried in or near Madrid, should be translated with public solemnities to the church of St. Isidro. The Spaniards observed, that though it was known in what churches some of these illustrious men had been interred, their graves could not be ascertained; and they asked whence the money was to come for this translation, when the Intruder could pay none of his servants, and wanted funds for things of the utmost necessity? "But the decree, like many others, was intended for the gazette, and for nothing else. Nevertheless," they continued, viewing the subject with natural and honourable feeling, "it excites our indignation that they should affect this veneration for our ancestors, who omit no means for debasing Spain, and subjecting her to the infamy of a foreign yoke."

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But the most remarkable of the Intruder's acts, was his promise of convoking the Cortes. "It was long," his partizans said, "since the Junta had amused the nation with vain hopes of this benefit, for which Spain was to be indebted to her new sovereign." The object of the intrusive Government at this time, in calling a Cortes of its own, must have been, to take off the attention of the Spaniards in those parts of the country which the French occupied, from the national Cortes; and that this intention, having been thus announced, should never have been carried into effect, is proof how well the unhappy men, who were ostensibly at the head of Joseph Buonaparte's councils, knew the insecurity of the puppet whom they served. Almost the last paper which issued from the royal press at

The Cortes.

April 18.

CHAP. XXXIV. 1810. Seville, had been an edict, declaring in what manner the Cortes should be chosen. Upon this subject the central Junta had asked the advice of the Spanish universities, and public bodies. Great difficulties had been apprehended from the obscurity in which the forms of the old Cortes were involved, as well as from the difference in the different kingdoms, which had each their own. It was well remarked by the university of Seville, that these things were matters of historical research, not of practical importance; there was now neither time nor necessity for the inquiry; the present business was to convene representatives, according to the general principles of representation, and leave them, after they had saved the country, to determine the peculiar forms of the general Spanish Cortes.

*Mode of
election.*

The plan which the Junta adopted was formed with reference to established forms, to present circumstances, and to the future convenience of election. Cities which had sent deputies to the last Cortes, were each to send one to this, and each superior Junta one also. The provinces one for every 50,000 heads, according to the census of 1797; wherever the excess above that number amounted to one half, an additional deputy was to be chosen; any smaller excess was not accounted. The mode of election was so regulated, as to render undue influence or interference impossible. Parochial Juntas were to be formed, composed of every housekeeper above the age of five-and-twenty, excepting such as had been found guilty upon any criminal charge; who had suffered any corporal punishment, or infamous sentence; bankrupts, public debtors, the insane, and the deaf and dumb. Naturalized strangers also were excluded, whatever might have been the privilege of their naturalization. The secular clergy were included. As soon as the *Justicia* received instructions from the corregidor, or alcalde mayor of the

district (*Partido*,) a parochial meeting was to be held, and the Sunday following appointed for the business of the primary election.

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The Spanish government did well in connecting this with religious ceremonies. The business of the day was to commence with the Mass of the Holy Ghost; after which the parish priest was to preach upon the state of the country, and the importance of choosing proper representatives, upon whom so much depended. Then adjourning to the place appointed, the magistrate should first make inquiry whether any means had been used to influence the electors; any person for whom such means had been employed, being rendered ineligible, and his agents or injudicious friends deprived of their vote: any person calumniating another, in hope of impeding his election, was punished with the same disabilities. The parishioners then, one by one, were to advance to the table at which the parochial officers and the priests presided, and there name an elector for the parish: the twelve persons who obtained a majority of names should go apart and fix upon one. It was not required that they should be unanimous, only that the person appointed should have more than six votes; and it was compulsory upon him to perform the duty to which he was elected. The primary election being thus completed, the parochial Junta was to return to the church in procession, their deputy walking between the alcalde and the priest; Te Deum was to be performed, and the day concluded with public rejoicings.

Within eight days afterward, the parochial electors should assemble in the principal town of the district, and form a Junta, over which the corregidor and the ecclesiastic of highest rank in the place presided. The testimonials of the electors were to be scrutinised; the same religious ceremonies to take place, and twelve persons chosen in the same manner, to appoint one

CHAP. or more electors for the district, according to its extent. They
XXXIV. might choose them out of their own number: but any persons
1810. born in the district, and resident in it, were eligible. The busi-
ness was to be transacted in the consistory, a record of its pro-
ceedings deposited among the archives, and a copy sent to every
parish, and to the capital of the province, where the final elec-
tion took place.

Here the electors of the district were to assemble. A Junta should have been previously constituted, consisting of the president of the superior Junta of the province; the archbishop or bishop, regent, intendant, and corregidor of the city, and a secretary. It was presumed that these persons would all be members of the provincial Junta; if not, they were called to this duty by virtue of their rank, and an equal number of members of the Junta added; this proviso being intended to secure for the provincial Junta that influence to which their services entitled them, for which their experience qualified them, and of which it might not have been easy to deprive them, even if it had been thought desirable. The board thus appointed, was to see that the primary and secondary elections were made throughout the province. After the same observances and scrutinies as on the former occasions, the final election was to be made. The person proposed must be a native of the province, but it was not necessary that his property should be there: nobles, plebeians, and secular priests, were equally eligible; no other qualification was required, than that he should be above five-and-twenty, of good repute, and not actually the salaried servant of any individual or body.

In this final election, the first step was to elect three persons successively. A simple majority was not sufficient here; more than half the electors must vote for the same person, and the voting be repeated till this should be the case: three having

thus been chosen, their names were to be placed in an urn, and he whose lot was drawn was the deputy to the Cortes. A fourth was then to be elected, whose name, in like manner, was submitted to the lot with the two which had been left undrawn, and this was repeated till the number of deputies for the province was made up. Supplementary deputies were then to be chosen, in readiness for any vacancy by death; the supplementaries were in the proportion of one to three. The number of provincial deputies amounted to 208; that of the supplementaries to 68.

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The provincial Juntas were to choose their members according to the rules of the final elections; observing also the same general principle, that the person chosen must be a native of the province. The form appointed for the city elections was, that where the *regidores* were proprietaries, or held their office during life by the king's appointment, the people should elect an equal number of electors, in the manner of the municipal elections. These electors, with the *regidores*, the syndic, and the officers who are called the *Personero y Diputado del Comun*, were to meet in the consistory, where the *corregidor* should preside, and there choose three persons out of their own body, the final decision being by lot. All the elections were to be made with open doors.

Twenty-six members were added for the Spanish possessions in America and the Philippines. But during the long interval which must elapse before these representatives could reach Europe, supplementaries for their respective provinces were to be chosen from natives resident in Spain; and a circular notice was issued, requiring that all American or Asiatic Spaniards then in the country would send in their names, ages, employments, places of birth and of abode. This being done, and lists made out accordingly, a Junta was to be formed, consisting of the

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members of the central Junta, who should at the time be acting as deputies for the colonies, or four ministers of the council of the Indies appointed by the Junta, and of four distinguished natives of the colonies, to be chosen by the other members: this Junta was to direct and superintend the election. Twelve electors for each province were to be chosen by lot from among the natives of that province then resident in Cadiz; but if it so happened that they did not amount to eighteen, that number was to be filled up by individuals of the other provinces. The twelve then chosen were to choose their deputies, in the manner of the final provincial election, first by nomination, and then by lot.

The archbishops, bishops, and grandees, were to meet in an upper house: it was required that the grandees should be the heads of their respective families, and above the age of 25; and those nobles and prelates who had submitted to the French government were excluded.

Such was the plan which the commission of the central Junta decided upon, and which the Junta adopted. The commission was composed of five members, the Archbishop of Laodicea, Jovellanos, Castanedo, Caro and Riquelme; but the two latter members being appointed to the executive committee, their places were supplied by the Count de Ayamans, and D. Martin de Garay. D. Manuel Abella, and D. Pedro Polo de Alcocer, were secretaries to the commission. The details were formed, and the official instructions drawn up by Garay. In their general principles the commissioners had been chiefly guided, as was expected and desired, by Jovellanos, the best and wisest of the Spaniards.

There was, however, a difference of opinion in the commission upon three points of considerable importance. Riquelme and Caro would have had only one house of assembly; Jovel-

lanos referred to the English constitution, as the best model, and one to which, in this point, the Spaniards, with sufficient conformity to their ancient customs, might assimilate their own. He proposed also, that certain qualifications of property, situation, and acquirements, should be required of the deputies. Riquelme opposed this restriction; and Jovellanos yielded to the majority of his colleagues with less repugnance, knowing how well the great body of the people had deserved of their country. Riquelme insisted that the Cortes should not assemble without deputies from the colonies; the other members would have omitted them in the first assembly, in consequence of the long and indefinite time which must elapse before they could be chosen in their respective provinces, and arrive in Spain. The plan which was adopted obviated this difficulty. The inadequate number of colonial deputies is less objectionable than it may at first appear, when the probable number of persons from whom the supplementaries were to be chosen is considered; especially as it was not pretended that the manner in which the first Cortes was convoked should be binding as a precedent. "The government," said Jovellanos, "fearful of arrogating to itself a right which belongs to the nation alone, leaves it to the wisdom and prudence of the nation to determine in what form its will may most completely be represented in future."

The last act of the Junta had been to consign to the Regency the charge of seeing the Cortes assembled, according to these rules. In this final decree, provision was made for choosing deputies to represent the provinces occupied by the enemy; they were to be chosen in the same manner as the colonial deputies. Here also the important point of the *veto* was determined. If the Regency refused its assent to a measure which had passed both houses, the measure was to be re-considered; and unless re-passed by a majority of two-thirds in each house,

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*Regulations
proposed by
the central
Junta.
Jan. 29.*

CHAP. it was lost, and could not be brought forward again in that
 XXXIV. Cortes; but if both houses, by such a majority, ratified their
 1810. former determination, three days were then allowed to the
 Regency, and if within that time the royal sanction was not
 given, the law was to be promulgated without it. The Junta
 endeavoured to confine the Cortes within its proper limits, by
 declaring that the executive power appertained wholly to the
 Regency, and the legislative to the representative body; and lest
 any party should arise, who should aim at making the Cortes
 permanent, or unnecessarily extending its duration, "by which
 means," the Junta said, "the constitution of the kingdom might
 be overthrown," the Regency was empowered to fix any time
 for the dissolution of the assembly, provided it were not before
 the expiration of six months.

*The re-
 gency delays
 the convo-
 cation.*

Feb. 11.

This decree, which developed the principles of the central
 Junta, and completed their labours, the Regency did not think
 proper to make public; one of the many acts of injustice which
 the Junta suffered after their compulsory resignation. The
 council of Castille, or rather the *Consejo-reunido*, in which such
 of its members were incorporated as had followed the legitimate
 Government into Andalusia, hinted, in a memorial full of ca-
 lumnies against the ex-Junta, that the Cortes ought not to be
 convoked; their opinion was doubtless of great weight with the
 Regency; and as the Regents did not conceive themselves bound to
 follow the course which the preceding Government had marked
 out, they suppressed the edict, and issued in its stead an address,
 breathing the same spirit as all the proclamations of the Spanish
 Government, but putting off the meeting of the Cortes. "The
 council of Regency," they said, "could well have wished that your
 representatives had been at this time in Cortes assembled, and that
 the nation itself might thus have regulated its own destinies.
 The means which are necessary for our deliverance would

quickly appear at its energetic and powerful voice. But this means of preservation has been too long delayed; and evils gathering upon each other, with the rapidity of a whirlwind, do not permit that it should be accomplished at the time and place appointed. The Isle of Leon, where the national congress ought to assemble, is at this time besieged by the enemy; from this isle we see their fires, we hear their artillery, we hear their insolent threats, and witness their ravages. Their rash endeavours, beyond a doubt, will fail against these intrenchments, where the watch tower is erected which presents to all good patriots a beacon in the midst of the tempest. But the Isle of Leon, thus threatened by the enemy, cannot be at present a proper place for the celebration of our Cortes; and necessity compels us to delay it till the present crisis shall be past, and place and time suitable for so august an assembly can be assigned. Meantime, none of the measures and forms established and decreed for the convocation are to be suspended for a moment. The elections are to proceed, and the members who are chosen must hold themselves ready to perform their functions; the intention of the Government being, that the Cortes shall meet as soon as the circumstances of the war permit."

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Notwithstanding this language, it is possible that Spain was indebted for its Cortes more to the annunciation from Seville that the Intruder was about to convoke one, than to the inclination of its own rulers. The central Junta had delayed it not from intentional procrastination, but from their sense of the difficulty of the task, and from the deliberation which so peculiarly characterizes the Spaniards. They had overcome the difficulties, and framed a plan of representation, which preserved a due respect to old venerable forms, and was well adapted to the existing circumstances of the country; this having been done, as soon as it was ascertained that Cadiz might defy the enemy there

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*Cortes con-
voked.*

ought to have been no delay. That was ascertained in February, as soon as the Isle of Leon was secured from a coup-de-main. But it was not till the middle of June that a decree was issued, ordering the elections to be completed as soon as possible, and requiring the deputies to assemble in the island during the month of August, that as soon as the greater part of them were met the sessions might begin. The plan which the central Junta framed was altered in one most material point, only one house being convoked. Had Jovellanos and his colleagues determined thus, they would still have summoned the privileged orders; but the Regency, departing inconsiderately from a resolution which had been the effect of long deliberation, neither summoned them to meet apart from the third estate, nor with it, nor devised any plan for representing them; so that two of the three estates were excluded as such from the national representation.

*Commence-
ment of
their pro-
ceedings.*

Three days of rogation were appointed previous to the opening of the Cortes, and on the 24th of September they commenced their proceedings. At nine in the morning the deputies assembled in a hall fitted up for their sittings in the palace of the Regency: the military were under arms, and they went with the Regents in procession to the parochial church of the Isle of Leon, where the Mass of the Holy Ghost was performed by Cardinal Bourbon, Archbishop of Toledo. After the gospel, the Bishop of Orense, who was president of the Regency, addressed them in a solemn discourse; and then the following oath was proposed: "Do you swear to preserve the Holy Catholic Apostolic Romish religion in these realms, without admitting any other? Do you swear to preserve the Spanish nation in its integrity, and to omit no means for delivering it from its unjust oppressors? Do you swear to preserve to our beloved sovereign, Ferdinand VII., all his dominions, and in

his failure, to his legitimate successors; and to make every possible exertion for releasing him from captivity, and placing him upon the throne? Do you swear to discharge faithfully and lawfully the trust which the nation reposes in you, observing the laws of Spain, but changing, modifying, and varying such as require to be altered for the general good?" When all the deputies had made answer, "Yes, we swear," they advanced two by two to touch the gospels; after which the bishop said, "If ye shall do this, so may God give you your reward; but if not, so may he enter into judgment with you!" The hymn *Veni Sancte Spiritus*, and the *Te Deum* were then sung.

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These ceremonies over, they returned in the same order to the hall of assembly; the Regents advanced to the throne, and occupied five seats under the canopy; the two secretaries of state, who accompanied them, took their seats at a table towards the head of the hall; and the deputies seated themselves indiscriminately as they entered, the old contest for precedence between Burgos and Toledo being no longer remembered. The bishop addressed them, briefly reminding them of the perilous state of the country, and the arduous duties which they were called upon to discharge; then desiring them to elect their president and secretaries from their own body, he and the other four members of the Regency quitted the hall, leaving a written paper upon the table.

A difficulty in point of form at the commencement of these proceedings was ended by appointing, as it were at random, two deputies to hold the offices of president and secretary, while the Cortes elected others. As soon as the election was made, the secretary read the paper which the Regents had left. "The five individuals," it said, "who composed the Regency, received that charge, above their merits and their strength, at a time when any delay in accepting it would have been injurious

CHAP. to the country; but they only accepted it and swore to discharge
XXXIV. its duties according to their capacity, till the solemn congress
1810. of the Cortes being assembled, should establish a government
founded upon the general will. That moment so longed for by
all good Spaniards has arrived, and the individuals of the council
of Regency can do no less than state this to their fellow-citizens,
that they may take it into consideration, and appoint the go-
vernment which they deem most adapted to the critical cir-
cumstances of the monarchy, for which this fundamental mea-
sure was immediately necessary."

Upon the motion of Torrero, deputy for Extremadura, the
plan of a decree was then read, which had been prepared by his
colleague Luxan, and which, after some discussion, was adopted
to this effect. The members of the congress now assembled,
and representing the nation, declared themselves legally con-
stituted in a general and extraordinary Cortes, wherein the na-
tional sovereignty resided. Conformably to the general will,
which had been declared in the most open and energetic man-
ner, they proclaimed, and swore anew, that Ferdinand VIIth, of
Bourbon, was their only lawful king; and they declared null and
void the cession of the crown which he was said to have made
in favour of Napoleon Buonaparte, not only because of the
violence which accompanied that transaction, but principally
because the consent of the nation was wanting. As it was not
proper that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers should
remain united, they reserved to themselves the exercise of the
legislative power in its full extent. They declared, that the
persons to whom they should delegate the executive power, in
the absence of their king, were responsible to the nation ac-
cording to the laws. They authorised the Regency to continue
exercising the executive power under the same title, till the
Cortes should appoint a Government which they might deem

more convenient. But to qualify itself for this continuance of its authority, the Regency should acknowledge the national sovereignty of the Cortes, and swear obedience to the laws and decrees which it should promulgate; for which purpose, as soon as the decree was made known to them, the members of the Regency should pass immediately into the hall of assembly, where the Cortes would remain till this was done, having declared their sitting permanent for this purpose. The form of the oath was thus prescribed: "Do you acknowledge the sovereignty of the nation, represented by its deputies in this general and extraordinary Cortes? Do you swear to obey its decrees, and the constitution which it may establish, according to the holy object for which they have assembled; to order that they shall be observed, and to see that they be executed? To preserve the independence, liberty, and integrity of the nation? the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion? the monarchical government of the kingdom? To re-establish upon the throne our beloved king D. Ferdinand VIIth, of Bourbon? and in all things to regard the public weal? As you shall observe all these things, God be your helper; and if you observe them not, you shall be responsible to the nation, in conformity with the laws." The Cortes confirmed for the present the established tribunals, and the civil and military authorities; and they declared the persons of the deputies inviolable, and that no authority or individual might proceed against them, except according to the manner which should be appointed in future regulations, by a committee for that purpose.

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Oath required from the Regents.

Between ten and eleven at night this decree was passed. One of the members observed, that the Regents might be gone to bed, if they were not immediately apprised that their presence would be required that night; a deputation was therefore sent to them, while the ceremonial with which they were to be

CHAP. received was discussed. About midnight, four of the Regents
 XXXIV. entered the hall, and took the oath. The bishop of Orense did
 1810. not come; the unseasonableness of the hour, and the infirm
 state of his health, were assigned as reasons for his absence, but
 it was soon known that a stronger motive had withheld him.
 The sovereignty of the nation was a doctrine which the venera-
 ble prelate was not prepared to acknowledge, and from that
 hour he ceased to act as one of the Regency.

*The bishop
 of Orense
 scruples to
 take the
 oath.*

Sept. 25. On the following day, the members resolved, as a conse-
 quence of their former decree, that the style in which they were
 to be addressed should be that of Majesty; highness was to
 be that of the executive power, during the absence of Ferdinand,
 and likewise of the supreme tribunals. They ordered also, that
 the commanders-in-chief, the captains-general of the provinces,
 the archbishops and bishops, tribunals, provincial Juntas, and
 all other authorities, civil, military, and ecclesiastic, should take
 the oath of obedience to the Cortes, in the same form as the
 Regency. By another edict, they decreed that their installation
 should be officially made known through all the Spanish do-
 minions, and every where celebrated with Te Deums and dis-
 charges of artillery; and that prayers should be offered up
 during three days, imploring the divine blessing upon their
 councils.

Sept. 26. The decree, by which the Regents were declared responsible,
 produced a memorial from them, requesting to know what were
 the obligations annexed to that responsibility, and what the
 specific powers which were given them; "unless these things,"
 they said, "were clearly and distinctly determined, the Regency
 would not know how to act, inasmuch as the ancient laws had
 drawn no line of distinction between the two powers; and thus
 they must be continually in danger, on the one hand, of exert-
 ing an authority, which, in the opinion of the Cortes, might not

be included in the attributes of the executive, or, on the other, of omitting to exert the powers which it involves, and which at this time were more necessary than ever." The reply of the Cortes proved with how little forethought they had passed their decree. "They had not limited," they said, "the proper faculties of the executive, and the Regency was to use all the power necessary for the defence, security, and administration of the state, till the Cortes should mark out the precise bounds of its authority. The responsibility," they added, "to which the Regents were subjected, was only meant to exclude that absolute inviolability which appertained to the sacred person of the king." The whole of a night-session was occupied in forming this answer.

Among the many erroneous opinions which prevailed in this country respecting the affairs of Spain, the most plausible and the most general was that which expected great immediate benefit from the convocation of the Cortes; an error from which, perhaps, no person was entirely free, except the few, who, like Mr. Frere, looked to the assembly rather with apprehensions of evil than with hope. But any great immediate advantage, any rapid acceleration of the deliverance of Spain, ought not to have been expected, unless it was supposed that the Spanish deputies would proceed like the French national convention, and that a revolutionary delirium might have produced a preternatural and overpowering strength. There was as little reason to look for this, as there could be for desiring it. The Spaniards, more than any other Europeans, are attached to the laws and customs of their country. Spain is to them literally a holy land; and its history, being composed for many ages of a tissue of connected miracles, to the greater part of the people sanctifies its institutions. But unless the Cortes took the executive power into its own hands, and gave the nation a re-

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CHAP. revolutionary impulse, which all circumstances forbade, it might
 XXXIV. have been known that the benefits to be expected would pro-
 1810. duce little or no immediate effect upon the operations of the
 war: if that assembly acted wisely they would be slow, certain,
 and permanent.

The mode of election secured a fair representation. Some of the members were of the French school of philosophy, and were sufficiently disposed to have followed the Brissotines, both in matters of state and church-policy. Having become converts to republicanism in their youth, and in the season of enthusiasm, they had imbibed a prejudice against England, which did not even now give way, though they hated Buonaparte and the present system of France as bitterly as the great majority of their colleagues. On this point there was but one feeling.

*First mea-
 sures of the
 Cortes.*

The first measures of the Cortes indicated a sense of their power, and a determination to assert it. Want of precedents, and of experience in the business of a deliberative assembly, were great impediments at their outset: they had hardly decreed the separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, before they confounded them in their own practice. Nevertheless this decree was important, for it was a great object to secure the judicial authority from the interference of government; that, breaking, they said, the chains with which the arbitrary power of some centuries had bound the hands of the most respectable ministers, justice might now be administered for the happiness of the people. A commission was appointed to prepare a report upon the best means of speedily terminating criminal causes. The result was, a decree that an extraordinary visitation of all the prisons should be made by the respective judicial authorities, and the accused brought to trial with as little delay as possible; and that for the future, the tribunals should transmit, through the Regency, to the Cortes, at intervals

Oct. 11.

of two months, accounts of all the causes pendent, and the persons in confinement. Llano, a supplementary member for Guatemala, proposed a more effectual remedy; that a committee should be appointed to frame a law to the same effect as the Habeas Corpus of the English.

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1810.
Dec. 14.

The Cortes found it necessary also to interfere with the executive. The Duke of Orleans had offered his services to the Spaniards; the former government had not thought proper to accept his offer, but the Regency, a few weeks after their installation, invited him to take the command in Catalonia. A century ago their conduct might have been easily explained, when Lord Molesworth gravely asked, what could be done for generals, in such havoc as was then made of them, if there were not so many younger sons of princes in Germany, who all ran wherever there was a war, to get bread and reputation? But pedigrees and patents of nobility were not considered now as exclusive qualifications for command, and the conduct of the Regency, in this instance, was inconsiderate and hasty. When the duke first offered his services, the Spaniards were in the full tide of success; and he expected, with good reason, that as soon as the French armies were disheartened, they would readily forsake a tyrant, to whom they were not bound by any tie of duty. Affairs bore a very different aspect when the Regency informed him, that the obstacles which had formerly frustrated his desires were now removed; reminded him of the triumphs which his ancestors had won in Catalonia; and called upon him to preserve the verdure of their laurels. The duke was a man of too much honour and courage not to fulfil the offer which he had made in more prosperous times. Accordingly he sailed from Sicily in the beginning of June, touched at Tarragona, and having been received there with the honours due to his rank, continued his voyage to Cadiz, where he landed under a salute of artillery.

*The Duke
of Orleans
offers his
services.
March 4.*

CHAP. The bishop of Orense had not arrived from his diocese to
 XXXIV. take his seat in the council of Regency when the duke was
 1810. invited; he therefore was not implicated in this transaction,
 which was in every respect exceedingly imprudent. There
 might have been some apparent cause for it, if the duke had
 been a general of great experience and celebrity, or if he could
 have assisted Spain either with men, money, or stores; but the
 Sicilian court had no means at its disposal: it had sent a present
 of a thousand muskets early in the year, and this was the extent
 of its ability. On the other hand, the presence of a prince of
 the Bourbon line, at the head of a Spanish army, would have
 certainly drawn against it a stronger French force than would
 otherwise have been employed, the destruction of one branch of
 that house being of more importance to Buonaparte than the
 conquest of Spain. That consideration may have had some
 weight with the Junta of Seville, when upon the first outburst
 of national feeling, Louis XVIII. wrote to the principality
 of Asturias, offering with his brother, his nephews, and cousins,
 to serve in their ranks, unite the Oriflamme with their standards,
 and call upon the deluded French to rally round it, and restore
 peace to the world. So many inconveniences were perceived in
 this proposal, that in conformity to Padre Gil's advice, no reply
 was made to it. And though the same objections did not apply
 to the Duke of Orleans, there was an obvious impolicy in inviting
 a Frenchman to the command; the central Junta had felt this,
 and the Cortes also felt it; they held a private sitting upon the
 subject, and the result was, that the duke re-embarked for
 Sicily.

*Second Re-
 gency.*

The Regents did not hold their power many weeks after the
 meeting of the Cortes. A new Regency was appointed, consist-
 ing of Blake, D. Pedro Agar, a naval captain and director-
 general of the academies of the royal marine guards; and D.

Gabriel Ciscar, governor of Carthagená. The reason assigned for this change was, that the members of the former Regency had made known their earnest desire that the weight of the administration, which they had supported for many months, under such critical circumstances, should be consigned to other hands. Those members were now to experience in their turn the same injustice which they had shown toward the Central Junta. Like them, they had disappointed the hopes of the people; and like them, more from the inevitable course of things than by their own misconduct. They were not, however, treated with equal cruelty. A decree was passed, that they should give in an account of their administration to the Cortes within two months, with a view to some future process. Shortly afterwards, in consequence of a secret sitting, they were ordered to retire from the Isle of Leon, and the place where each was to reside was appointed, after the arbitrary manner of the old court. Blake and Ciscar being absent, the Marquis del Palacio and D. Jose Maria Puig were appointed to act in their place till they should arrive. When they were called upon to take the oath, the same difficulty was found as in the case of the Bishop of Orense. The Marquis being asked if he swore to obey the decrees, laws, and constitutions of the Cortes, replied, Yes, but without prejudice to the many oaths of fidelity which he had taken to Ferdinand VII. The president informed him, that he must take the oath simply, or refuse it. The marquis requested that he might be allowed to explain himself. Upon this it was agreed that he should be heard after his colleagues had been sworn; and that business having been completed, he entered into an explanation, saying, "he was ready to take the oath in the form prescribed, provided those deputies who were versed in theological points would assure him that he might do it without scruple. All that he meant was more to ensure the purport of

CHAP.
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1810.

Oct. 28.

Nov. 28.

Dec. 17.

Oct. 28.

Palacio refuses the oath.

CHAP. the oath itself, conformably to those which he had so often taken
 XXXIV. to Ferdinand; and he had never doubted the sovereignty of the
 1810. nation assembled in its Cortes."

*Tyrannical
 conduct of
 the Cortes
 towards
 him.*

The Cortes manifested upon this occasion something of that precipitation, and something of that proneness to tyranny, by which the proceedings of popular assemblies have so often been disgraced. In this case, as in that of the Bishop of Orense, they might perhaps have thought that such scruples disqualified him for the office which he was called upon to accept; but those scruples ought to have been respected; and upon no principle of law or justice could they possibly be considered as a crime. But the marquis was ordered into custody, and the Cortes met again that night, to deliberate upon this unworthy business. One member said, that Palacio had lost the confidence of the public; he could not act in the Regency, because he had shown that his conscience was not such as was fit for a Regent; and his conduct ought to be investigated by judges appointed for that purpose. Capmany maintained, that the Cortes itself ought to take cognizance of the offence; and Arguelles, Oliveros, and Torrero, agreed in these exaggerated censures of an act which, even if censurable, amounted only to an error of judgement of the most venial kind. Arguelles declared, that should the Cortes retrace a single step, and not go forward with its decree, respecting the sovereignty of the nation and their own power, they would give a triumph to the enemy. It was voted, after a long discussion, that the Marquis had forfeited the confidence of the nation, and that another Regent must be appointed in his place. The Marquis del Castelar was chosen. Palacio now represented, through the captain of the guard, that he was confined at this time in a damp room, to the danger of his health, without having a place to sit down. It was then ordered, that he should be confined in his own house, under a guard, who was

never to lose sight of him. This discussion occupied the Cortes till midnight, and then they entered upon a secret sitting, probably upon the same subject. Three days after, it was voted that the Marquis was no longer qualified to act as captain-general of Aragon; and in three more, discovering how little conformable it was to their professed principles thus to proceed to condemnation before trial, the Cortes repealed the decree, and resolved, that both this case and that of the Bishop of Orense should be referred to judges appointed by the Regency, who were to hear the advocates of the Cortes, of the royal council, and of the Marquis, and to consult with the Cortes concerning their sentence. Meantime he was to remain a prisoner at large in the Isle of Leon, upon his parole.

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XXXIV.

1810.

Oct. 31.

If the Cortes, in the tyrannical character of these proceedings, reminded those persons who remembered the commencement of the French revolution of the errors which were then committed, it reminded them also of a measure springing from a more generous feeling, but which, both in France and England, experience had shown to be an error. A self-denying ordinance was passed at the motion of Capmany, deputy for Catalonia, a man well known for his literary labours: it enacted, that no member of the Cortes should be permitted, during the exercise of his functions, nor for a year afterwards, to accept for himself, or solicit for any other person, any pension, favour, reward, honour, or distinction, from the executive power which at that time existed, nor from any other Government which might hereafter be appointed. Gutierrez de la Huerta, supplementary member for Burgos, had prepared a more rigorous bill to the same effect, which was to punish the deputy who solicited any employment for a kinsman within the fourth degree, by expelling him from the Cortes, and depriving him for four years of his elective right, and the capacity of being elected. It was

Self-denying
ordinance.
Sept. 29.

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1810.

carried by acclamation, that some public testimony of disinterestedness should be given. There were, however, a few members cool enough to temper the enthusiasm of their colleagues, and qualify the vote, so as to render it somewhat less unreasonable. At their suggestion, such persons were exempted from the decree, who, by rank or age, were accustomed to succeed in military, ecclesiastic, and civil bodies, according to the rules or statutes. And it was admitted, that cases were possible in which extraordinary services might deserve an extraordinary reward.

*Liberty of
the press.*

Oct. 15

Two subjects of especial moment occupied much of the time of the Cortes. The situation of the colonies was one, which is too wide a topic to be touched on here: the other was the liberty of the press. Upon the motion of Arguelles, a committee was appointed to prepare a report upon this momentous point. Many curious discussions ensued. The Marquis of Vigo protested against taking the subject into consideration. "He was ready," he said, "to sacrifice his life, and even his reputation in the Cortes, which he regarded more than life, for his conduct on this occasion; but he would not sacrifice his conscience." "Whatever light," said Arguelles, "has spread itself over Europe, has sprung from the liberty of the press, and nations have risen in proportion as that liberty has been more or less complete among them. By its influence we saw the chains fall from the hands of the French nation; a sanguinary faction obtained the ascendancy, and the French Government began to act in direct opposition to the principles which it had proclaimed. After having solemnly and by acclamation declared, that the French republic renounced all conquests, they gave orders for the incorporation of Savoy; and the conduct of the Republic uniformly contradicted the principles of the National Assembly, both in respect to the states which they occupied, and to their allies. If at that time we had enjoyed a well regulated

liberty of the press, Spain would not have been ignorant what was the political situation of France, when she concluded the infamous peace of Basle. Spain then abandoned itself with blind subserviency to all the successive Governments of France; and from the convention to the empire, we followed all the vicissitudes of their revolution, always in the closest alliance, till we saw our strong places taken, and the armies of the perfidious invader in the heart of Spain. Till that moment it was not lawful for any one to speak of the French Government with less submission than of our own, and not to admire Buonaparte was one of the greatest crimes. In those miserable days the seeds were sown, and we are now reaping the bitter fruits. Look round the world! England is the only nation which we shall find free from these horrors; the energy of her Government has done much, but the liberty of the press has done more. By that means, wise and virtuous men were able to diffuse the antidote faster than the French could administer the poison, and the information which the people enjoyed made them see the danger, and taught them how to avoid it."

Brigadier Gonzalez affirmed, that whoever opposed the freedom of the press was a bad Spaniard. This occasioned a warm reply, and one of those altercations followed, which the Cortes was not then so well regulated as to prevent, or to cut short. A priest terminated it, by saying, that their first duty was to defend the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman religion, and whatever was contrary to that religion was bad. Then, citing the canons to prove that no work ought to be published without the license of a council, or of a bishop, he inferred that the liberty of the press was contrary to religion. The conclusion was perfectly legitimate, but it was met by an answer not less curious than the argument. "No person," said Mexia, "will deny, that Christianity has existed from the beginning of the world; for though

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1810.

CHAP. our Saviour was not yet come, those moral precepts, which are
XXXIV. the basis of his religion, and which were given by Moses, were
1810. written in the heart of man. In like manner, the liberty of the
press has existed from the time of Adam ; for printing is a mode
of writing, and the liberty of doing it is the same, whether it be
upon the leaf of a tree, or in wax, or upon paper ; and this
liberty all men have possessed. The art of printing, therefore,
where the liberty of the press was restrained, was an injury to
man, inasmuch as it deprived him of this primitive liberty."

There was, however, a great number of members who were
by no means prepared to change the opinions in which they
had been bred up ; and they listened with deep attention to those
speakers who maintained that it was both for the interest of the
writer and the public, that books should be subjected rather to a
previous censure, than to an after responsibility. The result was
not less characteristic than the long and animated discussions
which preceded it. After declaring that all persons were at liberty
to publish their sentiments without any license, the Cortes una-
nimously admitted an amendment which, by inserting the word
political, curtailed this liberty of half its extent : and all writings
upon religious matters were left subject to the previous cen-
sure of the ecclesiastic authorities, according to the decree of the
Council of Trent. Anonymous publication was allowed, but
the printer was to put his name and place of abode ; and if in
case of an offence against the laws he did not make known the
author, he was to incur the punishment himself. For the pur-
pose of securing the freedom of the press, and providing against
its abuse, the Cortes was to appoint a supreme board of censure,
composed of nine individuals, who were to reside near the Go-
vernment ; and a similar board of five members in every pro-
vincial capital ; three of the nine, and two of the five, being
secular clergy. The business of the provincial boards was

to examine such works as were denounced; and upon their sentence the judges were to suppress the book, and call in the copies which might have been sold; but their sentence was not definitive. The author or printer might demand a copy of the censure, and lay it before the supreme board: the supreme board might require them to revise their sentence; but their second opinion was to be final. If the book were suppressed, as a private libel, the individual aggrieved had still his remedy at law against the libeller. Some appeal was allowed against the decision of the ordinary. He was not to refuse his license without assigning the ground of refusal, and hearing what the author, editor, or printer, could allege in behalf of the work. If he then persisted in his refusal, the person interested might lay his censure before the supreme board, and refer the book to their judgment; if they found it worthy of approbation, their opinion was to be communicated to the ordinary, that he, being better informed upon the matter, might grant the license if he thought good, in order to prevent any farther appeal; but what that was to be was not stated. This was not the only point which, by a sort of compromise, was left doubtful in the decree. The article which empowered the supreme board to reverse the sentence of the provincial ones, declared, as it was originally worded, that upon their approbation the book should freely circulate, and that no tribunal should impede it. Some members upon this required that a proviso should be inserted, declaring this was not intended to intrench upon the authority of the Inquisition. To avoid such a recognition of that baleful power, Luxan proposed that the latter part of the sentence should be omitted, and this was carried by a majority of two votes. It was a victory for the liberal party to leave the question undecided. As soon as the discussion was concluded, a deputy moved that special and honourable mention of the Inquisition

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1810.

CHAP. should be made in the decree ; but the president prevented any
 XXXIV. debates upon this inflammatory subject by replying, that it
 1810. might be taken into consideration at some future time.

*State of the
 press.*

Thus having admitted that public opinion was the proper and indispensable check upon the proceedings of Government, the Cortes instituted a board nominated by Government to be a check upon public opinion, which, if the measure had not been merely nugatory, would have virtually destroyed the freedom it pretended to establish. But they were dealing with no easy subject. The press, like other prisoners, had broken loose when the old system was overthrown. It had effected the momentous service of rousing the nation, and it continued to keep up the spirit which it had excited ; but as for exercising any salutary restraint upon the proceedings of the Government, this was of all things what the public writers were least competent to do, and the men in power least likely to tolerate. The danger was, that the press might now at the same time inflame and misdirect the public mind ; a work for which eager volunteers are never wanting in such times. The Spaniards had taken arms to defend their institutions, to which with all their enormous abuses the people were devoutly attached. The best and wisest men wished to reform those abuses. Such men were few, and aiming only at what was lawful and just, they scrupled at any evil means for bringing it about. The party who were for destroying root and branch had no such principle to impede them. Despotism had made them republicans, and an abominable superstition had driven them into unbelief. They also were few, but they were more numerous than men whose opinions rested upon a safer ground ; they were bold and they were indefatigable, acting like some of the early propagandists and victims of the French revolution, in the enthusiastic belief, that nothing but good could result from the subversion of cor-

rupted establishments. Even in the Cortes there were some who looked to the most dreadful stage of that revolution rather as an example than a warning. One member wished for what he called a Christian Robespierre to save the country; another, for *un pequeño Robespierre*, one who would carry on a system of terror with a little more moderation than had been used in France; caustics they said were called for; matters must be carried on with energy and with blood, or the country was lost; heads must be stricken off, and that speedily; it was necessary to shed more Spanish blood than French. When such language was uttered in the Cortes, and circulated in the diaries of that assembly, it was, indeed, most necessary that efficient measures should be taken for restraining the licence of the press. A journal was published under the title of "The Spanish Robespierre," breathing the same spirit as these speeches. One of its numbers was suppressed; the fanatical author exclaimed against this as an outrage upon the sacred, the divine, the omnipotent liberty of the press. "I swear," said he, "upon the altar of the country, no one is more a Spaniard than I. I more than any one abhor despotism and its vile satellites. I alone am sufficient to overthrow them, and reduce that infernal monster to nothing. My soul is more untameable than the planets, more elevated than the firmament itself, more great than the whole universe." Even such ravings were not to be overlooked when, in the same number, it was asserted, that the minister who had suppressed his former paper had conspired against the liberty of the nation; that, therefore, he was guilty of treason, and consequently ought to be publicly hanged without the least delay. Yet the necessity of reform, . . . of a change in the spirit of the Spanish Government, which under all its changes of form had remained the same, was shown in the treatment of this revolutionist. He was cast into prison, and left there, it

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1810.

*Diario de
las Cortes,
T. 2. 441.
T. 4. 371.*

*El Robe-
spierre Es-
pañol.*

CHAP. was said in the Cortes, till he was half rotten, waiting inde-
 XXXIV. finitely for the decision of his case, which they who prosecuted
 1810. him were never likely to think of more!

*Debates
 concerning
 Ferdinand.*

At the motion of Perez de Castro, the Cortes voted a monument as a mark of gratitude to George III. and the British nation. They declared, at the same time, that the Spaniards would never lay down their arms till they had secured their independence, with the absolute integrity of their monarchy in both worlds, and till they had recovered their king. But though the restoration of Ferdinand was thus spoken of in this decree, there were many who perceived the evils with which his return was likely to be attended. The most cautious reformers, however loyal, knew but too well that his presence might prove a serious impediment to any reformation; the more theoretical ones could hope to effect their schemes only in his absence; and at this time it seemed probable that he might soon return, under circumstances which all true Spaniards, however widely differing upon other points, regarded with equal apprehension. The accounts which had been officially published in France of Kolli's adventure represented Ferdinand as still soliciting to be adopted by marriage into the family of the tyrant who had betrayed him. The Spanish Government, with the timid impolicy which continued to characterize it in such things, had not permitted the statement to appear in the Spanish newspapers; the substance of it, nevertheless, was well known at Cadiz, and many things tended to accredit it. For it was well understood, that the Intruder was weary of his miserable position, that Buonaparte was not less weary of supporting him there, and that the French generals were disgusted with the odious service in which they were employed. They were said to have reported every where that Ferdinand, with Buonaparte's consent, had contracted the de-

sired marriage (according to one account, it was with an Austrian archduchess), and that Buonaparte in consequence would replace him on the throne. There was intelligence from Madrid that a Spanish army of 30,000 men was about to be raised for him. The scheme was politic enough in all its parts to be deemed probable: it would have the cordial approbation of the Intruder's adherents; and all who regarded only their own selfish views, all who desponded, all who were impatient under privations and sufferings, all who desired repose, might be expected to concur in it. The youth, the inexperience, the defective education, the alleged simplicity of Ferdinand's character, were to be borne in mind; as through these he had formerly been entrapped, so might he now be made the instrument of Buonaparte, who would thus seek to obtain by intrigue what he was unable to win by force. Against this it was necessary to be prepared. Long and animated discussions were held upon this matter. It was moved, that if Ferdinand should cede any portion of the Spanish dominions to France, all persons obeying his orders to that effect should be declared traitors: that any marriage which he might contract under these circumstances should be declared null, (a proposition against which some of the ecclesiastics in the Cortes exclaimed as contrary to the principles of sound theology:) that if he entered Spain as Buonaparte's ally, he must be rejected, and war carried on against him under the black flag. Now was the time to engrave with the point of the sword upon their hearts that holy Catholic religion in which they must establish their trust! To the petition in the Litany which prayed for deliverance from the deceits of the Devil, they should add from the deceits of the French also. Rather than be thus deceived and debased, it were better that whole Spain should be made what Numantia and Saguntum had been: then might the Spaniards look down from heaven,

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Decree con-
cerning
Ferdinand.

and see whether these impious invaders would be bold enough to walk tranquilly through the silent abodes of their tremendous* ghosts!

The Cortes faithfully represented the nation in their feelings on this subject; and accordingly they issued a decree, declaring null and of no effect all treaties or transactions of any kind which Ferdinand should authorise while he remained in duress, whether in the enemy's country or in Spain, so long as he was under the direct or indirect influence of the Usurper. The nation, it was proclaimed, would never consider him free, nor render him obedience, till they should see him in the midst of his true subjects, and in the bosom of the national congress: nor would they lay down their arms, nor listen to any proposal for an accommodation of any kind, till Spain had been completely evacuated by the troops which had so unjustly invaded it. At the time when this brave decree was passed, the condition of Spain appeared hopeless to those persons by whom moral causes are overlooked, and from whose philosophy all consideration of Providence is dismissed. Fortress after fortress had fallen; army after army had been destroyed, till the Spaniards had no longer any thing in the field which could even pretend to the name, except the force under Romana with Lord Wellington. The enemy surrounded the bay of Cadiz, and were masters of the adjacent country, wherever they could cover it with their troops, or scour it with their cavalry. Yet in the sight of these enemies, from the neck of land which they thus beleaguered, the Cortes legislated for Spain; and its proceed-

* *Sea la España toda otra Numancia o Sagunto; y veremos desde el empireo, si estos impios espiritos fuertes se atreven a pasearse tranquilos por la silenciosa morada da nuestros tremendos manes.*

ings, though the Intruder and his unhappy adherents affected to despise them, were regarded with the deepest anxiety throughout the Peninsula, and wherever the Spanish language extends. There is no other example in history of so singular a position. During the three years which had elapsed since the commencement of the struggle, Buonaparte had not only increased his power, but seemed also to have consolidated and established it; while Spain had endured all the evils of revolution without acquiring a revolutionary strength; and, what appeared more surprising, none of those commanding spirits which revolutions usually bring forth had arisen there. Enlightened Spaniards had with one consent called for the Cortes, as the surest remedy for their country; and in England they who were most friendly to the Spaniards, and they who were least so, had agreed in the propriety of convoking it. Long as the Cortes had been suspended, it was still a venerable name; and its restoration gladdened the hearts of the people. A fairer representation could not have been obtained if the whole kingdom had been free, nor a greater proportion of able men; the circumstances, also, in which they were placed, increased their claims to respect among a people by whom poverty has never been despised. Many of the members, having lost their whole property in the general wreck, were dependent upon friendship even for their food. For although a stipend was appointed, some of those provinces which were occupied by the enemy could find no means of paying it; and no provision for remedying this default had been yet devised. They who had professions could not support themselves by practising, because the business of the Cortes engrossed their whole attention. The self-denying ordinance, which they had passed, excluded them from offices of emolument; and there were deputies who sometimes had not wherewith to buy oil for a lamp to give them light. Under

CHAP.
XXXIV.
1810.

*Character
of the
Cortes.*

CHAP. these circumstances they respected themselves, and were re-
XXXIV. spected by the nation according to the true standard of their
1810. worth.

But as the Cortes faithfully represented the characteristic virtues of the nation, they represented with equal fidelity its defects. The majority were scarcely less bigoted than the most illiterate of their countrymen; and they prided themselves upon having made the assembly swear to preserve the Romish as the exclusive religion of Spain: this, they said, was one of the things which reflected most lustre upon the Cortes. Their opponents, who designated themselves as the Liberal party, assented to what they could neither with prudence nor safety have opposed; and they swore, accordingly, to maintain in its domination and intolerance a corrupt religion which they despised and hated. Disbelief is too weak a word for expressing the feelings of a generous Spaniard toward the superstition which has eaten like a cancer into the bosom of his country. And most unhappily for themselves and Spain, the men whose heart and understanding revolted against intolerance and imposture were themselves infected with the counterpoison of French philosophy, and their best purposes were too often sophisticated with the frothy notions of that superficial school. This party, though far inferior in numbers, took the lead, with the activity and zeal of men who had embraced new opinions, and were labouring to promote them. Though fatally erroneous in what is of most importance, they acted in many cases with a quick and ardent perception of what is just; and not unfrequently they were right in the general principle, even when they were wrong in its application. Through their exertions, measures were carried, as far as votes of the Cortes could effect them, which, if they had been effectual, would have conferred lasting benefit upon the people. But in many of these reforms

they proceeded rashly, neither sufficiently regarding the rights of individuals, nor the opinions and habits of the nation; and in what was most required at such a crisis both parties were alike deficient. Instead of infusing into the Government that energy which had been expected, the Cortes weakened and embarrassed the executive by perpetually intermeddling with it; so that, under their control, the Regency which they had appointed became more inefficient than the central Junta. And instead of making the deliverance of the country their paramount object, they busied themselves in framing a constitution; a work, which, if it had been more needful, might well have been deferred till a more convenient season. Great part of their sittings was consumed in metaphysical discussions, arising out of the scheme of the constitution; and the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people was asserted in a temper which plainly manifested how surely that sovereignty, if it were once erected, would become unendurably tyrannical. Day after day these abstractions were debated, while the enemy was besieging Cadiz. Meantime no measures were adopted for bringing the army into a better state; and the mournful truth became apparent even to those who most reluctantly acknowledged it. But if it be difficult to form an effective army where there are none who have studied the principles and profited by the practice of war, it is yet more difficult to make legislators of men whose minds are ill disciplined, even when well stored.

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CHAPTER XXXV.

AFFAIRS OF PORTUGAL. ROMANA'S DEATH. BADAJOZ TAKEN
BY THE FRENCH. MASSENA'S RETREAT.

CHAP.
XXXV.

1810.

*Expecta-
tions of the
French.*

EARLY in November, the besiegers before Cadiz fired a salute in honour of Massena's triumphant entrance into Lisbon. Such demonstrations could not deceive the inhabitants of the Isle of Leon; but might serve to depress the Spaniards, who had no such means of information; and also to encourage the French themselves, whose confidence in their fortune had by this time received some abatement, and whose hopes of bringing the contest to an end rested chiefly now upon the success of the campaign in Portugal. Massena had undertaken the conquest of that kingdom in full expectation of outnumbering* any disciplined force which could be opposed to him, and still more certainly of outmanœuvring it; for the French Government well knew with what misplaced parsimony the military plans of the English were calculated; and they had neither reckoned upon the skill of the British general, nor the resolution of the British ministry, nor the spirit and exertions of the Portuguese people. He had been confirmed in this expectance by the

* An intercepted despatch from Berthier to Massena had informed him, on the authority of the English newspapers, that the British army did not amount to more than 23,000 men; that a reinforcement of 3000 had reached Lisbon; and, therefore, he had little to apprehend from their resistance; the Portuguese were about as many, and his force was fully sufficient to ensure success.

cautious system which Lord Wellington had, through that parsimony, been compelled to observe, during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo: and though it was by an accident of war that Almeida had fallen into his hands, the speedy reduction of a place so important at that juncture increased the habitual confidence of one who had been accustomed to hear himself called the Child of Victory. That presumption had received a lesson at Busaco, and a check for which he was equally unprepared at the lines of Torres Vedras. Could Lord Wellington have spared a sufficient force to have occupied Santarem, as well as Abrantes; or had the orders of the Portuguese Regency, for removing all provisions, been carried into full effect in that part of the country, he must soon have been compelled to retreat. The wonder, however, is that so much devoted obedience was found to a measure, as dreadful in its immediate consequences to the persons upon whom it fell, as it was indispensable for the deliverance of the country. But being allowed to take a position which was not to be forced without a greater expense of life than his antagonist could afford; having found the means of present subsistence, and possessing also that impassibility, . . . that utter recklessness of the sufferings which he inflicted, . . . that perfect destitution of humanity, . . . which one of his fellow marshals had said was necessary for a commander in this atrocious war, he was enabled to wait for assistance, and for the chance of events.

He had sent General Foy to give Buonaparte the fullest account of his situation; and to supply his wants till farther orders, or effectual reinforcements should be received, he ordered General Gardanne, who commanded on the Agueda, to escort a convoy of ammunition. Strong reconnoitring parties were sent out frequently, both on the Coimbra and Castello Branco roads, in the hope of meeting him; and one of these

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*See Vol. ii.
p. 334.*

*Gardanne
enters Por-
tugal, and
marches
back again.*

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parties had at length the mortification to ascertain that he had been within three leagues of their advanced posts on the Zezere, and had then turned back, a peasant having deceived him, by declaring that the whole French army had withdrawn. Whether the man acted thus upon the impulse of the moment, or had been sent from Abrantes upon this hazardous service, he succeeded in alarming men who, from the want of other tidings, were prepared to believe the worst. Gardanne's corps consisted of 3000 men; but they were so dispirited in their retreat, that when Colonel Grant, with a handful of the Ordenanza, fired upon them at Cardigos, they abandoned their convoy: nor did this active officer desist from the pursuit, till they had lost all their baggage and several hundred men; thus reaching the frontier in a manner which had every appearance, and all the consequences, of a precipitate and forced retreat. The Comte d'Erlon, General Drouet, who commanded the 9th corps, had meantime arrived there; and he determined to enter Portugal, and open a communication with Massena. Advancing, therefore, with 10,000 men, he left some 8000 under General Claparede, at Guarda, to drive away the Portuguese force in his rear.

*Drouet
enters with
10,000 men.*

Silveira commanded the force in that quarter: the other divisions, under Brigadier-General Miller, Colonels Wilson and Trant, shut in the line of the Mondego to the confluence of the Alva. Trant was in Coimbra, which he had recovered by a movement as important in its effects upon the campaign, as it was promptly conceived and ably executed. Wilson had occupied the road from Ponte de Murcella to Thomar, establishing himself at Cabaços; but when the French had occupied Thomar, they attacked him twice from thence, and at length compelled him to fall back upon Espinhal. This was precisely in the line of Drouet's march; and he was thus placed between two fires, the enemy who had driven him from Cabaços being now strongly

posted there. He therefore collected boats at Pena Cova, and crossed the Mondego, timing this movement so critically, that the next day, when the enemy had passed the Alva at Ponte de Murcella, and occupied Foz d'Arouce and the neighbouring villages, he re-crossed with a regiment of militia and some cavalry at the same place, took post the same evening at St. Andre, and captured some of their marauders there in the act of pillage; being then so near the invading force, that several of their stragglers came dropping in during the night, thinking their comrades were in possession of the place, and did not discover their mistake till they were captured. Early on the morrow he moved on Foz d'Arouce; Drouet's rear-guard had just quitted it; the village had been sacked, and several of its inhabitants of both sexes were lying dead in the streets, victims of those outrages and cruelties which invariably marked the movements of the French in Portugal. Wilson hung upon their flank and rear; and, cutting off their stragglers and marauding parties, which was all that could be done with so small a force, made about an hundred prisoners. Trant also marched from Coimbra with part of the garrison, in the direction of Miranda de Corvo, to harass the enemy, if he should take the Condeixa road; but Drouet, having communicated with the party at Cabaços, who expected his advance, halted at Espinhal, till he received instructions from Massena to proceed with his corps and establish himself at Leyria. Wilson then collected his division, and closed upon his rear, for the purpose of impeding him in that marauding system upon which the whole army depended for subsistence. Their detached parties were then brought in daily contact; a sort of warfare in which the Portuguese were fully equal to their invaders, and in which they had always the great advantage of sure intelligence.

Claparede meantime had moved in the direction of Lamego.

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*Rash opera-
tions of
Silveira.*

Silveira, giving him the opportunity which he sought, attacked his advanced guard at Ponte d'Abbade, and was repulsed: having thus exposed the comparative weakness of his force and his own want of skill, he was in his turn attacked at Villar de Ponte, and made a precipitate retreat upon Lamego: the enemy pursued him closely; and the Portuguese, with an honourable feeling, when they evacuated the city, carried with them 140 soldiers from the hospital, on their backs; for they had no other means of transport. Silveira then crossed the Douro. Lamego was thus left to the invaders' mercy, and Upper Beira open to their inroads. In consequence of this rashness on Silveira's part, Miller and Wilson were ordered toward the Douro by General Bacellar. Silveira, however, had retreated with such precipitation, that neither time nor opportunity was afforded for co-operating with him; but Bacellar took a position on the Payva, on the enemy's left flank, and Wilson at Castro-dayre, on their rear. Claparede would willingly have pursued Silveira beyond the Douro, that he might obtain the resources of a province which had not been exhausted; but these divisions were closing upon him, and menacing his communication with Almeida. He returned, therefore, to his position at Guarda.

*Conduct of
Drouet's
corps.*

But the country which Wilson had previously occupied and protected was thus left open to Drouet's marauding parties; and no sooner was his removal ascertained, than they were let loose, and carried desolation along the banks of the Alva and to the very heart of the Estrella. No part of the country suffered at this time more dreadfully than that which was exposed to this corps: it was in vain that the miserable inhabitants sought to conceal themselves in the depths of the great pine forest which extends over so large a portion of that sandy region; no recesses escaped the search of men who were impelled by hunger, by cruelty which seemed to have become in them a craving and

insatiable desire, and by a brutal appetite which rendered them even more dreadful and more devilish than their thirst for blood. The number of inhabitants who perished in the diocese of Leyria (one of the smallest in the kingdom) during the four months that the French retained possession there, was ascertained by official enquiries to be not less than 20,000: and a great proportion of these were butchered in the *Pinhal*, or died there of famine, and disease, and wretchedness.

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If Buonaparte had been in all other respects the hero, the philanthropist, and the philosopher, which he is represented to be by men whose understandings seem to be as impenetrable as their hearts, the history of this single campaign would nevertheless stamp his character with indelible infamy. Expecting, what indeed the event proved, that Lord Wellington had not a force with which to act offensively against Massena in the field, he calculated upon the resources of Lisbon, and made no arrangement for supplying the invading troops with provisions in case of any unexpected obstacle to their immediate and complete success. They were left as in Spain, to support themselves how they could; and in the cruelties which such a system inevitably occasioned, the evils of war received their only possible aggravation. After the battle of Busaco this army subsisted entirely upon what it could obtain by plunder. Throughout Portugal the peasantry employ oxen for draught; these fell into the enemy's hands, wherever the orders of the Regency had not been obeyed; and though those orders had met with an obedience unexampled in its extent, from a devoted people, yet there were many who, in hope that the danger might be averted, delayed parting with what it was ruin for them to lose; and thus the French obtained a supply of cattle, which, though it would have been inconsiderable for a British army, was not so for men in whose way of preparing food nothing is wasted. But the supply was not large; because kine are nowhere numerous in

*The French
army left to
subsist upon
the country*

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that country, where there is little or no use made of their milk, and little demand for their meat; and it was not lasting, because want of bread occasioned a consumption of animal food unusual among the French; for wherever they went they found the ovens and the mills destroyed. They bruised the corn and then boiled it, and they roasted the maize, till with that alacrity and cleverness which characterise the whole nation, they had repaired the demolished mills, and in places where there were none, constructed some of their own devising, turned by an ass at the end of a lever, or by force of arm. The hand mills which soon afterwards made part of their regimental equipments were an invention of Marmont's, suggested probably by the inconveniences which Massena suffered at this time. If the ingenuity with which they thus remedied one of their wants is characteristic, the circumstance is not less so that finding no other fit material for mill-stones they resorted to the churches, and took for that purpose the slabs with which the graves were covered, or the vaults closed!

At first, something like discipline was observed in the marauding parties, and regular detachments with their respective officers were sent on this degrading service; but it was found that these detachments brought home little or nothing, while they who went forth without orders and purveyed for themselves, returned driving before them beasts well laden with the provisions they had discovered; they were soon left, therefore, to take their course, without the slightest attempt on the part of the generals at regulation or restraint; and a system was thus tolerated, . . not to say encouraged, . . in which it is even more dreadful to reflect upon the depravity on one side, than the unspeakable miseries which were endured on the other. French writers who were themselves engaged in this accursed expedition have told us that the whole army had at times no other food than what was obtained from hiding-places which the Portuguese

who fell into their hands had been made by torture to discover ; and that acts of this kind were as ordinary a topic of conversation among the soldiers as any other incidents of their campaign ! In excuse for this, they observe, and truly, that the army must otherwise have perished, . . . that they were like starving sailors, when as the only means of prolonging their own lives they kill and eat their comrades, in extremity of hunger. In proportion as this apology, if such it may be called, be valid, is the guilt of that tyrant by whose deliberate orders the army was detained in such a situation ; and inferior only to his guilt is that of the commander by whom such orders were obeyed. Life is what every soldier must hold himself ready to lay down whenever his military duty should require the sacrifice ; but woe to that soldier who acts as if life were all that he had to lose !

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The same writers, who by the plea of necessity excuse a system so atrocious that even that plea cannot be admitted without doubt as well as shuddering, tell us also of supererogatory crimes committed by this army for which no motive but that of fiendish wickedness is assignable, no palliation possible. When a family was hunted out among the rocks, woods, or mountains by these hell-hounds, happy were the men who did not endure torments, the women who did not suffer violation, before they were murdered. The French officers, when any of them were made prisoners, endeavoured always to reject the opprobrium of these flagitious and undeniable deeds upon the Italians and Germans in their army : but let us be just to human nature, which has neither made the Italians and Germans more depraved than the French, nor the French than the English. The Italians, indeed, having grown up in a country where great crimes are notoriously committed with impunity, may have been accustomed to regard such crimes with less repugnance than either the Germans or the French. But

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French discipline had made all in its armies of whatever stock good soldiers: the first thing needful for moral improvement is to bring men under obedience, which is the root of civil virtue: military discipline had done this; had moral discipline been connected with it as it might and ought to have been, they who were made good soldiers, if they had not by the same process been made good men, would have been withheld from any open wickedness. But this was systematically disregarded in Buonapartes armies; the more thoroughly his servants had corrupted their feelings and hardened their hearts, the better were they fitted for the work in which they were to be employed. Under like circumstances, British soldiers might have been equally wicked; but no British Government has ever been so iniquitous as to place its soldiers in such circumstances. The only offence deemed worthy of punishment in Massena's army was insubordination towards a superior. A wretch might sometimes be apprehended in an act of atrocity so flagrant that it was not possible to let him escape; but there was no attempt to prevent such horrors, not even when there was the wish: they were known and suffered, . . . by better minds in despair, by others with unconcern. In such an army, the soldiers who brought young and handsome women to the camp, as part of their booty, were considered as humane; and humane by comparison they were, though these women, . . . whatever their former condition had been, . . . were played for as a stake at cards, were bartered for provisions or horses, and were put up publicly to sale! It is related, that such women as survived the first horrors of their situation became reconciled to it, because of the terror in which they had previously lived, and because their lives were now secure; that they attached themselves to those who became, as it is called, their protectors; and that it was no uncommon thing for a woman to pass from one such protector to another, rising a step at every exchange, till she became at last the mistress of a general!

The skill which some of these marauders acquired in their search for food, resembled the sagacity with which savages track their prey. That they should detect with unerring certainty any place of concealment in a dwelling or an out-house, might have been expected from the habits of plunder which they had been indulged in in former campaigns; but when they were questing in woods, or among rocks, or in the open country, a new sense seemed to be developed in them. There were men in every company who could discover a depôt of provisions by scent far off. Such resources, however, could ill suffice for such an army; and the reinforcements which they received bringing with them no supplies, added as much to their difficulties as to their strength. Wine, which was found in abundance at first, was lavishly consumed while it lasted. Bread failed entirely: and in many corps, the rations of maize were reduced first to a half, then to a third. A third of the whole army was at last employed in thus purveying from a wasted country, and their comrades are described as stationing videttes to watch for their coming, and communicate by signals the joyful intelligence if they came with supplies; for little now was brought back by the most successful marauders, and sometimes the whole produce of such an excursion was consumed before they returned to their quarters. They had found when they entered the kingdom whole towns and villages deserted at their approach; more appalling spectacles were presented now in the recesses to which they penetrated; whole families were seen there, lying dead; or in a state worse than death; and those who were not suffering from famine or disease seemed to be bewildered in mind as well as rendered wild in appearance, by perpetual terror and exposure.

The helpless and the most devoted were they who suffered thus, . . old men, women, and children; and they who remaining

CHAP. to protect wives, children, sisters, and parents, or to perish with
 XXXV. them, forewent for the performance of that duty the pursuit of
 1811. vengeance. Meantime, the greater part of the effective popu-
 lation were actively employed. Every where in the rear of the
 enemy parties of the militia and ordenanza were on the alert:
 and when General Foy, returning from Paris, entered Portugal
 with an escort of 3000 men to rejoin the invading army, Lieu-
 tenant-Colonel Grant, with eighty of the ordenanza, took pos-
 session of a height which commanded a pass near the village of
 Enxabarda, and kept up a fire upon them for two hours, as long
 as daylight served. Above 200 of their dead were counted within
 the distance of four leagues, the inclemency of the weather
 having killed many of the wounded. The invaders were not
 prepared to encounter such severe cold as is sometimes felt
 among these mountains. About three hundred men of Drouet's
 corps were frozen to death during a night march between
 Castello Branco and Thomar. There was a peasant belonging
 to the latter district of great bodily strength, and answerable
 hardihood, who, being deprived of his former peaceful occupa-
 tions, took up in its stead that of destroying Frenchmen, that he
 might live by spoiling them as they did by spoiling others; this
 man is said to have killed more than thirty of the enemy, during
 the month of February, with his own hand, and to have re-
 covered from them about fifty horses and mules, which, with
 other booty, he carried to Abrantes for sale. He continued to
 carry on this single-handed war as long as they remained in the
 country; and became so well known by his exploits that the
 French set a large price upon his head; but he was in no
 danger of being betrayed by his countrymen, and too wary to
 be entrapped. A cave in the mountains was his usual abode.
 Some of the wretched inhabitants from the adjacent parts took
 refuge near him, and felt themselves comparatively secure under
 his protection.

*Feldzug von
 Portugal,
 p. 66.*

Small parties from Abrantes cut off some 300 of the enemy during the two first months of the year. In one of these desultory affairs, which were all that occurred, while the two armies were waiting anxiously, each with its own views, Captain Fenwick, a most enterprising young officer, who commanded at Obidos, and had been engaged more than twenty times with the French foraging parties, received a mortal wound near Alcobaça: he was pursuing with some Portuguese recruits a party of fourscore French, when one of them, as he was within a few yards, turned round and shot him through the body. He had so won the confidence and good will of the peasantry, many of whom he had armed with French musquets, that they not only brought him the best information, but were ready under his command to face any danger. No man could have been more regretted for the excellent military qualities which he had displayed, and the expectations which were formed of him. The only other affair deserving of notice occurred at Rio Mayor. General Junot made a reconnoissance thither from Alcanhede in considerable force, having learned that there were stores of wine and corn in the town. The piquet which was stationed there retired. Junot rashly galloped into the town, and a soldier of the German hussars waited for him and brought him down. But though this robber left some of his blood upon that earth which had long been crying for it, the wound was not fatal, the ball having lodged between the nose and the cheek bone. A box of topazes which he designed as a present for Marie Louise, was intercepted by a party of the Spanish army in Extremadura, who with rare disinterestedness, foregoing all right to the prize, delivered it to the government. There were seventy-three stones, valued at 3250 dollars: as it was not possible in such times to discover from what churches or what family they had been plundered, the Spanish government dis-

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CHAP. posed of them by raffle, and appropriated the produce to the
 XXXV. relief of faithful Spaniards in the province of Burgos and La
 1811. Mancha.

*Massena
 perseveres
 in remain-
 ing, against
 Ney's ad-
 vice.*

Had Ney's advice been followed, the French, as soon as they had ascertained that it was hopeless to attack the lines of Torres Vedras, would have retreated immediately to the frontier. Well had it been for the credit of that army, and well for humanity, if this counsel had been taken. But he and Massena were upon ill terms; Massena, by his defence of Genoa, had acquired a character for endurance which was supposed to influence him at this time; and Buonaparte, in whose calculations human sufferings were never regarded, undoubtedly expected that there would be a change of ministry in England, and that the first measure of the Whigs when in power would be to withdraw the army from Portugal and leave Lisbon open to him. That party deceived him by their hopes as much as they deceived themselves; and they in return were duped by the falsehoods which the French Government published for the purpose of deluding the French people. The only statements which were allowed to be made public in France admitted, indeed, that the English force, and still more the nature of the ground, rendered the lines of Torres Vedras a strong position; but they affirmed that within those lines there was so severe a famine, that people lay dead and dying in the streets of Lisbon, while the French in their quarters were abundantly supplied. But at this very time it was felt by the invading army as no slight aggravation of their sufferings, that while they were in want of every thing, there was plenty beyond that near demarcation which they were unable to force, with all their courage and their excellent skill in war. Throughout the tract which they occupied, the towns of Torres Novas and Thomar were the only places where the inhabitants had generally re-

remained in their houses: but now, when they who had erroneously chosen this as the least of two evils found that the food was taken from them and their children, they began to retire within the British lines, . . . almost in a starving state. Lisbon, notwithstanding the great military force which it then had to support, and though 200,000 fugitives had taken shelter there, was constantly and plentifully supplied; and the distress for food which was felt there, arose only from want of means wherewith to purchase what was in the market. This was relieved by the Government and by the religious houses, who in feeding the poor at this time rendered unequivocal service to the community. Private charity also was never more nobly manifested than in this exigency; among the British officers, a weekly subscription was regularly raised in aid of the destitute; and it is believed that not less than 80,000 of the persons thus suddenly thrown upon the mercy of their fellow-creatures were housed, fed, and clothed at the private cost of those who in their own circumstances had very materially suffered from the interruption which the war had occasioned to their trade, from the pressure of war taxes, and of other requisitions rendered necessary by the exigencies of a state which was struggling for existence. There had been more danger from disease than from dearth, for no sooner had the army retreated upon the lines than the military hospitals were filled, and various other public and private buildings in or near the capital, which were appropriated to the same use. The hospital stores of every kind had been consumed, or carried off by Junot's army, and had not yet been re-supplied. Recourse was immediately had to the benevolent feelings of the people, and clothing and other things needful for the sick were liberally contributed. But during the time that the armies remained in their respective positions, the fever in the hospitals proved more destructive than the sword of the enemy. Meantime the condition of the Portuguese who remained without the lines, though

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1811.

*State of the
people with-
in the lines.*

CHAP. within the protection of the allies, became every day more
 XXXV. dreadful; they were not within reach of that eleemosynary dis-
 1811. tribution by which their less miserable countrymen were sup-
 ported; any thing which the country could afford was only to
 be obtained by rescuing it from the enemy, or by marauding in
 those parts which were open to his ravages: and when the men
 of the family perished in this pursuit, or were rendered by over-
 exertion and disease incapable of following it, there was no
 other resource for the women and children and the men thus
 rendered helpless, than the scanty aid which the troops stationed
 there could bestow. The British officers at Caldas da Rainha
 formed a hospital for these unhappy persons, anxiety and inanition
 having produced a fever: in that little, but then crowded town, the
 average of burials was from twenty-five to thirty a day: a trench
 was dug, and the dead laid along the side of it, till a Priest came
 once a day, and with one funeral service consigned them to the
 common grave. Orphaned children were wandering about with
 none to care for them, or give them food: and frightful as the
 mortality was, it would have been far greater but for a dis-
 tribution of soup and maize bread, made once a day by the
 British officers.

*False state-
 ments in
 France.*

It was also asserted in France that the discontent of the
 Portuguese, under the privations which their allies compelled
 them to endure, was at its height; that Marshal Beresford had
 ordered every inhabitant to be shot without process, who did
 not abandon his house upon the enemy's approach; that Trant
 and Silveira had been destroyed; and that not a day passed in
 which English deserters did not come over. Germans and Portu-
 guese, it was said, were not accounted deserters, because they only
 returned to their duty in joining the army of Napoleon. Such
 representations obtained more credit among factious English-
 men than in France, and Massena looked with far less hope to
 the result of his operations than was expressed by these de-

spondents. With that confident ignorance which always characterised their speculations, they gave him an additional army of more than 20,000 men, which was to join him under Bessieres, and they called Sebastiani from Malaga to co-operate in the united attack. "The whole effort," said they, "will be directed against Lord Wellington: the whole force is collecting and marching to the different points of attack, with the knowledge of the allies, but without their having any means of warding off the blow. The battle must be fought at the time, and in the way we have always foretold; and he must have firm nerves who can contemplate the probable issue with composure." "The crisis in Portugal," said another self-constituted director of public opinion, "may now be expected daily; and then let the calumniators of Sir John Moore do justice to the memory of that injured officer, who was goaded to commit his errors, and then abused for being defeated! He had not interest enough to have his errors christened exploits, and his flight victory." Another demagogue, after representing that it was England which caused the calamities of Portugal, and the English, whom the Portuguese ought to hate and execrate as the authors of their sufferings, asked triumphantly, "Who is there mad enough to expect that we shall be able to put the French out of the Peninsula, either by arms, or by negotiation? Where is the man, in his senses, who believes, or will say that he believes, that we shall be able to accomplish this? Suppose peace were to become the subject of discussion, does any one believe that Napoleon would enter into negotiations about Spain and Portugal? Does any one believe that we must not leave them to their fate? This is bringing the matter to the test. And if the reader is persuaded that we should not be able to stipulate for the independence of the Peninsula, the question is settled, and the result of the war is in reality ascertained!"

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*Schemes of
co-operation
from the
side of
Andalusia.*

An immediate retreat, such as Ney advised, would have been attended with a loss of reputation, which if Massena had been willing to incur, would have been ill brooked by Buonaparte. But in the position which the French had taken, if they could by any means subsist there, they might look for assistance from Soult, and so waiting, facilitate his operations, by occupying the chief attention of the British army. The Spaniards had nowhere displayed so little spirit as in Andalusia. The people of Cadiz, contented with the security for which they were beholden to their situation, seemed not inclined to make any effort against their besiegers; Soult, therefore, might spare a sufficient force for besieging Badajoz. His means for the siege were ample, and the place must fall unless it were relieved by an army capable of meeting the besiegers in the field; but such a force could be drawn only from the lines of Torres Vedras. If the allies were thus weakened, their position might be attacked; or should this still be thought too hazardous, the passage of the Tagus might probably be effected. This would put great part of Alemtejo in their power, and open the communication with Seville and Madrid. If, on the other hand, Badajoz were suffered to fall without an attempt at relieving it, the same advantage would follow from the advance of the victorious army. Masters of Badajoz, and the other less important fortresses, they might leave Elvas behind them: and if they could win the heights opposite Lisbon, they might from thence bombard the capital and destroy the shipping. With these views, Massena made preparations for crossing the Tagus. The British troops which were detached to the south bank, for the purpose of defeating this intention, were cantoned in the villages there, and suffered very much from ague in that low and unwholesome country. Opposite Santarem the river is sometimes fordable; and once the enemy took possession of an island,

called Ilha dos Ingleses, whence they carried off a guard of the Ordenanza, and some cattle. The possession of this islet might have greatly facilitated their passage, but they were speedily dislodged by a company of the 34th, which remained there from that time. To provide, however, against the possibility of their effecting this movement, and also against the advance of a force from the Alentejo frontier, measures had been taken for fortifying a line from the Tagus opposite Lisbon to Setubal; orders were issued for clearing and evacuating the country on their approach; and the inhabitants (well knowing by Loison's campaign what atrocities were to be expected from such invaders) were required to retire within this line.

Soult and Mortier accordingly, as had been foreseen, advanced from Seville in the latter end of December. Ballasteros, with his ill-equipped and ill-disciplined, but indefatigable troops, was driven out of the field; and Mendizabal, who, with 6000 foot and 2500 Portuguese and Spanish cavalry, had advanced to Llerena, and forced Girard to retire from thence, was now himself compelled to fall back upon Almendralejo and Merida, and finally upon Badajoz, throwing 3000 men into Olivença, a place which had been of great importance in the Acclamation and Succession wars, but which it would at this time have been more prudent to dismantle than to defend. Taking immediate advantage of this error, Soult sent Girard against it with the artillery of the advanced guard. The trenches were opened on the 12th of January. The commander, Don Manuel Herk, communicated with Mendizabal on the 21st, assuring him of his determination and ability to hold out: but a division of besieging artillery had arrived; it was planted in battery that night; and in the morning as soon as it opened, Herk surrendered at discretion. Mortier then immediately invested Badajoz.

The city of Badajoz, which in the age of Moorish anarchy was sometimes the capital of a short-lived kingdom, stands on the left

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*Olivença
taken by the
French.*

*Badajoz in-
vested.*

CHAP. bank of the Guadiana, near to the spot where it receives the Ge-
 XXXV. vora, and about a league from the little river Caya, which on
 1811. that part of the frontier divides Spain from Portugal. Its popu-
 lation before the war was estimated at 16,000. Elvas is in
 sight, at the distance of twelve miles, standing on higher ground,
 and in a healthier as well as stronger situation; for endemic
 diseases prevail at certain seasons in the low grounds upon the
 Guadiana. Count La Lippe had made Elvas one of the
 strongest fortifications in Europe. Badajoz is a place of the
 third order: it has no advantage of natural strength, like its
 old rival; but it had been well fortified, and was protected by
 two strong forts, S. Christoval on the west, and Las Pardaleras
 on the east. The acquisition of this city was of the utmost im-
 portance to the enemy; if Massena could keep his ground till
 it fell, a communication would be opened for him with Anda-
 lusia; Mortier's army would be enabled to co-operate with
 him and act against Abrantes; and against Lisbon itself, unless
 the Trans-tagan lines, which were in progress, should be as for-
 midable as those of Torres Vedras: and supplies might then be
 drawn from Alentejo, the western part of that province being a
 rich corn country.

*Death of
 Romana.*

Jan. 23.

Lord Wellington had concerted his plans for the defence of
 this important frontier with Romana; and a position behind the
 Gevora had been fixed on for keeping open a communication
 with Badajoz. Romana's army re-crossed the Tagus, and began
 their march thither; British troops were to follow, as soon as
 the reinforcements should arrive, which westerly winds, un-
 usually prevalent at that season, had long delayed; and Romana
 had named the following day for his own departure, when he
 was cut off by sudden* death, occasioned by ossification about

* A small edition of Pindar, which he had brought from the north, was in his
 pocket when he died. It is now in the possession of my friend Mr. Locker.

the heart. Due honours were paid to his remains by the Portuguese Government, as well as by the British army: his bowels were buried close to the high altar at Belem, the burial-place of the Portuguese kings, during the most splendid age of their history: his heart and body were sent to his native place, Majorca; and a monument was voted to him by the Cortes. Castanos was appointed to succeed him, and sailed from Cadiz for Lisbon accordingly; but before he could arrive, the consequences of Romana's death had been severely felt. Under the most difficult and hopeless circumstances that noble Spaniard had still kept his army in the field, and had repeatedly annoyed the enemy and obstructed their measures, without ever exposing himself to any considerable loss. The troops, therefore, had full confidence in him; but when Mendizabal met them at Elvas, and took the command, they had no such reliance upon their new leader. On the same day the Portuguese cavalry, under General Madden, drove the French beyond the Gevora; but being unsupported, they were driven back with some loss by General Latour Maubourg, and the whole force then entered, some into Badajoz, some into Fort Christoval. On the morrow a sortie was made, with more gallantry than good fortune, and with the loss of eighty-five officers, and 500 men killed and wounded: Don Carlos d'España was among the latter. The courage of the men in this sally was not more remarkable than the total want of arrangement in their leaders: when they had won the first battery they could not disable the guns, because they had forgotten to take spikes with them! Not discouraged by this severe loss, the troops came out on the 9th. The enemy's cavalry retired before them across the Gevora, and they took up their intended position on the heights of S. Christoval, between the Gevora, the Caya, and the Guadiana. From thence Mendizabal communicated with Elvas

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CHAP. and Campo Mayor, and there he fancied himself in perfect
 XXXV. security. The position, indeed, was strong, and while it was
 1811. held, Badajoz could not be taken. Lord Wellington had advised
 February. Romana to occupy it, but he had advised him to intrench it also,
 Destruction of his army. and the necessity of so doing had been repeatedly represented to
 Mendizabal in vain. Well understanding with what an antagonist
 he had to deal, Mortier would instantly have attacked him if
 the Gevora and Guadiana had not at this time overflowed their
 banks. Losing, however, no time in his operations, he carried
 Las Pardaleras by assault on the night of the 11th. On the
 18th all things were ready for the passage of the Guadiana, and
 a few shells from a well-planted howitzer had the effect of
 making Mendizabal remove his whole army out of the protection
 of the fort. Thus he abandoned the main advantage of his
 position, and yet took no other precaution against an attack
 than that of destroying a bridge over the Gevora ; but soldiers
 seldom fail to know when they are ill commanded, and Ro-
 mana's men now deserted in troops, rather than be exposed to
 the certain destruction which they foresaw. That very night
 Mortier threw a flying bridge over the Guadiana, forded the
 Gevora where it was waist-deep, and surprised Mendizabal on
 the heights. The camp was taken standing, with all the baggage
 and artillery : the cavalry fled, notwithstanding the efforts of
 their officers to rally them ; 850 men were killed ; more than
 5000 taken ; some escaped into the city ; some, with better for-
 tune, into Elvas ; the rest dispersed. The loss of the French,
 in killed and wounded, was only 170, so cheaply was this im-
 portant success obtained.

Governor
 of Badajoz
 killed.

This was the first consequence of Romana's death ; far worse
 were to ensue. Relieved from all inquietude on that side, Mor-
 tier now pressed the siege ; and yet not with that full confidence
 of success which the consciousness of his own strength and

adequate preparations might else have given him, because he knew that the governor, Don Rafael Menacho, intended to have emulated Zaragoza in the defence which he should make. This governor was killed upon the walls by a cannon ball, when the garrison were making their last sortie to prevent the covered way from being crowned. Don José de Imaz succeeded to the command: he was an officer of reputation, who had escaped with the troops from Denmark, had shared their sufferings under Blake, borne a part in their victory under the Duque del Parque, and followed their fortunes through evil and good till the present time.

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Imaz appointed to succeed him.

In the official accounts of the French it was said that the English, according to their custom, had remained tranquil spectators of the destruction of their allies. They had, indeed, been so in the early part of the campaign, to the bitter mortification of the army and of the general, who, by the half measures of his Government, was placed in this most painful situation. The ill effects of the Walcheren expedition were felt more in the timid temporising policy which ensued, than in the direct loss, lamentable as that had been; for the ministry having spent then where they ought to have spared, spared now where they ought to have spent. Just views, right feeling, and public opinion (which in these days is, whether right or wrong, more powerful with a British ministry than any or all other considerations) made them continue the contest; while secret apprehension of ill success, insensibly produced by the constant language of their opponents, who spoke with more than oracular confidence of defeat and total failure as the only possible event, withheld them from prosecuting it with vigour. They considered always what was the smallest force with which Lord Wellington could maintain his ground, never entrusting him with one that might render success calculable, and not yet venturing to believe that British courage would render it not

CHAP. less certain by land than it was by sea. Some excuse for this
 XXXV. weak policy, which even to themselves needed excuse, they
 1811. found in the prepossessions of the king, who, although upon
 February. some points of the highest importance he took clearer and juster
 views than the ablest of his ministers, could never in his latter
 days be brought to contemplate war upon the enlarged scale
 which the French Revolution had introduced ; but looked upon
 an army of 20,000 men to be as great a force as it had been in
 the early part of his reign. Against this prepossession the
 ministers had always to contend while the king was capable of
 business ; and when his fatal malady removed that impediment,
 Marquis Wellesley could not yet persuade his colleagues that
 the parsimony which protracts a war is more expensive than
 the liberal outlay which enables a general to prosecute it with
 vigour and thereby bring it to a successful end.

Had Lord Wellington found a reinforcement of 10,000 men
 when he fell back upon his lines, Massena, being entirely with-
 out provisions at that time, must have retreated as precipitately
 as Soult had done from Porto. That they were not attacked
 before they took up a position for the winter, and that no opera-
 tions against them were undertaken while they remained there,
 the French imputed either to want of enterprise, or want of
 skill in the British commander, undervaluing both, as much as
 they overrated the force at his disposal. But though they were
 thus unjust in their censures of Lord Wellington, the imputation
 which they cast upon the British Government had been to all
 appearance justified up to this time, except in the case of Ba-
 dajoz, on which occasion it was now made. Nothing but the
 grossest negligence and incapacity on his own part could have
 exposed Mendizabal to the total discomfiture which had befallen
 him. After the loss of his army it was impossible for Lord Wel-
 lington to detach a force sufficient for raising the siege, while
 Massena continued in his position ; but it was of such import-

ance to preserve Badajoz, that the British general determined to attack him, strongly as he was posted, as soon as the long-looked for reinforcements should arrive. But the opportunity which both generals at this time desired of thus deciding the issue of the invasion was not afforded them: the winds continued to disappoint Lord Wellington in his expectations of succour; and no patience on the part of the French could enable them longer to endure the privations to which the system of their wicked Government had exposed them. They consoled themselves under those privations by thinking that no English army could have supported them; for that the sufferings which they had borne patiently would have driven Englishmen to desert. But their endurance had been forced now to its utmost extent. Reports were current, that if Massena would not engage in some decisive operations, which might deliver them from their sufferings, he should be set aside, and Ney, in whose intrepidity they had the fullest confidence, be called upon to command them. That degree of distress had been reached at which discipline itself, even in the most intelligent army, gives way; and the men, when nothing was left of which to plunder the inhabitants, began to plunder from each other, without regard of rank, the stronger from the weaker. Massena, therefore, was compelled, while it was yet possible to secure supplies for the march, to determine upon retreating to that frontier which he had passed with such boastful anticipations of triumph.

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*Feldzug
von Portu-
gal. 30.*

The first information of his purpose came through a channel which was entitled to so little credit, that it seems to have obtained none. On the evening of the first of March, a Portuguese boy was apprehended in Abrantes with articles of provision, which were with reason suspected to be for an enemy, because the boy was not ready with an answer when he was asked for whom he was catering. Being carried before the governor, he confessed that he was servant to the commanding officer of a

*The French
begin their
retreat.*

CHAP. French regiment, who had sent him to purchase these things,
XXXV. because the army was about to return to the north of Portugal.

1811. The next day, he added, Massena would review the troops on
March. the south of the Zezere, and the retreat would commence on the evening of the fifth. That a boy in such a situation should have acquired this knowledge, is a remarkable proof of his sagacity, and of the indiscretion of the officer from whom he must have obtained it; for it was verified in all its parts.

Such a movement was, however, so probable, that it had for some days been expected. The first apparent indication of it was given by the French setting fire to their workshops, stores, and bridge-materials at Punhete, on the 3d. They had previously been sending the heavy artillery, the baggage, and the sick to the rear. On the 4th, transports with 7000 British troops on board anchored in the Tagus; and that same day the enemy's advanced corps withdrew from Santarem. Lieutenant Claxton, who commanded the gun-boats appointed to co-operate with the troops in Alentejo, saw them departing, as he was reconnoitring under that city. No time was lost in occupying it by the allies; and when it was seen how the natural advantages of that position had been improved by all the resources of military skill, Lord Wellington's prudence in waiting till time and hunger had done his work was acknowledged by those who before had been inclined to censure him for inactivity and want of enterprise. The opportunity which he had so long desired, and so anxiously expected, had now arrived; and in the sure confidence of intellectual power, he saw that the deliverance of the Peninsula might be secured in that campaign, if Badajoz were defended as it might and ought to be. No sooner, therefore, had it been ascertained that the enemy was retreating, than he dispatched the intelligence to Elvas, desiring the commander to communicate it to the governor of Badajoz, assuring him that he should speedily be succoured, and urging him, in reliance

upon that assurance, to defend the fortress to the last extremity. CHAP.
 That intelligence was dispatched on the 6th. General Imaz re- XXXV.
 ceived it on the 9th. The next day a breach was made, and Mor- 1811.
 tier summoned him to surrender. The garrison at this time con- March.
 sisted of 7500 effective men: the townsmen might have been made *Badajoz*
 effective also; provisions and ammunition were in abundance; *surren-*
dered.
 and the intelligence which Lord Wellington received from thence
 on the very day that Massena's retreat was made known to Imaz,
 was that the place might probably hold out a month; so well
 was it stored, so ably garrisoned, and so little injury had it re-
 ceived. The general, however, like every man who, in such a
 situation, is inclined to act a dishonourable part, called a council
 of war. The director of engineers delivered it as his opinion,
 that 5000 men would be required to resist an assault, and that
 then the surrender could only be delayed two or three days; if
 there was an evident probability of being succoured in that time,
 it would be their duty to hold out, though it should be to the last
 man; without such a probability, no farther sacrifice ought to
 be made. Twelve officers voted with him; one of them quali-
 fying his vote with the condition, that unless the garrison were
 permitted to march out by the breach, and incorporate them-
 selves with the nearest Spanish army, no terms should be ac-
 cepted. Imaz delivered his opinion in these words: "Notwith-
 standing that our second line of defence is not formed; that we
 have very few guns in the batteries of Santiago, St. José, and
 St. Juan, and no support for withstanding the assault, I am of
 opinion that, by force of valour and constancy, the place be
 defended till death." In this he was followed by General Don
 Juan José Garcia. The commandant of artillery, Don Joa-
 quin Caamaño, gave his vote for holding out in very different
 terms, and with as different a spirit. "The enemy," said he,
 "not having silenced the fire of the place, the flanks which

CHAP. command the ascent of the breach being in a state of defence,
 XXXV. the breach being mined, the pitch barrels ready, and the en-
 1811. trance covered by the parapet which was formed during the
March. night, I think we ought to stand an assault; or make our way
 out to join the nearest corps, or the neighbouring forts." This
 opinion, which did not, like that of the governor, invalidate
 itself, was followed by Camp-Marshal Don Juan Mancio. It is
 due to those who did their duty thus to particularise their names.
 In the votes of an unworthy majority Imaz found all he wanted;
 and even in their excuse, it must be remembered that this traitor-
 ous governor did not inform them of Massena's retreat, and the
 assurance which he had received of certain and speedy relief.
 Romana, whose fear of democracy made him every where at
 variance with the popular authorities, had ordered the Junta
 of Extremadura to leave Badajoz, and retire to Valencia de
 Alcantara. That Junta had distinguished itself by its activity
 and zeal, and had its members not been thus imprudently ex-
 pelled, they might have given to the defence of the city that
 civic character which had formed the strength of Zaragoza, and
 Gerona, and Ciudad Rodrigo; and which, in this instance,
 would have proved the salvation, as well as the glory of the
 fortress.

On the eleventh of March, therefore, the garrison laid down
 their arms and were made prisoners of war. The empty stipu-
 lation that they should march out by the breach, was granted,
 curiously, as it proved, to the disgrace of those who proposed
 it, . . . for so insignificant was this breach that some time was
 employed in enlarging it, to render it practicable for their
 passage! "Thus," in Lord Wellington's words, "Olivença
 and Badajoz were given up without any sufficient cause; while
 Marshal Soult, with a corps of troops which never was supposed
 to exceed 20,000 men, besides capturing these two places, made

prisoners and destroyed above 22,000 Spanish troops!" 17,500 were marched as prisoners of war to France! Mortier, in his dispatches, endeavoured to gloze over the conduct of General Imaz. "The death of Menacho," he said, "had possibly contributed to protract the siege for some days; for his successor wished to give some proof of his talents, and thereby occasioned a longer resistance." This could deceive no one. The Regency, when they communicated to the Cortes Mendizabal's official account of the fall of the place, informed them that they were not satisfied with the conduct of Imaz, and had given the commander-in-chief orders to institute an enquiry. But the surrender of the city was not the only part of these unhappy transactions which required investigation; and Riesco proposed that rigorous enquiry should also be made concerning the action of the 19th of February, and the consequent dispersion of Mendizabal's army, in order that condign punishment might be inflicted on those who were found culpable. "The loss of Badajoz," he said, "was a calamity of the greatest importance at this time: it facilitated to the enemy a free communication with Castille and Andalusia, gave them an entrance into Alentejo, and means for besieging Elvas: it would also enable them to support Massena; so that this fatal calamity might draw after it the conquest of Portugal." Calatrava proposed that it should also be explained why so considerable a division had been shut up in Olivença, and no attempt made to succour it. "My melancholy predictions concerning Extremadura," said he, "have been verified. The chiefs of the army of the left, instead of defending that province and preserving the capital, have at length ended in losing army, province, and capital. Well, indeed, may it be wondered at, that the governor, after having himself voted for continuing the defence, should immediately have capitulated, without sustaining an assault, . . a contradiction

CHAP.
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CHAP. which can no otherwise be explained, than by supposing that
XXXV the vote was given insincerely." He concluded by proposing,
1811. that notwithstanding the conduct of the governor, the Cortes
March. should make honourable mention of the heroic inhabitants of that place, and the brave garrison. Del Monte said, it had been remarked on this occasion, that the loss of a battle was followed always by the surrender of a place besieged. This, he properly observed, was a position not less perilous to get abroad, than it was false in itself. . . . Another member, with indignant feeling, demanded, that when the capitulation of Badajoz, and the votes of the council of war were published, there should be added to them a statement of the situation of Gerona when that city was surrendered. "At Badajoz," said he, "nothing has been alleged for surrendering, but that there was an open breach; nothing was said of want . . . nothing of sickness, nor of any one of those causes which might have justified the surrender. Let then the soldiers and the nation contrast with this the conduct of Gerona! Months before that city was yielded, there was not merely an open breach, but the walls were destroyed; . . . the scarcity was such, that boiled wheat was sometimes the only food; and for the sick, a morsel of ass-flesh, when it could be had. In this state the governor of Gerona ordered, that no man, on pain of death, should speak of capitulation. By this path did they make their way to glory and immortality! The soldier who would step beyond the common sphere has here what to imitate. If Badajoz had resisted only four days longer, it would have been relieved."

This was a cutting reflection. But though the loss of that city led to consequences grievously injurious to the allies, and to a dreadful cost of lives, it did not produce all the evil which Riesco apprehended; and that its evil effects did not extend thus far, was owing to the spirit of the Portuguese people, who,

unlike General Imaz and his companions in infamy, had discharged their duty to the utmost. Treachery, which had done much for France in other countries, had not been found in Portugal; and popular feeling, which had done more, was there directed with all the vehemence of vindictive justice against the most unprovoked, the most perfidious, and the most inhuman of invaders. But Massena's military talents had never been more eminently shown, and nothing could exceed the skill which was now manifested in all his dispositions. His columns moved by angular lines converging to a point, upon gaining which they formed in mass, and then continued their retreat, Ney with the flower of the army covering the rear, while Massena so directed the march of the main body, as to be always ready to protect the rear guard, which whenever it was hardly pressed fell back, and brought its pursuers with it upon the main army, waiting in the most favourable position to receive them. This praise is due to M. Massena and his generals, and the troops which they commanded: but never did any general or any army insure such everlasting infamy to themselves by their outrages and abominations, committed during the whole of their tarriance in Portugal, and continued during their retreat. Lord Wellington said, their conduct was marked by a barbarity seldom equalled, and never surpassed: all circumstances considered, he might have said it had never been paralleled. For these things were not done in dark ages, nor in uncivilised countries, nor by barbarous hordes, like the armies of Timour or Nadir Shah; it was in Europe, and in the nineteenth century that these atrocities were committed by the soldiers of the most cultivated and most enlightened part of Europe, mostly French, but in no small proportion Germans and Netherlanders. Nor was the French army, like our own, raised and recruited from the worst members of society, who enter the service in an

CHAP.
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*Skill and
barbarity
of the
French in
their re-
treat.*

CHAP. hour of drunkenness, or of necessity, or despair: the conscrip-
XXXV. tion brought into its ranks men of a better description, both as
1811. to their parentage, their breeding, and their prospects in life,
March. insomuch, that the great majority are truly described as sober,
orderly, intelligent, and more or less educated. Nor is it to be
believed, that, although they acted like monsters of wickedness
in this campaign, they were in any degree worse than other men
by nature: on the contrary, the national character of the French,
Germans, and Netherlanders, authorises a presumption that
they were inclined to be, and would have been good and useful
members of society, if the service in which they were com-
pulsorily engaged had not made them children of perdition.
How nefarious, then, must have been the system of that Go-
vernment which deliberately placed its armies in circumstances
where this depravation was inevitably produced! . . . how deserving
of everlasting infamy the individual by whose absolute will that
Government was directed! . . . and how deep the guilt of those who
were the willing and active agents of such a Government, . . . the
devoted servants of such a ruler! No equitable reader will
suppose that any national reproach is intended in thus dwelling
upon the crimes which were committed throughout the Penin-
sular war by the French and their allies: Englishmen under like
circumstances would have been equally depraved: the reproach
is not upon a brave and noble nation; it rests upon those alone
on whom the guilt abides; and as we tender the welfare and
improvement of the human race, let us hope that it may be
perpetual!

The retreat of this abominable army was marked by havoc,
conflagration, and cruelties of every kind. The towns of
Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, with the villages which
were near the British lines, suffered least, because the enemy
wished not to discover their intention of retreating. In these

places some of the corps had had their head-quarters for four months, and some of the inhabitants had been induced to remain; these people had now fresh proof of their delusion, in supposing that honour or humanity were to be found in the armies of Buonaparte; the French sacked their houses, and destroyed as many as time permitted on the night of their departure; and when their movements could no longer be concealed, they burnt, by Massena's orders, every town and village through which they passed.

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The most venerable structure in Portugal was the convent of Alcobaça. Its foundation was coeval with the monarchy. It had been the burial-place of the kings of Portugal for many generations. The munificence of nobles and princes, the craft of superstition, and the industry and learning of its members in better times, had contributed to fill this splendid pile with treasures of every kind. Its gorgeous vestments, its vessels of plate and gold, and its almost matchless jewelry, excited the admiration of the vulgar; the devotee and the philosopher were equally astonished at the extraordinary articles in its Relic-room; the artist and the antiquary beheld with wonder and delight its exquisite monuments of ancient art; and its archives and library were as important to Portuguese literature, as the collections of the Museum or the Bodleian are in our own country. Orders were issued from the French head-quarters to burn this place; that the work of destruction might be complete, it was begun in time, and the mattock and hammer were employed to destroy what the flames would have spared. The tessellated pavement from the entrance to the high altar was broken up with pickaxes, and the ornaments of the pillars destroyed nearly up to the arches. The French, who at this very time inserted an article in the capitulation of Badajoz, that no stipulations were therein made respecting religion because they

*Havoc at
Alcobaça.*

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were catholics like the Spaniards, mutilated here the Crucifix and the images of the Virgin, as if they studied in what manner they could most effectually shock and insult the feelings of the Portugueze. They cut the pictures which they did not burn; they broke open the tombs. Those of Pedro and Ignez de Castro were covered with historical sculptures: rich as England is in remains of this kind, we have none of equal antiquity which could be compared with them for beauty, or for their value to the antiquarian; and a story, hardly less generally known throughout Europe than the most popular parts of classical history, had in an especial manner sanctified these monuments. These, therefore, were especial objects of the enemy's malice, and more laborious mischief was exerted in destroying them, the tombs being so well constructed as not without difficulty to be destroyed. Fire was at length put to the monastery in many parts, and troops set round it to prevent the people from making any efforts to stop the conflagration. The edifice continued burning for two-and-twenty days. Two of the Cistercian brethren were afterwards appointed commissioners to search the ruins. They found some bones of Queen Orraca and part of her clothes; the body of Queen Beatriz, in a state of good preservation, and that of Pedro still entire, with the skin and hair upon it*. A few fragments only of Ignez de Castro could be found. These remains were deposited once more in the tombs, and the monuments repaired, as far as reparation was possible. The most valuable of the books and manuscripts had happily been removed in time.

* An officer whose journal is before me, and who entered Alcobaça on the 7th, describes what were supposed to be the bodies of Pedro and Ignez as having been well embalmed, and having each a great deal of hair still attached to the head.

Batalha was a structure equally sacred, and more beautiful. Had King Emanuel completed the original design, it would have excelled all other Gothic buildings; even in its unfinished state, it was the admiration of all who beheld it. It was founded upon the spot where the tent of Joam I. stood on the night before that battle which, for inferiority of numbers on the part of the conqueror, may be compared with Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt; and which, for the permanent importance of its consequences, when considered in all their bearings, is unparalleled. Here Joam was buried, after a long and glorious reign, upon the scene of his triumph; and here his four sons were buried also, men worthy of such a father; one of them being that Prince Henry whose grave, it might have been thought, would have been equally respected by all civilized nations. The monuments of these Infantes and of their parents were in a state of correspondent beauty with the temple in which they lay, and perfectly preserved. They were broken open by the French, and the remains of the dead taken from their graves to be made the mockery of these ruffians, who kicked about the head of Joam I. as a football, and left the body in the pulpit, placed in the attitude of one preaching.

Regnier's corps, which was the enemy's left, had moved from Santarem upon Thomar, from thence towards Espinhal: their centre from Pernes, by Torres Novas and Cham de Maçans, and the right from Leyria. The two latter effected their junction on the 9th in the plain before Pombal. What course the enemy would take in their retreat could not be foreseen; had they intended to retire by the way which they had entered, it was thought they would have sent a larger proportion by the Espinhal road. The centre of the allies had taken the same line as that of the French; the right advanced upon Thomar, the left upon Leyria. Our light troops had never lost sight of

CHAP.
XXXV.

1811.

*March.**Batalha.**Direction of
the enemy's
retreat.*

CHAP.
XXXV.

1811.

March.

*Affair be-
fore Pom-
bal.*

the enemy, and when the centre and right joined before Pombal, the British advanced guard, coming from Cham de Maçans, saw their junction from the heights. A brisk affair took place that day before Pombal, where the enemy had eight squadrons formed in different parts of the plain, supported by their whole cavalry. The 1st hussars and the 16th light dragoons attacked the most advanced of these squadrons, defeated them one after another, and drove them all together in confusion on their support, the troops composing which were repeatedly called upon by their officers to advance, but would not move; for they were quite dispirited, and satisfied with safety, seeing the allies were not in sufficient force to pursue their advantage. Lord Wellington could not collect a sufficient body to commence an operation before the 11th, when Loison, with three corps, and Montbrun's division of cavalry were leaving a position in front of Pombal. Having burnt the town, they attempted to hold the old castle, which stands upon an eminence above the Arunca; they were driven from thence, they then formed on the farther side of the town, and our troops did not arrive in time to complete the dispositions for attacking them while it was day;... but they were in time to rescue six women from the flames, whom the French had stripped naked, shut into a house, and then set the house on fire! During the night the enemy retired, and their rear took up a strong position between Pombal and Redinha, formerly a city, now a town, but bearing rather the appearance of a decayed village. They were posted at the end of a defile in front of the town, their right in a wood upon the little river Danços, their left extending to some heights upon the same stream, which has its source about two miles above the town. The light division, under Sir William Erskine, the Portuguese caçadores, under Colonel Elder, forming part, attacked their right; and Lord Wellington, bearing testimony to the merit of these allies, declared that he

*Affair be-
fore Re-
dinha.*

March 12.

had never seen the French infantry driven from a wood in more gallant style. Our troops then formed in the plain beyond the defile with great celerity, and Sir Brent Spencer led them against the heights, from which the French were immediately driven; but their skill was conspicuous in every movement, and no local advantage escaped them. Their retreat was by a narrow bridge, and a ford close to it, over the Danços; our light troops passed with them in pursuit, but they commanded these passages with cannon, and gained time to form again upon the nearest heights, before troops enough could pass over to make a fresh disposition for attacking them. As soon as this was done, they fell back upon their main body at Condeixa; and there they sent out regular parties to drive into the camp all females above ten years of age, and these victims were delivered to the soldiers!

There was now every reason to fear that Coimbra would share the fate of Alcobaca, and Leyria, and Pombal, and that the enemy, getting into Upper Beira, would lay waste in their destructive course a track of country which had hitherto been preserved from their ravages; or that Massena would endeavour to obtain possession of Porto, and defend himself there better than Soult had done. As soon as Lord Wellington had ascertained that the enemy were directing their retreat toward the Mondego, which was on the fourth day after they retired from Santarem, he dispatched advices to General Bacelar, whose head-quarters were at S. Pedro do Sul, directing him to send his baggage across the Douro, to secure means for passing it himself, with the troops under his command, and to take measures for defending the passage both at Lamego and at Porto. It was supposed in this dispatch that Colonel Trant would have retired from Coimbra upon the Vouga, the bridge over which river he was now ordered to destroy, and then proceed to Porto. Trant, however, had intercepted a letter from Drouet to Clapa-

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*The French
endeavour
to get pos-
session of
Coimbra.*

rede (who was then near Guarda), which led him to expect that the French would speedily commence their retreat, and that it would be in this direction; in consequence he destroyed an arch of the bridge at Coimbra; and when the concentration of their force at Pombal and Redinha made their course no longer doubtful, he withdrew his post from Condeixa, and evacuated the suburb of S. Clara, which is on the left bank: this had just been effected on the morning of the 11th, when General Montbrun entered it with a large body of cavalry. Preparations had been made for defending the passage, and happily at that time the Mondego was not fordable. The rivers in that part of the country are rendered impassable for cavalry by a few hours' rain, the water pouring down to them from the mountains on every side; but their course is so short, that they fall as rapidly as they rise. Montbrun, having no guns with him, could not return the fire of six six-pounders, the only artillery which Trant possessed; he retired, therefore, from S. Clara to the heights above it. This movement prevented him from discovering that the river became fordable in the course of the evening, and continued so for some days following. During the night Trant received advice from Colonel Wilson, that the river had become passable at a place some ten miles above the city; and from the other hand he was informed that a few of the enemy's dragoons had actually crossed near Montemor o Velho. Measures were immediately taken for defending both fords; and the field-pieces were fired occasionally, in the hope that they might be heard at the advanced posts of the allied army, and Lord Wellington thus be assured that Coimbra was not in the enemy's possession; but the wind was southerly, and the intention therefore failed. Not doubting but that the French were in retreat and the allies in close pursuit, Trant had no thought of retiring from his post, when he now received dispatches from Bacelar, in-

closing Lord Wellington's instructions, wherein he was supposed already to have withdrawn, and was ordered to take upon himself the protection of Porto. These orders he obeyed, by sending off the main body of the militia, during the night of the 12th, toward Mealhada, remaining himself with a detachment at the bridge. In the morning there was no indication of an attempt upon the town; only a few dragoons were to be seen on the heights of S. Clara; he resolved, therefore, to place his division in a position, and proceeded to join it for that purpose; instructing the officer whom he left in command at the bridge, to take nothing upon himself in case of any communication from the enemy, but refer it to him, and act accordingly. An hour had hardly elapsed, before Montbrun summoned the city to surrender. The officer referred the summons to Trant: it had been merely made to keep in check the garrison which Montbrun supposed to be still there, and in force; for that general having found them ready on the 11th and 12th had advised Massena to retire by the Ponte de Murcella; and when Lord Wellington came up with the main body, who were strongly posted at Condeixa, to his great joy he perceived that they were sending off their baggage in that direction. Immediately he inferred that Coimbra was safe, and marching General Picton's division upon their left towards this road, now the only one open for their retreat, they were instantly dislodged, leaving Condeixa in flames. The allies then communicated with Coimbra; a detachment of cavalry, returning from their demonstration against that important city, were made prisoners, and Trant and Wilson were directed to move along the right bank of the Mondego, and prevent the enemy from sending detached parties across. In the order which Massena issued for burning every town and village, Coimbra had been particularly mentioned.

On the 14th the French rear-guard were driven from a

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strong position at Casal Nova, where they had encamped the preceding night. The whole line of their retreat was full of advantageous positions, of which they well knew how to avail themselves; but he who pursued them was also a master in the art of war; and in his own retreat had acquired a perfect knowledge of the ground. Their outposts were driven in: they were dislodged by flank movements from the posts which they successively took in the mountains, and were flung back with considerable loss upon the main body at Miranda do Corvo, where it was well posted to receive and support them. Here Regnier, with the second corps, effected his junction, so that the whole French army was now assembled. General Nightingale, who had pursued this column, rejoined the British army the same day at Espinhal: and as it was now in the power of Lord Wellington to turn their position, they abandoned it during the night.

A thick fog on the following morning gave them time, and favoured their movements. Some deserters came in, who said that they were destroying carriages, baggage, and ammunition. About nine the day cleared up, and the troops, renewing the pursuit, passed through the smoking ruins of Miranda do Corvo. Hitherto they had only seen proofs of the cruelty of the enemy along the road; they now began to see proofs of his distress; for from this place the road was strewn with the wreck of a retreating army, broken carriages, baggage, carcasses of men and beasts, the wounded and the dying. Amid this general havoc, nothing was more shocking than the number of horses, asses, and mules, which the French, when their strength failed, had hamstrung, and left to suffer a slow death. To have killed them at once would have been mercy, and mercy was a virtue which this army seemed to have forsworn: it even appeared, by the manner in which these poor creatures were grouped,

that Massena's troops had made the cruelties which they inflicted a matter of diversion to themselves! Every day the bodies of women were seen whom they had murdered. In one place some friars were hanging, impaled by the throat upon the sharpened branches of a tree. Every where peasants were found in the most miserable condition; poor wretches who had fallen into the hands of the French, and been tortured to make them discover where supplies were hid, or made to serve as guides, and when their knowledge of the way ended, shot, that they might give no information to the pursuers. The indignation of our army was what it ought to be; men and officers alike exclaimed against the atrocious conduct of their detestable enemies. "This," said Lord Wellington, "is the mode in which the promises have been performed, and the assurances fulfilled, which were held out in the proclamation of the French commander-in-chief, when he told the inhabitants of Portugal, that he was not come to make war upon them, but, with a powerful army of an hundred and ten thousand men, to drive the English into the sea! It is to be hoped that the example of what has occurred in this country will teach the people of this and of other nations, what value they ought to place on such promises and assurances; and that there is no security for life, or for any thing that renders life valuable, except in decided resistance to the enemy."

The retreating army had no provisions except what they plundered on the spot, and could carry on their backs, and live cattle, with which they were well provided. As far as Condeixa the allied troops had been supplied by transport from Lisbon, to their own admiration, so excellent had been the previous arrangement. But as they advanced, they suffered more privations than the enemy whom they were driving out of the country, for the French left the land as a desert behind them, and the

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commissariat could not keep up with the rapidity of such a pursuit. The dragoons always kept sight of the enemy ; they were constantly mounted before daybreak, their horses were never unsaddled, and were obliged to carry their own sustenance, which, it may be supposed, was sufficiently scanty. In the midst of a country where the people regarded them not merely as allies, but as friends, brothers, and deliverers, that people had not even shelter to afford them, and none of the troops had tents ; those which they occupied in the lines were left there. But they reaped an abundant reward in the success of their general's well-concerted and patient plan, in the anticipated applause of their own countrymen, in the blessings of the Portuguese, and in that feeling, . . of all others the happiest which can fall to a soldier's lot, . . that they were engaged in a good cause, and that the wickedness of the enemy rendered it as much a moral as a military duty to labour for his destruction. With these feelings they attacked them wherever they were found. Massena had taken up a formidable position on the Ceyra, which falls into the Mondego a few leagues above Coimbra, and is one of the Portuguese rivers in whose bed gold has been found ; a whole corps was posted as an advanced guard in front of Foz de Arouce, on the left side of the river. Here Lord Wellington again moved his divisions upon their right and left, and attacked them in front. In this affair the French sustained a considerable loss, which was much increased by a well-managed movement of the English 95th. That regiment observed a body of the enemy moving off in two parallel columns. There was a woody cover between them, into which the 95th got, the fog and the closing evening enabling them to do so unperceived ; from thence they fired on both sides, and retiring instantly that the fire was returned, left the two columns of the French to keep up a heavy fire upon each other as they passed the cover. The

darkness of the night increased their confusion: many were drowned in crossing the river, . . . a mountain stream swoln by the rains, . . . and it is said that one column blew up the bridge while the other was upon it. Much baggage, and some ammunition carriages, here fell into the hands of the pursuers. The light division got into the enemy's bivouac, and found not only some of their plunder there, but their dinners on the fires. A heavy fog had delayed the movements of the army, and prevented a more serious attack, from which much had been expected.

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Having blown up the bridge, the enemy's rear-guard took a position on the bank of the river, to watch the ford. The loss which they had sustained on the preceding day was betrayed in part by the bodies which they had thrown into the water to conceal it, but which were seen as the stream bore them down. Lord Wellington was obliged to halt the whole of the following day for supplies, the rains having rendered bad roads almost impassable. Here, too, the ill news from Badajoz compelled him to order toward that frontier a part of his army, which should otherwise have continued in the pursuit. During the night, the French moved off, and the pursuers forded the Ceyra on the 17th. On the 18th, they advanced toward the Ponte de Murcella; the French, who, during the whole of the retreat, made their marches by night, putting their troops in motion a few hours after dusk, had retired over this bridge and destroyed it, using the very mines which the British had constructed for the same purpose, on their retreat in the preceding autumn. They were now posted in force on the right of the Alva. Lord Wellington turned their left by the Serra de Santa Quiteria, and manœuvred in their front; this compelled them to retire upon Mouta. It was believed that they had intended to remain some days in the position from which they were thus driven, because many prisoners were

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CHAP. taken who had been sent out in foraging parties toward the
 XXXV. Mondego, and ordered to return to the Alva. During the night
 1811. the staff corps constructed a bridge which was ready at day-
March. break for the infantry. The cavalry passed at a ford close by,
 and there was some difficulty in getting the artillery across. On
 the 19th, they were assembled on the Serra de Mouta, the enemy,
 as usual, having retired in the night. From this place they con-
 tinued their retreat with the utmost rapidity. Lord Wellington
 kept up the pursuit with only the cavalry and the light division
 under Sir William Erskine, supported by two divisions of in-
 fantry, and by the militia on the right of the Mondego. The
 remainder of the army was obliged to halt, till the supplies,
 which had been sent round from the Tagus to the Mondego,
 should arrive; this was absolutely necessary, for nothing could
 be found in the country.

*Resistance
 made by the
 peasantry.*

The peasants did not every where abandon their villages to the
 spoilers; in some places they found means to arm themselves,
 and their appearance deterred the enemy from making their in-
 tended attack, the pursuers being so near at hand; in others
 they entered the burning villages with the foremost of the allied
 army in time to extinguish the flames. There is a village called
 Avo, six-and-thirty miles from Coimbra, containing about 130
 houses. The ordenanza of that district were collected there;
 they repelled a body of 500 French in five different attacks, and
 saved the village. The little town of Manteigas was less for-
 tunate. The inhabitants of the adjoining country, confiding in
 the situation of a place, which was, as they hoped, concealed in
 the heart of the Serra de Estrella, had brought their women and
 children thither, and their most valuable effects; but it was dis-
 covered, and in spite of a desperate defence, the town was stormed,
 by a force as superior in number as in arms. The officers car-
 ried off the handsomest women; the rest were given up to the

mercy of men as brutal as their leaders. But every where the naked bodies of the straggling and wounded, which the English found upon the way, showed well what vengeance these most injured people had taken upon their unprovoked and inhuman enemies. In one place a party of them were surprised in a church digging the dead out of their graves in search of plunder.

As the French drew nearer the frontier, their foraging parties assumed more confidence, and at the same time their wants becoming more urgent, made them more daring. They passed the fords of the Mondego near Fornos, in considerable numbers, to seek supplies in a country as yet unravaged; but they were attacked by Wilson, who pursued them across the river and captured a great number of beasts of burthen, laden with plunder of every description, which they abandoned in their flight. He took several prisoners also, and in consequence of the loss which they had thus sustained, a strong division was detached against him, which took a position on the left bank of the river, so as to cover the flank of the retiring columns from any further operations of this militia force, till they had passed Celorico. Lord Wellington, for want of supplies, was not able to proceed till the 26th, when he advanced to Gouvea, halted again the next day, and on the following reached Celorico. The French were then at Guarda, which they occupied in strength, and where they apparently intended to maintain themselves. Between Celorico and that city, the inhabitants of a village, men and women alike, were found dead or dying in the street, their ears and noses cut off, and otherwise mangled in a manner not to be described. The horror and indignation of the allies were raised to the highest pitch by this dreadful sight; and the advanced guard coming up with some hundreds of the guilty troops, whose retreat had been impeded by the premature destruction of a bridge, gave them as little quarter as they deserved. But as the enemy only

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passed through this part of the country, it had not suffered so much as those places where they had been stationary, and consequently had had leisure to prepare * for the work of barbarous devastation which their Generals had determined upon committing. Not having time now to destroy every thing before them, they burnt only the principal houses: poorer habitations escaped; and the peasants who had fled before the retreating army to the mountains no sooner saw the allies come up, than they returned to their dwellings, baked bread for their deliverers from the corn which they had concealed, and did every thing in their power to assist them.

Guarda.

Guarda stands upon a plain of the Serra de Estrella (the Mons Herminius of the Romans) near the sources of the Zezere and the Mondego, and near the highest part of that lofty range; its site is said to be higher than that of any other city in Europe; the ascent to it continues nearly four miles, by a road wide enough for two carts abreast, winding in numberless sinuations along the edge of a deep precipice, the sides of which are over-spread with trees. The city indeed owes its origin to this commanding situation, having grown round a watch tower (called in those days *guarda*) which Sancho the First erected there in the first age of the monarchy. Lord Wellington collected his army in the neighbourhood and in the front of Celorico, with a view to dislodge the enemy from this advantageous post. The following day he moved forward in five columns, supported by a division in the valley of the Mondego; the militia under Trant and Wilson covering the movement at Alverca against any attempt which might have been made against it on that side.

* A French orderly book was found near Batalha, in which it appeared what number of men were daily ordered upon the service of destroying, as far as they could, that beautiful edifice, one of the finest in Europe.

So well were the movements concerted, that the heads of the different columns made their appearance on the heights almost at the same moment; upon which the enemy, without firing a shot, retired upon Sabugal on the Upper Coa; for although Dumouriez, with his superficial knowledge of the country, had spoken of Guarda as the key of Portugal, and upon that authority it has been described as one of the finest military positions in the kingdom, the French Generals perceived that its apparent strength only rendered it more treacherous, and were too prudent to attempt making a stand there, against one whom they now could not but in their hearts acknowledge to be at least their equal in the art of war. Their retreat was so rapid that they had not time to execute the mischief which they intended; our troops entered in time to save the Cathedral, the door of which was on fire: the wood of its fine organ had been taken by the enemy for fuel, and the pipes for bullets. They took a strong position, their right at Ruvina guarding the ford of Rapoula de Coa, with a detachment at the bridge of Ferreiros; their left was at Sabugal, and their 8th corps at Alfayates. The right of the allied army was opposite Sabugal, their left at the bridge of Ferreiros, and Trant and Wilson were sent across the Coa below Almeida, to threaten the communication of that place with Ciudad Rodrigo and with the enemy's army.

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The river Coa rises in the Sierra de Xalma, which forms a part of the great Sierra de Gata; and entering Portugal by Folgozinho, falls into the Douro near Villa Nova de Foscoa. The whole of its course is through one of the most picturesque countries in Europe, and it is every where difficult of access. Sabugal stands on the right bank. This town was founded about the year 1220, by Alonso X. of Leon, who named it from the number of elder-trees (*sabugos*) growing about it: the place is now remarkable for some of the largest chesnut trees that are

The Coa.

Sabugal.

CHAP. any where to be seen. It was afterwards annexed to the Portu-
 XXXV. gueze dominions, and its old castle still remains a monument of
 1811. King Diniz, whose magnificent works are found over the whole
 April. kingdom. The enemy's second corps were strongly posted with
 their right upon a height immediately above the bridge and
 town, and their left extending along the road to Alfayates, to a
 height which commanded all the approaches to Sabugal from
 the fords above the town. They communicated by Rendo with
 the sixth corps at Ruvina. It was only on the left above
 Sabugal that they could be approached; our troops, therefore,
 were put in motion on the morning of the third of April, to turn
 them in this direction, and to force the passage of the bridge of
 Sabugal. The light division and the cavalry, under Sir W.
 Erskine and Major-General Slade, were to cross the Coa by
 two separate fords upon the right, the cavalry upon the right
 of the light division; the third division, under Major-General
 Picton, at a ford on the left about a mile above Sabugal;
 the fifth division, under Major-General Dunlop, and the ar-
 tillery at the bridge. The sixth division remained opposite the
 enemy's corps at Ruvina, and a battalion of the seventh ob-
 served their detachment at the bridge of Ferreiros. Colonel
 Beckwith's brigade of the light division was the first that
 crossed, with two squadrons of cavalry upon its right; the
 riflemen skirmished; the enemy's picquets fell back from the
 river as they advanced: they forded, gained the opposite
 height, formed as the companies arrived, and moved forward
 under a heavy fire. At this time so thick a rain came on,
 that it was impossible to see any thing before them, and the
 troops pushing forward in pursuit of the picquets, came upon the
 left of the main body, which it was intended they should turn.
 The light troops were driven back upon the 43d regiment; and
 Regnier, who commanded the French, perceiving, as soon as

*Action be-
 fore Sa-
 bugal.*

the atmosphere cleared, that the body which had advanced was not strong, attacked it in a solid column, supported by artillery and horse. The allies repulsed it, and advanced in pursuit upon the position. They found a strong enclosure in the front lined with a battalion; and the enemy forming fresh and stronger bodies, attacked them with the hussars on the right, and a fresh column on the left. Our troops retired, took post behind a wall, formed again under a heavy fire of grape, canister, and musketry, again repulsed the enemy, again advanced against them, and took from them a howitzer posted in the rear of the French battalion, which was formed under cover of that in the stone enclosure: this gun had greatly annoyed the allies. They had advanced with such impetuosity that their front was somewhat scattered; a fresh column with cavalry attacked them; they retired again to their post, where the battalions of the 52d and the 1st Caçadores joined them: these troops once more repulsed the enemy, and Colonel Beckwith's brigade, with the first battalion of the 52d, again advanced upon them. Another column of the French, with cavalry, charged their right: but they took post in the stone enclosure on the top of the height, from whence they could protect the howitzer which had been won, and they again drove back the enemy. Regnier had moved a column on their left to renew the attack, when part of General Picton's division came up; the head of General Dunlop's column forced the bridge at the same time, and ascended the heights on the right flank; the cavalry appeared on the high ground in rear of their left, and Regnier then retreated across the hills towards Rendo, leaving the howitzer in the hands of those by whom it had been so gallantly won; about 200 were left on the field, with six officers and 300 prisoners. Our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted to 161. What that of the French was in wounded is

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CHAP. not known. They retired in the greatest disorder, cavalry,
XXXV. artillery, infantry, and baggage, all mixed. A fog favoured
1811. them, otherwise a good account would have been given of half
April. their corps. Lord Wellington described this action, though the
unavoidable accidents of weather had materially interfered with
the operations, and impeded their success, as one of the most
glorious that British troops were ever engaged in.

Regnier joined the sixth corps at Rendo; for it had broken up from its position at Ruvina as soon as the firing began; they retreated to Alfayates, followed by our cavalry; that night they continued their retreat, and entered the Spanish frontier on the fourth. On the following day the advance of the allied army pushed on, and occupied Albergaria, the first village on the Spanish border. An inhabited village was what they had not seen before since their retreat in the autumn, those excepted which were within the lines of Torres Vedras. The villages in Spain had not been injured; it seemed as if the French wished to make the Spaniards on this frontier compare their own condition with that of the Portuguese, that they might become contented with subjection. Massena's soldiers even paid here for bread; and arriving not only hungry, but with a longing desire for that which is to them the most necessary article of food, they paid any price for it: the peasants seeing that they were rich in plunder, and finding them in the paying mood, made their charges accordingly. This sudden transition from a devastated country to one which had been exempted from the ravages of war, where the villages were clean, and the cottages reminded Englishmen of those in their own land, was not less striking than was the passing at once from a wild mountainous region to a fine and well-wooded plain.

Some hope was entertained that the appearance of Trant and Wilson's force before Almeida might make the French ap-

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apprehend a serious attack, and induce them to evacuate it. But throughout the war they never committed any error of this kind. It rarely happened in their service that any person was appointed to a situation for which he was not well qualified; and the commander of this fortress, General Brenier, was a man of more than common qualifications. The Coa, after these divisions crossed it at Cinco Villas, rose; and the governor concerted with General Regnier an attack upon them, which, their retreat being thus cut off, must have ended in their destruction, if Lord Wellington, apprehending the danger, had not pushed forward a small corps, which arrived just in time to divert the enemy's attention, and save them. On the eighth the last of Massena's army crossed the Agueda, not a Frenchman remaining in Portugal, except the garrison of Almeida, which Lord Wellington immediately prepared to blockade. The allies took up that position upon the Duas Casas, which General Craufurd had occupied with the advanced guard during the latter part of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, having their advanced posts upon Galegos and the Agueda. Thus terminated the invasion of Portugal, in which Massena, with 110,000 men, had boasted that he would drive the English into the sea. A general of the highest reputation, and of abilities no ways inferior to his celebrity, at the head of the largest force which France could send against that country, was thus in all his plans baffled by a British general, and in every engagement beaten by British troops. An enemy the most presumptuous and insolent that ever disgraced the profession of arms, the most cruel that ever outraged human nature, had been humbled and exposed in the face of Europe; . . it was in vain for the French Government to call their retreat a change of position, . . however they might disguise and misrepresent the transactions in Portugal, however they might claim victories where they had sustained de-

*The French
 cross the
 frontier.*

CHAP. feats, the map discovered here their undeniable discomfiture ;
 XXXV. and the smallest kingdom in Europe, a kingdom too which
 1811. long misgovernment had reduced to the most deplorable
 state of disorganization, had, by the help of England and the
 spirit of its inhabitants, defied and defeated that tyrant before
 whom the whole continent was humbled. Russia had been
 so foiled in arms and dressed in negociation so as to become
 the ally of France, to co-operate in her barbarous warfare
 against commerce, and to recognise her extravagant usurpa-
 tions. Prussia had been beaten and reduced to vassalage.
 Austria was still farther degraded by being compelled to give
 a daughter of its emperor in marriage to one whose crimes that
 emperor himself had proclaimed to the world. Poles and
 Italians, Dutch and Germans, from every part of divided and
 subjected Germany, filled up the armies of this barbarian ; and
 the Portugeze, . . the poor, degraded, and despised Portugeze,
 . . the vilified, the injured, the insulted Portugeze, . . were the
 first people who drove this formidable enemy out of their coun-
 try, and delivered themselves from the yoke.

March 18.
*Opinions of
 the Whigs
 at this time.*

*Mr. Pon-
 sonby.*

*Mr. Free-
 mantle.*

While Massena was retreating, and before the intelligence
 arrived in England, a debate took place in both houses, upon a
 motion, that two millions should be granted for the Portugeze
 troops in British pay. The opposition did not let pass this oppor-
 tunity of repeating their opinions and their prophecies, . . in happy
 hour! Mr. Ponsonby said, that our success consisted in having lost
 almost the whole of Portugal, and having our army hemmed in
 between Lisbon and Cartaxo ; except that intermediate space, we
 had abandoned all Portugal. Mr. Freemantle, after a panegyric
 upon Sir John Moore's retreat, said that the present campaign left
 Lord Wellington incapable of quitting his intrenchments, and
 only waiting the result of such movements as the enemy might
 be disposed to make. " It rests with the enemy," said he, " to

choose his day, to make his own dispositions, to wait for his reinforcements, to choose whether he will continue to blockade you, or whether he will give you a fair opportunity of contending with him in the field. If we are to judge by the publications in France, he will decide upon the former; and in this he will judge wisely. The result of all your victories, of all your expenditure in men and money, of all your exertions, and of all your waste of the military resources of this country, is . . the position of your army at Lisbon, insulated and incapable of acting, but at the discretion of the enemy: your allies in every other part of the peninsula overwhelmed, and only manifesting partial and unavailable hostility; your own resources exhausted, and your hopes of ultimate success, to every mind which is not blinded by enthusiasm, completely annihilated! Such is the result of a system founded upon the principle of attempting to subdue Buonaparte by the force of your armies on the continent! Will any man say that this has been a wise system? Will any man, who is not determined, under any circumstances, to support the measures of a weak and misguided government, contend that it has been successful? that it has answered either the promises to your allies, or the hopes to your country? that it has either contributed to their security, or to your own benefit?"

General Tarleton also delivered it as his opinion, that we had lost the whole of the peninsula, except the spot between Cartaxo and Lisbon; that the Portuguese troops had never been of any actual service; that we could not maintain ourselves in the country, for the fatal truth must at length be told; and that when our army was to get out of it, he was afraid it would be found a difficult matter. Lord Grenville, in the Upper House, spoke to the same purport, affirming that the British army in Portugal did not possess more of the country than the ground which it actually occupied, and that while we were vainly drain-

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*General
Tarleton.*

*Lord Gren-
ville.*

CHAP. ing our own resources, and hazarding our best means, we did
XXXV. not essentially contribute to help Portugal, or to save it. It was, he
1811. added, because he had the cause of Spain and Portugal sincerely
and warmly at heart, that he felt anxious we should pause in this
wild and mad career of thoughtless prodigality, look our own
situation in the face, and learn the necessity of economising our
resources, that we might be able, at a period more favourable
than the present, to lend to the cause of the nations of the Pe-
ninsula, or to that of any other country similarly situated, that
support and those exertions which, when made under all the
circumstances of our present situation, must be found not only
wholly unavailing to our allies, but highly injurious to ourselves.

Two days after these opinions were delivered, the telegraph
announced the news of Massena's retreat.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

CADIZ. BATTLE OF BARROSA. DEATH OF ALBURQUERQUE.

ABOUT the same time that the tide had thus turned in Portugal, came tidings of a victory in Spain, which, if it led to no other result, tended to raise the character of the British army and the spirits of the nation. When Soult marched against Badajoz, hoping to co-operate with Massena in the conquest of Portugal, he made such large drafts from the army before Cadiz, that it was thought possible, by a well-concerted attack, to raise the blockade. The plan was, that an expedition should sail from Cadiz, and force a landing between Cape Trafalgar and Cape de Plata, or at Tarifa, or at Algeciras. The Spanish force at St. Roques was then to join, and a combined attack to be made upon the rear of the enemy's line; while, in the mean time, an attempt should be made from the Isle of Leon to open a communication with them. D. Manuel de Lapeña was appointed to the command. He had conducted the wreck of the central army during the latter part of its retreat, under circumstances in which no military skill could be displayed, but in which his patriotism and moderation had been fully proved. Lieutenant-General Graham, who commanded the British troops at Cadiz, consented to act under him. This officer was now in his sixty-first year. The former part of his life he had past in the enjoyments of domestic comfort, amusing himself with rural

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*Expedition
from Cadiz.**Lieutenant-
General
Graham.*

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sports, with improving his estates, and with literature: after eighteen years of happiness his wife died on the way to the south of France, and Mr. Graham, seeking for relief in change of place and in active occupations, joined Lord Hood as a volunteer when Toulon was taken possession of in 1793. Here he distinguished himself greatly, and on his return to England obtained permission to raise a regiment, but not without great difficulty and express discouragement from the commander-in-chief. He was at Mantua with Wurmser in 1796, and escaped by cutting his way through the besiegers in a night sortie: and he bore a distinguished part at Malta when Sir Alexander Ball, under circumstances the most painful, and with means the most inadequate, by his wisdom and perseverance recovered that island from the enemy. Nevertheless the time of life at which he had entered the army, and the manner, impeded his promotion; and he would probably never have risen in rank if General Moore had not experienced great assistance from him in his retreat, and at the battle of Coruña, and sent home so strong a recommendation that it could not be neglected.

Apprehensions of the enemy.

The expedition, though upon no extensive scale, was yet a great exertion for a government so poor in means as the Regency, so feeble, and with all its branches so miserably disorganized. The bustle in the roads was visible from the enemy's lines, as well as from the city; in Cadiz the highest hopes were excited, and Marshal Victor felt no little degree of alarm. He thought that when Soult had so considerably weakened the blockading force, he ought to have placed Sebastiani's army at his disposal, in case of need: this had not been done, and Victor, seeing the naval preparations, sent to that general, entreating him to manœuvre so as to alarm the allies upon their landing, and to endanger them; but his entreaties were of no

effect, and Victor complained in his public dispatches, that this corps, though numerous, in good condition, and at leisure, had not given him the least assistance.

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During the latter days of January and great part of the following month, heavy rains delayed the expedition, and rendered all the roads impracticable by which the allies could have approached the enemy. On the 20th of February, the troops were embarked, waiting a favourable opportunity to proceed into the Straits: General Graham had about 4000 British and Portuguese, the Spaniards were 7000. The British got to sea the next day, and not being able to effect a landing near Cape Trafalgar, nor at Tarifa, disembarked at Algeciras, from whence they marched to Tarifa. The roads between the two towns were impassable for carriages, and therefore the artillery, provisions, and stores, were conveyed in boats, by indefatigable exertions of the seamen, against every disadvantage of wind and weather. The Spanish transports were thrice driven back, but reached Tarifa on the evening of the 27th, and the next day they began their march to the Puerto de Facinas, a pass in that chain of mountains which, bounding the plain of Gibraltar on the west, runs to the sea from the Sierras of Ronda. To this point the road was practicable for carriages, some days' labour having been employed in making it so: from thence it descends to those spacious plains which extend from the skirts of the chain to Medina Sidonia, Chiclana, and the river Santi Petri: and the roads below were in a dreadful state, the country being marshy, intersected with a labyrinth of streams; one of which, the Barbate, which receives the waters of the Lake of Janda, is a considerable river. At Veger, about half way between Tarifa and the Isle of Leon, the French had three companies of infantry and 180 horse. They had also a small fort with two pieces of cannon at Casas Viejas, on the road to Medina. These points

February.
The troops
land at Al-
geciras.

They pass
the Puerto
de Facinas.

CHAP. it was hoped to surprise, and the troops therefore encamped on
 XXXVI. the side of the mountain, taking every precaution to conceal
 1811. their movements from the enemy.

February.

*Lapeña's
 proclamation.*

Lapeña, when the troops commenced their march, addressed a proclamation to them, which at once disclosed the extent of his object, and the confidence with which he expected to realize it. "Soldiers of the fourth army," said he, "the moment for which you have a whole year been longing is at length arrived: a second time Andalusia is about to owe to you her liberty, and the laurels of Mengibar and Baylen will revive upon your brows. You have to combat in sight of the whole nation assembled in its Cortes; the Government will see your deeds; the inhabitants of Cadiz, who have made so many sacrifices for you, will be eye-witnesses of your heroism; they will lift up their voices in blessings and in acclamations of praise, which you will hear amid the roar of musketry and cannon. Let us go then to conquer! my cares are directed to this end; implicit obedience, firmness, and discipline, must conduct you to it: if these are wanting, in vain will you seek for fortune! and woe to him who forgets or abandons them: he shall die without remission! The gold, whose weight makes cowards of those who have plundered it from us, the bounties which a generous Government will bestow, and the endless blessings of those who will call you their deliverers, . . . behold in these your reward!" At Facinas the operations were to commence; here, therefore, the order of march was arranged, and the troops formed into three divisions, the van being under General D. Jose Lardizabal, the centre under Camp Marshal the Prince of Anglona, and the reserve under General Graham.

*Advance
 against
 Veger.*

At night-fall on the first of March, a detachment under Colonel D. José Aymerich with two four-pounders, began its march to surprise Veger. A squadron accompanied it under

the first adjutant of the staff, Major-General Wall, as far as the Fuente del Hierro, where these two parties separated, Aymerich taking the direct line for Veger, Wall going to the right across the lake of La Janda and the river Barbate, to cut off the retreat of the enemy by the roads to Medina and Chiclana. It was hardly probable that he should succeed in this attempt, for the way was not only circuitous and full of difficulties, but there was also another road, that of Conil, by which they might make their retreat, and which lay so wide of the others, that it could not be occupied: Wall's movement, however, covered Aymerich's, and facilitated his operations. The Barbate is navigable as far as Veger bridge, where it touches the foot of the high hill upon which Veger stands. At this bridge Aymerich arrived in the morning; it was fortified, and the French, under every advantage of situation, were preparing to defend it, when Wall's cavalry appeared on the other side; upon this they retired by the Conil road fast enough to effect their retreat. Three of their gun-boats and three pieces of cannon were taken here; the enemy suffered no other loss, but the chief object in view was accomplished, for the possession of this post secured the flank of the allies.

Meantime the main body advanced against Casas Viejas: the distance being twelve miles, Lapeña supposed, from the information of his guides, that he should arrive some hours before daybreak. But there were so many streams to cross, and so many intervening marshes, that notwithstanding the hard labour of the pioneers, and the utmost exertions of the artillery officers, these twelve miles were a journey of twelve painful hours, so that he did not arrive in time to reconnoitre the fort before it was broad day. The enemy having fired a few shot, took post upon a hill behind the fort, on the Medina road. The German hussars in the British service, and the Spanish carbineers under

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March.

*Junction of
the troops
from St.
Roques.*

General Whittingham, were ordered to wheel round upon the enemy's right, and surround them in that direction, while Baron Carondelet, with another squadron of cavalry, forded the Barbate, and crossing a flooded marsh, where the water was up to their saddle-girths, advanced to charge them. Two battalions of infantry, the one Spanish, the other English, crossed at the same time to support him; and the enemy presently gave way, leaving about thirty killed and wounded, thirty-three prisoners, two pieces of cannon, and all their stores.

The troops from St. Roques joined this day, marching by way of Las Casas de Castaño, and leaving a small detachment in Alcala de los Gazules. This division, consisting of 1600 men, was added to the centre, whose force now amounted to 6000; that of the vanguard was 2100, that of the rear 5100, 4300 being British and Portuguese, the rest Spaniards. The cavalry were in a separate body under Whittingham. The whole force, when thus united, consisted of 11,200 foot, 800 horse*. They had twenty-four pieces of cannon. Lapeña's plan was now to march by Veger, upon the Santi Petri, and attack the intrenchments there which formed the left of the enemy's lines. Thus the pass of the river would be laid open, and a communication established with the Isle of Leon, from whence the army might receive provisions, which it now began to want, and might be reinforced with artillery, foot, and horse: thus too they might combine their operations with those which would be made from the Spanish line of defence, and from the bay, in such manner, that while the

* Marshal Victor, in his official account, affirmed, as positively as falsely, that there were 22,000 men, among whom were at least 8000 of the best English troops; thus, according to the system of his government, doubling the number of his opponents.

success appeared almost certain, the risk even in case of defeat would be avoided, which must be incurred upon any other plan from the nature of the ground and the want of stores. Victor did not suspect that any difficulties upon this head could influence the movements of the allies, and he seems to have expected that his position would be attacked in a more vital part. He reinforced with a battalion of voltigeurs, General Cassagne, who occupied Medina Sidonia with three battalions and a regiment of chasseurs; and he took a position himself with ten battalions at the Cortijo de Guerra, the intermediate point between Medina and Chiclana, from whence he could bear upon the allies in case they should advance upon either. General Lapeña, however, had no thought of moving upon Medina: "it was strong by nature," he said, "fortified with seven pieces of cannon, besides some in its castle, and distant only two leagues from the Cortijo."

Camp-Marshal D. Jose de Zayas, who commanded in the Isle of Leon, meantime had well performed his part of the concerted operations. He pushed a body of troops over the Santi Petri, near the coast, on the first, threw a pontoon bridge across, and formed a tete-du-pont the following evening. The French general Villatte was immediately ordered to attack this point during the night, and, in French customary phrase, to drive the Spaniards into the sea. About midnight the enemy made their attack with three regiments, and by dint of superior numbers, forced their way into the works at various points. Zayas speedily reinforced the post, and drove them out with the bayonet: it was wholly an affair of the bayonet, for the troops were too much intermingled to permit of firing. Some of the French had reached the middle of the bridge, others crossed it, probably as the best means of saving themselves when they

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March.

*The French
attack
Zayas, and
are repulsed.*

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*March.
Passage of
the lake
of Janda.*

found that they had pushed on too far; they fell in with the Spaniards who were hastening to assist their comrades, and in this manner effected their escape.

Having failed in this attempt, Victor marched towards Chiclana, and ordered Cassagne to join him from the Cortijo, rightly concluding that Lapeña meant to attack the French lines at Santi Petri, which, should he succeed, would enable him to receive reinforcements from the Isle, and then he would march upon Chiclana. The Spanish general thought to deceive him into a belief that the attack would be made by Medina, and for this purpose left a party at Casas Viejas to mount guard, and keep up fires, as if the whole force was there, while on the third they proceeded to Veger. An excess of caution seems to have been Lapeña's failing; lest the enemy from Medina, which was about ten miles from the beaten road, should think of attacking him upon his march, he chose a by-road on the left of the Barbate, unfrequented, because there is the lake of Janda to be crossed on the way. This lake is a considerable piece of water, between the two roads from Tarifa to Medina Sidonia and to Chiclana. The bottom consists of mud; but to render it fordable, a stone causey had been built, rather under than in the water, about six feet wide, and some 500 yards in length, bushes and poles being fixed at intervals to mark its edge, and prevent the traveller from stepping into the mud. At this time the water upon the causey was in some places more than mid-deep. The Spaniards were some hours in passing, Lapeña exhorting them from his horse; and many of the officers made the men carry them across, while our officers were encouraging their soldiers by example, and General Graham was in the water on foot. On the evening of the 4th, they advanced from Veger, by way of Conil, towards Santi Petri. This place La-

peña hoped to reach by daybreak ; but upon entering a wood about ten miles from the village, and about as much in extent, his advanced guard was suddenly attacked by some cavalry who sallied from the cover. The enemy were repelled, but the column halted while the wood was explored ; and this, with the doubt and hesitation of the guides, heightened by the fears and feelings which night excited, and the local circumstances of a country where carriages seldom or never passed, caused a delay of two hours, so that they did not get out of the wood till it was broad day ; and the hope which Lapeña had with little reason indulged, of surprising his vigilant enemy, was destroyed. The three divisions therefore advanced in as many columns ; their movements could not possibly be concealed ; the enemy did not appear to molest them, but an officer of the French staff was seen singly reconnoitring them. The operation was to commence from a height called the Cabeza del Puerco : they halted here to refresh themselves, and Lapeña harangued the van which was destined to make the attack.

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The lines which were to be attacked formed the left of the French works. They were supported by the sea on one side, on the other by the channel of Alcornocal, and the fortified mill of Almansa. Villatte had about 4000 men to defend this position, but his force had been considerably weakened in his unsuccessful attempt upon the tete-du-pont. He had, however, very considerable advantage in the nature of the broken ground, a thick wood through which the assailant must advance, and the perfect knowledge, which, in the course of twelve months' undisturbed possession, he had acquired of every path and every inequality of surface. This wood so covered the enemy, that only four of their battalions in the first line were visible ; they had their right supported by the Torre Bermeja, and three guns

*Position of
the enemy.*

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March.

*Communi-
cation with
the Isle of
Leon.*

in their centre. Lardizabal, reinforced by part of the second division, advanced to attack them: the remainder of the troops held a position upon the Cabeza del Puerco, or hill of Barrosa, the cavalry being in advance upon the right.

Villatte anticipated their movements, and fell upon both flanks of Lardizabal's advance at the same time; at first he had the advantage, . . but the regiment of Murcia, under its Colonel D. Juan Maria Muñoz, checked his progress, Lardizabal with a battalion of the Canaries attacked his right, and the Spanish guards, and the regiment of Africa under Brigadier D. Raymundo Ferrer, and Colonel D. Tomas Retortillo, charged with the bayonet. The enemy were routed, and the communication with the Isle of Leon was thus opened by this well-conducted and successful attack. Two battalions of the French escaped and carried off their field-pieces, the nature of the ground saving them. Lapeña's first object was thus accomplished, and in order to maintain the important position that he had gained, which had in its front a thick pine forest, extending to Chiclana, and which he apprehended the enemy would use their utmost efforts to recover, he directed, in concert with General Graham, that the British troops should move down from Barrosa towards the Torre de Bermeja, leaving some Spanish regiments under Brigadier Begines upon the heights. The position which it was intended to occupy is formed by a narrow woody ridge, the right on the sea cliff, the left falling down to the creek of Almansa, on the edge of a marsh. From the position of Barrosa to that of Bermeja, the communication is easy, along a hard sandy beach upon the west. General Graham's division had halted on the eastern slope, his road therefore lay through the wood, and having sent cavalry patrols toward Chiclana, who saw nothing of the enemy, he began his march about noon.

General Lacy, the chief of the Spanish staff, was sent forward by Lapeña to maintain the heights of Bermeja; here it was that the danger was apprehended; and the firing had recommenced in that direction. The nature of the ground was such, that what was passing at Barrosa could not be seen at Bermeja; perhaps there was a deficiency in those arrangements, by which, in a well-organized army, information of what is passing in one part is rapidly conveyed to another; and there was certainly the want of a good intelligence between General Graham and the Spanish commander under whom he had consented to act. The British troops had proceeded about half way, and were in the middle of the wood, when they were informed that the enemy was appearing in force upon the plain, and advancing towards the heights of Barrosa. That position General Graham considered as the key to that of Santi Petri, and immediately countermarched in order to support the troops who had been left for its defence.

The heights of Barrosa extend to the shore on one side, and slope down to the plain on the other towards a lake called the Laguna del Puerco: the ridge itself was called Cabeza del Puerco by the Spaniards, but it will retain the better name which was this day acquired for it. Victor with 8000 men advanced against this point. The troops which had been left there were the regiments of Siguenza and Cantabria, a battalion of Ciudad Real, another of the Walloon guards, and a battalion of the King's German legion. Ignorant of Graham's movements, and knowing themselves unable to maintain the post against such very superior numbers, they thought it best to form a junction with the British, whose rear they should by this means cover, and be themselves covered on the way by the pine forest through which they were to pass. Accordingly they made this movement with perfect coolness, and in perfect order, General

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*March.**Heights of
Barrosa.*

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*March.
General
Graham
marches
back to the
heights.*

Whittingham covering one flank, Brigadier D. Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon the other ; for on both sides the enemy endeavoured to envelope them.

Graham, meantime, was marching rapidly back, but at a distance from the shore ; whereas these troops kept near it, apparently to lessen the danger of being turned on that side by the enemy's light infantry. In such intricate and difficult circumstances it was impossible to preserve order in the columns ; and before the troops were quite disentangled from the wood, they saw that the detachment which they were hastening to support had left the heights ; that the left wing of the French were rapidly ascending there, and their right stood upon the plain, on the edge of the wood within cannon shot. General Graham's object in countermarching had been to support the troops in maintaining the heights ; " but a retreat," he says, " in the face of such an enemy (already within reach of the easy communication by the sea beach) must have involved the whole allied army in all the danger of being attacked during the unavoidable confusion of the different corps arriving on the narrow ridge of Bermeja nearly at the same time." Trusting, therefore, to the courage of his men, and regardless of the numbers and position of the enemy, he resolved immediately to attack them.

*Battle of
Barrosa.*

Marshal Victor commanded the French ; General Ruffin, whose name was well known in the history of this wicked war, commanded the left upon the hill ; General Leval the right. Graham formed his troops as rapidly as the circumstances required ; there was no time to restore order in his columns, which had unavoidably been broken in marching through the wood. The brigade of guards, Lieutenant-Colonel Browne's flank battalion of the 28th, Lieutenant-Colonel Norcott's two companies of the 2d rifle corps, and Major Acheson, with a part of the 57th (separated from the regiment in the wood), formed

on the right under Brigadier-General Dilkes. Colonel Wheatley's brigade, with three companies of the Coldstream guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson, (separated likewise from his battalion in the wood,) and Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard's flank battalion, formed on the left; Major Duncan, opening a powerful battery of ten guns in the centre, protected the formation of the infantry; and as soon as they were thus hastily got together, the guns were advanced to a more favourable position, and kept up a most destructive fire.

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Leval's division, notwithstanding the havoc which this battery made, continued to advance in imposing masses, opening its fire of musketry. The British left wing advanced against it, firing. The three companies of guards, and the 87th, supported by the remainder of the wing, charged them with right British bravery; Colonel Bilson with the 28th, and Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost with part of the 67th, zealously supported their attack, which was decisive in this part of the field. An eagle, the first which the British had won, was taken. It belonged to the 8th regiment of light infantry, and bore a gold collar round its neck, because that regiment had so distinguished itself as to have received the thanks of Buonaparte in person. The enemy were closely pursued across a narrow valley, and a reserve, which they had formed beyond it, was charged in like manner, and in like manner put to the rout. General Dilkes was equally successful on his side. Ruffin, confident in his numbers and in his position, met him on the ascent. A bloody contest ensued, but of no long duration, for the best troops of France have never been able to stand against the British bayonet. Ruffin was wounded and taken, and the enemy driven from the heights in confusion. In less than an hour and half they were in full retreat, and in that short time more than 4000 men had fallen, . . for the British loss in killed and wounded amounted to 1243;

CHAP. not a single British soldier was taken. The French loss was
XXXVI. more than 3000. General Bellegrade was killed, General Rous-
1811. seau mortally wounded and taken; the prisoners were only 440,
March. because there was no pursuit.

The 20th Portuguese regiment fought side by side with the British in this memorable action. One squadron of the German Legion, which had been attached to the Spanish cavalry, joined in time to make a successful charge against a squadron of French dragoons, which it completely routed. General Whittingham, with the rest of the cavalry, was engaged, meantime, in checking a corps of horse and foot who were attempting to win the height by the coast. The Walloon guards, and the battalion of Ciudad Real, which had been attached to Graham's division, and had been left on the height, made the greatest exertions to rejoin him; but it was not possible for them to arrive before the victory was decided, and the troops were too much exhausted to think of pursuing their advantage. They had been marching for twenty hours before the battle.

The distance from Barrosa to Bermeja is about three miles; Lapeña could not see what was passing at the great scene of action, and an attack was made at the same time upon Bermeja by Villatte, who had received reinforcements from Chiclana: the enemy were vigorously resisted there, and were called off by Victor in consequence of his defeat. When the Spanish general was informed of Graham's brilliant action, he entertained great hopes of succeeding in the farther movement which had been intended. In the dispatch which he sent that night to Cadiz, "The allied army," he said, "had obtained a victory so much the more satisfactory as circumstances rendered it more difficult; but the valour of the British and Spanish troops, the military skill and genius of General Graham, and the gallantry of the commandant-general of the van-guard, D. Jose Lar-

dizabal, had overcome all obstacles. I remain," he continued, "master of the enemy's position, which is so important to me for my subsequent operations."

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But no attempt was made to profit by the bloody victory which had been gained. General Graham remained some hours upon the heights which he had won, and as no supplies came to him, the commissariat mules having been dispersed at the beginning of the action, he left a small detachment there, and then withdrew his troops, and early the next morning crossed the Santi Petri. While he was on his march, two landings were effected by way of diversion, between Rota and Catalina, and between Catalina and Santa Maria by the marines of the British squadron, with 200 seamen and 80 Spanish marines: they stormed two redoubts, and dismantled all the sea defences from Rota to St. Maria, except Catalina. Preparations were made to attack the tete-du-pont and the bridge of St. Maria, but the enemy advanced in force from Puerto Real, and Sir Richard Keats, knowing that General Graham had now re-entered the Isle of Leon, ordered the men to re-embark.

March.
Diversion
on the coast.

Such was the lame and impotent conclusion of an expedition which had been long prepared and well concerted, in which the force employed was adequate to the end proposed, and of which every part that was attempted had been successfully effected. General Graham complained loudly of Lapeña; and the people of Cadiz, the Cortes, and the government, were at first equally disposed to impute the failure to the Spanish commander. The Cortes voted an address to the Regency on the ninth, saying that the national congress, not being able longer to endure the grief and bitterness of seeing the circumstances of the expedition remain in doubt and obscurity, requested the executive government to give them, as speedily as possible, a circumstantial account of the proceedings of the Spanish army. When

The Cortes
demand an
inquiry.

CHAP. this account was laid before them, they declared that the con-
 XXXVI. duct of the general with regard to the advantages which might
 1811. have been obtained on the memorable day of the battle was not
 March. sufficiently clear; "the Cortes therefore," said they, "in dis-
 charge of its sovereign mission, and using the supreme in-
 spection which it has reserved to itself over whatever may in-
 fluence the salvation of the kingdom, desires that the council of
 Regency will immediately institute a scrupulous investigation
 with all the rigour of military law."

*Outcry in
 England
 against
 Lapeña.*

*April 1.
 Speech of
 Mr. Ward.*

If such was at first the prevailing opinion in Cadiz, it may well be supposed that the Spanish general would be exposed to severe censure in England. The story which obtained belief was, that Lapeña and the Spaniards had been idle spectators of the action, whereas, if they had only shown themselves upon the adjoining heights, the French would have raised the blockade, and retired in dismay to Seville; and that after the battle, while he and 12,000 Spaniards remained inactive, he sent to General Graham, whose troops were without food, and had marched sixteen hours before they came into action, desiring him to follow up the victory, for that now was the time to deliver Cadiz. A vote of thanks passed unanimously in both houses; but a few days afterwards, when the ordnance estimates were before the house, the honourable J. W. Ward said, "he hoped he might now be allowed to ask for some explanation of the deplorable misconduct of our allies; for of that conduct it would be idle to affect to speak in doubtful terms, it was reprobated with equal indignation by all parties throughout the country. Was it to be endured," said he, "that while the British troops were performing prodigies of valour in an unequal contest, that those allies, for whose independence they were fighting, should stand by, cold-blooded spectators of deeds, the bare recital of which should have been enough to warm every man of them

into a hero? If, indeed, they had been so many mercenaries, and had been hired to fight for a foreign power and in behalf of a foreign cause; . . if they had been so many Swiss, . . in that case their breach of duty, however culpable, would have been less unaccountable, and perhaps more excusable; but here, where they were allies bound to this country in obligations greater than ever before one nation owed to another . . our brave men lavishing those lives which their country had so much better right to claim, in defence of that cause in which those allies were principals . . in such a case, tamely to look on while the contest between numbers and bravery hung in doubtful issue, . . this did appear to him to betray an indifference, an apathy, which, if he could suppose it to prevail among the Spaniards, must render, in his mind, the cause of Spanish independence altogether hopeless."

Mr. Perceval replied, "that Mr. Ward had expressed a stronger and more determined censure upon the Spaniards than could be justified by any evidence which had yet appeared. Had he expressed his regret that the English had been left to fight the battle alone, and had he required some explanation on the subject, such conduct would have been perfectly natural and right; but it was neither just nor generous thus upon insufficient grounds to prejudice men who were to undergo a legal investigation. General Graham's dispatches furnished no grounds for these sweeping accusations; the Spanish troops which had been attached to his division made every effort to come back and join in the action; and when the situation of the rest of the army, posted at four miles distance, was taken into consideration, it required more information than they possessed at present, to justify the passing a censure upon the whole Spanish army, or even upon any part of it."

Mr. Whitbread now rose. "He should have been glad,"

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Mr. Perceval.

Mr. Whitbread.

CHAP. he said, "to have joined in the general expression of ex-
XXXVI. ultation when the vote of thanks was past;...he should have
1811. been glad to have added his mite to the general tribute in ap-
plause of the heroism of that day, and to have claimed the hero
of that day as his much-valued friend. This he should have
been glad to have done, if he could have had sufficient control
over himself to have abstained from doing more. Mr. Perceval
had spoken like the advocate of the Spaniards; they must be
defended at all events, no matter how! And what was it that
was attempted to be defended? The English army was on the
point of being sacrificed...the Spaniards were in sight of them,
within twenty minutes quick march of them! and what did they?
What were they? Why, just what they have been described by
his honourable friend...cold-blooded spectators of the battle!
After coldly witnessing a band of heroes fighting and dying for
their cause, General Lapeña tells our small army, exhausted
with its unparalleled victory over numbers, that, forsooth, now
was the time to push its success. What did this redoubted ge-
neral mean? Was it insult, or treachery, or cowardice,...each,
or all? He did not mean to complain of the Spanish people,
but of their officers. He should ever think of Barrosa as a day
memorable for the glory of the Britons, and not less memorable
for the infamy of the Spaniards. Was it to be endured, that
our brave fellows should be so basely deserted, after an excessive
night-march, the moment they entered the field, against a foe
always formidable from discipline, and then doubly so from
numbers? Why were the two battalions withdrawn from the
heights of Barrosa? why was their position abandoned preci-
pitately to the French? who gave this order but a Spanish of-
ficer? What! should not this excite a jealousy? Was this the
first time a Spanish army had been cold-blooded spectators of
British heroism? Did they want this to remind them of the

stately indifference shown by Cuesta in the battle of Talavera? CHAP.
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 Was all sound in Cadiz? Was there no French party there? 1811.
 Were British armies never before betrayed till the battle of Barrosa? He said betrayed, for it was nothing less; the two battalions never came up till our army had repulsed the French, beaten them off, and was in hot pursuit of them as fast as our army could pursue... as fast as their exhausted limbs could carry their noble hearts! Then what had been our allies?... At Talavera nothing... at Barrosa nothing... or rather at both perhaps worse than nothing. The allied force sailed from Cadiz... the British fought... the Spaniards looked on. The British conquered; and yet the siege was not raised. Again he asked, was all sound at Cadiz? Was it true that General Graham had been obstructed and foiled in all his plans... that in the midst of the fight, while the British troops were doing feats which perhaps British troops alone could do, their allies were doing what, he hoped, such men alone were capable of... plundering the British baggage? Was this true? It was not the Spanish people he complained of; he gave them every credit; but he gave their leaders none. If all this was so, or nearly so, were the British armies to be risked so worthlessly? Were they to be abandoned to treachery or cowardice? For in either or both must have originated the unnatural, ungrateful, and infamous treatment they had met with."

Whatever error of judgement General Lapeña might have committed, the charges thus brought against him and his army were as ill-founded as they were intemperately urged. Instead of being cold-blooded spectators of the battle, the main body of the Spaniards were four miles distant; there was a thick wood between them and the scene of action, and they were themselves actually engaged at the time. And it is worthy of remark, that while invectives, which had no other tendency than

*Remarks on
the failure
of the expe-
dition.*

CHAP. to produce a breach between England and Spain, were thus
XXXVI. lavished upon the Spaniards, by those politicians who would
1811. have had us abandon Spain and Portugal to the tyrant's pleasure, the French were endeavouring to excite discontent between the two countries by accusations which directly contradicted these aspersions. Marshal Victor affirmed in his official account, that when he determined to attack the heights, the Spaniards under Lapeña were at the time warmly engaged; the cannonade and the fire of the musketry were extremely brisk, he said; and with that falsehood which characterised the execrable system of his government, he added, that the English, according to their custom, had wished to place the Spaniards in the post of danger, and expose themselves as little as possible.

Lapeña prayed that an immediate inquiry should be instituted, that the inquiry should be made public, and that he should be punished if he were found culpable. The inquiry was made, and the result was an honourable acquittal. The proceedings were not published; and unhappily the good opinion of the Spanish government afforded no proof, scarcely a presumption, of the deserts of those on whom it was bestowed. At this very time they appointed Mahy, who had done nothing in Galicia, but oppress the inhabitants and paralyse the efforts of a brave and willing population, to another command; and Mendizabal, by whose misconduct their best army had been destroyed, was sent to command in the North. But though it cannot be inferred that General Lapeña was not worthy of censure, because he was pronounced free from fault, little investigation may suffice to show that the outcry raised against him was intemperate, if not altogether unjust, and that the failure of the expedition was owing to the disagreement between the British and Spanish generals, more than to any misconduct on

the part of the latter. Whether prudently or not, General Graham had consented to act under Lapeña; and whether the plan of operations was well concerted or not, he had assented to it. That plan was, that the allies should open a communication with the Isle of Leon, by breaking through the left of the enemy's line; this being done, they would receive supplies and reinforcements, and might proceed to farther successes. It had never been intended in this plan that the British should turn back to attack a part of the French army, whose numbers were, to their own, in the proportion of two to one, and who had every advantage of ground; nor that they should cripple themselves by fighting upon ground, where mere honour was all that could be gained. The memorial which Lapeña addressed to the Cortes, praying for an inquiry into his conduct, contains his justification. "He had assured General Graham," he says, "on the evening after the battle, that the troops from the isle should come out, and that provisions should be sent to the English; and it was with extreme surprise he learned that they had retreated without his knowledge." The cause of this movement is perfectly explicable; the Spaniards in Cadiz and the island, never very alert in their movements, were not ready with an immediate supply of provisions, and the British troops after the battle were neither in a humour, nor in a state, nor in a situation to wait patiently till it should arrive. From this moment all co-operation was at an end. When the Spanish general applied to his own Government, and to General Graham, respecting farther operations, the former told him that they had written to the British ambassador, and were waiting for his answer; the latter that he was not in a condition to come out of the isle again, but that he would cover the points of the line of defence. Lapeña thus found himself deprived of that part of the allied force upon whose skill and discipline his best hopes of success must have

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CHAP. been founded; "had he acted for himself," he said, "he would
 XXXVI. have pursued the enemy with the Spanish troops alone, but he
 1811. was under the necessity of consulting the government which was
 so close at hand." This alone would have occasioned delay; but Lapeña was at that moment under a charge of misconduct preferred against him by the British, and echoed by the people and the Cortes; and thus in delays, formalities, and examinations, the irrecoverable hours were lost.

*Death of Al-
 burquerque.*

It must have added to the grief of the true Spaniards in Cadiz upon this occasion, when they remembered that they might at this day have had a general who had every claim to the confidence of his men, his government, and his allies, that distinguished services, unbounded sacrifices, enterprise, talents, and devoted patriotism could give. That general, the Duque de Alburquerque, whose name will ever be regarded as the most illustrious of his illustrious line, had just at this time fallen a victim to the malignity of the Junta of Cadiz. After remaining in England eight months in a state of exile, intolerable to one who was as capable as he was desirous of serving his country in the field, he printed a statement of his conduct and case, which he had withheld as long as any possible injury could be apprehended from its publication. This he sent to the Cortes; it was received as the merits of its author deserved; eulogiums never more justly merited were heard from all sides; the Cortes declared that the duke and his army had deserved well of their country, particularly for preserving the Isle of Leon and Cadiz, and they desired that the Regency would recall him from England that he might again be actively employed. In consequence of this, he was appointed to the command in Galicia. The Junta of Cadiz however, acting as they had done in other cases, even of greater importance, in contempt of the Government, drew up a reply to his statement; it was addressed to the

duke, and with insolence equal to their ingratitude, and falsehood if possible surpassing both, they called him, in direct terms, an impudent calumniator and an enemy to his country. Each of the members of this body signed it individually; it was printed as a hand-bill, and a copy of it was sent to London by some private hand, and reached Alburquerque through the two-penny post, that no possible mark of insult might be wanting to the transaction.

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Alburquerque ought to have despised any attack from that quarter, and more especially one which, by its intemperance and scurrility, so plainly showed in what vile passions it had originated. But he wore his heart for daws to peck at, and his enemies knew but too well the infirmity of his nature. At first he endeavoured to repress or to conceal his feelings, and drew up a short and dignified representation to the Cortes; but this did not satisfy him; notwithstanding the earnest dissuasions of his friends, he determined upon replying to the Junta, and he devoted himself to this composition with an earnestness which made him forgetful both of food and of sleep. Three days were thus employed in a state of restless and feverish anxiety. The wound all this while was rankling, and the venom of the Junta did its work. On the fourth day a frenzy-fever seized him; he felt the approach of the disease, and was perfectly sensible of the cause, for having sent for D. J. M. Blanco White, he took from his pocket, as soon as he saw him, a strip of paper on which he had written, "*como calumniador y enemigo de la patria,*" ..the words which had stung him to the heart, ..and said, "When they ask why I have lost my senses, this paper will answer for me." ..A dreadful scene ensued; fits of tears were followed by paroxysms of rage, and on the third day of his illness he expired: happily in the course of the disease the sense of his own wrongs, intolerable and fatal as it had proved, gave

CHAP. way to a deeper feeling; he forgot himself in thinking of his
 XXXVI. country; his repeated exclamations of vengeance upon Napo-
 1811. leon Buonaparte were so vehement and loud that they were
 distinctly heard by the passers in the street; and his last breath
 was spent in imprecations upon the tyrant whose wickedness
 had caused all the unutterable miseries of Spain. Every public
 honour which the British Government could bestow was paid
 to the remains of this illustrious man, and his body was deposited
 in that same vault in Henry VII.'s chapel wherein Marlborough's
 had formerly been laid, till it could be sent home, to rest with
 his ancestors*.

* The following epitaph upon Alburquerque, worthy of the author and of the
 subject, is the composition of Mr. Frere:—

“Impiger, impavidus, spes maxima gentis Iberæ,
 Mente rapax, acerque manu bellator, avita
 Institui monumenta novis attollere factis;
 Fortunâ comite, et virtute duce, omnia gessi;
 Nullâ in re, nec spe, mea sors incepta fefellit.
 Gadibus auxilium tetuli, patriamque labentem
 Sustentavi; hæc meta meis fuit ultima factis,
 Quippe iras hominum meritis superare nequivi.
 Hic procul a patriâ vitæ datus est mihi finis,
 Sed non laudis item; gliscit nova fama sepulto,
 Anglorum quod testantur proceres populusque,
 Magno funus honore secuti, mœstitiâque
 Unanimes. Æterna, pater, sint fœdera, faxis,
 Quæ pepigi. Nec me nimium mea patria adempto
 Indigeat, nec plus æquo desideret unquam.
 Sint fortes alii ac felices, qui mea possint
 Facta sequi, semperque benignis civibus uti.”

CHAPTER XXXVII.

GRANT AND SUBSCRIPTION FOR THE RELIEF OF THE PORTUGUEZE. OPERATIONS ON THE ALENTEJO FRONTIER. BATTLES OF FUENTES D'ONORO AND ALBUHERA. BADAJOZ UNSUCCESSFULLY BESIEGED BY THE ALLIES.

It was now made apparent, as well by the battle of Barrosa, as by the whole conduct of the Cortes, that no successful exertions were to be expected on that side; and that, though the subjugation of the Peninsula could not but appear every day more hopeless to the Intruder's government, all reasonable hope of its deliverance must rest upon Lord Wellington, and the allied army under his command. Thus far his foresight had been fully approved by the issue of Massena's invasion; that general had entered Portugal with 72,000 men, and had received reinforcements to the amount of about 15,000 more: ten he had lost at Busaco; about as many more had died while he perseveringly maintained his ground; and what with prisoners, sick and wounded, and the losses on the retreat, about 40,000 only were remaining when he recrossed the frontier. The invaders had lost their horses, carriages, ammunition, and cannon; but for this they cared not; they had the strong hold of Ciudad Rodrigo on which to retire; and even the wreck of their army was more numerous than the force which drove them out of Portugal.

During these events, the opponents of the English ministry improved with more than their wonted infelicity the opportunity

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*Opinions of
the opposi-
tion writers
at this time.*

CHAP. afforded them of exhibiting their errors in judgement, their want
 XXXVII. of that knowledge which is the foundation of political wisdom,
 1811. and their destitution of that generous feeling which sometimes
 March. renders even error respectable. When the first news arrived
 that the French were breaking up from their position, they cau-
 tioned the public against extravagant expectations; "such ac-
 counts," they said, "have come too often to raise enthusiasm in
 any but simpletons and stock-jobbers; and there seems no rea-
 son for altering the opinion which we have so often expressed,
 that, happen what may partially, the ultimate loss of the Peninsula
 is as certain as ever it was, and that we are only delaying the
 catastrophe by needless proofs of a valour, which our enemies
 admire much more than our allies. In the mean time, Spain
 does nothing, except calumniate and kill her exiled patriots;
 and reasonable people have long ceased to look to any place
 but South America for the resuscitation of Spanish independ-
 ence."

When it was known beyond all doubt to those whose belief
 was not influenced by their wishes, that Massena was in full re-
 treat and Lord Wellington pursuing him, "these retreats and
 pursuits," said they, "are fine things for tickling the ears.
 Most probably the retreat is, as usual, an alteration of position;
 and the pursuit a little look-out on the occasion, enlivened by
 the seizure of a few unfortunate stragglers." At the discovery
 that this change of position was from the Zezere to the Agueda,
 ..nothing less than the evacuation of Portugal, ..the despondents
 were neither abashed nor silenced. "Buonaparte's honour,"
 they said, "was pledged to effect his projects in the Peninsula,
 and unfortunately his power was as monstrous as his ambition.
 Massena would now throw himself upon his resources both in
 men and provisions; he was removing from a ravaged and de-
 solate country, to one comparatively uninjured and fertile; and

it was to be remarked, that while the French were falling back upon their supplies, the allies were removing from their own. In such a state of things, could Lord Wellington's army long exist on the frontiers? The war had become one of supplies and expenses; if the enemy could establish large magazines at Almeida, they could again advance, the same scenes would again be repeated, and Lisbon would again become the point of defence. The result must certainly be determined by the success or ill success of the French in Spain. If Spain falls," said they, "nothing short of a miracle can preserve Portugal; and that Spain will fall, is almost as certain as that her people are self-willed and superstitious, her nobility divided and degraded, and her commanders incapable, arrogant, or treacherous." We were, moreover, warned by these sapient politicians, to remember, that there were seven marshals in Spain, besides generals, with distinct commands; and that the French, having retired upon their resources, had only abandoned Portugal for the season, that they might return and reap the harvest which they had left the natives to sow. It was not enough to dismay the nation by thus prognosticating what the French would do, they threw out alarming hints of what, even now, it was to be apprehended they might have done. "If," said they, "Massena had received adequate reinforcements from France, the positions which he took at Guarda and Almeida would have drawn the allies into a most dangerous predicament; and let us imagine what might at this very instant be the perilous situation of Lord Wellington, if a considerable army had really been collected under Bessieres!" Happy was it for England, that the councils of this country were not directed by men who would have verified their own predictions, leaving the enemy unresisted, as far as Great Britain was concerned, because they believed him to be irresistible!

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*Address of
the Portu-
guese Go-
vernment to
the people.*

But while the factious part of the British press was thus displaying how far it was possible for men to deaden their hearts against all generous emotions, the Portuguese governors were expressing their gratitude to England for the effectual support which she had given to her old ally. They told the people that their day of glory was at length arrived; they had passed through the fiery ordeal, by which the merits of men were tried and purified; they were become a great nation. "Humbling themselves," they said, "before the first and sovereign Author of all good, they rendered thanks to their Prince, for establishing, in his wisdom, the basis of their defence;...to his British majesty, to his enlightened ministry, and to the whole British nation, in whom they had found faithful and liberal allies, constant co-operation, and that honour, probity, and steadiness of principle, which peculiarly distinguished the British character;...to the illustrious Wellington, whose sagacity and consummate military skill had been so eminently displayed;...to the zealous and indefatigable Beresford, who had restored discipline and organization to the Portuguese troops;...to the generals and officers, and their comrades in arms, who had never fought that they did not triumph;...finally, to the whole Portuguese people, whose loyalty, patriotism, constancy, and humanity, had been so gloriously displayed, during the season of danger and of suffering." "Portuguese," said they, "the effects of the invasion of these barbarians; the yet smoking remains of the cottage of the poor, of the mansion of the wealthy, of the cell of the religious, of the hospital which afforded shelter and relief to the indigent and infirm, of the temples dedicated to the worship of the Most High; the innocent blood of so many peaceful citizens of both sexes, and of all ages, with which those heaps of ruins are still tinged; the insults of every kind heaped upon those whom the

Vandals did not deprive of life . . . insults many times more cruel than death itself; the universal devastation, the robbery and destruction of every thing that the unhappy inhabitants of the invaded districts possessed: . . . this atrocious scene, which makes humanity shudder, affords a terrible lesson, which you ought deeply to engrave in memory, in order fully to know that degenerate nation, who retain only the figure of men, and who in every respect are worse than beasts, and more blood-thirsty than tigers or lions; who are without faith and without law; who acknowledge neither the rights of humanity, nor respect the sacred tie of an oath."

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They proceeded to speak with becoming feeling and becoming pride of the manner in which the emigrants from the ravaged provinces had been received wherever they had fled. The great expense of subsisting the fugitives at Lisbon had been supported, they said, by the resources which were at the disposal of Government, but still more by the voluntary donations of individuals, among whom they mentioned with particular distinction, the British subjects in Portugal. It remained for completing the work, to restore the fugitives to their homes; to render habitable the towns which the barbarians had left covered with filth and unburied carcasses; to relieve with medicine and food the sick, who were perishing for want of such assistance; to revive agriculture, by supplying the husbandman with seed corn, and bread for his consumption for some time, and facilitating his means of purchasing cattle and acquiring the instruments of agriculture. These, they said, were the constant cares of the Government, these were their duties; but their funds were not even sufficient to provide for their defence, and therefore they called upon individuals for further aid.

Lord Wellington in the preceding autumn, as soon as he fell back to the lines of Torres Vedras, had represented to his own

Lord Wellington asks relief for the suffering Portuguese

CHAP. Government the distress to which those districts must be re-
 XXXVII. duced through which the enemy passed, . . a distress which Por-
 1811. tugal had no means of relieving. "Upon former occasions,"
 he said, "the wealthy inhabitants of Great Britain, and of Lon-
 don in particular, had stepped forward to relieve foreign nations,
 whether suffering under the calamities inflicted by Providence,
 or by a cruel and powerful enemy. Portugal had once before
 experienced such a proof of friendship from her oldest and most
 faithful ally: but never was there case in which this assistance
 was required in a greater degree than at present, whether the
 sufferings of the people, or their loyalty and patriotism, and
 their attachment to England, were considered. I declare," said
 Lord Wellington, "that I have scarcely known an instance in
 which any person in Portugal, of any order, has had communi-
 cation with the enemy, inconsistent with his duty to his own
 sovereign, or with the orders he had received. There is no in-
 stance of the inhabitants of any town or village having remained,
 or of their having failed to remove what might be useful to the
 enemy, when they had sufficiently early intimation of the wishes
 of Government, or of myself, that they should abandon their
 houses, and carry away their property." He therefore recom-
 mended this brave and suffering people to the British Govern-
 ment, and the British people, whenever the country should be
 cleared of its barbarous invaders, as he hoped and trusted that
 it would.

April 8.
 Parlia-
 mentary
 grant for
 the relief of
 the Portu-
 guese.

That hope had now been accomplished: his letter was laid
 before Parliament, and a message from the Prince Regent was
 presented, stating, "That, having taken into consideration the
 distress to which the inhabitants of a part of Portugal had been
 exposed, in consequence of the invasion of that country, and
 especially from the wanton and savage barbarity exercised by
 the French in their recent retreat, which could not fail," he said,

“to affect the hearts of all persons who had any sense of religion or humanity, he desired to be enabled to afford to the suffering subjects of his Majesty’s good and faithful ally, such speedy and effectual relief as might be suitable to this interesting and afflicting occasion.” Accordingly a grant of 100,000*l.* was proposed; Marquis Wellesley saying, when he moved an address to this effect, “he hoped he had not lived to see the day, though he had sometimes been surprised by hearing something like it, when it should be said that ancient faith, long-tried attachment, and close connexion with our allies, were circumstances to be discarded from our consideration, and that they should be sacrificed and abandoned to the mere suggestions and calculations of a cold policy.” Earl Grosvenor was the only person who demurred at this motion. “He felt considerable difficulty in acceding to it,” he said, “particularly when he considered how much had been done already for Portugal, and he would ask whether their lordships were really prepared to take the whole burden upon themselves, and exempt the Portuguese altogether from the charge of relieving their own countrymen? It was a principle as applicable to public as to private affairs, that you should be just to your own people before you were generous to other nations.” The Marquis of Lansdowne spoke in a better mind: “Whatever,” he said, “might have been his opinion regarding the policy of our exertions in Portugal, no doubt existed with him, that the efforts made by the people of Portugal eminently deserved at our hands the aid now asked, to relieve that distress into which they had been plunged by the enemy. Even, therefore, if he believed that Lord Wellington would be again compelled to retreat, still he would vote for the present motion, convinced that it could not fail to make an impression in Europe highly favourable to the British character, by displaying its beneficence, its generosity, and its humanity, as contrasted with the savage bar-

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*April.**Marquis
Wellesley.**Earl Gros-
venor.**Marquis of
Lansdowne.*

CHAP. XXXVII. 1811. *April.* barity of the enemy. In extending to the people of Portugal that generosity for which they might look through Europe and the world in vain, we placed our national character upon a pinnacle of greatness which nothing could destroy. Even if our army was compelled to evacuate Portugal, and we should be unable to withstand there the progress of the French, still the posterity of the inhabitants of Portugal would remember with gratitude the aid afforded to their ancestors in the hour of their distress. For these reasons, the address should have his hearty concurrence."

Mr. Ponsonby.

Public subscription.

Mr. Ponsonby in like manner, when the vote was moved in the Commons, declared, "that it was not less due to the spirit of Portugal, than to the magnanimity of Great Britain, . . . that it was as consistent with our interest, as it was material to our honour. The only regret," said he, "with which it is accompanied on my part, proceeds from the reflection, that the vast expenditure of this country should render it necessary to limit the vote to so small a sum." But the liberality of the British people has seldom been more conspicuously displayed, than in the subscriptions which were made on this occasion. About 80,000*l.* was subscribed. The public grant was to be measured, not by the necessities of the Portuguese sufferers, but by the means of the British Government; and the Prince of Brazil called it "a most ample donation, entirely corresponding to the generosity with which a great nation and its Government had assisted Portugal." The individual proofs of beneficence were acknowledged in the most honourable manner; the Prince issued an order, that the list of subscribers should be printed at the royal printing-office, and copies sent to the chambers of each of the suffering districts, where, having been publicly read after mass, they should be laid up in the *Cartorios*, or archives of the respective districts; the original list was to be deposited among the royal

archives in the Torre do Tombo at Lisbon, "that the humanity of the one nation," said the Prince, "and the gratitude of the other may be attested to future generations."

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The *dezembargador*, Joam Gaudencio Torres, and Mr. Croft (one of a family which had been long established at Porto, and who was subsequently attached to the British legation) accepted the charge of distributing this grant, and for that purpose, of visiting the districts which had been ravaged, and seeing in person to the distribution. It required no common degree of humanity, and no ordinary strength of heart, to undertake so painful an office. The time, it may be hoped, is approaching, when the usages of war will as little be admitted before man, as a plea for having destroyed the innocent and the helpless, as it will before God. Massena had gone to the utmost limits of that dreadful plea before he broke up from his position. Opposite to the house in which he had fixed his own quarters at Santarem were the ruins of a church, into which a number of wretched children, whose parents had perished, and who were themselves perishing for hunger, had crept, that they might lie down and die. They were found there by the first British troops who entered the town, stretched upon straw and rubbish... the dying and the dead together, reduced to skeletons before they died. When the officer, who relates this in his journal, saw them, pieces of bread which our soldiers had given these poor orphans were lying untouched before many who were incapable of eating, and some who had breathed their last. Multitudes, indeed, had been famished before he abandoned his hopes of conquest; but for the subsequent conduct of that merciless general and his army no military motives can be assigned... none but what are purely malignant and devilish. Marshal Massena had formerly declared, that if he could land with an army in England, he would pledge himself, not indeed to effect the con-

April.
Distribu-
tion of the
grant.

Children
famished at
Santarem.

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which the
French left
the country
they had
occupied.**Pombal.*

quest of the country, but to reduce it to a desert. In Portugal it was proved that out of the wickedness of his heart his lips had then spoken ; for on his retreat, he endeavoured, in perfect conformity with the political system of his emperor, to increase by every possible means the horrors of war and the sum of human suffering. The cruelties which were perpetrated by that retreating army formed but a little part of the evils they inflicted upon the brave nation which had successfully resisted them ; and in the districts which they devastated, the inhabitants who perished under their hands were less to be compassionated than those who survived. The famine which they intentionally produced, by destroying every thing in the course of their retreat and within reach of their power, continued to depopulate the country long after it was delivered from its enemies. Endemic diseases were produced by want of food and of raiment, by exposure, by grief, and hopeless wretchedness. The hospitals, with which Portugal abounded, had shared the general destruction : many had been burnt, others gutted, the resources of all destroyed ; and those of the clergy and of the convents, to which the sufferers would otherwise have looked for aid, and from which they would have found it, were in like manner totally dilapidated. The income of the Bishop of Leyria was reduced from 40,000 *cruzados* to forty ; and others had suffered in a like degree. In that district the population was cut down by the barbarities of the enemy, by famine, and by disease, from 48,000 to 16,000 ; and in the subdivision of Pombal from 7000 to 1800. Two hundred families in the town of Pombal derived before the invasion a comfortable subsistence from husbandry ; after the retreat an hundred and sixty-four of those families had totally disappeared ; and the few survivors of the remaining thirty-six were suffering under famine and disease. In a principal street of that poor town the commissioners found one dis-

mantled dwelling, standing alone in the midst of ruins, and containing three wretched inhabitants. Such was the desolation which this more than barbarous enemy had left behind them, that in what had been the populous and flourishing town of Santarem, the screech owls took possession of a whole street of ruins, where it seemed as if man had been employed in reducing human edifices to a state which rendered them fit receptacles for birds and beasts of prey. The number of these birds, and the boldness with which the havoc every where about inspired them, made it frightful to pass that way even in the daytime; insomuch, that a soldier who had been promoted for his personal bravery was known more than once to forego his mess, rather than pass to it through these ruins. Dogs who were now without owners preyed upon the dead. Wolves fed on human bodies in the streets of Leyria; and retaining then no longer their fear of man, attacked the living who came in their way. The servant of an English gentleman was pursued one evening by two, in the outskirts of that city; he escaped from them only by climbing a single olive tree, which, happily for him, had been left standing; it was just high enough to afford him security, yet so low that the wolves besieged him in it all night; three or four others joined them in the blockade, and when he was seen and rescued in the morning, the bark as high as they could reach had been scored by their repeated endeavours to spring up and seize him.

There were parts of the country where the people, having no other sustenance, allayed the pain of emptiness without supplying the wants of nature, by eating boiled grass, which they seasoned, such as could, with the brine and scales left in the baskets from which salt fish, or sardinhas had been sold, these being at that time the scarce and almost only remaining articles of food. Among a people in this extreme distress, the com-

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missioners had the painful task of selecting the cases which could bear no deferment of relief, when every case was urgent, when multitudes were perishing for want, and when the whole amount of the means of relief at their disposal, economized as those means were to the utmost, was deplorably inadequate to the just and pressing claims upon it. Eighteen months after the retreat, the price of provisions in the wasted provinces was about six times higher than before the invasion; a fact from which some conception may be formed of the misery endured in the course of those months, and of the state of things when the commissioners entered upon their arduous and painful task. Inadequate to this dreadful necessity as the aid of England was, yet, while it is to be feared a greater number perished for want of human, or of timely help, 43,000 sick and 8000 orphans were saved by it. The relief was not bestowed in food alone, and in the means of removal, but in the means of future subsistence . . . cows, oxen, implements of agriculture, and seed of various kinds. The gratitude of the people, to their honour it should be said, was more in proportion to the intention and good-will which were thus manifested, than to the actual relief which was afforded. And if in Portugal, as there would have been in any other country, men were found whose hearts were so hard and their consciences so stupified that they sought only how to make the necessities and miseries of their fellow-creatures an occasion of lucre for themselves, it may safely be asserted, that never in any public calamity was there less of such wicked selfishness displayed than at this time. The commissioners who were employed ten months upon this service, (which was not less hazardous than painful, for it exposed them continually to contagious disease as well as to the constant sight of suffering,) performed their office gratuitously, and would not consent to have their personal expenses reimbursed: the secre-

tary and assistants who always accompanied them refused to accept any pecuniary recompense for their time and labour: and the house of the Vanzellers of Porto advanced money for purchasing great part of the cattle, and would receive no commission whatever upon the negociation and payment of the bills. A brother of that house, while the allied army occupied the lines, received under his own roof at Lisbon, and at his own cost maintained more than forty refugees, who were all personally unknown to him before that time: and at his mother's* country house near Porto, as many as came daily were fed in her own presence, from seventy to an hundred and upwards being the usual number. It is consolatory to record such examples in a history where so many errors and crimes must be recorded. When the distribution was completed, the Portuguese Regency assured the British Government that there did not appear to have been a single complaint against the justice and regularity with which it had been made, and that this scrupulous and efficient application of the grant to the ends intended was owing to the unwearied exertion of Mr. Croft and his colleagues: they added, that they should lay those high services, as they properly denominated them, before the Prince of Brazil, and expressed their desire that Mr. Croft's conduct might be made known to the Prince Regent of Great Britain. That gentleman was, in consequence, created a Baronet, and received the royal Portuguese Order of the Tower and Sword.

No measure could have had the effect of inspiring the Por-

Political effect of this distribution.

* This lady is known with her own hand and that of her waiting woman, to have vaccinated above 12,000 persons. The Royal Academy of Sciences at Lisbon presented her with a medal in acknowledgement and commemoration of the services which, in public and private, she was continually rendering to humanity.

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tugueze people with so much confidence, as this public distribution of seed corn, and tools, and cattle. They who had been most apprehensive of another invasion, were convinced that Great Britain would not have conferred such a gift, if what was now bestowed upon them were likely to be wrested from them by the enemy; and under that conviction they resumed in hope those labours, from which despair might otherwise have deterred them. But it was far from Lord Wellington's intention to deceive them into any fallacious opinion of their own security; on the contrary, his first thought, after he had driven the French beyond the frontier, was to warn the Portuguese that the danger might yet be renewed. "Their nation," he said, "had still riches left, which the tyrant would endeavour to plunder: they were happy under a beneficent sovereign, and this alone would make him exert himself to destroy their happiness: they had successfully resisted him, and therefore he would leave no possible means unemployed for bringing them under his iron yoke." He appealed to all who had witnessed the successive invasions of Junot, Soult, and Massena, whether the system of the French had not been to confiscate, to plunder, and to commit every outrage which their atrocious dispositions could devise? and whether from the general, to the lowest soldier, they had not delighted in the practice of such excesses? "The Portuguese," he said, "ought not to relax their preparations for resistance. Every man capable of bearing arms ought to learn the use of them: those who, by their age or sex, were not capable of taking the field, should beforehand look out for places of safety where they might retire in time of need: they should bury their most valuable effects, every one in secret, not trusting the knowledge of the place to those who had no interest in concealing it: and they should take means for effectually concealing, or destroying the food, which, in case of necessity, could

not be removed. If," said Lord Wellington, "these measures are adopted, however superior in number the force may be which the desire of plunder and of vengeance may induce the tyrant to send again for the invasion of this country, the issue will be certain, and the independence of Portugal will be finally established, to the eternal honour of the present generation." Having issued this proclamation, and made arrangements for the blockade of Almeida, Lord Wellington, leaving his army under Sir Brent Spencer, took advantage of the temporary inaction of the enemy to go into Alentejo.

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Beresford had accompanied the commander-in-chief in pursuit of the retreating enemy, as far as the Ceyra. There Lord Wellington received news as unexpected as it was unwelcome, that Badajoz had been surrendered by its base governor. Another piece of intelligence distressed him; a Spanish officer of rank and ability, who had arranged the correspondence which was carried on with his countrymen in those parts of Spain possessed by the French, had been made prisoner in the route of Mendizabal's army, and immediately entered the Intruder's service. Lord Wellington acted with characteristic sagacity on this occasion; neither treating, nor considering this person as wholly reprobate because he had shown a want of principle which proceeded from want of courage to endure adversity, he caused a letter to be written to him, containing a hint, that bad as his conduct was, it would be his own fault if he made it unforgiveable. The hint was taken as it was meant; . . . for the motive of ingratiating himself with his new patrons was not strong enough to overpower a natural humanity, a remaining sense of honour, and a prudential consideration of the instability of fortune: the officer kept his secret, and lived to be well rewarded for having done so. The surrender of Badajoz, which left the besieging army at liberty to act against the allies wherever they

*Marquis
Beresford
goes to
Alentejo.*

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 XXXVII. checked him in what else would have been a career of victory:
 1811. but while he continued the pursuit of the retreating army, he
March. sent the Marshal to his command on the south of the Tagus, to
 provide against the consequences which might result from Imaz's
 baseness.

*Valencia de
 Alcantara,
 Albuquerque,
 and
 Campo
 Mayor
 taken by
 the French.*

Mortier, meantime, not failing to pursue to the utmost the
 advantage which that misconduct had given him, advanced
 upon Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Campo Mayor,
 in order that the troops which he knew would be sent against
 him might be deprived of those points of support. The first of
 these places had long ceased to be of any importance as a for-
 tress; it was taken by surprise, and seven brass guns, being the
 whole of its artillery, were destroyed for want of carriages.
 Latour Maubourg went against Albuquerque; its fortress, a
 century ago, had been called impregnable; and might now
 have made some defence, relief being so near at hand; but the
 appearance of an enemy and a few cannon-shot sufficed to ter-
 rify the garrison; they surrendered without resistance, and were
 sent prisoners to Badajoz with seventeen brass guns of large
 calibre: the French then razed the works. While these de-
 tachments were thus successfully employed, Mortier himself
 opened the trenches before Campo Mayor: this fortress resisted
 better than its Castillian neighbours had done; a battalion of
 militia incurred some disgrace by its conduct, but the spirit
 of the inhabitants and the governor was excellent, and the place
 held out eleven days.

March 22.

*Beresford
 arrives on
 the frontier*

The fall of Campo Mayor was regretted, more for the sake of
 its brave defenders than for any advantage that could accrue to
 the enemy from a conquest which they could not maintain.
 Marshal Beresford arrived at Chamusca during the siege, and
 on the day that it surrendered, assembled his corps at Portalegre,

now strengthened by the 4th division, and Colonel de Gray's brigade of heavy cavalry. On the 24th, every thing was collected at and in front of Arronches; and on the following day he moved against Campo Mayor, meaning, if the enemy should persist in retaining it, to interpose between that town and Badajoz. The main body of the French had by this time returned to the Caya, the whole of their besieging train had re-entered Badajoz, they had removed thither the heavy guns from Campo Mayor, and Soult had given orders to destroy the works there, which were prevented by the appearance of Marshal Beresford's corps. About a league from the town, the allies fell in and skirmished with the enemy's advanced horse: and Brigadier-General Long advancing rapidly with the cavalry, came up with their whole force, which, upon perceiving his movements, had evacuated the place, and was retiring toward Badajoz. It consisted of eight squadrons of cavalry, and two battalions of infantry, commanded by General Latour Maubourg; the latter were retreating in column with two troops of hussars at their head and two closing their rear, the rest manœuvring so as at once to cover the retreat of the foot, and secure to themselves its support: upon the approach of the allies, the French infantry formed an oblong square, and the horse took up a position *en potence*. Long's first object was to dispose of their cavalry; he ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Head, with the 13th dragoons, to attack in flank the three squadrons which were on the same line with the infantry; while he, with three Portuguese squadrons, attacked in front the three which formed the angle to the right of the others: Colonel Elder, with two squadrons of Portuguese, was to cover his left, and turn the enemy's right; and eight squadrons of heavy dragoons to support the attack. As soon as Head advanced, the enemy changed their position, brought forward their right, and met the

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March.*Affair near
Campo
Mayor.*

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charge; they were immediately broken, and in their flight carried away with them the other squadrons, which, from the change of position, had in some measure become a second line. From Campo Mayor to Badajoz is an open plain without tree or bush; over this ground the French retreated rapidly, skirmishing the whole way. The 13th pursued with ungovernable eagerness, and the two squadrons of Portugeze which were sent to their support caught the same spirit, and dispersed in the heat of pursuit. In this affair, there were many opportunities for the display of individual courage and dexterity. Colonel Chamorin, of the 26th French Dragoons, was encountered by a corporal of the 13th, whose comrade he had just before shot through the head: each was a master of his horse and weapon, but at length the corporal, striking off the helmet of his enemy with one blow, cleft his head down to the ears with another.

The heavy cavalry, meantime, had been halted two miles off, and there only remained with General Long three squadrons of Portugeze with which to harass and impede the French infantry, till it could be brought up: these Portugeze did not stand the fire of the column and the appearance of the hussars; and though they were soon rallied, the retreating column gained ground considerably before the heavy cavalry could overtake them. The 13th and the two Portugeze squadrons were then perceived returning from the pursuit which they had followed with such heedless precipitation, as to have given the enemy the superiority of numbers, and to have lost twenty-four killed, seventy wounded, and seventy-seven prisoners: some of them had pushed on to the very gate of Badajoz, and were taken on the bridge. Marshal Beresford would not risk the loss of more cavalry, and the enemy's column therefore retired unmolested, retaking fifteen out of sixteen guns which our 13th had taken. The loss of the French was very

considerable ; in one of their regiments only six officers out of sixteen remained for duty. The next morning a French captain of dragoons came with a trumpet, demanding permission to search the field for his colonel. Several of our officers went out with him. The peasants had stripped the dead during the night ; and more than six hundred naked bodies were lying on the ground, mostly slain with sabre wounds. It was long before they could find Chamorin, lying on his face in his clotted blood ; as soon as the body was turned up, the French captain gave a sort of scream, sprung off his horse, threw off his brazen helmet, and kneeling by the body, took the lifeless hand, and kissed it repeatedly with a passionate grief which affected all the beholders.

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After this affair, Beresford cantoned his troops at Campo Mayor, Elvas, Borba, and Villa-Viçosa ; they were equally in need of rest and of refitment, great part of the British infantry having made forced marches from Condeixa, and being in want of shoes. General Ballasteros, who was seldom at any time in force without suffering defeat, and never defeated without presently obtaining some success ; after experiencing some of these customary alternations, and incurring some severe losses in the Condado de Niebla, had fallen back upon Gibrleon, hoping to effect a junction with Zayas, who had been sent from Cadiz with 6000 men, of whom 400 were cavalry. Something was always to be expected from Ballasteros's remarkable activity, but there was equal reason for dreading the effect of his incaution ; by Beresford's request, therefore, Castanos wrote to desire that he and Zayas would not commit themselves, but reserve their force entire for co-operating with him. Beresford's objects at this time were, to throw a bridge across the Guadiana at Jurumenha, .. to recover Olivença, drive Mortier out of Extremadura, and form as soon as possible the siege of Badajoz. Foreseeing the

*Measures
concerted
with the
Spaniards.*

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want of a bridge, Lord Wellington had frequently, before the fall of that place, urged the Spanish general officers to remove the bridge-boats, and other materials which were in store there, to Elvas: they began to follow this advice, but so late and so slowly, that only five of the twenty boats had been removed, when Mendizabal's defeat rendered any further removal impossible: these, when laid down, left 160 yards of the river uncovered. Nor was this the only difficulty. It had been supposed that ample supplies had been collected at Estremoz and Villa Viçosa; but owing to the poverty of the Government, and to that mismanagement which, from the highest to the lowest of its departments, prevailed and was maintained, as if by prescriptive right, throughout, not enough were found to ensure the subsistence of the troops from day to day. Moreover there were no shoes in store for an army which had marched itself barefoot. And had there been no deficiency of stores, and no previous difficulties to overcome, Beresford's force, consisting of 20,000 effective men, British and Portugueze, was inadequate to the operations which he was to undertake with it, though it was the utmost that Lord Wellington could spare from the more immediately important scene of action on the frontier of Beira.

*Bridge constructed at
Jurumenha.*

Nothing, however, that could be done by diligence and exertion was omitted. The Guadiana was in such a state that it seemed feasible to construct a bridge by fixing trestles across the shallow part of the river, and connecting them with the five Spanish boats in the deeper stream; or those boats might be used as a floating bridge for the artillery and heavy stores, and the interval filled with some half dozen tin pontoons, which had been sent from Lisbon to Elvas, and which, though weak and bad of their kind, might bear the weight of infantry, there being a practicable ford for the horse. This latter plan was preferred; materials were collected not without great difficulty, and delays

which that difficulty occasioned ; trees were to be felled for the purpose, and the trestles were made only seven feet in height, because no timber for making larger was found near the spot. On the 2d of April the engineers reported that the passage was ready for the following day, and three squadrons passed that evening, and stretched their piquets along the advanced hills ; thus making a show which imposed upon the enemy. The troops marched from their cantonments, and arrived at daybreak in a wood within a mile of the bridge. No apprehensions of the river had been entertained, for there had been no rain in those parts ; but heavy rains had fallen far off, in the high regions where the Guadiana has its sources. When day broke it was seen that the water had risen three feet seven inches in the course of the night ; planks, trestles, and pontoons were swept away by the current, and the ford also had become impassable. Beresford still determined to cross, not losing the opportunity which the enemy by their want of vigilance allowed him. Enough of the trestles were collected from the river to form, with two of the pontoons, two landing places, and two floating bridges were made of the Spanish boats. This was completed by the afternoon of the 5th. The army immediately began to cross ; and continued crossing, without an hour's intermission, from three that afternoon till after midnight of the 8th. Only one man and horse were lost in the operation. Some country boats meantime carried across the three days' reserve of biscuit ; and the same proportion of slaughter-cattle swam over. The troops bivouacked in succession as they passed, forming a position in a small semicircle, from Villa Real on the right to the Guadiana on the left. Severely as the French had suffered in the affair before Campo Mayor, they acted at this time with as much disregard of their enemies, as if they had no abler general than Mendizabal to contend with, and no better troops than those

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*Passage of
the Gua-
diana.*

CHAP. which they had so easily routed. They had 12,000 men within
 XXXVII. three hours' march, who might have effectually disputed the
 1811. passage, or cut off the advanced guard. But so ill were they
 April. informed of Beresford's movements, and so negligent in ascer-
 taining them, that they made no endeavour to interrupt him till
 the morning of the 8th, when they advanced in some force, and
 surprised before daybreak a piquet of the 13th dragoons; but
 they were driven back by the 37th, which closed the right of the
 position; and finding the allies too strong for them, desisted from
 any further attempt.

*Olivença
 retaken.*

On the morning of the 9th, as soon as the fog cleared, the
 army marched in three columns upon Olivença; it was thought
 not unlikely that the enemy would wait for them there, or on
 the opposite bank of the Valverde river, where the ground was
 favourable: they had, however, fallen back to Albuhera, leaving
 a garrison in Olivença. The place was summoned, and refused
 to surrender; guns and stores, therefore, were ordered from
 Elvas; the fourth division remained to besiege it; and the rest
 of the army moved by Valverde, and bivouacked in the wood
 of Albuhera, the enemy's rear guard retiring before their ad-
 vance, which entered S. Martha on the 12th. Here the army
 halted till the 15th, to get up provisions which were still
 brought from the rear; and on that day Olivença surrendered
 at discretion, before the breach was practicable. The gar-
 rison consisted of about 480 men, in a place where Mendizabal
 had thrown away 3000. The French had committed a fault of
 the same kind, though not to an equal extent; the force they
 left there being totally inadequate to the defence of so large a
 fortress. The recapture of this place would have produced an
 angry contention between the Spanish and Portuguese Govern-
 ments, if Portugal had not been rendered, by English influence,
 patient in this instance under a galling sense of injustice. The

territory on the left of the Guadiana, in which Olivença stands, was part of the dowry given with his daughter to Affonso III. by the Castillian king, Alfonso the Wise; a grant which, though deemed at the time to have been an arbitrary, and therefore an illegal cession of national rights, was subsequently confirmed to Portugal with due form by the treaty between kings Dinez and Ferdinand IV. But as the Guadiana might seem to form a natural boundary between the two kingdoms on this part of the frontier, Spain has ever looked with an evil eye upon this cession. Five centuries had not reconciled a people peculiarly tenacious of what they deem national rights, to this dismemberment, as they considered it, though in itself of little importance to Spain, and though what had been ceded to Portugal was in reality the right of winning it from the Moors, and keeping it when won. In times of international war, therefore, the possession of Olivença had been contested not less as a point of honour than for its own value, when it was a place of great strength; and so strong was the border spirit which prevailed there that, when the Spaniards captured it in 1658, the whole of the inhabitants chose rather to leave the town, and lose whatever they could not carry with them, than become subjects to the King of Spain, though the property of those who should remove was offered to any who would remain. It was restored at the end of that war, and Portugal continued to hold it till its cession was extorted in 1801, in the treaty of Badajoz. But the war which was terminated by that treaty had been entirely unprovoked by Portugal: Spain was then acting as the deceived and degraded instrument of French policy; and the Portuguese felt, as they well might do, that the surrender, though made to Spain, had been compelled by France; and that so long as Spain retained Olivença by virtue of that treaty, they were an injured people. The Prince of Brazil, in the proclamation which he issued on his arrival in

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*Claim of
the Portu-
guese to
that place.*

CHAP. Brazil, declaring war against France, and against Spain as
XXXVII. then the ally and instrument of French oppression, had pro-
1811. tested against the injustice which was done him in that treaty,
April. and declared his intention of recovering when he could whatever
he had then been compelled to abandon: and the Spaniards
were themselves so conscious of this injustice, that the local
authorities, with the sanction of the Junta of Extremadura, had,
at the commencement of the war against Buonaparte and the
Intruder, proposed to restore Olivença and its district to Portugal
for a certain sum of money. The Central Government had not
authorised this proposal; and Olivença was not to be thought of in
times when the independence of both nations was at stake. But
fortune had now put it in the power of the Portuguese to right
themselves: Olivença had been taken by the French, and re-
taken from them by an allied force of Portuguese and British;
and one of the Portuguese Regents proposed to his colleague the
British ambassador that the Portuguese standard should be dis-
played there, without previous explanation, or subsequent jus-
tification of the measure. There prevailed at that time a strong
feeling of irritation in the Portuguese Government against the
Spaniards, occasioned by the conduct of the Spanish officers on
the frontier, and the unrestrained irregularities of the Spanish
troops wherever they passed: they had even sacked a townlet
near Badajoz, an act for which the Portuguese meditated re-
prisals, and had actually proposed so insane a measure to the
British minister, when the Spanish regency allayed their resent-
ment by disavowing the act, and issuing orders for the punish-
ment of the parties concerned. Having thus been in some de-
gree mollified, they were persuaded not to injure the common
cause by asserting their own claim, just and reasonable as that
claim was; but to wait the effect of a treaty then pendent
with Spain, in which the restoration of Olivença was stipulated

and not disputed. It is discreditable to Spain that the restitution which Portugal was then contented to wait for has not yet been made.

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Olivença having been taken, the allied army marched upon Zafra and Los Santos; this movement being designed to secure themselves from interruption in the intended siege, and to protect Ballasteros, who, after failing to effect a junction with Zayas, was pressed by a French division under General Maransin, and compelled to retire successively on the 13th and 14th from Fregenal and Xeres de los Cavalleros. The French, upon discovering Beresford's advance, on the following day retired hastily toward Llerena, which Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded to Mortier in the command, occupied with about 6000 horse and foot: the division which now joined him consisted of 4000 infantry and 500 cavalry. At Los Santos the allied cavalry fell in with the 2d and 10th of the enemy's hussars, about 600 in number, who were apparently sent on reconnoissance: they charged our 13th dragoons weakly, and were repulsed; then retreated from the force which was moving against them; and presently quickening that retreat, fled to Villa Garcia, and were followed for nearly ten miles at a gallop. In this they lost a chef d'escadron, killed, and about 160 men and horses prisoners: the British eleven horses of the 4th dragoons, who died of fatigue after the chase. The enemy remained one day longer at Llerena, and on the following, when a movement against them had been ordered for the next morning, retired to Guadalcanal, thus for the time abandoning Extremadura. Beresford then cantoned his infantry at Valverde, Azenchal, Villa Alva, and Almendralejo, the cavalry remaining at Zafra, Los Santos, Usagre, and Bienvenida: here the resources of the country were sufficient for their plentiful supply. A Spanish corps of about 1500 men, under the Conde de Penne Villamur,

*The French
retire from
Extrema-
dura.*

CHAP. belonging to Castaños's army, occupied Llerena. Ballasteros,
 XXXVII. with about an equal force, was at Monasterio; and Blake, who
 1811. had sailed from Cadiz for the Guadiana on the 15th, with 6000

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foot and 400 horse, had reached Ayamonte, with 5000 of his men and 200 of his cavalry; the others had been compelled by weather to put back. Soult was at this time uniting his disposable force near Seville; nearly the whole corps from the Condado de Niebla had joined him there, and he had also drawn a detachment from Sebastiani's corps, and some regiments from Puerto S. Maria. This was the situation of the respective armies when Lord Wellington arrived at Elvas, and was met there by Marshal Beresford.

April 20.

*Siege of
 Badajoz
 undertaken.*

Thus far in this memorable campaign the war had been conducted by the British commander as a game of skill: it was now to become a game of hazard. The base surrender of Badajoz distracted his attention as much as it had disappointed his reasonable hopes: that the place should be recovered was of the greatest importance to his future operations; to the enemy, it was of equal importance to maintain it: Soult could bring into the field a force sufficient for its relief; it was well garrisoned; whatever injury had been done to the works was thoroughly repaired; it had sufficient artillery, and was well supplied. Lord Wellington and Beresford reconnoitred it; three battalions came out to skirmish with the reconnoitring party, and were driven back, but with the loss on our side of three officers and about forty men killed and wounded. The siege, to be successful, must be vigorously pursued, so that there might not be time enough allowed for relieving the place; no plan, therefore, could be adopted which would require more than sixteen days' open trenches: but at least twenty-two, and this too, if the means were fully equal to the undertaking, would be required, if either of the south fronts were attacked, which yet it was plainly seen

April 22.

would have been the preferable points of attack, had time permitted; and means as well as time were wanting. The plan which was adopted therefore as the only one in these circumstances feasible, was to breach and assault Fort Christoval, and having reduced it, to attack the castle from thence; three or four days battering might, it was thought, form a practicable breach in the castle wall, which on that side was entirely exposed, as well as apparently weak, and if the castle were carried, Badajoz could make no farther resistance.

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During the night of the 23d, the Guadiana rose nearly eight feet and a half in the course of twelve hours; the bridge which had been thrown across it at Jurumenha since the army passed was swept away, and the whole of its materials carried down the stream and lost. The communication was restored by another bridge of casks at the end of the month; but Lord Wellington seeing the danger of such a river in the rear of the army, immediately changed the cantonment of the troops, and directed Beresford to occupy and rest his rear upon Merida, where the old Roman bridge rendered his passage at any time sure. No sooner had these instructions been given, than he was recalled to Beira by intelligence that Massena was approaching the Agueda in force, and seemed to threaten an attempt for the relief of Almeida.

*Bridge at
Jurumenha
swept away.*

*Lord Wel-
lington re-
called to
Beira.*

It was owing in great measure to the inactivity of the Spanish commander in Galicia, that Massena felt himself in safety as soon as he was out of Portugal, was enabled to rest the remains of his army, and to draw reinforcements from Castille, which enabled him to resume offensive operations, only fifteen days after the last of his troops had crossed the frontier in their retreat. The enemy had received great annoyance in Old Castille and Leon from D. Julian Sanchez, and other guerrilla parties, but none from the nominal army of Galicia, whose

*Inactivity
of the Spa-
nish com-
mander in
Galicia.*

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general, D. Nicolas Mahy, had suffered Massena's dépôts to be protected by from 5000 to 6000 men dispersed between Burgos and Ciudad Rodrigo. The Galicians cried out against him, complaining that, when he had filled the prisons with his own countrymen, he seemed to think any other operations unnecessary. He was displaced in consequence of their representations, and General Abadia appointed, (after Albuquerque's death,) to succeed him; but Abadia had lingered at Lisbon instead of hastening to take the command; Massena, as soon as the pursuit ceased upon the frontier, had no danger to apprehend from any other quarter, and his army was re-equipped and reinforced in no longer time than would have been necessary to recruit it after its fatigues. The Intruder having gone to Paris, the force which would otherwise have been required for his personal security was disposable for this service, so that, with the cavalry and artillery of the imperial guard, and the troops which were collected from Castille and Leon, he mustered not less than 40,000 effective infantry and 5000 horse. Lord Wellington had not supposed it possible that, after such a retreat, Massena could in so short a time have been at the head of such a force. He arrived at Villa Ferosa on the 28th, and at once perceived that a formidable attempt would be made for relieving Almeida: his own force consisted of 34,000 men, 2000 horse, including those who were engaged in the blockade.

*Country
between the
Agueda and
Coa.*

The country between the Agueda and the Coa is a high open tract, which falls in a gradual slope from the mountains on the south in which those rivers have their sources, to the Douro: here and there are woods of cork and ilex, and the whole tract is intersected and divided into ridges by streams which run parallel to the larger rivers during the greater part of their course, and fall most of them into the Agueda. An army advancing into Portugal might, by moving upon the ridge of

Fuentes Guinaldo, turn the right of all the positions that can be taken upon these smaller streams; or if it advanced in a direct line, the parallel ridges and woods covering any movement without interrupting it, would favour it in manœuvring and directing its principal strength against either flank. The allies were cantoned along the Duas Casas, and toward the sources of the Azava, the light division being at Gallegos and Espeja, upon the latter. But the ridge between the Duas Casas and the Turon offered the most advantageous position, because on the left it was of difficult access in front, and on the right it connected with the high country about Navedeaver, from whence the communications were easy in the direction of Alfayates and Sabugal.

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Before Massena took the field, he addressed his troops in another bootless boast. "Soldiers of the army of Portugal," said he in his general orders, "after six months of glorious and tranquil operations, you have returned to the first scene of your triumphs; but the enemies of Napoleon the Great have the audacity to blockade a fortress which they dared not previously attempt to defend. Soldiers, if your valour then intimidated their columns, will it not now punish them for their temerity? Will not you bring to their recollection, that you are still the same brave men who drove them to their trenches at Lisbon? Some regiments of cavalry, and reinforcements from his majesty's guards, conducted by the marshal of the district, assist in your efforts and your duties. Forget not that it is your courage which must maintain that superiority of heroism and intrepidity which forms the subject of the admiration and the envy of other nations. Through you, the honour of the French armies will render renowned the hitherto unknown banks of the Coa, as you have made the rivers of Italy and of the North for ever memorable. Soldiers, a victory is necessary, in order to pro-

*Massena's
address to
his army.*

CHAP. cure you that repose which the equipment and administration
 XXXVII. of the regiments require. You will obtain it; and you will pre-
 1811. pare yourselves in the leisure that will result from it of marching
 to new triumphs."

May.
Battle of
Fuentes
d'Onoro.

May 3.

At day-break on the 2d of May the main body of the French crossed the Agueda at Ciudad Rodrigo, and moved in two columns toward the Azava, which they crossed that evening; our light division fell back from its cantonments on that river, the enemy being very superior in cavalry, and the horses of the allies in bad condition, by reason of hard service and wretched fodder: so great, indeed, was the want of food for them, that it had been necessary to cut the green rye, to the harvest of which the unfortunate peasants had looked for their next year's subsistence. On the following morning the French continued to advance, two columns moving towards Alameda and Fort Conception, and one, with the whole of the cavalry, upon Fuentes d'Onoro, a little village upon the Duas Casas. Lord Wellington had assembled his first, third, and seventh divisions on the heights, between that river and the Turon, in front of Villa Fermosa: the 3d was posted on a ridge crossing the road from that townlet to Fuentes d'Onoro, which village was occupied by its light companies, and by three companies of the 5th battalion of the 60th under Lieutenant-Colonel Williams: the first division was formed on the right of the third, and the seventh moved from Navedeaver towards the first, throwing out flanking parties toward Poço Velho. This division incurred some danger in the movement: they were in the wood of Poço Velho, and the enemy's cavalry got in their rear; but though they had ground to pass on which cavalry could act, they made good their retreat, notwithstanding the superiority of the French in that arm. Major-General Campbell, with the sixth, observed the bridge over the Duas Casas at Alameda, and Sir W. Erskine the passages

of the same stream at Fort Conception and Aldea do Bispo. Brigadier-General Pack, with his brigade of Portuguese and the Queen's regiment from the sixth division, kept up the blockade of Almeida; and Julian Sanchez occupied Navedeaver with his little party of horse and foot, . . . men more experienced in desultory warfare than in regular battles, but of approved courage. The extent of this position was not less than six miles from flank to flank, the left being supported by the ruins of Fort Conception, the right at Navedeaver: the village of Fuentes d'Onoro was in the right of the centre, close to the Duas Casas, situated on a slope, and concealed by the ground: a great part of the line from that village to the ruined fort was in a certain degree secured by the rocky and intricate channel of the Duas Casas, and its steep and rugged bank on the side of the allies, . . . the passage being very difficult for cavalry and artillery, and defensible by a comparatively small force: on the other side the position was not so strong, being nearly on a flat, save that there was a small eminence with a tower on its summit, on which the right rested. Head-quarters were at Villa Ferrosa, behind the Turon, about two miles from Fuentes d'Onoro. The heights which the troops occupied are of a very gradual ascent, accessible to cavalry in every part, except here and there, where there are masses of rock. The ground upon which the French formed was a plain, with woods behind it; and immediately in the neighbourhood of Fuentes d'Onoro there were groves of ilex on the right bank of the Duas Casas, which they occupied in force throughout.

The position which Lord Wellington had taken appeared to Massena a fine line of battle, but he thought it was not without danger to the troops that held it; for they had the wild Coa behind them, and only a single carriage communication, in itself sufficiently difficult, by the little town of Castello Bom.

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This communication it was his intention to seize ; and for that purpose, while with a part of his army he kept the centre of the allies in check, he proceeded in force against their right, and endeavoured to obtain possession of Fuentes d'Onoro. Having brought up his artillery, he commenced the attack at two in the afternoon, by a cannonade upon the village, under cover of which fire a strong column of infantry moved against it. Lord Wellington perceived his intention, and reinforced the village as occasion required with the 71st, the 79th, and the second battalion of the 24th. Lieutenant-Colonel Williams was wounded, and the command then devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron of the 79th. Repeated and vigorous efforts were made against this post ; and the enemy at one time obtained possession of it in part, but they were driven out before night put a stop to the action.

May 4.

The French did not renew the attack on the following day, but confined themselves to reconnoitring the British position, particularly the right, toward which they moved part of their troops, chiefly cavalry, in the direction of Navedeaver, Massena thinking that he had found accessible ground between that village and Poço Velho. Lord Wellington, from the course of his reconnoissance, inferred what was his purpose, and in the evening moved the 7th division, under Major-General Houston, to protect, if possible, the passage of the Duas Casas at Poço Velho, where the enemy intended to cross in hopes of gaining possession of Fuentes d'Onoro from that side, and of the ground behind the village. As soon as it was daylight on the 5th, this

May 5.

intention on their part became evident. The allied cavalry was then moved to the left of the 7th division, somewhat more forward ; the light division was in march from Alameda towards the same station ; the 3d had bivouacked in a line parallel to the ridge of the hill toward Fuentes d'Onoro ; and the 1st upon

its right: these divisions were connected with each other, and the village was occupied by part of the troops of both, both being ready to support it. There was a distance of about one mile from the right of the 1st division to the ground on which the light division had arrived, and about half a mile from thence to the 7th; the cavalry covered this last interval; the former was protected by piquets and light infantry in the wood between Fuentes d'Onoro and Poço Velho. This would have been a critical situation for a commander less reasonably confident in himself and in his troops. There was no appui for the right of the British army, and it had the Coa in its rear with only one passage for artillery. The French were superior in numbers, and what was of far greater importance here, greatly so in cavalry: their horses were fresh, whereas ours had been of necessity overworked and insufficiently fed: moreover, the ground favoured their preparations for attack, a large extent of wood within little more than a mile of the British line concealing their movements.

Early in the morning one of the enemy's corps appeared in two columns in the valley of the Duas Casas, opposite Poço Velho, having the whole of their cavalry under General Montbrun on the left. The infantry directed itself against the village; the cavalry moved through the open country between it and Navedeaver, a part circling about, under favour of the ground, to turn the right flank of the allies. Julian Sanchez was compelled to retire; and so, with some loss, were two battalions of the 7th division from Poço Velho. Houston moved with that division to protect their retreat and that of the cavalry, with which view he placed himself on a rocky height, and there formed the Chasseurs Britanniques. The first attack of their advanced cavalry was met by a few squadrons of British, who obtained a partial advantage, and took a colonel and some other

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CHAP. XXXVII. prisoners; but their eagerness, and still more their inferiority, occasioned some confusion: they were in their turn pressed, and the enemy for a short time had possession of two guns belonging to our horse-artillery. The main body of the French cavalry advanced rapidly, charged through the piquets of the 85th, and followed our horse up the hill: but the attack thus gallantly begun was not maintained with equal gallantry. The ground was intersected with stone walls, which protected part of our troops; those who had not that advantage stood firm. The chasseurs under Lieutenant-Colonel Eustace, and a detachment of the Brunswick corps, were somewhat concealed by a rising ground, where in many parts the rocks stood several feet above the surface: availing themselves of this, they waited till the main body of the enemy's cavalry came in a line with their front, within threescore paces, and then rising up threw in a well-directed volley, which checked them and made them retire in disorder; yet the charge had appeared so formidable, that, it is said, Lord Wellington feared the Brunswickers were lost. Their loss was trifling; but they narrowly escaped afterward from the Portuguese, who, because of their caps, mistook them for enemies. The attack was renewed, but in vain, though some of the French dismounted and acted as light infantry to assist in it.

Lord Wellington had occupied Poço Velho and the adjoining ground for the sake of maintaining his communication across the Coa by Sabugal, while he provided at the same time for maintaining the blockade of Almeida. The danger of attempting both was now evident, and looking with just confidence rather to victory than to any likelihood of retreating, he drew in the right of the army. Placing, therefore, the light division in reserve in the rear of the left of the 1st, he ordered the 7th to cross the Turon and take post on some commanding

ground, which protected the right flank and rear of the 1st, covered the communication with the Coa on that side, and prevented that of the enemy with Almeida by the roads between the Coa and the Turon. The 7th division thus covered the rear of the right, which was formed by the 1st in two lines. Colonel Ashworth's brigade, in two lines, was in the centre, and the 3d division, in two lines also, on the left. D. Julian's infantry joined the 7th in Fresneda; his horse were sent to interrupt the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. Fuentes d'Onoro was in front of the left. The right of the French infantry was opposite that village, the left and centre between it and Poço Velho, in the wood, and within 2000 yards of the British position. A part of their cavalry was on the right flank of their right; a few squadrons were with artillery opposite the 1st division, and the main body was in the open country, from whence the right wing of the allies had withdrawn.

The great object of the enemy now was to gain possession of Fuentes d'Onoro, which was defended by the 24th, 71st, and 78th; and these regiments were supported by the light infantry battalions of the 1st and 3d divisions, and some Portuguese corps. They directed against this post several columns of their infantry supported by artillery; succeeded in turning it by the wood toward Poço Velho; gained possession by superior numbers of the point of land where the chain of piquets passed, and from thence penetrated into the village. They even advanced some little way on the road toward Villa Fermosa: but here the 21st Portuguese regiment checked them; the 74th and 78th were detached by General Picton, charged them, and retook the village. Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, by an enemy who stepped out of the ranks to aim at him. His countrymen, the Highlanders, at whose head he fell, set up a shriek, and attacked the French with a

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CHAP. spirit not to be resisted: the man who had slain their com-
 XXXVII. mander was pierced by many bayonets at once: the leader of
 1811. the French, a person remarkable for his stature and fine form,
 May 5. was killed, and the Highlanders in their vengeance drove the
 enemy before them. More than once Fuentes d'Onoro was won
 and lost; the contest in the streets was so severe that several of
 the openings were blocked up with the dead and the wounded,
 but they were finally driven through it by Colonel Mackinnon:
 they kept up a fire upon it till night closed, at which time 400
 of their dead were lying there. The command of the village
 devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Cadogan.

Meantime, the enemy from the wood in front of the British
 line brought fifteen pieces of cannon to bear upon it, and with
 those above the village established a severe cross fire, under
 cover of which, a column of infantry attempted to penetrate
 down the ravine of the Turon, to the right of the 1st division: but
 they were repulsed by the light infantry of the guards, and some
 companies of the 95th. Their cavalry also charged and cut
 through the piquets of the guards, but were checked by the
 fire of the 42d. During the night and the succeeding day,
 Lord Wellington strengthened his position by throwing up
 breast-works and batteries; and this, after the lesson he had
 received, deterred Massena from attempting any farther attack.
 He made no movement till the 8th, nor did Lord Wellington
 provoke an action: he had succeeded in keeping his ground,
 and thereby maintaining the blockade; and nothing was to be
 gained by attempting more with inferior numbers, and a weak
 and exhausted cavalry. On the 8th and 9th, the French col-
 lected their whole army in the woods between the Duas Casas
 and the Azava, recrossed the latter river on the evening of the
 9th, and retired the next day across the Agueda, having failed
 entirely in the object for which the movement had been under-

*The French
 retire.*

taken, and the battle fought. The loss of the allies on both days amounted to 1378 killed and wounded, 317 prisoners. That of the French was not ascertained: they acknowledged only 400: but that number was counted in the village of Fuentes d'Onoro, and 500 of their horses were left dead on the field. Under the government of Buonaparte, truth was never to be found in any public statement, unless it was favourable to himself; and none of his generals exercised to a greater extent than M. Massena the license which all took of representing their defeats as victories. This action had severely mortified that general; he had been beaten by an army numerically inferior to his own, and weak in cavalry, upon ground which was favourable for that arm, and which Lord Wellington would not have chosen, had circumstances permitted a choice; it was an action in which the skill and promptitude of the British commander, and the gallantry and steadiness of the allied troops, had been evinced throughout.

Defeated in the field, and disappointed in his intention of saving Almeida, Massena sent orders to the Governor, General Brenier, to blow up the works, and retire with the garrison upon Barba de Puerco. Brenier having previously received instructions from Bessieres and from Berthier to prepare for thus evacuating the place, should it be necessary, had made 140 cavities ready to be charged before the end of April; but knowing that Massena would make every effort to retain possession of this fortress, which was the only fruit of his six months campaign in Portugal, he had prepared also for a vigorous defence, hoping to hold out till the first of June. The battle of Fuentes d'Onoro put an end to his hopes; for the firing was heard in Almeida, and proved that it was a serious action; and as the communication which he every moment expected did not

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*Escape of
the garrison
from Al-
meida.*

CHAP. arrive, Brenier could be in no doubt concerning the event. Mas-
XXXVII. sena's orders reached him on the 7th. Immediately the cavities
1811. were filled, the balls and cartridges thrown into the ditch, and
May. the artillery destroyed by discharging cannon into the mouths of
the pieces. Two days were thus employed ; on the morning of
the 10th he assembled the officers, and having read to them his
instructions, told them, that when the place was once demolished,
the intentions of their sovereign would be perfectly fulfilled ;
that that single object ought to animate them ; that they were
Frenchmen, and must now prove to the universe that they were
worthy of being so. They continued to work in destroying
stores and artillery, and completing the mines, till the moment
of their departure ; and at ten at night, all being assembled with
the greatest silence, Brenier gave as a watch-word, Buonaparte
and Bayard, and set off (in his own words) under the auspices
of glory and honour. In coupling these names, he seems not to
have felt how cutting a reproach they conveyed to every honour-
able Frenchman.

About one, the mines exploded ; at the same time the gar-
rison attacked the piquets which observed the place, and
forced their way through them. They marched in two columns,
fired as little as possible, and passed between the bodies of
troops which had been posted to support the piquets. Brenier
had studied the ground so well that he would not take a guide ;
a guide, he thought, would only make him hesitate and perhaps
confuse him ; the moon served as his compass, the different
brooks and rivers which he crossed were so many points which
insured his direction, and he placed his baggage at the tail of each
column, in order that it might serve as a lure to the enemy, for
to save it he knew was impossible. On the part of the block-
ading troops there was a culpable negligence ; for as the garrison

had frequently attacked the nearest piquets, and fired cannon in the night during the whole blockade, but more particularly while Massena was between the Duas Casas and the Azava, they thought this attack was nothing more than one of the ordinary sallies, and did not even move at the sound of the explosion, till its cause was ascertained. General Pack, however, who was at Malpartida, joined the piquets upon the first alarm with his wonted alacrity, and continued to follow and fire upon the enemy, as a guide for the march of the other troops. The 4th regiment, which was ordered to occupy Barba del Puerco, missed the way, and to this Brenier was chiefly indebted for his escape. Regnier was at the bridge of San Felices to receive him, and there he effected his junction, having lost, in this hazardous and well-executed escape, by the French official account, only sixty men. But the loss had been tenfold of what was there stated. For though the lure of the baggage was not thrown out in vain, and too many of his pursuers stopped or turned aside to secure their booty when the horses and mules were cast loose, he was followed and fired upon by General Pack's party, and by a part of the 36th regiment, the whole way to the Agueda, 490 of his men were brought in prisoners, and the number of killed and wounded could not have been inconsiderable.

The English and their general did full justice to the ability with which Brenier performed his difficult attempt. Massena made use of it to colour over his defeat, and represented the evacuation and not the relief of Almeida as the object for which the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro was fought. "The operation," he said, "which had put the army in motion was thus terminated." Shortly afterwards he returned to France, with Ney, Junot, and Loison, leaving behind them names, ever to be execrated in Portugal, and to be held in everlasting infamy. Marmont succeeded him in the command. The army, which

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*May.**Marmont
succeeds
Massena in
the com-
mand.*

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Lord Wel-
lington re-
called to
Alentejo.

still called itself the army of Portugal, went into its cantonments upon the Tormes, having, in Massena's curious language, *advanced* into Spain that it might rest; and Lord Wellington set out for the south, summoned by intelligence from Marshal Beresford that Soult, notwithstanding previous rumours, which described him as fortifying Seville, and preparing to stand on the defensive in Andalusia, was advancing into Extremadura. These tidings reached him on the night of the 15th; and he set out on the following morning.

Badajoz be-
sieged.

When the British commander had been recalled from Badajoz to secure the recovery of Almeida, Beresford was left waiting till the Guadiana should fall sufficiently for him to re-establish the bridge. The French under Latour Maubourg, when they had been forced to retire from Llerena, fell back to Guadalcañal; it was of importance to push them as far off as possible during the intended siege; and a combined movement of Colonel Colborne, Ballasteros, and the Conde de Penne Villamur, who commanded the cavalry of the Spanish army in Extremadura, made them, though far superior in force, retire to Constantino. This service having been performed, the investment of Badajoz was commenced on the 4th of May. But the enterprise was undertaken under every possible disadvantage. For Marshal Beresford had not force enough to carry on the siege, and at the same time hold a position which should cover it from interruption. He was as inadequately supplied with other means as with men: ample stores, indeed, had been ordered from Lisbon to Elvas, and on the part of the governor at Elvas, General Leite, nothing was wanting which his zeal and activity could effect: but these could do little in an exhausted country, where carriage was not to be procured, and all that could be brought up was miserably insufficient. At that time also, the French were perfectly skilled both in the attack and defence of

fortified places, while we had every thing to learn : there was not even a corps of sappers and miners attached to the army, so that all those preliminary operations to which men may be trained at home, at leisure, and in perfect safety, were here to be learnt under the fire of an enemy as well skilled in all the arts of defence as we were deficient in those of attack. In this branch of war they were as superior to us as our troops were uniformly found to theirs in the field; and it is a superiority against which courage, though carried to the highest point, can be of no avail. On the part of the besieged, courage and the high sense of duty may suffice, though outworks have fallen, walls are weak, and science wanting: this had been proved at Zaragoza and Gerona. But it is one thing to assail ramparts, and another to defend them; and the braver the assailants, the greater must be their loss, if they are not directed by the necessary skill.

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On the 8th the investment of the town on the northern side was effected, and that same evening the siege commenced. The soil was hard and rocky; the men unaccustomed to such work and not numerous enough for it, for which causes, and the want also of intrenching tools, a sufficient extent of ground could not be opened the first night. The enemy, who allowed no opportunity to escape them, took advantage of this, made a sortie on the morning of the 10th, gained possession of a battery, and when driven back were pursued with such rash ardour to the very walls of Fort Christoval and the *tête-de-pont*, that the besiegers lost more than 400 men. A breaching battery, armed with three guns and two howitzers, was completed during the next night, and on the morrow the garrison's well directed fire disabled one of the howitzers and all the guns. That same day intelligence was received from the Regent, General Blake, that Soult had left Seville with the declared intention of relieving

*Interrup-
tion of the
siege.*

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*Arrangement
between Lord
Wellington
and Casta-
ños con-
cerning the
command.*

Badajoz, and that Latour Maubourg, returning upon Guadalcañal and Llerena, had forced Penne Villamur to fall back. Orders therefore were given to hold every man in readiness to retire. But other accounts, on the 12th, seemed to make it probable that Soult's movements were only intended against Blake, who had come to Fregenal, and against Ballasteros, who from Monasterio had pushed his advances toward Seville; and on that probability Beresford ordered ground to be broken against the castle. Fresh dispatches in the middle of the night from various quarters made it beyond all doubt that Soult was rapidly advancing; immediate orders, therefore, were given to raise the siege, for Beresford deemed it better to meet the French marshal, and give him battle with all the force that could be collected, Spanish, Portuguese, and British, than by looking at two objects to risk the loss of one. General Cole's division was left with some 2000 Spaniards to cover the removal of the guns and stores; and Beresford met Blake and Castaños at Valverde on the 14th. Any jealousy which might have arisen concerning the command had been obviated by a previous arrangement between Castaños and Lord Wellington. The latter, in a written memorial concerning the operations which ought to be pursued in Extremadura, had proposed that whenever different corps of the allied armies should be united to give battle, the general who was possessed of the highest military rank, and of the longest standing, should take the command of the whole. This would have given it to Castaños; but he, with that wise and disinterested spirit which always distinguished him, proposed, as a more equitable arrangement, that the general who had the greatest force under his orders should have the chief command, and that the others should be considered as auxiliaries. Lord Wellington perfectly approved of the alteration. "It was my duty," said he, "in a

point so delicate as that of the allied troops acting in concert, to submit a proposition so reasonable in itself as to obtain universal assent; but it was becoming the manly understanding, candour, and knowledge of existing circumstances which characterise your excellency to make an alteration in it, substituting another proposal better calculated to please those of the allies who have most to lose in the battle, for which we must prepare ourselves."

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Lord Wellington had left it at Beresford's discretion to fight a battle or retire, if circumstances should render one or other alternative necessary. But the effect of a retreat would, as he saw, have been most disastrous: it would have deprived the Spaniards of all hope for any efficient exertion on the part of Great Britain; it would have exposed Blake and Castaños to destruction; the British army would have suffered a second time in reputation; the Portuguese troops would have lost their confidence in their allies and in themselves; and in the retreat itself, ... with an army so dispirited, through an exhausted country, and before such troops as the French under such a commander, ... the numerical loss might have been greater than in a well fought though unsuccessful engagement, and the consequences worse.

*Reasons for
giving bat-
tle to the
French.*

Our cavalry, with that of Castaños, under the Conde de Penne Villamur, falling back as the enemy advanced, was joined at Santa Martha by Blake's. The British and Portuguese infantry, except the division which was left to cover the removal of the stores to Elvas, occupied a position in front of Valverde; but as this, though stronger than any which could be taken up elsewhere in those parts, would have left Badajoz entirely open, Beresford determined to take up such as he could get directly between that city and the enemy. He therefore assembled his force on the 15th at the village of Albuhera,

*The allies
assemble at
Albuhera.*

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where the roads meet which lead to Badajoz and to Jurumenha by Valverde and Olivença. A little above the village a brook called Ferdia falls into the Albuhera, one of the lesser tributary streams of the Guadiana; between these rivulets, and beyond them, is one of the open and scattered woods of ilex, which are common in this part of the country. There is a bridge over the Albuhera in front of the village. The village had been so completely destroyed by the enemy, that there was not an inhabitant in it, nor one house with a roof standing. The cavalry which had been forced in the morning to retire from Santa Martha joined here, and in the afternoon the enemy appeared. Blake's corps making a forced march, arrived during the night; Cole with his division, and the Spanish brigade under D. Carlos d'España, not till the following morning. The 15th had been a day of heavy rain; and both these divisions, from forced marches, and the latter also from fatigue in dismantling the works before Badajoz, were not in the best state for action.

The whole face of this country is passable every where for horse and foot; Beresford formed his army in two lines nearly parallel to the Albuhera, and on the ridge of the gradual ascent from its banks, covering the roads to Badajoz and Valverde; Blake's corps was on the right in two lines; its left on the Valverde road joined the right of Major-General Stewart's division, the left of which reached the Badajoz road, and there Major-General Hamilton's division closed the left of the line. Cole's division, with one brigade of Hamilton's, formed the second line. The allied force consisted of 8000 British, 7000 Portuguese, and 10,000 Spaniards; hardly two thousand of these were cavalry. Soult had drawn troops from the armies of Victor and Sebastiani, and left Seville with 16,000 men; Latour-Maubourg joined him with five or six thousand; but he had a very superior cavalry, not less than 4000, and his artillery also

was superior, he having forty-two field pieces, of which several were twelve pounders, the allies only thirty. He had the greater advantage of commanding soldiers who were all in the highest possible state of discipline, and whom, though they were of many countries, long habit had formed into one army; whereas the allied force consisted of three different nations; the Portuguese indeed disciplined by British officers, but the Spaniards in their usual state of indiscipline; and one third of the army not understanding, or understanding imperfectly, the language of the other two.

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Soult did not know that Blake had joined during the night, and he thought to anticipate his junction by attacking the right of the allies, thus throwing himself upon their line of communication, when the possession of the rising ground would decide the battle. At eight in the morning his troops were observed in motion; his horse crossed the Ferdia, and formed under cover of the wood in the fork between the two rivulets. A strong force of cavalry, with two heavy columns of infantry, then marched out of the wood, pointing toward the front of the allied position, as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuhera; while, at the same time, under protection of that superior cavalry which in such a country gave them command of the field, their infantry filed over the river beyond the right of the allies. Their intention to turn the allies by that flank, and cut them off from Valverde, was now apparent; upon which Beresford ordered Cole's division to form an oblique line to the rear of the right, with his own right thrown back, and requested Blake to form part of his first line and all his second to that front.

*May 16.
Battle of
Albuhera.*

While the French General Godinot made a false attack upon Albuhera, Soult, with the rest of the army, bore on the right wing of the allies. The attack began at nine o'clock; a heavy storm of rain came on about the same time, as favourable

CHAP. to the French, who had formed their plan, and consequently
XXXVII. arranged their movements, as it was disadvantageous for the al-
1811. lies, whose measures were to be adapted for meeting those of the
May. enemy.

After a gallant resistance, the Spaniards were forced from the heights, and the enemy set up a shout of triumph which was heard from one end of the line to the other; their exultation was not without good cause, for the heights which they had gained raked and entirely commanded the whole position. The Spaniards to a man displayed the utmost courage; but their want of discipline was felt, and the danger of throwing them into confusion whenever change of position was necessary; yet the station which had been intrusted to them was precisely that upon which the fate of the whole army depended. They rallied at the bottom of the hill, turned upon the enemy, and withstood them, while Lieutenant-Colonel Colbourne brought up the right brigade of Stewart's division, and endeavoured to retake the ground which had been lost.

These troops had been hurried as soon as the intention of the French was perceived: they arrived too late; instead of being the defendants of the strongest ground, they had to assail the enemy already established there, and the more they advanced the more their flank became exposed. Finding that they could not shake the enemy's column by their fire, they proceeded to attack it with the bayonet; but in the act of charging, they were themselves suddenly turned and attacked in the rear by a body of Polish lancers: these men carried long lances with a red flag suspended at the end, which, while so borne by the rider as to prevent his own horse from seeing any other object, frightens those horses who are opposed to it. Never was any charge more unexpected, or more destructive; the rain, which thickened the whole atmosphere, partly concealed them; and those of the brigade who saw them approaching mistook them for Spa-

niards, and therefore did not fire. A tremendous slaughter was made upon the troops who were thus surprised; and the loss would have been greater, if the Poles, instead of pursuing their advantage, had not ridden about the field to spear the wounded. The three regiments of Colbourne's brigade lost their colours at this time; those of the Buffs were recovered, after signal heroism had been displayed in their defence. Ensign Thomas, who bore one of the flags, was surrounded, and asked to give it up. Not but with my life! was his answer, and his life was the instant forfeit; but the standard thus taken was regained, and the manner in which it had been defended will not be forgotten when it shall be borne again to battle. Ensign Walsh, who carried the other colours, had the staff broken in his hand by a cannon ball, and fell severely wounded; but, more anxious about his precious charge than himself, he separated the flag from the shattered staff, and secured it in his bosom, from whence it was taken when his wounds were dressed after the battle.

The 31st regiment, being the left of the brigade, was the only one which escaped this charge, and it kept its ground under Major L'Estrange. The issue of the day seemed at this time worse than doubtful, and nothing but the most determined and devoted courage saved the allies from a defeat, of which the consequences would have been worse than the immediate slaughter. The third brigade under Major-General Houghton, with the fusileers and Portuguese brigade under Major-General Cole, advanced to recover the heights, their officers declaring that they would win the field or die. Houghton and Sir William Myers fell, each leading on his brigade. The fusileers, and the Lusitanian legion, 3000 when they advanced, could not muster 1000 after they had gained the rising ground, . . . for they did gain it after all this carnage; 2000 men, and sixty officers, including every lieutenant-colonel, and field officer, were either

CHAP.
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May.

CHAP. killed or wounded. But the enemy in their turn suffered greater
 XXXVII. slaughter when they were forced down into the low ground to-
 ward the river; our musketry and shrapnells then mowed them
 1811. down. The attack upon the village was continued somewhat
 May. longer; but the enemy were never able to make any impression
 there.

Soult made a vigorous effort to rally his men in this part of the field: he rode forward with an eagle in his hand, and for a moment checked their flight; but it was only for a moment: they saw their left retreating in confusion, and they followed the example. Only two battalions could be collected at first, and afterwards four, in any order: these formed behind the first rivulet at the foot of the ridge; the rest of their force was dispersed like a swarm of bees, and could not be brought up till they reached the wood. Still the superiority of the enemy in horse was such that it was impossible for the allies to pursue their victory. Soult therefore retired to his bivouac in the wood, and his reserve with a powerful artillery occupied the hill, under cover of which he had formed his columns of attack. The rain which had fallen heavily during the action became more severe at evening, and continued so that night and the following day. The rivulets, swoln now to torrents as they poured from the heights, were reddened with blood; and exposed to that weather the wounded lay where they had fallen, for there was no possibility of removing them; not a house which could have afforded shelter was near.. not a carriage or beast of burden could be found for transporting them to the rear. But wickedness is ever on the alert, and many of the wounded in this condition were stripped to the skin, by those miscreants who attend upon the movements of an army like birds and beasts of prey.

The allies made fresh dispositions immediately after the battle, in case the enemy should re-advance: they improved

their position by moving toward the right flank; their freshest troops were placed in the first line; and the flags taken from the Polish lancers, some hundreds in number, were planted in defiance upon the crest of the position, singular trophies of a most well-deserved victory. Kemmis's brigade came up the next morning, and reinforced them with 1500 men; but all continued quiet on both sides. On the night of the 17th, Soult moved off his wounded under cover of the wood, and prepared for his retreat, which he commenced the ensuing day. Our cavalry followed to hang upon his rear, and in a very gallant affair with the rear guard at Usagre, about 150 of their horse were killed, wounded, or taken, without loss on our part, though they had then 3000 men in the field, and the allies not more than half that number. Hamilton's division was sent back to reinvest Badajoz: that place had remained free between the 16th and 19th, in which interval it had received no relief, and the garrison had only time loosely to fill up the approaches which had been made. Lord Wellington arrived at Elvas on the 20th; rode over the field the next day, and expressed himself highly pleased with Marshal Beresford, upon whom so arduous a responsibility had rested, and with the army which had demeaned itself so gallantly.

The battle of Albuhera was one of the most murderous in modern times. The British loss consisted of nearly 900 killed, 2732 wounded, 544 missing; the Portugeze, of whom only a small part were brought into action, lost about 400; the Spaniards above 2000. The French left 2000 dead on the field; about 1000 were made prisoners; Generals Werle and Pepin were killed. Soult, in his official dispatch, declared, that his whole loss amounted only to 2800 men; but a letter from General Gazan was intercepted, wherein he stated that he had more than 4000 wounded under his charge. The heat, he said, would prove very injurious to them, especially as there

CHAP.
XXXVII.
1811.
May.

CHAP. were only five surgeons to attend them, and many had died
 XXXVII. upon the road. This letter was written three days after the
 1811. action, and as the bad cases die in numbers in the first few
 May. days, and the mortality must have been greatly increased by
 want of rest, of accommodation, and of surgical aid, it was in-
 ferred, that the total loss of the enemy could not have been
 less than 8000 men. Soult is said to have acknowledged, that,
 in the whole course of his long service, he had never before
 seen so desperate and bloody a conflict. He is said, also, to
 have observed, "there is no beating those troops, in spite of
 their generals! I always thought them bad soldiers, and now I am
 sure of it; for I turned their right, and penetrated their centre;
 they were completely beaten; the day was mine, and yet they
 did not know it, and would not run." About 300 of his prisoners
 were put into a convent which had been converted into a prison:
 they undermined the wall, and escaped with their officers at
 their head. The peasantry guided them, and supplied them
 with food on their way, and they rejoined the army in a body
 on the thirteenth day after the battle.

The official dispatch of the French general was, as usual,
 falsified for the public. Soult there asserted that, having gained
 the height, he was surprised to see so great a number of troops,
 and that he then first learned from a prisoner how Blake with
 9000 Spaniards had effected a junction during the night. This
 discovery, he said, made him resolve not to pursue his victory, but
 content himself with keeping the position which had been taken
 from the enemy, and that position he* retained, . . the enemy,
 after the carnage which was made among them by Latour

* The dispatch, however, like other falsehoods of the same kind, carried with
 it its own confutation; for it stated that the allies made no prisoners except two or
 three hundred wounded, who were left on the field; but the same dispatch said,

Maubourg and the Polish lancers, not having dared to attack him again. CHAP.
XXXVII.

Few battles have ever given the contending powers so high an opinion of each other. The French exhibited the highest possible state of discipline that day: nothing could be more perfect than they were in all their movements; no general could have wished for more excellent instruments, and no soldiers were ever directed by more consummate skill. This was more than counterbalanced by the incomparable bravery of their opponents. The chief loss fell upon the Buffs and the 57th. The first of these regiments went into action with twenty-four officers and 750 rank and file;... there only remained five officers and thirty-four men to draw rations on the following day. Within the little space where the stress of the battle lay, not less than 7000 men were found lying on the ground, literally reddening the rivulets with blood. Our dead lay in ranks as they had fought, and every wound was in the front. A captain of the 57th, who was severely wounded, directed his men to lay him on the ground at the head of his company, and thus continued to give his orders. Marshal Beresford saved his life by his dexterity and personal strength: as he was encouraging his troops after the charge of the Polish lancers, one of these men attacked him; avoiding the thrust, he seized him by the throat, and threw him off his horse; the lancer recovered from his fall to aim a second thrust, but at the moment was shot by one of the general's orderlies. Sir William Myers, leading on that brigade 1811.
May.

that the French kept the field for two days, retaining the position they had won, .. how then could the wounded who were left upon the field have fallen into the hands of the allies? But throughout this war the remark made some three centuries ago by the Flemish historian Meyer was verified, that *res suas Galli non majore solent SCRIBERE fide, quam GERERE.*

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May.

which recovered the fortune of the field, exclaimed it would be a glorious day for the fusileers. In ascending the ground his horse was wounded; another was brought, which he had hardly mounted, when a ball struck him under the hip, and passed upward obliquely through the intestines. He did not fall, and attempted to proceed; but this was impossible, and when he was carried off the field he seemed to forget his own sufferings in exultation at beholding the conduct of his brave companions. A heavy rain was falling, there was no shelter near, and Valverde, whither it was thought proper to convey him, was ten miles distant. He would rather have had a tent erected over him; but his servants, hoping that he might recover, insisted upon removing him to a place where a bed might be procured. The body of General Houghton was borne past him, on a mule, to be interred at Elvas. Upon seeing it, Sir William desired, that if he should die they would bury him on the spot. He lived, however, to reach Valverde, and till the following day. When his dissolution drew near, he desired that his ring might be taken to his sister, and that she might be told he had died like a soldier. Six of his own men bore him to the grave, and laid him under an olive tree near Valverde. It is to be hoped that a monument will be placed there to mark the spot.

Blake, Castaños, Mendizabal, Ballasteros, Zayas, and Carlos d'España, were in the field, and all distinguished themselves. Blake and Castaños had each an arm grazed. España was run through the hand by a lance. In the heat of the action, when the issue of the battle appeared most hopeless, many of the Spaniards were heard exclaiming to each other, "What will the *Conciso* say?".. thus stimulating themselves to new exertion by remembering the honour or dishonour which a free press would bestow, according to their deserts. Of three stand of colours which were taken from the enemy, one was presented to the

Cortes. Del Monte moved, that it should be deposited in some church dedicated to the Virgin-Mother, the patroness of the Spains; but Garcia Herreros observed, that the hall in which they met would, after the dissolution of the Cortes, again be used as a church, and it was therefore resolved that the colours should remain there. It was proposed also, that a pillar should be erected in the plains of Albuhera; and that the little town of that name which had been entirely destroyed, should be rebuilt by the nation, and exempted from all rates and taxes for ten years.

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May.

By this time the 3d and 7th divisions arrived from Beira. Lord Wellington re-invested Badajoz on the 25th, and broke ground four days afterward. It was well that the former siege had been interrupted; there would otherwise have been a great sacrifice of men in attempts which, for want of adequate means, must have been unsuccessful. The means, though somewhat increased both in men and materials, were still inadequate; time pressed also; for where Lord Wellington's efforts were directed, thither would those of the enemy be directed also; Marmont would move from the Tormes toward the Tagus to co-operate with Soult against him, and the disposable force which they might bring together far exceeded all that he could command. Rapid measures, therefore, were necessary, and it was determined to pursue the original plan, but to commence the attacks upon Fort Christoval and the castle at the same time, that the enemy's attention might be divided. Guns were brought from Elvas, and the officers and gunners of a company of British artillery were distributed among the Portuguese, to supply as far as their numbers went the want of skill in their allies: but the guns were of a soft composition of metal, false in their bore, without any of the modern improvements; the shot were of all shapes and sizes; the howitzers which were used for mortars

*Siege of
Badajoz re-
sumed.*

CHAP. were not better in their kind than the guns, nor did the shells
 XXXVII. fit them better; and these wretched brass pieces failed so fast
 1811. under the heavy firing which was required, that iron guns were
 ordered from Lisbon.

June.

*Unsuccess-
 ful attempts
 upon Fort
 Christoval.*

On the 6th of June the breach in Fort Christoval was reported practicable; it appeared to be so from the trenches; and at the following midnight a storming party of 180 men, conducted by Lieutenant Forster of the Royal Engineers, who had examined the breach the preceding night, moved towards it. The palisades had been destroyed by the battery; the counterscarp at that spot was only four feet deep; the advance therefore easily descended into the ditch and reached the foot of the breach, where they discovered that, since evening closed, the enemy had removed the rubbish, and that the escarp was standing clear nearly seven feet high. The advance, after it had in vain endeavoured to get over this obstacle, might have retired with little loss: but the main body had now entered the ditch; and in that spirit of mad courage which attempts impossible things they tried with ladders fifteen feet long, which had been sent for mounting the breach with, to escalate the front scarp of the fort where it was twenty feet high; in this they persisted for an hour, while the garrison showered down upon them shells, stones, handgrenades and combustibles at pleasure, and almost as a sport; nor did they retire till they had lost twelve killed and ninety wounded, more than two-thirds of their number, Forster being among the slain. Not disheartened by this, the besiegers renewed the attempt three nights after; they were provided with ladders of sufficient length; but the enemy were now on the alert, and had strongly garrisoned the fort: the officer who conducted the advance was killed on the glacis, and the officer in command immediately on descending into the ditch: and it could not be ascertained, from the report of the

survivors, whether they had attempted a breach which, having, as on the former occasion, been cleared, had been rendered impracticable, or whether their efforts had been misdirected against the face of a demibastion which had been much injured, and might in the night easily be mistaken for a breach: but in one or other of these blind endeavours they persisted desperately under a tremendous shower of the most destructive missiles, till after an hour's perseverance, when forty had been killed and an hundred wounded, the remainder were ordered to retire.

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That night's failure determined Lord Wellington to raise the siege. It had manifestly become hopeless for want of means; and the next morning an intercepted letter from Soult to Marmont was brought in, dated the 5th, and saying that he was ready to begin his march, effect a junction, and complete the object of their wishes. "If they lost no time," he said, "they might reach the scene of action before the English reinforcements arrived, and Badajoz would be saved." By other communications, Lord Wellington knew that Drouet's corps had marched from Toledo, and would probably join Soult that very day, and that Marmont might be expected at Merida in a few days; for this general, after having patrolled on the 6th to Fuentes d'Onoro and Navedeaver, as a reconnoissance, and to cover the march of a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, began his march the next day to the south, by way of the Puerto de Baños and Placencia: he crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, an important point, where the French, having re-established the bridge, had covered it by strong batteries. In consequence of this information Lord Wellington began to move the stores to the rear, as soon as darkness had closed. The whole loss had been nine officers and 109 men killed, twenty-five officers and 342 men wounded and prisoners: but the numerical inadequately represents the real loss in those operations for which men are either selected for their

*The siege
raised.*

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1811.

*June.**Junction of
Soult and
Marmont.**The allies
take a posi-
tion within
the Portu-
guese fron-
tier.*

skill, or adventure in the hope of distinguishing themselves. On the 12th the siege was finally raised ; but the blockade was still maintained, and Lord Wellington posted his army near Albuhera to cover it and to hold in check an enemy who would not again venture upon giving battle, unless with an overpowering force. The French, however, had now collected all their troops from the two Castilles, except a small garrison at Madrid, all the remains of Massena's army, and all their force from Andalusia, except what was sufficient for Sebastiani and Victor to keep up a show of inactive strength within positions where experience had now fully shown that no vigorous attack was to be apprehended. Thus they brought together a greater force than the allies could oppose to them ; and though Lord Wellington was not so inferior in numbers as to have felt fear, or even doubt, concerning the issue of an action, the relative resources of the allies in men, as those resources were then managed, were not such that they could afford to win a second battle of Albuhera. The blockade therefore was raised after Marmont and Soult had effected their junction : the enemy entered Badajoz, and the allies, recrossing the Guadiana, took up a line within the Portuguese frontier. There the corps from the north, under Sir Brent Spencer, joined them. It had crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha by a floating bridge, carrying about twenty horses at a time. The spirit of our light division at this time was such that the men would suffer any thing on a march rather than be seen straggling ; and in this movement two men, when ascending the hills to Niza, carried that spirit so far that they actually died of heat in the ranks. The whole army being thus united, a position was chosen in which battle would have been given if the French had attempted to enter Portugal : it was on the heights behind Campo Mayor, and the troops were bivouacked on the Caya in readiness to occupy it : their line extended from Arronches to Jurumenha, that of the enemy from

Merida to Badajoz. But though the French had brought together not less than 70,000 men including 8000 cavalry, while the cavalry opposed to them were only 3500, and the whole force not more than 56,000, they contented themselves with making a reconnoissance in considerable strength. One body of their horse got in the rear of a piquet of the 11th light dragoons: the situation was ill chosen; the regiment had arrived from England but a few days before; the men, therefore, were inexperienced in such service, and ignorant of the ground: they mistook the enemy for Portuguese; and every man, sixty-nine in number, except the lieutenant in the advance, was taken. This was the only advantage they could obtain. Another body at the same time failed in an endeavour to ascertain the position and number of the allies: their intention was perceived; the main body of the troops was concealed from them behind the hills; and after some hours' manœuvring, some skirmishing, and some firing from Campo Mayor, the guns of which fortress flanked the front of Lord Wellington's position, they desisted from their baffled attempt.

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1811.
June.

Soult affected to regret that a general action had not been brought on. He magnified the merit of the defence of Badajoz, saying, that it would be cited in military history as one of the most memorable exploits of its kind; and he magnified the importance of the junction of the two armies on the Guadiana, calling it one of the most marked events of the war in Spain. This general had a more than common interest in blazoning forth a success which covered his late defeat. "Thus," said he, "the signal victory which was gained at Albuhera has been ascertained in favour of the imperial army: the main object which I had in view was then accomplished, that of making a diversion in favour of Badajoz, and enabling that fortress to prolong its resistance. It is now evident that the battle of Al-

*Soult boasts
of his suc-
cess.*

CHAP. buhera gained us at least twenty days, during which we were
 XXXVII. enabled to make arrangements for bringing up new reinforce-
 1811. ments, and the army of Portugal was able to take part in the
 June. operations: thus the second object which I had in view in
 making my first movement has been also accomplished; and the
 troops which fought at Albuhera have not ceased a single day
 to act upon the offensive against the enemy." Beyond all
 doubt Marshal Soult was one of the ablest generals of his age:
 his operations at this time were ultimately successful, but his
 earnestness to prove that he had gained a victory at Albuhera
 only shows how deeply he felt the defeat.

The French government were elated with an advantage
 which came seasonably after the various disgraces that the
 French arms had suffered in the peninsula. "The English,"
 said they, "are again to learn, and by a mighty thunderbolt..
 (the raising of the siege of Badajoz is a presage of it), that they
 cannot with impunity leave the element of which they have
 usurped the empire." The English, however, had long been
 accustomed to hear of these thunderbolts, and to defy the more
 tangible weapons of the enemy. Soult said, in his official ac-
 count, "that they appeared to have given up Spain entirely,
 and to be concentrating themselves for the defence of Lisbon:
 they felt their inability to support the contest; and every thing,"
 he added, "induced him to think that when the army of reserve
 should have arrived upon Almeida, they would feel the impos-
 sibility even of maintaining themselves at Lisbon." While the
 enemy threw out these boastful anticipations, Lord Wellington
 remained in his position, watching their movements, and cer-
 tain that they could not long subsist the force which they had
 brought together.

*Blake's
 movements.*

Before the allies retreated across the Guadiana, a plan had
 been arranged between General Blake and Lord Wellington, that

the former should make a movement into the county of Niebla, distract the enemy's attention by threatening their rear, and take advantage of whatever favourable opportunity this concentration of the French forces might give him. Accordingly the Spaniards set out on the 18th from Jurumenha, and on the 22d reached Mertola, . . the distance is about 110 miles, . . but it was a most exhausting march in the midst of summer, through a dry country, for troops half of whom were barefoot, and whose commissariat was in the most deplorable state. The provisions were never sufficient to allow full rations ; and though the Spaniards supported fatigue and hunger with their characteristic patience, men will not continue to undergo such privations without a strong hope that some adequate success will recompense them ; and Blake had unhappily acquired the character of being an unfortunate leader.

From Mertola, he embarked his artillery for Ayamonte. The horse swam the Guadiana, the men crossed it by a temporary bridge of boats ; and after resting two days to refresh the troops, he marched against Niebla. Niebla is an old town, which had fallen to such decay, that its population at this time did not exceed an hundred persons : its walls, however, were less dilapidated than its houses, and the French had repaired its castle so as to render it a post of respectable strength, from whence they domineered over the surrounding country. Blake found it stronger than he expected: he attempted an escalade in the night with ladders, which were too short, as well as too few, for the success of the enterprise ; consequently the attempt failed, though the garrison did not consist of more than 300 men. He remained three days before the place, which gave the French governor of Seville time to take the field against him, and make some prisoners before his army could reach the mouth of the Guadiana, and re-embark for Cadiz. Great numbers of his men

CHAP.
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1811.

*June.**June 30.
He fails at
Niebla and
returns to
Cadiz.*

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1811.

June.

deserted during this ill-conducted expedition. Blake possessed considerable talents, but the good which those talents might have produced, when he was called to the Regency, was in great measure frustrated by his jealousy of the English. At Albuhera he seemed to have overcome this unworthy feeling; but it returned upon him, and Lord Wellington remarked, in his public dispatches, that neither General Castaños nor himself had received any intelligence from him since he began his march from Jurumenha.

*The French
armies se-
parate.*

This movement, therefore, which might have greatly annoyed the enemy, and of which such expectations had been raised, that it was at one time reported and believed Blake had actually entered Seville, ended only in the diminution of the army and of the general's reputation. But Lord Wellington had taken his measures too wisely to suffer any other evil than that of disappointed hope from this failure. He knew that the enemy could not possibly long continue to subsist their forces when thus concentrated; and accordingly, as he expected, they broke up from the Guadiana about the middle of July, having fortified the old castles of Medellin and Truxillo to strengthen their hold upon Extremadura. Soult returned to Seville; and Marmont, recrossing the Tagus at Almaraz, went again to his command in the north. Lord Wellington then moved his whole army to the left, and cantoned them in Lower Beira, where he remained, waiting till time and opportunity should offer for the blow which he was preparing to strike.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

MEASURES OF THE FRENCH IN ARAGON. MANRESA BURNT.
FIGUERAS SURPRISED BY THE CATALANS. SIEGE AND
CAPTURE OF TARRAGONA BY THE ENEMY, AND RECAPTURE
OF FIGUERAS. CAMPOVERDE SUPERSEDED BY GENERAL
LACY.

BOTH in Portugal and in Andalusia the French had at length encountered a resistance which, with their utmost efforts, they were unable to overcome: but their career of success continued longer in the eastern provinces, where their operations were conducted with more unity of purpose, and where Great Britain afforded only a precarious and inefficient aid to the best and bravest of the Spaniards.

No sooner had Tortosa fallen, than Marshal Macdonald began to prepare at Lerida for laying siege to Tarragona. The arrival at Barcelona of a convoy of ammunition and grain from Toulon relieved him from all anxiety on that point, and left him at leisure to direct his whole attention to this great object, which in a military view would complete the conquest of Catalonia, . . . any other Buonaparte was incapable of taking. Tortosa was to be the pivot of the intended operations against Tarragona first, and after its fall, which was not doubted, against Valencia; and to facilitate these operations, Col de Balaguer was put in a state of defence, and Fort Rapita which commanded the mouth of the Ebro. These measures had been

CHAP.
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1811.

*Plans of the
French in
Catalonia.*

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1811.

March 19.

The Pyrenean provinces administered in Buonaparte's name.

taken when General Suchet received orders from Paris to undertake the siege, and was at the same time informed that Lower Catalonia was to be under his command. Early in the preceding year, this general had been told that he must raise in his government of Aragon means both for the pay and subsistence of his troops, France being no longer able to support such an expense; and that while he was to communicate as before with the *E'tat-major* of the army concerning military affairs, he was to receive instructions upon all matters relating to the administration, police, and finances of the country, from the Emperor alone. It was evident, therefore, that Buonaparte was as little disposed to keep faith with his brother, King Joseph, as he had been with his ally Charles IV., and Ferdinand his invited guest, but that it was his intention to extend the frontier of France from the Pyrenees to the Ebro; and in fact from that time all orders of the government in that part of the Peninsula were issued in his name. The faithful Spaniards cared not in which name it was administered, acknowledging neither, and detesting both: if they had any feeling upon the subject, it was a sense of satisfaction that their unworthy countrymen in the Intruder's service should be deprived of the shallow pretext with which they sought to excuse their treason to their country. At first this change appeared to increase the difficulties of Suchet's situation, who while he looked only to a temporary occupation of the province, would without scruple have supplied himself by force, regardless in what condition he might leave it to those who should succeed him, or what sufferings he might bring upon the inhabitants. But regarding himself now as fixed in a permanent command, it behoved him to adopt measures which, ..if any thing could have that effect upon the Aragonese, might gradually reconcile them to subjection, by giving them the benefit of

a military government, regularly as well as vigorously administered.

The province was in a miserable state; though the population had increased from the end of the Succession war till the beginning of Charles IV.'s reign, it had diminished since that time, owing to causes which have not been explained. There were 150 deserted villages in it, and nearly 400 in which a few houses were all that remained, . . . this, not in consequence of the existing war, but of the preceding decay. Yet before the invasion, Aragon exported corn, wine, and oil to Catalonia on one side, and to Navarre on the other: to that export the war had put an end; fields, and vineyards, and oliveyards, had been laid waste; and an enormous consumption of sheep by the armies had almost destroyed the only kind of cattle which in that country could be depended on for food. It had been drained of money also both by the national and intrusive governments: before the siege of Zaragoza, three millions of francs had been remitted to Seville; and the spoils of the suppressed convents to the amount of a million *reales* and 3000 marks of silver had been afterwards sent to Joseph's treasury at Madrid. Very many families, and among them all the wealthiest, had emigrated, taking with them all the specie they could collect, . . . the miserable remains of their fortunes. Trade had suffered in the same degree as agriculture; there were no manufactures left; and from a province in this condition, which in its best times paid only four million francs to its native government, eight millions were to be raised for the annual pay of the troops alone. Suchet began by levying an extraordinary contribution per month, which more than doubled in amount the tax in ordinary times; the mode of collecting was prepared for him by a regulation of Philip V., who as a punishment upon the three provinces of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, for their

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1811.

State of
Aragon.

System of
the French
general.

CHAP. adherence to his opponent the Archduke Charles, had subjected
XXXVIII. them to a property tax, taking from them the privilege which
1811. they had formerly possessed of taxing themselves. It might
have been thought impossible to wring this additional impost
from a ruined people ; but the hoards of prudence, of selfishness,
and of misery are opened at such times, and what has been
withheld from the pressing necessities of a just cause, is yielded
to a domineering enemy ; and Suchet, while he insisted to the
utmost upon the law of the strongest, and regarded no other
law, had clear views of the policy by which obedience to that
law is to be facilitated or conciliated. No compunction with-
held him from any crime which he deemed it expedient to com-
mit ; but he would do good as well as evil, and perhaps more
willingly, when it accorded with his purpose ; and worldly
wisdom producing the effect of better motives might under other
circumstances have made him a beneficent ruler. He abolished
monopolies by retaining which nothing was to be gained ; he
sent for his wife from France, to conciliate the Aragonese
ladies by her means, and their husbands by theirs ; he employed
the influence of those priests who followed the example of their
traitorous archbishop ; and he purchased with offices in the
revenue department and in the police the ablest of the Spa-
niards whose souls were for sale. Among them was Mariano
Dominguez, who having held the office of military Intendant
under Palafox during the siege of Zaragoza, lived to be praised
by General Suchet for the eminent services which he rendered
to the French. He was made corregidor of that city ; and it
is said that under his administration, not a single murder
occurred there during eighteen months, though before the war
the annual average exceeded three hundred. In no situation
does a man seem so cut off from repentance, as when he can
reconcile himself to his own dereliction of duty by the good

that he may do in an office which he has accepted as the price of his integrity.

The money which Suchet raised for his military and civil establishments was presently expended in the province, to the immediate benefit of the people upon whom it had been levied. The troops were paid every five days, the civil officers regularly received their salaries, and what they received was necessarily spent in the country. Suchet took care also to purchase there whatever it could supply for the clothing and equipment of the troops, paying for it at once from the contributions; and the active circulation which was thus occasioned, if he may be believed, made the inhabitants themselves sensible that they were gainers by such taxation. He repaired the dykes, the sluices, and the great basin at Mount Torrero which had been destroyed during the siege; the canal was thus again restored: preparations were made for conducting water into the city and erecting fountains there: the hospitals and the bull circus were repaired; bull fights, the national sport and the national reproach, were exhibited; and by these means...and by his refusal to send the treasure of Our Lady of the Pillar to Madrid, notwithstanding repeated orders to that effect, he endeavoured to gratify the Zaragozans, while he erected works about the city to secure it against any sudden attempt. Buonaparte's orders were not so safely to be disregarded as those of the Intruder; when, therefore, Suchet was instructed to confiscate and burn all the English goods which could be found in Aragon, the general remonstrated against so impolitic a measure, and proposed instead, to levy a duty upon such goods of fifty per cent; but Buonaparte hated England too vehemently to be capable of receiving any advice which opposed the indulgence of that insane passion, and Suchet found it necessary to search the

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XXXVIII.

1811.

*Good effect
of paying
the troops
regularly.*

*Memoires
du Mare-
chal Suchet,
1. 302.*

*British
goods burnt
at Zaragoza.*

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1811.

Memoires,
I. 306.

*Prepara-
tions for be-
sieging
Tarragona.*

warehouses, and make a bonfire of what he found there, in the *Plaza Mayor* at Zaragoza, taking care however that the search should be as perfunctory as he could venture to make it, and leaving colonial produce untouched because it happened not to be specified in his orders.

But the Spaniards were a people whom no length of time could reconcile to an usurpation by which they felt themselves insulted as much as they were wronged and outraged. Though his political sagacity was equal to his military skill, and though he was placed in a part of the peninsula where the Spaniards never received the slightest assistance from their British allies, even in Aragon he felt the insecurity of his position, and deemed it an advantage of no trifling moment when he could discover a manufactory of arms among the mountains. The Spanish frontier is that upon which France was least provided with military establishments; but the want of stores, which in other quarters could be drawn abundantly from the arsenals of Douay, Metz, and Strasbourg, was supplied here by the treacherous seizure of Pamplona before hostilities commenced, and by the subsequent capture of Lerida, Mequinenza, Tortosa, and Col de Balaguer. In this respect the war had abundantly furnished its own means; nor was he deficient in numbers for the siege which he was about to undertake, the army now under his command consisting of more than 40,000 men, notwithstanding its daily waste, and the great losses it had suffered. The Italian division from 13 or 14,000 men had been reduced to five or six; but with the population of France, Italy, and the Netherlands, at his disposal, and of those states which, under the name of confederates, were actually subjected to the French government, Buonaparte thought that no war could thin his armies faster than the conscription could recruit them; and under his officers he

well knew that men of any nation would soon be made efficient soldiers. Suchet found it better to make the regiments of different nations act together than to keep them in separate divisions; they were more likely thus to be influenced by a common feeling, and less liable to be affected by the proclamations in Italian, German, Dutch, and Polish, as well as Spanish and French, which General Doyle addressed to them, inviting them to abandon the unjust service in which they were engaged. Suchet provided also for their wants with a solicitude which made him deservedly popular among his men. He saw that the commissariat department was better administered by military than by civil agents; and having placed it therefore wholly in their hands, he adopted the farther improvement of giving to each regiment the charge of its own cattle, convoys of which from Pau and Oleron were constantly on the road, protected by a chain of fortified posts from Canfranc and Jaca to Zaragoza. It was found that by this means the cattle were better guarded and more easily fed; that the movements of the army were not impeded by them; and that when the soldiers reached their bivouac they were no longer under the necessity of marauding for their food. This general was as little subject as Massena to any visitations of compassion; but he knew that a system of marauding must in the end prove as fatal to the army which subsisted by it, as to the inhabitants who were the immediate sufferers.

But the people whom he protected from irregular exactions were under an iron yoke; they were to be kept down only by present force and the severest intimidation; and Suchet prepared willingly for the siege of Tarragona, because he saw that the only serious losses which the Spaniards sustained was when they defended fortified places with a large military force. Their armies, when routed in the field, collected again as easily as they were dispersed; but from Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tor-

CHAP.
XXXVIII.
1811.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1811.

Memoires,
2. 17.

Manresa
burnt by
Macdonald.

March 30.

tosa, no fewer than 800 officers and 18,000 soldiers had been sent prisoners into France. He desired therefore to attack a fortress which would be regularly defended, as much as he dreaded to encounter a civil defence. While he was preparing for the enterprise, the news of Massena's retreat raised the hopes of the Spaniards, and made their desultory parties every where more active: in proportion as they were elated, were the invaders exasperated. A considerable force under Marshal Macdonald moved upon Manresa. Sarsfield and Eroles were on the alert to harass its movements; and they attacked its rear at Hostal de Calvet, about an hour's distance from that city: many of the Manresans were in the field. The disposition of the inhabitants was well known, and perhaps Manresa was marked for vengeance, because it was the first place in Catalonia which had declared against the French; and one of those journals also was printed there which contributed so greatly to keep up the national spirit. Upon whatever pretext, . . . for pretexts are never wanting to those who hold that every thing ought to succumb before military force, . . . orders were given to burn the city: it was set on fire in the night, and between seven and eight hundred houses were consumed. The very hospitals were not spared, though an agreement had been made between the Spanish and French generals, that they should be considered sacred, and though that agreement was produced by one of the physicians to General Salme, and its observance claimed on the score of honour and good faith as well as of humanity. It availed nothing; the wounded were taken out of their beds; the attendants plundered; the building sacked and set on fire. It was by the light of the flames that Sarsfield and Eroles attacked the enemy at Hostal de Calvet; their orders were that no quarter should that night be given; and in consequence of many who surrendered (for in this partial action the Catalans had

greatly the advantage) one man alone was spared. The commander-in-chief, Campoverde, accused Macdonald of having in this instance broken his faith, as well as violated the received usages of war; and he issued orders that his troops, regular or irregular, should give quarter to no Frenchman, of what rank soever, who might be taken in the vicinity of any place which had been burned or sacked, or in which the inhabitants had been murdered. Subscriptions were raised for the relief of the Manresans; and, as in every case where intimidation was intended, the effect of this atrocity was to render the invaders more odious, and give to that desire of vengeance with which the Spaniards were inflamed the dreadful character of a religious obligation.

Macdonald was at this time meditating an attempt upon Montserrat, the possession of which place would be of great advantage in the operations against Tarragona. But the Catalans were not idle. Looking to something of more permanent importance than could be achieved in desultory warfare, Rovira, who from the commencement of the struggle had so distinguished himself as to be honoured with the particular invectives of the French, had long projected schemes for recovering from the enemy some of the fortresses whereof they had possessed themselves, and these schemes he proposed to the successive generals in the principality, all of whom, till Campoverde took the command, regarded them as impracticable. Rovira, however, was not deterred by ridicule from prosecuting plans which appeared to him well founded; and Campoverde at length listened to his representations. He had established a communication in Barcelona, which, like other attempts of the like nature, was discovered; and five persons, two of whom were women, were condemned to death for it, but only one, Miguel Alzina by name, fell into the enemy's hand, and he was executed upon the glacis of

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1811.

*April.**Scheme for
the recovery
of Barcelona
frustrated.*

CHAP. Monjuic. The sentence charged him with having conspired to
 XXXVIII. betray that fortress and the place of Barcelona to the Spaniards :
 1811. this he had done, and in suffering for it, felt that he was dying
 April. a martyr to his country's cause : but he was charged also with
 having intended to poison the garrison ; and that any such pur-
 pose should have been sanctioned by the commander-in-chief,
 under whose sanction the scheme was formed, or that it should
 have been communicated to him, or even formed at all, is not to
 be believed. Of the persons who were acquitted of any share in
 the conspiracy, two were nevertheless ordered to be sent into
 France, and there detained till the general pacification of Cata-
 lonia ; and one, who was niece of Alzina, to be confined in a
 nunnery, under the special observation of the vicar-general and
 of the prioress, who were to be responsible for her.

Rovira had concerted a plan also for surprising Figueras : it
 was conceived in the spirit of more adventurous ages, and there-
 fore, some of those persons who felt no such spirit in themselves
 called it, in mockery, the Rovirada ; to better minds, however,
 it appeared so feasible for men like those who had undertaken
 it, that Martinez, the commandant of the division of Ampurdan,
 was instructed by Campoverde to join him in the attempt.

Figueras. Figueras is a little town situated in the midst of the fertile
 plain of Ampurdan, eighteen miles from the French frontier.
 Some centuries ago it was burned, and its castle razed, by the
 Count of Ampurias, in his war with Jayme I. of Aragon ; but in
 the last century, Ferdinand VI. erected there one of the finest
 fortifications in Europe, which he called, after his canonized
 namesake and predecessor, the Castle of St. Fernando. It is
 an irregular pentagon, the site of which has been so well
 chosen upon the solid and bare rock, that it is scarcely possible to
 open trenches against it on any side ; and it commands the plain,
 serving as an entrenched camp for 16,000 men. As a fortress

it is a masterpiece of art; no cost was spared upon it, and the whole was finished in that character of magnificence which the public works of Spain continued to exhibit in the worst ages of the Spanish monarchy. But an English traveller made this prophetic remark when he visited Figueras in the year 1786, "Every such fortress requires an army to defend it, and when the moment of trial comes, the whole may depend on the weakness or treachery of a commander, and instead of being a defence to the country, may afford a lodgement to the enemy." No where has that apprehension been more fully verified than in the place where it was excited. Figueras was surrendered to France in the revolutionary war, by corruption or by treason, more likely than by cowardice; for the governor had behaved bravely at Toulon. After the peace he returned to Spain, was delivered over to trial, and condemned to lose his head; but the punishment was commuted for perpetual exile. When the place was restored, after the treaty of Basle, some ink spots still remained upon the wall, where an officer, in honourable indignation, had dashed his pen, either determining not to sign the capitulation, or in despair for having borne a part in that act of infamy. And now Figueras served as a strong hold for the invaders, having been one of the four fortresses which Godoy delivered into their hands as the keys of Spain, before Buonaparte avowed his profligate design of usurping the kingdom.

Rovira, who was a doctor in theology as well as a colonel, and regarded the contest to which he had devoted himself as a holy war, fixed upon Passion week as the fittest time for the attempt: there could be no season so proper for it, he thought, as that on which the church was celebrating the sufferings and death of Christ*! Accordingly, on Palm Sunday he assembled

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1811.

April.

Townsend's
Travels, 1.
p. 81. 3d
edition.Attempt
upon Fi-
gueras.

April 6.

* Diario de Manresa, April 20.

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XXXVIII.

1811.

April.

his division in the village of Esquirol, and when they were drawn up, addressing them, says the Spanish relator, like another Gideon, he desired that every man who was willing to accompany him in an expedition of great peril, but of the highest importance and greatest honour, should step out of the line; 500 men immediately volunteered, all of the second Catalan legion. The same appeal was made to another detachment at S. Privat, and ninety-two of the battalion of Almogavares, and 462 of the Expatriates, as those Catalans were called who came from parts of the country which the French possessed, offered themselves. The two parties formed a junction that night at Ridaura, and marched the next day, by roads which were almost impracticable, to Oix, a village close upon the French border. From thence they proceeded on the 8th by Sadernes, Gitarriu, and Cofi, to Llorena, taking this direction in order that the enemy and the men themselves might be induced to believe it was their intention to make an incursion into France. The alarm spread along the border as they wished; the somaten was rung; the French peasantry, and about 300 troops of the line, collected at S. Laurent de Sardas, and remained under arms for thirty hours. At noon on the 9th, the Catalans left Llorena, and proceeded in a direction toward Figueras as far as the wood of Villarit, where they concealed themselves in a glen till night came: it had rained heavily all day, and a strong north wind was blowing, nevertheless orders were given that no man should kindle a fire on pain of death.

*Rovira
takes it by
surprise.*

One scanty meal a day was all that could be allowed to these hardy and patient men; but a good allowance of generous wine had been provided for them when it should be most needed: this was distributed now after they had been formed into six companies, and when night set in they advanced to Palau-Sur-roca, a short hour's distance from the fortress. The officers of

each division were men who were well acquainted with the works; and each was now informed what point he was to attempt, at what time, and in what manner. At half past two the first party leaped into the ditch; three soldiers, who had served in the garrison more than a year, for the purpose of performing this service when the hour should come, opened the gate which leads into the ditch to receive them. The first sentinel whom they met was killed by one thrust before he could give the alarm; the different parties went each in its allotted direction; and so well had every part of this enterprise been planned, and so perfectly was it executed in all its parts, that before men, officers, or governor, could get out of their quarters, . . . almost before they were awakened, . . . Figueras was in the hands of the Spaniards, and its garrison, amounting to about 1000 men, were prisoners. The gate by which they had entered was immediately walled up to guard against any counter-surprise; and as Rovira, being a native of the country, and conspicuous in it since the commencement of the war, was better known than Martinez, orders were sent out in his name, and signed by his hand, calling upon the men of the adjoining country to come and strengthen the garrison. His signature left no doubt of an event which they could else hardly have been persuaded to believe, so much was it beyond their hopes, and in a few hours men enough were assembled there to man the works.

There were about 700 of the enemy in the town, who supposed at first that the stir which they perceived in the castle was merely some quarrel between the French and the Italians of whom the garrison was composed. One of them went to ascertain this; he was asked *quien vive* as he approached, and upon his replying "France," was fired at and shot. Upon this the French commandant sent a trumpeter, who was ordered to return and tell his master on the part of General Martinez and Colonel Rovira, that no Frenchman must again present himself

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CHAP. before the fortress, or he would be answered at the cannon's
 XXXVIII. mouth. Martinez immediately sent off a dispatch in brief, but
 1811. characteristic language: "Glory to the God of armies, and
 April. honour to the brave Catalans, St. Fernando de Figueras is
 taken; Rovira had the happiness of directing the enterprise,
 and I of having been the commander." The Doctor-Colonel, in a
 private letter which found its way to the press, alluded to the
 ridicule which had been cast upon his project: "The *Rovirada*
 is made," said he, "and the great fortress is ours!"

Rovira re-
 warded
 with church
 preferment.

Rovira needed no other reward than the place in history
 which the success of this *Rovirada* secured for him; but it was
 not the less becoming that the government should express their
 sense of his services. Some little time after, the dignity of
 Maestre-Escuela, which is equivalent to that of prebend in the
 English church, fell vacant in the cathedral of Vich. A decree
 had past in the preceding year for leaving unfilled such eccle-
 siastical offices as could, without indecency, be dispensed with,
 and applying their revenues to the public use as long as the
 necessities of the country should require. The Regency applied
 to the Cortes to dispense with this law for the present occasion
 only, that they might confer the vacant dignity upon Rovira, as
 the most appropriate testimony of national gratitude; that when
 the bloody struggle in which they were engaged against the
 tyrant of Europe should have terminated happily, as was to be
 expected, they said, he might have a decorous retirement suit-
 able to his profession, and an establishment for that time in
 which, indispensably, he ought to renounce the military honours
 and dignities with which he was now decorated, but which, in
 any other than the actual circumstances, were incompatible with
 his ministerial character. Arguelles declared, that the Doctor
 Brigadier (for to this rank he had then been promoted) was worthy
 in the highest degree of national gratitude; but he wished that any
 mode of remuneration should be devised rather than one which

involved the suspension of a law, . . . too perilous an example not to be carefully avoided. But Creus observed, that Rovira, who was a priest as much in heart as in profession, would value this prebend more than any military rank which could be conferred upon him; and more even than the archdeanery of Toledo, because it was in his own country. And he argued, that no injury could accrue to the state, as the income might be reserved for the treasury while the existing circumstances continued. Garcia Herreros was of opinion that the reward ought to be of the nature of the service; the soldier should have a military recompence, the priest a clerical one; he proposed, therefore, that as the order of St. Fernando had just been instituted, Dr. Rovira should be the first person who should be invested with it; and that when the war was ended one of the best prebends should then be given him. The proposal of the Regency, however, was adopted, and Rovira was made Maestre-Escuela of the cathedral of Vich, for having recovered Figueras.

Had the Catalans been equally successful at Barcelona, all their losses would have been more than compensated; the success which they had gained excited the greatest exultation, not only in Catalonia, but throughout the whole of Spain. Te Deum was sung at Tarragona, and the town was illuminated three successive nights. In Madrid the Spaniards could scarcely dissemble their joy. In the Cortes the news was welcomed as the happiest which had been received since the battle of Baylen; and the Regency called upon the people for fresh contributions and fresh efforts to improve this unexpected success, the first of its kind which had been obtained during the war. The army which had achieved it, they said, was in want of every thing; and the two Regents who were in Cadiz (Blake being absent) set the example themselves by contributing each a month's salary. It was, indeed, a success which if the Spa-

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Suchet re-
fuses to
send the
troops
which Mac-
donald re-
quired from
him.*

niards had been able, or their allies alert enough to have improved it, might have been a far more momentous advantage than the victories of Barrossa and Albuhera. The first report appeared incredible to the French generals; when it was confirmed, Macdonald called upon Suchet to send him by forced marches that part of the army of Catalonia which he had placed under his command; unless this were done, he said, Upper Catalonia was lost; for neither Rosas, Gerona, nor Hostalrich, were provisioned, and the consequences of this cruel event were incalculable; and Maurice Mathieu, who commanded in Barcelona, instructed the governor of Lerida to be ready with provisions for these troops upon their way, not doubting but that Suchet would see the necessity of the measure in which he was called upon to concur. But when that general had recovered from the first grief and astonishment which the news excited, he considered that part of these troops being employed in an expedition among the mountains, and the others along the Ebro to protect its navigation, from twenty to five and twenty days must elapse before they could receive orders from Zaragoza, assemble at Lerida, and march from thence by Barcelona to Figueras; during which interval the Spaniards would have done all they could do for storing and garrisoning the place. All the French could do was to blockade it with the troops which were nearest at hand: those from a distance would arrive too late, and there would then be the difficulty of supporting them in a part of the country stripped of its resources. If the Spaniards should fail in endeavouring to throw sufficient supplies into the fortress which they had surprised, the unexpected success with which they were now so greatly elated would in the end be little to their advantage: it would even facilitate his operations against Tarragona, for Campoverde would doubtless move his army towards the Ampurdan, instead of endeavouring

to interrupt the investment of that city; to hasten that investment, therefore, and press the siege would be the best service which he could render to the French in Upper Catalonia: this opinion he thought Buonaparte would form, whom the intelligence would reach at Paris five or six days before he had received it at Zaragoza: upon that opinion, therefore, he resolved to act, on his own responsibility; and he had soon the satisfaction of knowing that his conduct in so doing was approved and * applauded.

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His judgement was not less accurate as to what was, in this instance, to be expected from the Spaniards, who were still destined to suffer for the weakness of their government, the want of union in their leaders, and the want of system which was felt in every department. Eroles, indeed, acted on this emergency as he always did, with promptitude, and vigour, and ability. Collecting all the force he could, he hastened from Martorell to reinforce the garrison of Figueras, and on his way took the forts which the French had erected in Castelfollit and Olot, and made above 500 prisoners there. Though a considerable force had already been collected to blockade the place, he entered it on the sixth day after its capture, with 1500 infantry, 150 horse, and about 50 artillery-men, losing on the way some forty killed and sixty wounded; but the French battalion, which endeavoured to prevent his entrance, suffered more than a threefold loss. General Baraguay d'Hilliers had by that time brought together about 8000 troops for the blockade, nearly half of which had been called off from blockading the Seu d'Urgel, and had made a circuitous march within

Memoires,
l. 13—18.Eroles introduces
troops into
Figueras.

April 16.

The French
blockade it.

* *Voila qui est militaire* was the phrase in which Buonaparte expressed his approbation.

CHAP. the French border. All posts of minor importance they imme-
XXXVIII. diately abandoned, retaining only Rosas, Gerona, and Hostal-
rich, in that part of Catalonia, and even weakening the gar-
1811. rison of Gerona so much, that that place might have been
April. recovered by a second *Rovirade*, had there been another Rovira
to conduct one. But there was little concert among the Catalan
leaders; it was deemed fortunate that Eroles had not been
obliged to require the cooperation of another body, which from
its position he might have looked to for aid, because there was
ill blood between that body and the corps which he commanded.
His arrival was well-timed, for the garrison was disorderly as
well as weak, . . more enterprising than wary, . . not to be re-
strained from making rash sallies against the blockading force;
and they had also 1500 prisoners to guard, whom, for their
own security, they were compelled to confine so closely, that
they were in reasonable apprehension lest disease and infection
should be the consequences. But supplies were as needful as
reinforcements; wine and oil were especially wanted. The
Spaniards, with more alertness than they often exerted, sent off
a convoy of stores with one of their frigates from Tarragona: it
came into the bay of Rosas three days after Eroles had entered
the fortress, but it had to wait off shore, vainly expecting that a
sufficient force for escorting it might be collected. The British
squadron off that coast was too weak to afford any effectual
assistance. Captain Buller, taking immediate advantage of the
enemy's departure from those places, had landed at Palamos, St.
Feliu, Cadeques, and Selva, embarked their guns and destroyed
their batteries; a useful service for the time, but one which could
not affect the operations on the land, and the commander-in-chief
in the Mediterranean, who was applied to for some ships of the
line, could spare none from his own anxious station, where all his
vigilance was required for watching those ports in France from

whence the enemy might look for reinforcements or supplies. In Valencia, where there were most means, there was least energy; and in Tarragona, where alacrity was not wanting, it was necessary to wait for the new levies before they could venture to send from thence any considerable body of old soldiers with which Campoverde might undertake the relief of the blockaded fortress, lest Suchet, if his preparations for besieging that city were any thing more than a feint, should find it in a state of insecurity and weakness.

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April.

That general had been never more in earnest. He perceived that he could no longer look for any cooperation from the side of Catalonia in his intended siege; from thence, however, he expected little interruption, but he apprehended serious annoyance from Mina; for if that enterprising chief could connect himself with the Catalans of the upper valleys, it would be possible for him, he thought, to draw after him so large a part of the Aragonese, that he might cut off the communication with France, and thus endanger the subsistence of the besieging army. None of the Guerrilla leaders were placed in so dangerous a position as Espoz y Mina. Every fortress in Navarre was occupied by the French, and they were in possession of all the country which surrounded it. There was no point from which he could receive succour; none upon which he could retire: the mountains were his only fastnesses; and he had no resources but what were to be found in his own genius, and in the courage of his comrades, and in the love of his countrymen. But this man was the Scanderbeg of his age. Reille, the French governor of Navarre, had received special instructions to hunt him down; and toward the close of the preceding year, the enemy had succeeded in surprising his troop. He and the commanders of the second and third battalions, Cruchaga and Gorriz, immediately began to collect their scattered force, and

Memoires,
2. 20.

*Attempts
to destroy
Mina.*

CHAP. perceiving that their dispersion would not have been so in-
XXXVIII. jurious but for want of order, they abstained awhile from
1811. offensive operations, for the purpose of disciplining the men.
Reille hoped again to surprise them while they were thus employed, and detached Colonel Gaudin from Pamplona with 1500 foot and 200 horse, who was to form a junction with an equal number, drawn from Tudela, Caparroso, and Tafalla by Colonel Brescat, surround Mina, and occupy all the points by which he might endeavour to escape. Mina was informed of their movements: before the two detachments could join, he drew Gaudin into an ambuscade, in which forty of his cavalry were killed, and about 100 infantry made prisoners; he then attacked them in their position at Monreal, drove them from it, and was about to renew the attack upon a second position which they had taken, when intelligence that Reille with a force from Pamplona was hastening to Gaudin's succour, induced him to retire. The Guerrilla chief let his men rest one day, and on the second attacked Brescat, who, with 1300 men and 170 horse, occupied Aybar, part of the line within which it was intended to surround this heroic Navarrese. The enemy were driven successively from every position where they attempted to make a stand, till having fallen back two leagues, they reached the river Aragon: the infantry crossed it by the bridge at Caseca, the cavalry swam the stream, and thus interposed a barrier between themselves and their pursuers, which Mina was not able to force, being without artillery. In this action the French left 162 men and sixty-three horses upon the field: their commander and about 220 men were wounded.

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Reille next sent his brother, at the head of 5000 foot and 200 horse, against this harassing enemy. For the last month Mina had been manufacturing arms, ammunition, and clothing for his men, at Lumbier, and there two thousand of the French found

him. Aware of their intention, and having concerted measures with his officers, he did not disturb the soldiers in the rest which they were enjoying, till the moment arrived. Then, telling them what the force was which was ordered against them, they exclaimed, with one voice, that it would not be for their honour to abandon the post without resistance, even though all France should attack it. Two companies, under D. Juan de Villaneuva, defended the fords of the river, and repulsed the enemy in their first attempt at crossing, forcing them to retire with such precipitation, that some of Mina's men, who passed over at night to see what they had left behind, collected more than an hundred muskets from the field. The French took a position which Mina was not strong enough to force, and for a day and half both parties kept up a fire upon each other; by that time a reinforcement came to the enemy from Pamplona. The river was well defended against them, and before they won the passage they lost above 300 killed, and twice the number wounded: among those who died of their wounds was Leon Asurmendi, a renegade Spaniard, known by the name of *Conveniencias*, and infamous for the crimes which he had committed in aid of the intrusive government. Having succeeded in crossing the river, the French chose rather to perpetrate their usual cruelties upon the inhabitants of Lumbier than follow Mina, who retired without loss, and in the best order. They obtained information from some traitors of the place where the Spaniards had their hospital; but Cruchaga and Gorriz were too vigilant to let it be surprised, and when the enemy approached they were so warmly received that they were driven back the four hours' march to Lumbier, leaving on the way sixty killed, many wounded, and twelve prisoners.

Mina was at this time raising a fourth battalion; the French sent a detachment to cut it off before it should be completely

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formed. Four hundred and fifty men, destined for this service, proceeded against the village of Echarri-Aranaz, where the commandant of the battalion, D. Ramon de Ulzurrun y Eraso, had only about one hundred to oppose them. He left the village, and disposed his handful of men so judiciously, for the double purpose of concealing their numbers and annoying the enemy, that the French dared not enter the place, and during the night the officers did the piquet duty themselves, being afraid to trust their soldiers. "Reams of paper," Mina said, "would not suffice for the details of all the skirmishes in which he and his party were engaged, . . . for every day, and sometimes twice or thrice in the day, they were occurring."

The more the enemy suffered from this band, the more efforts they made for its destruction, and towards the close of January, Mina was again surrounded. But this lion was not to be taken in the toils. His first measure was to determine upon a point of reunion, and with that spirit which made him so truly formidable to the usurpers of his country, he fixed upon the mountains immediately above Pamplona. Here, having overcome every difficulty that a vigilant and powerful enemy could interpose, Mina collected his gallant companions: still the pursuers were on all sides; there was not a point which he could occupy without being attacked, neither could he remain in that position; and 2000 men, with a proportionate cavalry, sallied from Pamplona to dislodge him. Mina had not waited for this: knowing that there was no escape but by becoming the assailant, he sent Gorriz to El Carrascal, upon the left of the city, to call the attention of the enemy in that direction, and fall upon any convoy or escort which might be upon the road. This movement succeeded perfectly: the troops which were advancing had proceeded little more than a mile when they were hastily recalled by the alarm which Gorriz had raised in another

quarter, and the governor, thinking that Mina was on that side, and that the other roads were secure, ordered a convoy of sixty carts with ammunition and stores to set out for Vitoria; 200 men escorted it, and 1000 men followed at about an hour's interval: . . in Navarre distance is commonly expressed by time . . the best measure in so mountainous a country.

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When Mina received intelligence that this convoy was setting out, his men were fasting, and they were three hours' march from the position which it was proper to occupy for intercepting it. Leaving Cruchaga with the main body, he set off with the horse and two companies of foot; but the convoy had passed the place where he meant to attack it before he could come up. The horsemen, however, fell upon its escort, and they, abandoning the carts, took possession of an adjoining height, where they defended themselves, relying upon the greater force in their rear, and likewise upon assistance from the fortress of Irurzun, which was only at half an hour's distance. Mina had no time to complete their destruction; it was of more importance for him to secure the ammunition, more precious in his circumstances than the richest booty, and for this there was little leisure; . . on two sides the enemy were approaching in force, and the escort was ready to assail him on the third. Night came on, and on all sides there was firing; his men became mingled with the enemy, and sometimes engaged one another. But when Mina had succeeded in collecting his men, and would have contented himself with drawing them off in safety, and destroying the stores, a general cry arose that they would rather perish than leave behind them what they should make so useful. The men, therefore, loaded themselves with cartridges, of which, after each man had stored himself, they carried off more than 60,000. Other effects, however tempting, they regarded not:

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but, spoiling what they could, and setting fire to the powder carts, they drew off in safety with their precious plunder. The joy of Mina and his comrades for this success was clouded by one of those fatal accidents for which even a soldier is not prepared: Gorriz that day, in leading on his troops, was thrown from his horse, and lived only long enough to go through the last ceremonies of the Romish superstition: however worthless these were to the sufferer, the thought that his salvation was thus secured was the consolation of his comrades, and probably of no little importance in keeping up their hopes and their belief in the protection of Heaven. Mina spoke of his loss with the deepest sorrow, a sorrow which was felt by all his fellows in arms, whom he had more than once led on to victory, and sometimes saved from destruction.

Mina was now in that perilous stage of his progress, when every new exploit, adding to his celebrity without adding to his strength, served to increase his danger, by exasperating afresh the enemy, and exciting them to make greater efforts to destroy him. In Aragon, as well as in Navarre, the French troops were put in motion to hunt him down, by night and day, like a wild beast. Harispe occupied the bridges of Sanguessa, Galipienzo, and other passes into Aragon; Panatier with another division watched La Ribera de los Arcos, Estella, and its vicinity; and three moveable columns kept up the chase. The first impulse of the Navarrese hero, when he found himself thus beset, was to attack the enemy; but for this he was too weak. Turning back, he marched above Pamplona by El Carrascal, and there he discovered that two of their columns were close at hand; upon this he countermarched towards Lumbier. Harispe was informed of his movements, and at Irurozqui Mina found the French in his front: his men had made long and rapid marches for the three preceding days, nevertheless they prepared for battle with

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their wonted resolution. Before the firing began Harispe sent a cavalry officer with a flag, which Cruchaga, who went out to meet him as an enemy, discovered just in time as he levelled a pistol at him. The Frenchman said, he had matters of great importance to treat of, and Mina therefore came to hear them. His errand related to the treatment of prisoners; it was believed in the French army that Mina's soldiers gave no quarter, and he came to request that this practice might no longer be continued. Mina on his part disclaimed the system which was imputed to him, and required a like declaration on the part of the enemy; to which the French officer replied, that his general was distinguished for humanity, and that all the officers of that division had received orders to treat such of Mina's men as might fall into their hands as prisoners of war, since they now knew that they did not deserve to be styled brigands, but defenders of their country. Mina observed in his dispatches, that this officer behaved with perfect courtesy, and with more honour than was usual for a Frenchman; and he clearly perceived that this acknowledgment of the rights of war proceeded not from the humanity of the general, but from the discontent of the miserable men under his command, whom Buonaparte and his agents in Spain sent to butcher or to be butchered.

An affair ensued, in which Harispe lost half his cavalry in vainly attempting to break the Spaniards. Five times he attacked their position, and was as often repulsed; but Mina perceiving that a movement was made to cut off his retreat, withdrew in time, in good order, and keeping up a brisk fire. This continued till evening closed; night set in with fogs, and the French and Spaniards got confused and intermingled, firing upon their comrades: at length the latter retired into a difficult pass, where the enemy did not venture to follow them. Mina now determined, with the advice of Cruchaga and his other

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 XXXVIII. a different point; a measure which would distract the attention
 1811. of the enemy, who would thus lose sight of him, withdraw per-
 haps part of their troops, and divide the others, and thus give him
 opportunity to collect his companions again, and strike a blow
 when it was not expected. He himself retained only twenty
 horsemen, with whom he meant to make a circuit to preserve
 order among his scattered bands, and prevent excesses of any
 kind. After a while he came to a village near the French
 border, where some of his companions had stationed themselves,
 and where he hoped to give a little rest to his comrades; but an
 overpowering force was brought against him, and he, again dis-
 persing his infantry, went with his little band of horsemen into
 France. Here he found that his name was known, and his vir-
 tues honoured by the mountaineers, while every heart cursed
 the tyrant who inflicted curses upon Europe, and brought dis-
 grace as well as misery upon France, by the crimes which he
 compelled her to perpetrate. They offered all they had to the
 Spaniards, but Mina would suffer nothing to be taken without
 paying its fair price.

It was not long before the French discovered with astonish-
 ment, that Mina had entered France; they dispatched forces
 against him, which he eluded, and, wandering about the borders
 of Roncesvalles, Viscarret, and Olbayceta, surprised one of their
 parties, killing two officers and seven men. A handful of men
 only were engaged, . . . but it was a well-timed success, and an
 auspicious scene, and Mina said, that the Spanish spirit of old
 times shone in his comrades that hour. A greater force, to
 which the fugitives had given the alarm, followed him during the
 whole night, but without success; and he continued among the
 mountains within the French border, waiting impatiently for
 better prospects. "From thence," says he, "I stretched my eyes

over this kingdom close at hand, covered with innumerable enemies, and I groaned for her miserable condition; the imprisonment of so many of its good inhabitants, the persecution and the banishment of the relations of my companions rent my soul, seeing myself without the means for redressing their wrongs.”

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But the opportunity which he expected, and which he provided by his retreat, soon occurred; the greater part of the troops which had been sent against him returned toward Zaragoza, and so well had Mina instructed his officers, and so well did they execute their instructions, that when he re-entered Navarre, his whole band were re-assembled within four and twenty hours. “It would not have been strange,” he said, “if some of the men, closely pursued as they had been, and dispersed in scattered parties, as the only means of safety, had returned home; but only a very few who were sick had done this, and of them not a man without his officer’s permission.” During this long pursuit, the enemy, less accustomed to fatigues and privations than the hardy mountaineers of Spain, suffered a tenfold greater loss than they inflicted; above 1000 of their men were invalided, and as many more wounded in the incessant skirmishes which took place.

A seasonable supply of flints, cartridges, and other necessities, was sent at this time to Mina by the Junta of Aragon. He was soon seen at the gates of Estella; from that city he decoyed an hundred of the garrison, by showing only a few of his men, whom they sallied to cut off; then he rose upon them, killed half their number, and took the rest prisoners under the very walls of the fortress, not one escaping. A letter from Reille to Marshal Bessieres was intercepted shortly afterwards, in which he said, “that by this imprudence of the governor of Estella, they had lost more men in one foolish affair, than they had taken from the enemy during a pursuit of two months. The

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CHAP. brigands," he added, "had so many partisans, that their sick
 XXXVIII. and wounded were in all parts of the country, and yet it was
 1811. impossible to detect them: the public spirit was very bad, and
 the business could never be completed in Navarre, till a place of
 deportation was appointed for all the relations and connexions
 of the brigands, and strong escorts along the road to convoy
 them thither."

Renewing their efforts for the destruction of an enemy who
 became every day more popular among his oppressed country-
 March 23. men, the French attacked Mina a few days after his exploit be-
 fore Estella, near Arcos. His inferiority in numbers was com-
 pensated by his perfect knowledge of every foot of the ground,
 the experience of his officers in their own mode of warfare, and
 his confidence in all his followers. After an action which con-
 tinued nearly the whole day, he drew off in good order, and
 scarcely with any loss, having killed and wounded nearly 400
 of the enemy. They obtained a reinforcement, and renewed
 March 26. the attack on the third day at Nacar, where he occupied a
 strong position, and where he succeeded in repulsing them,
 with the loss of forty killed, about 200 wounded, and seventeen
 prisoners. He now entered Aragon, and while one part of his
 force, under Cruchaga, approached Zaragoza, Mina, with three
 companies and a few horse, surprised a party of the enemy con-
 sisting of 152 gendarmes and twenty-eight cavalry: the horses,
 the commander, another officer, and seventy-seven of the soldiers,
 were made prisoners, all the rest fell, not a man escaping.
 Successes of this kind made Mina dangerous in more ways
 than one to the invaders. Germans, Italians, and even French,
 deserted to him. In the course of five days fifteen hussars
 came over with their arms and horses, and fourteen foot sol-
 diers, besides some poor *juramentados*, who were happy in an
 opportunity of joining their countrymen.

The Junta of Valencia sent him a timely supply of arms; he issued his proclamations through Navarre, and a man was soon found for every musket. Another convoy from Valencia was on its way, and had to cross the Ebro in front of Calahorra. Mina set forth to secure its passage, leaving one battalion at Puente la Reyna to observe the enemy in Pamplona, and another at Carcar to cover Lodosa, which the enemy occupied, and from whence he apprehended most danger. When he reached the river he stationed part of his little force upon the left bank to guard against any attack from Lodosa, on that side also, and with two companies forded, meaning to attack a body who occupied a village on the other side, about a league from the ford. They fled at his approach, leaving some of their effects behind them: 150 horse also, who were in Calahorra, fled to Lodosa; and the passage being thus freed, Mina received his convoy, and returned the same night to Estella, . . . for the French after their late loss had evacuated that city, and he made it at this time his head quarters.

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Well had it been for Spain if all the supplies which the Juntas of Aragon and Valencia raised had been as well employed as the little portion allotted to Espoz y Mina. The French were now so well aware of the superiority of his followers over their troops in personal conflict, that they never moved against him without artillery. In his mode of warfare it was impossible for him to be provided with equal arms; but one of his men, by name Josè Suescun y Garcia, contrived to fix three barrels upon one stock and fire them by one lock; they carried two ounce balls, and were found to succeed well the first trial, which was in an action fought by Cruchaga near Tafalla, with an inferior force against 1500 foot and 180 horse. Between 300 and 400 of the enemy were killed and wounded, and twelve were made prisoners, whom Mina, upon the pro-

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 XXXVIII. his own men.

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At this time the Intruder went to Paris, for the ostensible purpose of being present at the baptism of Buonaparte's son. Mina was on the watch to incommode him, as he said, upon his journey; but this wretched man was too well aware of the danger not to take every possible precaution, and occupied every place along the road with a strong force before he ventured to advance. Mina had still his eye upon this road; and shortly afterwards, when 6000 of the enemy from Pamplona and Tudela were about to make a combined movement for the purpose of dislodging him from Estella, he abandoned that place to them, as if in fear of their numbers, and with the whole of his force entered the province of Alava. He himself, with three of his four battalions and the cavalry, reached Orbizu, the first village in that province, on the morning of the next day; the fourth proceeded by a different route. Here he received information that Massena was expected at Vitoria, on his way to France, with an escort of 2000 men, after his defeat at Fuentes d'Onoro. The hope of meeting with one who had been called the Child and Favourite and Angel of Victory delighted Mina, and he set off immediately in hopes of intercepting him; but Cruchaga, overcome by an illness against which he had borne up for many days, was most reluctantly compelled to remain behind.

At five in the evening of the 24th they reached the Puerto de Azazeta, and halted there till it was dark, lest they should be seen by the enemy or some of his scouts, in passing some plains which were at no great distance from Vitoria. Mina would not enter any village on his way, for the French, under pain of rigorous punishment, had enjoined all persons to give intelligence of his movements; and he was careful not to compromise the people. On the 25th, at four in the morning, he reached

Arlaban, the mountain which forms the boundary between Alava and Guipuzcoa, and here he chose his ground, placing one battalion in the woods on the left of the road, two on the right, and the cavalry upon the plain; the fourth he meant to station in a grove when it should arrive, from whence it might surprise the enemy's rear-guard. There was a little village near, about six miles only from Vitoria; and, that no information might be given by any of the inhabitants, he marched them all off, old and young, into the mountains, and placed a guard over them, ordering them to remain quiet for eight hours as they valued their lives.

Soon after these preparations were made, a messenger reached him with news that Massena had arrived at Vitoria, and would halt there; but that a great convoy was on the point of setting out, with a general in one coach, a colonel and lieutenant-colonel and two women in another, 1100 prisoners, and an escort of 2000 foot and 200 horse. The hope of delivering the prisoners repaid him for the disappointment of his design against Massena. Not trusting too implicitly to the messenger, for fear of deceit, he ordered him to be bound to a point of the rock, and placed a guard over him, who was to put him to death if he attempted to escape, but he promised him a munificent reward if his information should be verified. They were not long in suspense. About eight o'clock the enemy's van appeared, . . . 100 foot and twenty horse, who were allowed to pass unmolested; a second party of thirty foot and twelve horse passed in like manner, that Mina might not, by giving the alarm too early, lose his object. The main body came next with the prisoners, a number of carts laden with plunder, and one of the coaches. A fire was opened upon them from the left by one battalion, and the two others rushed out upon them from the right. The prisoners threw themselves upon the ground that they might not fall by the

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XXXVIII. Mina went to the coach, for the purpose of saving its pas-
1811. sengers ; the two officers, however, refusing to surrender, de-
fended themselves with their sabres ; one was killed ; Colonel Lafitte, the other, was wounded and made prisoner with the women. The French, though thrown at first into confusion and dreadfully cut up, formed with the celerity of well-disciplined and experienced troops ; 600 foot and 100 horse brought up the rear with the other coach : upon the first fire the coach was driven back to Vitoria, escorted by the horsemen ; the infantry remained and got possession of a height, from whence they annoyed the Spaniards, who were now completing their victory. Two hundred men from the garrison of Salinas came to their succour, but they were dislodged and driven to the gates of Salinas. Mina's fourth battalion did not arrive till the business was done ; the men had made a forced march of fifteen hours and were fasting, nevertheless they joined in the pursuit. By this time reinforcements came to the enemy from Vitoria, and the French in Salinas being joined by part of the garrison of Mondragon, and of all the neighbouring posts, again showed themselves. Mina drove them back, and then thought it advisable to secure what he had gained ; the affair had continued five hours, and his men had neither eaten nor drank since ten in the morning of the preceding day ; he therefore retired with his spoils to Zalduendo, six hours' distance from the field.

The French lost their whole convoy and above 1000 men, of whom about 110 only were made prisoners. Among the slain was Valbuena, who, having formerly been aid-de-camp to Castaños, had entered the Intruder's service, and distinguished himself by his cruelty to his own countrymen. The booty was very great : Mina reserved one load of specie for the public service, and his men took what they could find, many loading

themselves with gold, . . . the plunder which their enemies were conveying to France. The peasants' artillery was tried on this day for the second time with excellent effect; at the first discharge it brought down above twenty of the French, and on the second dispersed a column which had formed in the road. The loss of the Spaniards was inconsiderable, but D. Pedro Bizarro, who that day commanded the cavalry, was dangerously hurt, to the great grief of Mina and all his comrades. Many women were taken, they were treated with respect, and set at liberty. Among the Spaniards who were delivered were twenty-one officers; Garrido was one, the leader of a Guerrilla party in Castille.

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Mina's first care was to place the rescued prisoners in safety, and this could only be done by getting them into Valencia. For this purpose he sent to Duran and the Empecinado to co-operate with him, and pass along the banks of the Ebro in order to protect their passage; but Duran was too far distant, and the Empecinado was at this time closely pressed by the enemy; he had therefore nothing to rely on but himself. Accordingly he made preparations for throwing a bridge over the river, and named the place where it was to be done; the materials were sent towards this place, and he moved in the same direction: then in the middle of the night turning aside marched to a part of the river twelve miles distant, tried the depth by forcing his own horse into the water, and making each of his cavalry take up a man behind him, in this manner landed the whole in safety, while the enemy were waiting to attack him when he should be employed in making his bridge.

Next his band was heard of at Irun, when D. Jose Gorriz, who, according to the Maccabean system, had succeeded his kinsman in the command of the third battalion, forming a junction with the fourth under Ulzurrun, marched against that place, defeated the

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garrisons of Oyarzun and Beriatsu, got possession of the stores of the Intrusive government at Irun, and burnt the bridge which the French had constructed over the Bidasoa, which there separates France from Spain; after which they returned with their booty, though all the force of the adjoining posts was collected to oppose them. Greater and more persevering efforts were now made to destroy him. Caffarelli arrived to take the command in Biscay, and his first object was to signalize himself by the destruction of an enemy, for whose blood Buonaparte thirsted as he had thirsted for that of Schill and of Hofer. Mina was in the village of Mendigorria with three of his battalions and his cavalry, when Caffarelli with one division came against him by Puente la Reyna, another by the Valle de Echaurri; Reille advanced with a third by Carrascal, and a fourth moved from Logroño upon Estella. The whole force in motion against him amounted to 8000 foot and 2000 horse. Mina put himself in ambush near Carrascal, meaning to attack Reille; he engaged him, and forced him to retire upon Tafalla: but when the Guerrilla chief had advanced in pursuit as far as the village of Barasoain, he discovered that Caffarelli, marching back from Puente, had contrived to cut off the battalion which he himself commanded, and place it between two fires. Reille and Caffarelli then, whose joint force amounted to 700 horse and 4000 foot, attacked him with as great advantage of ground as of numbers, and Mina for the moment expected to see six of the seven companies of his battalion cut off. Their desperate courage brought them off with the loss of twenty-three killed and eighty taken; a heavy loss, but far less than there had been cause to dread, . . . and for which in the action they had revenged themselves. He himself was in the most imminent peril: a party of hussars surrounded him, and one of them aimed a blow which he had no other means of avoiding but by stretching

himself out upon his horse; the horse at the same moment sprung forward and threw him; he recovered his feet and ran; the horse, . . . whether by mere good fortune, or that, in the wild life to which Mina was reduced, like an Arab he had taught the beast to love him, . . . followed his master, who then lightly leaped into his seat, and, though closely pursued, saved himself.

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He got to Lerga with his men; Reille marched to Tafalla, Caffarelli to Monreal; each division being thus three hours' distance from him. The next day he moved to Sanguesa, and rested there the whole day. On the morrow he was apprized that Caffarelli was approaching Lumbier and Reille Caceda, both points within two hours of him: upon this he sent his cavalry along the river Aragon to call off their attention in that direction, while with the infantry he took his route for the mountains of Biqueza. The two hostile divisions followed him, one on the right, the other on the left, hoping again to place him between two fires; he had the start of them only half an hour, and having gained the mountain, put his men in order to defend the post; but in the evening the enemy moved off, meaning to take him at more advantage, and he reached the village of Veguezal. This was on the 16th of June; the next day he was informed that Caffarelli and Reille, with the French from the district of the Cinco Villas, would attack him on the 18th on the three sides of the Puerto, Navascues, and Tiermas: he eluded them all by marching to Iruzozgui. Caffarelli followed him as far as Artieda, which was an hour and a half's distance. Mina was not informed of this; they met on the way to Aoiz; the Spaniards had the good fortune to gain a strong position upon some heights, where they were able to repulse the enemy, notwithstanding his forces were double in number, with the loss of more than 300 killed. This gained them a day's respite from their pursuers: on the 20th they learnt that Reille

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had again joined Caffarelli, and Mina once more resolved to divide his force, and thus multiply the chances of escape. Cruchaga, with the second battalion, took his course toward Roncesvalles, and he, with the first and third, marched for Zubiri. On his way he learnt that the French in Aoiz had been 6000 foot and 700 horse, who were now thus disposed of; 4000 were marching to Zubiri, 2000 with 400 horse to the town of Urroz, and Reille with 300 horse was gone to Pamplona; 200 who had escorted the wounded were also on their way to Zubiri with a supply of ammunition. Fearful as this intelligence was, his men ate their rations with composure, and then amidst incessant rain turned to Larrainzar; . . . from thence he sent his third battalion to Bustan, and he himself, with the remaining one, marched for the village of Illarse. His own danger was not diminished by this separation, for it seemed of more importance to the enemy to secure his single person than to destroy the troop; they followed close upon the scent: from Illarse they pursued him to Villaneuva in Araguil, where he arrived at night, and from whence he set out at two in the morning: as little was he able to rest at Echarri Aranaz; from thence, through the Puerto de Tizatruga, he made for the Puerto de Lezaun; still they were close upon him; he got on to Los Arcos, and the enemy halted at Estella, twelve miles distant.

The French had formed their plan for hunting him down with perfect knowledge of the country, meaning to hem him in on all sides among the mountains; and they had assembled not only all their troops in Navarre for this service, but had drawn soldiers from Alava also, and from part of Castille, and were aided by reinforcements from France. Not less than 12,000 men were now employed against him. Mina, however, knew the ground as well as his pursuers, and never losing hope, and never without resources, he once more divided his men into small moveable

columns, which he dispersed among the mountains in contrary directions, but with such instructions, that whenever a favourable opportunity arrived, the re-union might be effected as rapidly as before. The French were thus compelled either to extend their line so far that their strength would not be sufficient to cover it, or else to keep it together without any object upon which they could bring it to bear. As he expected, they found themselves at fault, and before they knew how to act, or where to seek him, he had re-united his three battalions and all his cavalry in Estella, where Cruchaga, with the other battalion, hastened to join him, after having attacked the enemy in Roncesvalles, killed and wounded twenty-five of them, and driven the rest into their fort.

Mina's reputation was greatly raised by the ability with which he extricated himself from so many dangers, and the loss which he so frequently inflicted upon the enemy; but these persevering efforts of the French had the desired effect of rendering it impossible for him to undertake any enterprise which might tend to the relief of Figueras, or, by disturbing Suchet in Aragon, operate in aid of Tarragona. That city, one of the most remarkable in Spain for its monuments of antiquity, and for the historical circumstances connected with it, stands about the distance of a musket shot from the sea shore, on a steep and rocky eminence, where (in the words of Florez) it commands and enjoys a free air, a clear sky, and its own fertile plain. Its foundation being in an age beyond the reach of history, has been variously ascribed to Tubal, Hercules, Teucer, Remus, a king of Egypt, and a colony of Phocæans, by fablers who sought in their inventions to gratify that allowable and useful pride which citizens learn to take in the place of their birth and abode... or to accredit their own theories, or to support some baseless etymology of its name. This alone is certain, that it was a considerable place before the Romans and

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Suchet,
T. 2. 20.
Tarragona.España Sa-
grada, T.
24. p. 69.

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*Ycart.
Grandezus
de Tarra-
gona, 65.*

*Laborde
Voyage Pit-
toresque.
Introd.
p. 31.*

Suetonius.

*Orosius,
L. 7. § 15.*

Carthaginians contended for the dominion of Spain; and the remains of its more ancient walls, which excited the wonder of antiquaries in the sixteenth century, excite in the present age their sagacity, their conjectures, and their doubts; for, though resembling those which are called Cyclopean in magnitude and solidity, they differ from them in construction. The Scipios so greatly enlarged and embellished it as almost to be considered its refounders; and, on the division of the Peninsula under the Romans, it gave name to that province which had before been called Citerior Spain. Augustus, according to fond Spaniards, issued from Tarragona his ever memorable decree that all the world should be taxed; here it was that the palm was said to have grown upon his altar during his life; and the year after his death the inhabitants sent deputies to Rome, soliciting permission to erect a temple to him as a god: . . . a fragment of that altar, a single stone of that temple, and a few medals, are now the only remains of their vile and impious adulation. When Galba was declared emperor, the crown of gold for his inauguration was taken from the temple of Jupiter in this city. The Egyptian Isis was worshipped here, and the African goddess Cœlestis: and when the Romish church had corrupted Christianity with the polytheism and idolatry of Pagan Rome, changing the names, but retaining the superstition, the craft, and the sin, it was then inferred that Santiago *must* have sanctified Tarragona by his presence, it being certain that he was at Zaragoza when our Lady descended there with the pillar from heaven. When the Barbarians in the reign of Gallienus first entered Spain, Tarragona was reduced by them almost to a heap of ruins; and it was the last place in that country which the Romans retained. Many of the Gothic kings coined money there. It underwent a second destruction from the Moors, in revenge for the resolution with which the inhabitants resisted them. Louis the Pious recovered it from them at the beginning of the 9th cen-

tury, but the Christians could not hold it long; nor is it known by whom it was finally taken from the Mahommedans, nor when, except that it was sometime in the 11th century, . . . an uncertainty, which shows how slowly it had risen from its ruins. Indeed, when Oldegar was made archbishop there, in the year 1116, large oak and beech trees were growing in the cathedral. This personage, eminent during his life as a politic prelate and saint militant, and as a worker of miracles after his death, refortified the city, and may be said to have refounded it.

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XXXVIII.
1811.

*Ordericus
Vitalis,
892, quoted
by Florez,
T. 25.
p. 116.*

The ruined and almost desolate city, with all belonging or which ought to belong thereunto, was given to this prelate and his successors in the see, under the Roman church, by the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer 3: the deed of gift transferring to the archbishop full power of every kind, stipulating only for an alliance offensive and defensive with the Tarragonans. Oldegar, finding that after ten years his means were not sufficient to complete the cathedral, or to defend the city, transferred the grant to be held as a feud under the see to a Norman knight, Rodbert Burdet by name, who had married in that land, and had acquired there considerable possessions and a great name; but this family, a branch whereof continues to flourish in England, seems to have taken no root in Spain. The tithes both of the sea and land were reserved for the see: . . . those of the nuts * alone from the Selva de Avellana are said to have yielded in some years a thousand escudos. Funds for completing the cathedral, the largest and massiest in Catalonia, were raised by a contribution which the Pope imposed upon the suffragan

*Florez, T.
25. App.
No. v.*

*Ordericus
Vitalis, L.
13, § 5.
Florez, T.
10. App.
ult.*

*Diago.
Condes de
Barcelona,
p. 183.*

* Sixty thousand bushels, from the woods at the foot of the western mountains, were shipped in the year 1775. SWINBURNE.

CHAP
XXXVIII.

1811.

Florez, T.
24. 69.

bishops, and by soliciting alms in aid of the work throughout the province; but the city never recovered even a semblance of its former prosperity. Its circumference is now little more than two miles, and the river Francoli, which, when it bore its ancient name of Tulcis, ran close to Tarragona, is now a mile distant from it. War had not been the cause of this improsperity; for after its restoration, the Moors never attempted it; it suffered little in the revolt of the Catalans; and nothing in the Succession war, the English being received there by the inhabitants, and retiring from it after the peace of Utrecht. But at the time when it might otherwise have partaken the improvement which was then general in Spain, the neighbouring town of Reus made an extraordinary advance in industry and opulence, trebling its population in the course of fifteen years; and making Salo its port, it had the effect rather of taking from Tarragona what trade it might have had, than of contributing to it.

When this unexpected war commenced, Tarragona was deemed so little important as a fortress, that its garrison consisted only of fifty men; it was now the only strong place which the Catalans possessed upon the coast, every exertion had been made to strengthen its works, and they who relied upon fortresses regarded it as the last bulwark of Catalonia. The city was crowded with fugitives from the open country and from towns in the enemy's possession; there was a strong garrison; and Tarragona had this advantage above every other place in the province which had yet been besieged, that supplies and reinforcements could at all times be thrown in by sea. Captain Codrington was in the roads with the *Blake*, *Invincible*, and *Centaur*, ready to aid in any way wherein the zeal and intrepidity of British seamen could be rendered available. Under these circumstances, the spirit of the principality being what it was, and Valencia with unexhausted resources close at hand, a

resolution like that of the Zaragozans and Geronans, or an influencing mind like that of Palafox or of Mariano Alvares, would have baffled all the efforts of the enemy; and unity of counsels, with a competent leader in the field, might have rendered the siege fatal to the besiegers. There were men and means in abundance, the inhabitants as well as the garrison were prepared to act or to suffer, neither will nor resolution were wanting; but there was no commanding mind, no harmony of purpose; some hearts were accessible to fear, and some to corruption. This Count Suchet knew, and could calculate as certainly upon confusion and perplexity in their counsels as upon steadiness and method in his own.

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1811.

He established his head quarters at Reus: the inhabitants of that busy town had been properly rewarded for the inclination which they had shown toward the French; and their hatred toward them now was in proportion to their sufferings and their repentance. Suchet endeavoured to win them over by maintaining strict discipline, and by courting the chief authorities, civil and religious. Expecting also an obstinate resistance, he prepared extensive hospitals with all things necessary to receive his wounded, and made arrangements for removing them without delay from the trenches; measures whereby he deserved and obtained the affections of the soldiery in a greater degree than any other of the French generals in Spain. He pushed the siege with characteristic vigour, and had soon the satisfaction to learn that Campoverde, having been defeated before Figueras in attempting to relieve that fortress, had hastened back to Tarragona by sea with the remainder of his troops, who were more likely to dispirit the garrison by the distrust which they had conceived of themselves and of their commander, than to bring any increase of real strength. Sarsfield remained with one division in the field, and threatened the enemy's line

May 2.
Siege of
Tarragona.

Campo-
verde enters
the city
after a
defeat.

CHAP. from Mora to Reus. This brave and enterprising officer an-
 XXXVIII. noyed them on that side; and that part of the besieging army
 1811. which was encamped on the high and dry level ground at a
 May. distance from the Francoli and the Gaya, suffered for want of
 water, having continually to repair and protect the aqueduct.
 The most important of the outworks were Fort Francoli, on the
 left bank of the river to the west of the city, and Fort Olivo:
 the latter was a new fort, about 400 toises to the north, on
 ground so high that it could not with safety have been left un-
 occupied; and this it was deemed necessary to reduce before any
 attack could be made upon the body of the place. On the part
 of the enemy's engineers every thing was done which could be
 expected from a thorough practical knowledge of their destruc-
 tive art; and so vigorously were their advances resisted by the
 Spaniards, that the wounded who were carried to the French
 hospitals are stated by Suchet himself to have been from fifty
 to threescore daily during the siege of this outwork. The Spa-
 niards estimated them as nearer 300. In one of the sorties
 General Salme was killed; his body was buried under a part of
 the aqueduct; his heart embalmed, and deposited under that
 well known monument which is called the Tomb of the Scipios.
 Fort Olivo held out till the night of the 29th; nor would it then have
 been taken had there not been found a wretch wicked enough
 to sell the blood of his comrades and the interest of his country.
 The garrison, consisting of 2000, was to be changed that night,
 the regiment of Illiberia returning into the town, and that of
 Almeria taking its place: the French presented themselves at
 the same time with the new garrison, while a false attack was
 made in another quarter, and entered with them; others found
 their way through a dry aqueduct, which the Spaniards had
 neglected either to destroy or properly to secure, and Fort Olivo
 was thus taken, some 800 Spaniards being made prisoners, and

*Fort Olivo
betrayed.*

more than as many slain. For the information which led to this carnage a price had been bargained, and the money* was paid.

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1811.

At this time General Senen de Contreras arrived at Tarragona in a frigate from Cadiz. He had distinguished himself when a young man, by abridging the voluminous Military Reflections of the Marquis de Santa Cruz, and was thought to have studied his profession so well that he was sent by Charles III. on a travelling mission, to examine into the military institutions of other countries. On this service he was employed four years, visiting England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, and in the campaign of 1788 he served against the Turks. In the war against revolutionary France he acted as aid-de-camp to General Urretia in the Pyrenees; and in the present contest had afforded a timely support to the Portuguese in Alemtejo and Algarve, .. had been in the retreat of the central army, gaining some partial successes in those disastrous days, .. and afterwards, in some critical situations and some important stations, supported the reputation which he had obtained. He landed now at Tarragona in an inauspicious hour, and had immediately a command entrusted to him at the gate opposite Fort Olivo, where he passed the first unhappy night after his arrival in receiving the fugitives. On the following morning Campoverde assembled his chief officers and the deputies of the superior Junta: it was agreed that an effort for raising the siege should be made in the field; and while the general in chief should be thus employed, Contreras was appointed to command in the city. The danger of the place, and the numerous defects of its incomplete works, were obvious to all military men; and to no one

May.
General
Contreras.

Contreras
appointed to
command
in the city.

* This, which was suspected at the time, I happen to know.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1811.

*June.**Campo-
verde goes
out to act in
the field.*

more clearly than to the general who now unwillingly took upon himself the charge of defending it. He represented that he was neither acquainted with the troops and officers whom he was to command, nor with the civil authorities with whom he should have to act, nor with the people on whose energetic aid he must rely, nor with the place itself (of which not even a plan could be produced), having, in fact, none of that information which might be considered indispensable for such a command. With this responsibility, however, Contreras was left; and Campoverde departed by sea with his staff, and so many officers (every man seeming to act at his own pleasure), that of the regiments in the garrison only two were left with their own colonels or proper commanders. He issued a proclamation before his departure, promising to return in the course of six or eight days with an army, and make an effort, which was to be seconded by the garrison, for raising the siege. The new commander had no expectation that this promise would be performed; but the garrison and the inhabitants looked with confidence to its fulfilment, . . . for the Spaniards are a hopeful people, and, all circumstances considered, they had on no former occasion had such reasonable ground for hope. They had lost about 3000 men during the siege, which they supposed to be a less loss than the French had sustained, and they could more easily be reinforced. If, indeed, the same means of defence had been resorted to here as in Zaragoza and Gerona, Tarragona, defective as its works were, must have been impregnable: it was secure against famine; it was in no danger of pestilence; and its numbers might always have been kept up. The enemy had broken the aqueduct, expecting to distress the besieged by reducing them to use the brackish water of their wells; but in this he was deceived, for no distress was occasioned by it. The very sight of the English squadron, and the constant communication with it, and its aid

on all opportunities, contributed greatly to the confidence which was felt.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1811.

June.

Contreras did not partake that confidence; his measures, however, were such as might support it. He established a military police; he formed the inhabitants into companies; and he employed the women in such services as they were capable of performing. On their part, indeed, a spirit was manifested such as the time required: no danger deterred them from administering refreshments to the soldiers at their stations, nor from bearing away the wounded: it was sometimes necessary to restrain their ardour, but on no occasion did it need excitement. The military chest was almost exhausted; the commander replenished it by levying a contribution upon those merchants who had retired to Villa Nueva with their effects. He gave ear to no overtures from the enemy of whatever kind. When Suchet proposed a suspension of hostilities, that the dead might be interred who lay in heaps around Fort Olivo, in sight from the ramparts of the city, even that proposal was rejected; and in that hot season of the year, and on that rocky soil where graves could not be dug, the French, for their own sakes, were compelled as long as the siege continued to consume the slain by fire.

They gave the fort which they had won the name of Salme, from the general who had fallen before it. And now their attacks were directed against Fort Francoli, which they reduced at length to such a state that the commandant found it necessary to abandon it as untenable, destroying such stores as he could not remove. Hitherto there had been no want of firmness in the besieged; but vigour, confidence, and unanimity were wanting among their leaders. Three members of the supreme Junta were in the city, in order that the civil power might through them afford all the aid which the military might require: this they did most unreservedly; but the proposals which they made

Fort Francoli abandoned.

CHAP. met with no correspondent consideration, and the soldiers com-
 XXXVIII. plained of the inaction in which they were kept. When Cam-
 1811. poverde first entered the place, it was supposed that he had
 June. invested Sarsfield with powers to act for him both as governor-
 general of the province and commander in the field; but Sarsfield
 Sarsfield. was soon called after him to Tarragona, and remained there after
 he had departed. This general was one of the best officers in the
 Spanish service for an inferior command, . . . an intelligent, enter-
 prising, intrepid, and honourable man; but he was punctilious
 and irritable, and thought less of his country and his duty than
 of his own personal importance, . . . differing in this most widely
 from Eroles, of whose high reputation and higher virtues he was
 so jealous, that he regarded him with a dislike little short of per-
 sonal enmity. This same unhappy temper made it impossible
 for him to act cordially with Contreras. In the field he might
 have been far more serviceable than in the fortress, for in the
 field it was that the best service might have been effected, and
 the French acknowledged and feared his activity as a partisan:
 but though he kept up that character in the sallies which he di-
 rected, his impractical disposition marred all his better qualities.
 What he did was without consulting the governor; he neither
 thought it necessary to concert operations with him, nor even to
 inform him of the results.

*Cataluña
 Atribulada,
 13.*

Meantime the siege was pressed with the utmost skill and
 exertions; and on the part of the Spaniards there was as much
 want of concert and ability without the walls as within. Troops
 were twice sent from Carthagená to reinforce the place, and
 both times without arms, so that when they arrived they were
 useless, there being already 2000 men there more than there
 were weapons for; and therefore by desire of Contreras they were
 carried on to Villa Nueva, there to be armed, if Campoverde
 could arm them, or to take their own course! And on the part

*Troops sent
 to reinforce
 the gar-
 rison, and
 landed else-
 where.*

of Campoverde himself there was such uncertainty, such seeming apathy, that the British officers, who were exerting themselves with indefatigable zeal, apprehended the worst consequences from the incapacity which they now perceived in him. O'Donell, now Conde de Bisbal, was not yet sufficiently recovered from his wound to take the field: his services were never more needed than at this time, when there was no lack of means or men, only of hearts and heads to direct them. He consulted, however, with his brother, who had a command in the Valencian army, and in concert with him and Captain Codrington it was agreed that 4000 of the best Valencian troops should be sent in British ships to reinforce the garrison, while the rest of that army should move to the banks of the Ebro, and there, in concert with the Aragonese, threaten Suchet's depôts, the movement which of all others he apprehended most. These troops, under General Miranda, were accordingly embarked at Peñiscola, with written orders to land at Tarragona; the intention being that they should join in a sally, which Captain Codrington thought could not fail of success. Miranda, however, refused to land, protesting that both his written and verbal instructions forbade him to shut himself up in the fortress with his division. This was neither the place nor the time for disputing; and as little good service can be expected from one in whom good will is evidently wanting, the division landed at Villa Nueva, according to Campoverde's desire, that they might join him at Igualada, and act upon the besiegers' flank.

Suchet, meantime, was not without uneasiness: he had already lost 2500 men, including 280 officers; and hitherto the chief advantage which he had gained had been obtained less by force of arms than by corruption. But the feeble irresolution of the Spanish leaders and their ruinous delays gave him time, by which he profited like one who knew its value; and on the

CHAP.
XXXVIII.
1811.

CHAP. evening of the 21st he assaulted the lower town; three breaches
 XXXVIII. had been made, and with all its defences, it was in the course of
 1811. an hour in his hands, at the cost of about 500 men. It is said
 June. that the same means for insuring success had been provided
 The lower town taken. here as at Fort Olivo*. With the exception of a small number,
 all the Spaniards were put to the sword in the town, at the port,
 in the houses, and in pursuit..to the gates of the upper town; only
 160 prisoners were taken, most of whom were wounded; no more
 than these were spared, while the number of bodies which the
 French collected and burnt amounted to 1350. Suchet then
 held forth a threat which he had now shown, that the troops
 whom he commanded were capable of carrying into effect:
 Suchet's threat. "I fear much," said he, "that if the garrison wait for the as-
 sault in their last hold, I shall be forced to set a terrible example,
 and intimidate Catalonia and Spain for ever by the destruction
 of a whole city!"

Sarsfield, who was slightly wounded in this action, embarked
 immediately to join Campoverde and act in the field; this he
 did without informing Contreras of his intention, and at a mo-
 ment when his presence was more needful than it had been at
 any former time. An officer was appointed to succeed him as
 soon as his departure was known; but before that officer could
 The mole at Tarragona. repair to his post, the enemy had forced it, and were masters of
 the mole. Ten years had not quite elapsed since that port had
 been a scene of proud rejoicing, the King and Queen of Spain
 having visited it to inspect the works at the mole, which having

* Contreras insinuates as much in his account of the siege. I have heard it
 asserted as a thing believed by those who had the best opportunity of forming a
 true opinion; but the assertion was not supported by direct evidence, as in the case
 of Fort Olivo.

been commenced in the year 1790 were then on the point of completion. The quarries being near at hand, an enormous stone had been prepared for this occasion, on which an image of Neptune, ten feet high, was placed, with one hand reining the dolphin on which he stood, with the other holding his trident. The huge mass was raised by the exertions of three hundred men, and let down into its place in the sea, Neptune descending with it as into his own empire, amid the sound of music, and the festive discharge of artillery, and the exulting acclamations of myriads of beholders. The beach which on that day had been lined with happy multitudes was soon to become the scene of the most atrocious tragedy in this whole dreadful war.

The Junta of Tarragona were now so indignant at the conduct of Campoverde, whose futile movements at this crisis were as injurious as his inactivity, that they enclosed to him his own proclamation, issued at the time of his departure, wherein he had promised to relieve them in the course of a few days. Three weeks had now elapsed; he had been reinforced with 4000 Valencian troops on whom he had not counted when that promise was made; and there was a general outcry against his unfitness for the command. Eroles alone acted with the spirit which the exigence required, and succeeded in capturing a convoy of 500 laden mules between Mora and Falset, and cutting off part of their escort. Wherever his services were most needed, there he was always to be found, .. seeking as little to aggrandize as to spare himself, his single object being the deliverance of his country. The magazines at Reus were not so well provided but that the loss of these supplies would have been felt by the besiegers, if the city had been defended after the manner of Gerona. But the Geronans were commanded by a man of the old heroic stamp, and they had no base examples to discourage them; whereas the garrison and the people of

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1811.

*June.**Campo-
verde's
inactivity.*

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1811.

*June.**Ill beha-
viour of the
Spanish
frigates.*

Tarragona saw nothing in the conduct of their leaders and their countrymen but what was disheartening. While the gun-boats and launches of the British squadron were employed every night, and all night long, in annoying the enemy's working parties, there were two Spanish frigates which remained quiet spectators. While the English were removing women, children, and wounded in their transports to Villa Nueva, those frigates would not receive on board their wounded countrymen who were sent off to them; and these poor creatures were left to lie without assistance of any kind in the boats which brought them off, till relief was sent them from the British ships. This heartless disregard of all duty called forth strong remonstrances from General Doyle as well as from Captain Codrington; and it was not till above 2000 people had been removed in our transports, that the positive orders of Contreras, and the threat of General Doyle, that the captain of one of their frigates should be put under arrest if he refused to receive the wounded, compelled them to act as if they had some sense of honour and humanity. Had the Spaniards in the fortress and in the field displayed as much spirit and alacrity as was manifested by the British ships in their aid, Contreras has declared that Tarragona could not have been taken.

*Col. Skerret
arrives with
British
troops.*

Suchet meantime pushed his attacks vigorously against the only remaining defences of the city, aware that he had no time to lose, and that if preparations were made for defending the streets and houses, a war of that kind might detain him till efficient succours should arrive by sea. Sir Edward Pellew, who had just taken the command of the Mediterranean fleet, was hastening with all speed to assist the besieged; and when the enemy's batteries for forming a breach were almost completed, a detachment of 2000 British troops under Colonel Skerret arrived from Cadiz in the bay. He landed with his

engineers, and they perceived how ill the front which the French threatened was able to withstand such batteries as would presently be opened against it. There was but one point now at which a disembarkation could be effected, and that point was flanked by the enemy. The disembarkation would nevertheless have been made, and these troops would have saved Tarragona, or fallen in its defence, if Contreras had not recommended that they should co-operate with Campoverde from without: their presence, he thought, might goad that general on to action, and give reasonable hope of some decisive success in the field, from which alone he looked for deliverance. Besides, he said, the garrison was numerous enough; and as soon as the enemy should have opened their trenches, and begun to batter in breach, he had determined to abandon the place, thinking it of more importance to preserve 7000 fine troops, than to defend the ruins of Tarragona. Skerret, therefore, met Eroles, who came from Campoverde; and they agreed with Doyle and Codrington, that the best plan would be for a sally to be made from the town with 4000 men, and Skerret at the same time to land and join in it. But when they came to consult with Campoverde himself and with Sarsfield, doubts and difficulties were started; other schemes were proposed, discussed, and rejected, and at length a written project of Campoverde's was assented to. He had just before required 3000 of the best troops from the garrison: Contreras said, he would not commit such an error as to send them: he sent, however, one of the regiments which had been specified. Meantime, precious hours were let pass unprofitably by the Spaniards, and the French the while were unremittingly active in their operations.

On the 28th, a breach had been made between two bastions capable of only two, or, at the most, three men abreast. That afternoon there was a strong cannonade: it ceased, and a

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1811.

*June.**Tarragona
taken by
assault.*

CHAP. XXXVIII. 1811. *June.* dispatch came off from Contreras to the squadron, saying that the British guns had silenced the enemy's batteries, that very little harm had been done to the place, and that the breach was nothing; yet he said, knowing the city was not tenable, he had determined upon leaving it with the garrison next day. While the British officer was reading this dispatch, the enemy were seen from the ships storming the breach, and in half an hour the place was carried. The Spaniards, disheartened by all the previous events of the siege, . . . betrayed by some, and by others deceived and disappointed, . . . abandoned themselves now: they were seized with a sudden panic; . . . and there is nothing to alleviate, nothing to mingle with and modify the horror where-with the ensuing tragedy will be regarded as long as the history of these times shall be held in remembrance. The scene was shameful as well as shocking. Instead of maintaining the breach, as the people of Gerona had done when suffering under disease and famine; instead of attempting to cut their way through the enemy, which at one time had less wisely and less generously been intended, the soldiers fled. Without the satisfaction of selling their lives dearly or the sense of duty to console them in death, they suffered themselves to be butchered without resistance. Some of the officers tried every means to rally their men, but such efforts were in vain; that moral discipline had been neglected by which Zaragoza and Gerona have rendered themselves for ever worthy of admiration. The governor of the place, Gonzalez, with a handful of brave men, defended himself till the last, and fell. Contreras was wounded and taken prisoner. The last effort was made before the cathedral, whither a multitude of Spaniards had betaken themselves; some in the vain hope that the sanctity of the place might protect them, some that they might die before their altars, and some to avail themselves of the vantage ground afforded by the ascent, which is by a flight

of threescore steps. The conquerors made their way up under a destructive fire; and their fury, according to Suchet, knew no bounds, till upon entering the cathedral they beheld nine hundred wounded lying on the pavement. Their bayonets, he says, respected them; and he commends what he calls this trait of humanity. Little was shown elsewhere; but the carnage was chiefly among the inhabitants. Many thousands who had got over the ramparts or through the embrasures, or through the gate of St. Antonio, fled along the beach. The French field artillery and the batteries opened a fire upon this mixed and flying multitude on one part; and on another the cavalry charged among them, sabring the women and children, and trampling them down.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.
1811.
June.
Mémoires,
2. 105.

These execrable conquerors kept up a heavy fire upon the landing-place, where women and children stood grouped together, crouding to the British boats; and they endeavoured to sink the boats that were employed in this service of humanity. Suchet stated in his official account that four thousand men were killed in the city, and a thousand sabred or drowned in endeavouring to make their escape, . . . “a horrible massacre had been made,” he said, “with little loss on the side of the conquerors; the terrible example which he had foreseen had taken place, and would be long remembered in Spain!” From the Spaniards and from our own officers we learned what was the nature of this example, which, because it was threatened, must be believed to have been predetermined! More than six thousand unresisting persons were butchered; old and young, man and woman, mother and babe: and when the enemy had satiated their thirst for blood they turned to the perpetration of crimes more damnable than murder. In the streets and in the churches they violated women who had escaped their first fury, only to suffer now worse horrors before they died. Nuns and wives, and

Massacre at
Tarragona.

CHAP.
XXXVIII.

1811.

June.

widows in the hour when they were widowed, girls and children, were seized on by these monsters, . . . and, retaining their cruelty when rage and lust were palled, they threw many of these victims, and of the wounded Spaniards, into the burning houses.

There were officers in this accursed army whose hearts revolted at the wicked service in which they were engaged, and who at all times redeemed themselves as far as they could by acts of individual humanity. What little mercy was shown at Tarragona, . . . little indeed it was, . . . was owing to such men. But General Suchet was of the school of terrorists*; his intention

* There was a town called Bedouin in the department of Vaucluse, which contained about 500 houses and some 2000 inhabitants: they had a good trade in silk, and the place was flourishing. In the month of May, 1794, the tree of liberty which had been planted without this town was cut down during the night. Fearing in those dreadful times the consequence of this act of individual indiscretion, the townsmen themselves informed the deputy Maignet of it, an ex-priest, who was then upon a Robespierrean mission in the department. This availed nothing in their favour: he issued a decree proscribing not only the people of Bedouin, but of the surrounding communes also, and condemned the town to be burnt. — An officer, by name Suchet, commanded the battalion which accompanied Maignet's commission to execute this decree. Sixty fathers of families, after the mockery of a revolutionary trial, were put to death, those who were spared being placed at the foot of the scaffold during the execution. Suchet then gave the word for setting fire to the town, and it was burnt to the ground. The church was the only building which was not destroyed by the flames, and that was demolished by means of gunpowder. Such of the inhabitants as had fled were hunted out in their retreats by the soldiers of the detachment, and shot like wild beasts. The answer of Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety to the report of this transaction was, *Le Comité est satisfaite de la conduite de Maignet.*

Prud'homme, Hist. des Erreurs, des Fautes, et des Crimes commis pendant la Revolution Francaise, t. 2. 170—176.

I know not whether the Suchet of Tarragona was the Suchet of Bedouin. If he was not, then has France produced two monsters of the name instead of one.

was to intimidate Catalonia and the whole of Spain by this terrible example ; and on the following morning he ordered the Alcaldes and Corregidores from the surrounding country to be brought together and led through the streets of Tarragona, that they might see the bodies which were lying there, and report to their countrymen what they might expect if they dared attempt resistance to the French ! If, indeed, at any time it were possible to intimidate such a people as the Catalans, who in all ages have shown the same invincible resolution, it would have been now, when the last bulwark of the province had fallen. By some strange imprudence the greater part of their ammunition had been deposited there, and very little remained in those parts of the country which were yet free. There still remained in the field the remains of an army which they had clothed and armed at their own cost, as well as raised among themselves ; and which, often as it had been defeated, had nevertheless shown a braver countenance to the enemy, and inflicted upon him greater loss than any other in the Spanish service. The general, however, held a council of war at Cervera ; the usual course when a commander wishes to shift from himself the ignominy of the measures which he is prepared to take. It was proposed to abandon the province, as if farther resistance were hopeless. Eroles was not present ; and though Sarsfield, who was the first to give his opinion, declared that any one who should vote for such an abandonment would be a traitor to his country, and that he and his division would stand or fall with the principality, he received only a faint and false support from Campoverde, and was consequently outvoted ; and an aid-de-camp of the general was sent to inform Captain Codrington that they were on their march to Arens there to embark, leaving their horses on the beach. Codrington replied, that having brought the Valencians thither for a special service, he felt himself bound in duty to

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*June.**Contreras,*
*p. 72.**Campoverde*
resolves to
abandon
*Catalonia.**July 1.*

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*July.**Eroles re-
fuses to
leave it.**General
Lacy ar-
rives to take
the com-
mand.*

take their division on board, and return them to the general and kingdom by which they had been spared ; but that he would not embark the army of Catalonia, and thus make himself a party concerned in the abandonment of a province which he was sent to protect. Upon receiving this answer, Campoverde determined upon marching into Aragon, . . not upon any brave attempt, but for the chance of making his way into some safer country ; a determination which so dismayed the Valencians, that nearly 2000 of them dispersed, as well knowing how much better they could shift for themselves individually than they were likely to fare in such an undertaking. The commander now began to perceive that as the English would not take away his army by sea, neither would the troops follow him by land ; and there was a general call that Eroles should take upon himself the command. But Eroles, who acted always from a worthier motive than ambition, replied to the Junta of generals, who would have conferred it upon him in obedience to the voice of the people, that as long as any of those who were his superior officers remained in the principality, he must decline it ; but that whenever, in pursuance of the resolution which had been taken, they should pass the boundaries, he would then, however unwillingly, take upon him that duty, rather than see his country thrown into the worse anarchy which must otherwise ensue.

That anarchy began already to be felt. The superior Junta at Solsona were left to learn as they could the resolution that had been taken of withdrawing the army which they had raised and provided ; and deserters were already collecting in bands and acting as guerrillas, or as banditti, as opportunity invited. But the Junta, when they laid their situation (dissembling nothing) before the British admiral, assured him that they would persevere in the contest, because they knew that the Catalans

were more than ever unanimous in their abhorrence of the invaders. Tarragona had been betrayed, not conquered: the enemy might congratulate themselves upon their good fortune, not upon victories well contested and fairly won; . . . this was the language of the people. At this crisis, General Luis Lacy arrived upon the coast to take the command: the Duque del Infantado had been talked of for it, and the Catalans wished for him; but the Duke was more in his place at Cadiz; and a fitter commander than Lacy could not at that time have been sent to a charge which might seem so hopeless. Eroles, after a fruitless endeavour to meet him, sent him full information of the state of affairs, and promised to support him in the command whereto he was regularly appointed, with all the personal exertions of which he was capable, and all the influence that he possessed in this his native province. The French were just then endeavouring to cut off the Valencian division, and their movements made the communication difficult between the army and the coast. The remainder of that division, however (reduced to 2400, though not a man had fallen, for they had never faced the enemy), made their way to Arens de Mar, and were there embarked, Eroles detaining the enemy by a feint at Mataro. Lacy then assumed the command of an army which he said was non-existent: "Bad as I expected to find things," said he, "they are infinitely worse; and my only consolation must be, that there is absolutely nothing left for me to lose."

The fortified points which the Catalans still retained were Berga, Montserrate (for this had been made a military post), Figueras, Cardona, and the Seu d'Urgel. Berga was dismantled by Lacy, because he was unable to defend it, and it might have been a useful hold for the French. Orders arrived from Paris to demolish Tarragona, preserving only a redoubt there, to reduce Montserrate, and then prepare to march against the kingdom of Valencia. Suchet was at the same time created a

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*July.**July 9.**Montser-
rate taken
by the
French.*

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*July.**Fall of
Figueras.**Aug 19.**Base usage
of the pri-
soners taken
there.*

marshal of the empire for his services ; the massacre at Tarra-
 gona was considered as no reproach to him, or the army by
 which it had been perpetrated. By General Rogniat's advice,
 the works which surrounded the upper town were preserved, be-
 cause they might be defended by a thousand men : the other
 works were destroyed, and the greater part of the artillery
 removed to Tortosa. Montserrate was then attacked ; . . its
 former peaceful inhabitants had removed to Majorca, and taken
 with them in time the treasures of their sanctuary. Great enter-
 prise and activity were displayed in the attack : and the garrison,
 confiding too much in the natural strength of the mountain,
 suffered themselves to be surprised from its heights. This was
 a severe loss to the Catalans ; for it was now their chief depot,
 and they had counted upon its security. The last calamity in
 this series of misfortunes was the fall of Figueras. When it had
 been blockaded between four and five months, and all the horses
 were eaten, the garrison sallied, and attempted to force their
 way through the besiegers. An aid-de-camp of the governor
 had deserted and given information of their purpose ; the enemy
 therefore were prepared to receive them ; nevertheless they
 made their way to the *abattis*, formed of trunks of trees, which
 they found impenetrable ; and after three attempts in the course
 of one day, these gallant men were compelled to capitulate,
 three sacks of flour being all the provisions which were left.
 During two preceding days they had employed themselves in
 destroying whatever could be of use to the enemy. Honourable
 terms were obtained, and Martinez was made to say in his dis-
 patch to his own Government, that the garrison were treated by
 the French with the generosity which characterises that nation.
 That phrase would be rightly understood by the Spaniards.
 It had been stipulated that they should march out with their
 baggage, and deliver their arms on the glacis. But no sooner

had they given up their arms than they were plundered; and they were marched into France in such a state of destitution, that they were indebted for needful covering to the humanity of the towns through which they passed. Eight hundred peasants were among these prisoners. Buonaparte sent them to the hulks at Brest and Rochefort, and there they were compelled to work with the convicts, being distinguished from them only by a dress of different colour, not by any difference in * treatment.

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When Figueras had been recovered from the enemy, it was asserted in the Government gazette, that in consequence of that event the French had abandoned Hostalrich and Gerona, and that the English had taken Rosas; so readily did the Spaniards listen even to the idlest rumours of success! The French in like manner believing, or professing to believe, what they wished, gave out upon their recapture of this fortress that the war in Catalonia was ended: so M. Macdonald affirmed in his dispatches; and the vain boast was repeated in the Barcelonan journal, though in that city undeniable proofs of its falsehood were daily and hourly received. One of the most remarkable men whom these troubles had drawn from obscurity into active life was Jose Manso, who at the commencement of the struggle followed the humble occupation of a miller upon a small patrimony of his own, near Barcelona; some French officers, by their outrageous conduct towards him, roused in him a spirit which under hap-

Manso.

* One of the first acts of the provisional government upon the overthrow of this tyrant, was to give orders for the liberation of these injured Catalans, and their removal to Spain; considering, they said, that the violence committed upon men, whose only offence was that of having fought in defence of their country, outraged humanity, and the laws which were consecrated by the nations of Europe.

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pier circumstances might never have been awakened, and he began his honourable warfare against the invaders with only three comrades. By a series of exploits skilfully planned and bravely executed, he had gained for himself a high reputation, which was in no slight degree enhanced by his moral worth ; for it might truly be said of him that he was without fear and without reproach. When Manso entered upon this new course of life he was about two or three and twenty years of age, and was so uneducated that he could neither write nor read ; but every portion of time that could now be spared from his military duties was devoted to self-improvement, and his progress in this kept full pace with his fortune. At this time he held the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Catalan army ; and when Suchet, soon after the fall of Tarragona, was on his way to the capital of the province, he, at the head of a detachment, harassed his march, and succeeded in cutting off some fifty of the enemy and taking six, between Ordal and Molins de Rey ; but twelve of his soldiers were taken in these skirmishes, and the French commander ordered some of them to be shot, some to be hanged, and some to be burnt, though they claimed the protection to which they were entitled by the laws of war, and though they threw themselves at his feet and entreated mercy. His orders were executed ; some thirty peasants of St. Vicente, Molins de Rey, and Palleja, who were working in the fields, were murdered in like manner ; and every woman who fell into the hands of these inhuman troops became their victim. Manso issued a proclamation denouncing these crimes before God and man ; and declaring that the right of reprisals which till then he had from humanity forborne to exercise should instantly be enforced, he hung his six prisoners in the immediate vicinity of Barcelona ; and gave notice, that every Frenchman who from that hour

fell into his hands should be put to death, till the enemy should have learnt to treat as prisoners of war brave men who were fighting for their country which had been perfidiously invaded, their religion which was insolently outraged, and their king who had been treacherously decoyed into captivity.

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The French asserted also in their journals, that the Junta of Catalonia had fled to Majorca, giving up the principality in despair. The Spanish frigates had indeed run for that island, contrary to orders, carrying with them the archives, and the money, stores, ammunition, and medicines intended for the inland fortresses, and at that time especially needed by them. But the Junta were at their post when Catalonia was left to stand or fall by its own strength, and when without their presence there could have been none to call forth or direct it. In many parts of Spain the provincial Juntas disregarded sometimes, and sometimes counteracted, the orders of the Government; but here the duties of Government devolved upon the Junta. From Solsona they now issued some of those proclamations which contributed so greatly to support the national cause, calling upon their countrymen in the language of hope and heroism and indignation, and exhorting them to rely upon their good cause and their own right arms, and the justice of the Almighty. The Barcelonan journal said that Lacy had fled with the Junta. If they who made this assertion believed it themselves, they were speedily undeceived. That general declared in a proclamation, that if his well founded hope of soon seeing better days should be disappointed, he would die with the last soldier rather than abandon his post: eight days he allowed the dispersed troops for rejoining their colours at the places fixed upon; those who should not then have rejoined were to be pursued as deserters by the civil and military authorities. "Catalans," said he, "the country is in danger, and now more than

*Conduct of
the Junta of
Catalonia.*

*Lacy's pro-
clamation.*

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ever stands in need of your exertions. The Junta and your general are bound to explain to you your situation, because true courage consists not in being ignorant of danger, but in overcoming it. The fall of Tarragona has made that situation critical in the extreme, not desperate. There yet remain to us inextinguishable hatred of oppression and ardent love of independence ; . . there yet remain to us strong-holds and mountains ; . . there remain to us the arms of our numerous and valiant youth for recovering what is lost, and for making the enemy know that the attempt to conquer us is vain. With fewer resources did Pelayo from the mountains of Covadonga begin the deliverance of Spain : and there are not wanting to us chiefs who are determined to follow his glorious example. Great efforts are necessary ; let our efforts then be united, and for those who have not spirit to follow this resolution, let them abandon us and join the enemy, that we may know whom to treat as enemies, and whom as friends. The priest, the religioner, the father of a family, every one has wrongs to avenge, every one has much to lose, and our country calls upon all. In all parts the alarum-bell is heard, and wherever there are enemies, there should be Catalans to fight them. War and vengeance must be our only business ; and, like our forefathers, let us leave to the women the care of our houses and families !”

*Retreat of
the cavalry
from Cata-
lonia to
Murcia.*

Yet while Lacy held this language, and used at the same time every exertion for collecting the dispersed troops, he was obliged to dismiss a body of cavalry, from utter inability to support them, or even to feed the horses. Brigadier D. Gervasio Gasca commanded this division, which contained twelve superior, and 112 subaltern officers, 922 men, and about 500 horses, the remains of the regiment of Alcantara, the Numancian dragoons, Spanish hussars, *cazadores* of Valencia, and hussars of Granada. They had to make their way through Aragon, into a

free province, and incorporate themselves with the first army they could find. The details of their march show the skill with which the enemy had chosen his positions, so as to give him military command of the country; for near as Valencia was, Gasca was six weeks on the way, and travelled between 700 and 800 miles before he could effect his junction with a Spanish army. He began this perilous retreat on the 25th of July, with his horses in miserable condition for want of food, and without money; getting provisions and information as he could find them, and having no means of procuring either, except such as chance or charity might bestow. At Graus, a small party of the enemy were found, whom they kept in check with a part of their force, while the rest forded the Esera by Barazona. Making long marches, so as to outrun the intelligence of the enemy, they succeeded in passing the rivers Cinca and Gallego without opposition; but when they were in the district of Las Cinco Villas de Aragon, knowing that the French from Barbastro and Huesca were about to collect and cut them off, they made yet longer marches, taking a more devious direction, and moving by night. Notwithstanding these precautions, they were attacked at midnight near the village of Luesia, by what force they knew not, but the fire came from the village, and from a height which commanded the ground over which they were passing. Gasca could not prevent his men from making a precipitate retreat, he had only time to name a place of rendezvous; and while the enemy, who consisted of 1000 foot, and from two to three hundred horse, under the Polish general Chlopiski, hastened to cut them off from the pass of the Gallego, Gasca avoided them by entering Navarre, where he rested three days at Eybar, expecting help from Espoz y Mina to effect the perilous passage of the Ebro. Three parties of that distinguished leader's cavalry came to assist and guide him: their knowledge of

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 XXXVIII. unexpected march to one of the fords of the river; its waters
 1811. were swoln, and they were obliged in some places to swim; the
 August. passage, however, was effected, and immediately Gasca marched
 from four in the afternoon of one day till eight on the following
 morning, that he might get out of reach of the garrisons of
 Tafalla, Caparroso, and Tudela. The danger was now less
 imminent, though still sufficiently great; they made shorter
 marches, varying their direction, according to the intelligence
 they procured of the enemy; and thus, after six weeks of such
 hardships as few people, except the Spaniards, could have sus-
 tained, they joined the army in Murcia by the circuitous way of
 Guadalaxara and Cuenca, having lost upon the road four officers,
 153 men, and 213 horses: the greater part of these men had been
 dispersed in the night route at Luesia; the horses had mostly
 died upon the march.

*State of the
 enemy in
 Catalonia.*

But the Catalans, in circumstances under which almost any
 other people would have despaired, never lost hope; their saying
 was, that now, when the fortified places were lost, the war was
 only begun. And, indeed, deplorable as the state of things was
 for the natives, it was far more so for the invaders: they were
 masters of almost every fortress, but their dominion did not
 extend beyond the walls. They levied contributions upon the
 villages near, and this was all;... they could only move in large
 detachments, and wherever they moved they were harassed by
 the armed peasantry and the Somatenes. The daily and hourly
 cost of life at which they kept their ground was such, that the
 enemy, who avowed their determination of extirpating half the
 inhabitants in order to intimidate the rest, must have exhausted
 the resources, if not the patience, of France, before such a deter-
 mination could be executed. In the preceding year Suchet had
 dispersed a proclamation, declaring that Great Britain and her

Spanish allies had made peace with France, and acknowledged Joseph Buonaparte as king of Spain. The French now circulated a report that negotiations were going on, and with such probability of success that Talleyrand had been sent to London, and the Emperor himself had gone to the coast for the purpose of expediting the business. But these artifices availed them nothing, for Doyle contradicted their falsehood in addresses which were carried every where and eagerly received, . . . and British ships were still upon the coast, to act wherever opportunity might offer.

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Every success at this time was of great importance in its moral effect. Men are usually alive to hope in proportion as their natures are generous ; and the same cause, which throughout the war rendered it impossible to depress the Spaniards, made them easily elated. Of the patriotic journals which were published in every part of Spain, scarcely a number appeared that did not contain details of some skirmish, some Guerrilla attack, some successful enterprise, or hair-breadth escape, . . . more animating than success in the recital. These things, more even than signal victories, tended to excite a military spirit, when no other advantage accrued from them. But of the advantages which the Catalans at this time obtained, one was of considerable importance. An expedition of Spaniards and English, who in all were but a handful of men, recovered the isles of Las Medas, which had been betrayed to the enemy the preceding year. Colonel Green, the British commissioner, and Baron de Eroles, commanded in this well-planned and well-executed attempt ; and the crew of the Undaunted frigate, Captain Thomas, displayed that zeal and those resources in dragging guns up the rocks, by which British seamen have often made themselves dreaded upon their enemies' shores. They found in the fort four guns, and provisions for three months. Both officers perceived how important it was to retain possession of a place

*Las Medas
recovered
by the Spaniards.*

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September.

Sept. 4.

Sept. 13.

which at little expense might be rendered a second Gibraltar, . . . for little was necessary to render it impregnable: here was a post where they could receive supplies, and here a dépôt might be securely established. Eroles, therefore, dispatched orders for 500 men to come and garrison it. The French were equally aware of the advantage which the possession of this point would give their enemies. They brought down a considerable force to Estardit, a village on the opposite shore, and opened batteries against the island, which was within reach of shells. The succours which Eroles had gone to expedite did not appear; the force upon the island consisted only of 146 men, exhausted with the fatigues which they had undergone; and Colonel Green reluctantly yielding to the representations of the officer of the Undaunted, abandoned the works which he had begun, and with them the hopes which he had formed, and blew up the fort. The opportunity, however, was happily retrieved. Lacy, who felt the want of such a point to look to, embarked with 200 men from Arens de Mar in the Undaunted; and taking with him labourers, tools, and stores in some transports, re-occupied the islands, giving them the names of the Isles of Restoration, because, he said, this might be considered as the first step to the recovery of the principality. Water was discovered there, a sufficient garrison established, and the fortifications commenced and carried on in sight of the enemy on the opposite shore, and in defiance of their batteries. Bomb-proofs for men and stores were soon made in a situation favourable for such works. The chief battery was named Lacy by the governor; but that general said he would not permit himself to receive this honour, it should be called Montardit, in honour of the last Catalan whom the French, having taken in arms, had put to death, in violation of the laws of war.

General Lacy, being unable to undertake any considerable

attempt against the enemy, determined, in the right spirit of a soldier, to make activity and enterprise supply the want of numbers, and cut up the invaders in detail. They had formed a chain of fortified posts from Barcelona to Lerida. These he resolved to attack, and began by a rapid march upon Igualada, where the enemy had fortified a Capuchine convent. Four hundred men with two guns were to have joined him from Cardona; but he was disappointed of this aid, for no means of moving the guns, nor for making the road practicable for them, could be procured in time; all that could be done was to surprise the town, and cut off as many of the French as possible before they could take refuge in their fort. At three in the morning the sentinels were put to the sword, the enemy surprised in their quarters, twenty-five prisoners were taken, and about 150 killed; the rest escaped into the convent, as they got out of their beds; and Lacy, seeing at daybreak that succours were coming to them from Monserrate and Casa-Masana, retired to Coll de Gusem satisfied with his success, and thence to Manresa. This made them suppose that he had desisted from offensive operations; and a convoy which, in fear of his movements, had been for some days detained at Cervera, ventured to move toward Igualada. Eroles with half the Catalan force got before it, and the commander-in-chief with the other half cut off its retreat. A column with artillery sallied from Igualada to its assistance, but came only to share in the defeat; 200 were wounded and made prisoners, the killed were in proportion, and the whole convoy was taken.

The general finding now that his presence was necessary in the Junta, to forward the formation and organization of the army, left Eroles, his second in command, to complete the plan, which had already so far succeeded that the French, dreading a second attack, and weakened by this last loss, retired precipi-

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*September.**Successful
enterprise
of Lacy
and Eroles.**Oct. 4.**Oct. 7.*

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Oct. 10.

tately from Igualada, Monserrate, and Casa-Masana, to Barcelona. Eroles no sooner knew that Igualada had been evacuated, than he marched against Cervera. The French, when they saw him approaching, withdrew from the city into the university, which they had fortified; and a body of 500 foot and thirty horse, which had just arrived from Lerida to their support, turned back to provide for its own safety. D. Luis de Creeft and D. Jose Casas were sent to pursue them, while Eroles with one ten-pounder prepared to attack buildings which had been designed by their founders for far other purposes than those of war. This single gun threw down part of the house in which it was planted; but Eroles turned the accident to advantage; for while he affected to be replacing it, in order to deceive the enemy, the gun was moved to another situation, from whence it opened its fire anew, and its carriage was rattled along so as to make them believe that more artillery was about to be brought to bear. Their commandant soon hung out the white flag, and 630 men were made prisoners of war, at an expense to the Catalans of only ten in killed and wounded.

*Corregidor
of Cervera
taken and
punished.*

This conquest set free a considerable territory, which, ever since the loss of Tarragona, had been at the enemy's mercy. Creeft, meantime, with a force inferior to that he was pursuing, followed the column which was retreating to Lerida, and which on its way was joined by the garrison of Tarrega, another post abandoned by the French in their alarm. In this pursuit the corregidor of Cervera was taken attempting to escape with the enemy; a man who had joined the French, and, with the malevolence of a traitor, persecuted his own countrymen. He had invented a cage in which to imprison those who did not pay their contributions, or were in any way obnoxious to him: it was so constructed as to confine the whole body, leaving the head exposed to be buffeted and spit upon; and sometimes this

devilish villain anointed the face of his victim with honey to attract the flies and wasps. "To-morrow," said Eroles in his dispatches, "the señor corregidor will go out to parade the streets in this same cage, where the persons who have suffered this grievous torment may behold him: *Discite justitiam moniti, et non temnere Divos!*" The capture of this man was worth as much, in the feelings of the people, as all the preceding success.

Eroles, with the rest of his division, now hastened to Bellpuig, where Creeft had blockaded about 400 French in the old palace of the Dukes of Sesa, a castle of the fifteenth century, which they had fortified, and which commanded the town. The besiegers had only one ten-pounder, and the walls were more than seven feet thick. They had no time to lose, for Latour, with the troops who had escaped from Igualada, and the garrisons of the other evacuated posts, was preparing, in concert with the enemies from Lerida and Balaguer, to march against them. Unused as they were to such operations, and, as Eroles said, without any other engineers than ingenuity and strong desire, they made three mines which reduced the castle almost to a heap of ruins: 184 prisoners were taken, the rest of the garrison perished. This success completed Lacy's plan, and set free the whole of the country between Lerida and Barcelona. Eroles then, by a movement as judicious as it was unexpected, while the French commanders were concerting plans against him, marched by the Seu de Urgel to Puigcerda, where he routed all the force that the enemy could bring against him: then having occupied the pass of the Valle de Luerol, he entered France, and levied contributions in Languedoc. It was the earnest wish of Baron de Eroles, that his troops in this expedition should be as much distinguished by their good order, moderation, and humanity, as the French in Spain were for their crimes. In every place, except one, this object was effected; but in the

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Eroles enters France
and levies
contributions.

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little town of Marens, the only place where resistance was made by the inhabitants and an armed force, a soldier, in violation of his orders, set fire to one of the houses: the wind was high, the flames spread, notwithstanding the efforts which were made to stop them, and the whole place was burnt. Villamil, governor of Seu de Urgel, who commanded this division of Eroles' army, expressed his regret for what had happened; "*But, perhaps,*" he said, "*the furious hand which committed the evil had been impelled by divine justice, that France might behold an image of Manresa.*" Every where else the orders of the commander were rigidly observed; and the French, admiring the humanity of an enemy who had been so grievously wronged, in many places where they paid the required contribution, acknowledged the justice of this retaliation. Some thousand sheep and corn, and specie to the amount of 50,000 dollars, were the fruits of this first inroad of the Spaniards into France.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE FRENCH ENTER GALICIA. LORD WELLINGTON THREATENS
CIUDAD RODRIGO, WHICH IS RELIEVED BY MARMONT.
GENERAL HILL SURPRISES THE ENEMY AT ARROYO
MOLINOS. SIEGE OF MURVIEDRO. DEFEAT OF BLAKE,
AND CAPTURE OF VALENCIA.

AT no time had Lord Wellington's situation been more
uneasy than at this : not so much because of the inadequacy of
his means in the field, for, such as they were, he was able to
oppose the enemy and baffle him at all points ; as because of
the distressed state of the Portuguese Government, and the ap-
prehended instability of his own. Marlborough had had more
various and conflicting interests to adjust and keep in unison,
but he had no other difficulty with his allies : he could rely
upon a sure support in the British cabinet, till he had beaten
down all opposition in the field ; and the feelings both of the
army and the nation were with him. Lord Wellington might
rely upon himself with a confidence as well founded, but he
could have no other trust. Nothing was to be expected from
any government which the Spaniards might form for themselves ;
and it now began to appear that the inert part of the nation,
which must every where be the majority, would have been
best pleased to remain neuter if that had been possible, and let
the French and English fight the battle and bear the cost. Por-
tugal, indeed, had been delivered from the enemy ; but there

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1811.

*August.
State of
Portugal.*

CHAP. Lord Wellington had to contend with intrigues and jealousies
 XXXIX. in the Government both at Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro; and with
 1811. the difficulties arising from want of provisions, want of trans-
 ports, and the state of the commissariat, the persons employed
 in which were for the most part either idle or dishonest, or
 ignorant of their duty; so that at this time the Portuguese army,
 though brought by Marshal Beresford and the British officers to
 an efficient state of discipline, was reduced to half its nominal
 strength. Their troops were starving in the field, and dying in
 the hospitals, for want of money. If there was much to complain
 of here on the part of the Portuguese ministry, the conduct of
 Great Britain itself was neither consistent nor generous. En-
 gaged as we were in the war, Lord Wellington thought we ought
 to have entered upon it with a determination of carrying Portugal
 through it at whatever cost; that for this purpose we should
 have required an efficient control over all the departments of
 the state, have seen the resources of the country honestly and
 exclusively applied to the objects of the war, and have made up
 the deficiency whatever it might be: this he had recommended
 from the beginning, but the influence which was exercised was
 less at this time than it had been when the Convention of Cintra
 was concluded.

*Expectation
 of peace.*

No general ever more anxiously desired to be placed at the
 head of an army than Lord Wellington did now to be relieved
 from the command; but of this he had no prospect, except from
 such a peace as would in its certain consequences have given
 Buonaparte all that he was seeking vainly to obtain by war.
 There was great apparent danger of this at this time. In case
 of the death of the king, or the acknowledged unlikelihood of
 his recovery (which now daily became more unlikely), the
 French speculated upon a change of administration in England,
 and the accession of the Whigs to power. The French officers

eagerly looked for this, expecting to make such a peace as would enable them to withdraw from the Peninsula without loss of credit, and to re-enter it as soon as their perfidious policy should have prepared a favourable opportunity. In our own army also there were many who regarded the probability of peace with as much complacency as if the end for which the war had been waged would have been secured by it. These were persons who neither by their acquirements, nor pitch of mind, were qualified for the rank which they had attained in their profession; who had not the slightest feeling or perception of the great interests which were at stake, but knowing little, understanding nothing, and criticising every thing, infected all about them with despondency and discontent.

On the other hand, there were at this time, in many parts of Europe, hopeful symptoms, of which Lord Wellington was well informed. Even when Austria had concluded the most unfortunate of its struggles, with loss of honour as well as loss of territory, one of the wisest heads in Germany assured the British Government, that although the German courts swarmed with men who were great calculators of all possible disasters, and who knew nothing more of the human heart than its weaknesses and its selfishness, . . the Germans themselves, though subjugated, were not yet debased by their subjugation; they would one day revenge their wrongs; a warlike spirit would be developed among them, which had been neglected or suppressed by their feeble and corrupt governments; and it would then be seen that there are times when enthusiasm judges more wisely than experience, and when elevation of mind creates resources for the talents which it calls forth. Russia, which had so long been duped by Buonaparte, became sensible of his perfidy, when, in violation of the treaty of Tilsit, he incorporated the Hanse towns and the duchy of Oldenburgh with the French

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1811.

August.

*Disposition
of the conti-
nental pow-
ers to resist
Buona-
parte.*

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August.

empire. An opposition to the tyrant's schemes was manifested in Sweden, where it was less to have been expected: for when the French government demanded permission to march troops through Sweden into Norway, and embark them there for the purpose of invading England, the Swedish government refused, and communicated its refusal to the British cabinet. Prussia, meantime, was silently preparing to break its yoke; and in the course of this autumn, arms, stores, and artillery to a considerable amount, were shipped from England for its use. This was so secretly done, that not a rumour got abroad of any expectations from that quarter; and if the British ministry had acted with as much ability in the management of the war, as in its other foreign relations, its conduct would now have been entitled to unqualified praise: but no representations could as yet induce it to make exertions proportionate to the opportunities that invited, or the necessity that called for them. Whether Buonaparte apprehended, or not, any opposition to his ambitious career in the north of Europe, he was too able a politician to let pass the opportunity of employing as large a force in the Peninsula as could be supported there upon his predatory system of warfare; and accordingly more than 50,000 troops were marched into Spain between the middle of July and the end of September.

*Plans of
Soult and
Marmont.*

When Marmont and Soult, finding it impossible to take Lord Wellington at advantage, separated on the Guadiana, their plan was, that the former should keep the English in check, while Dorsenne, who had succeeded Bessieres in the north, should enter Galicia, fortify Lugo, seize Coruña by a *coup de main*, and in this manner once more obtain military possession of the province.

*Dorsenne
enters Gali-
cia.*

Abadia had just taken the command of the Galician army; it was in wretched equipment, and without magazines of any

kind; but the men had confidence in their general, and when Spanish soldiers have this feeling to invigorate them, they will support privations under which the troops of almost any other nation would sink. His advanced guard was at S. Martin de los Torres, and occupied the bridge of Cebrones; one division was at Bañeza, another at the bridge of Orbigo, and the reserve at Astorga. Dorsenne collected his troops in a line of operations on the Ezla, the right leaning upon Leon, and the left at Castro Gonzalo: then he crossed the Ezla, one division marching upon the Bridge of Orbigo, two upon Bañeza, and the reserve upon Cebrones. Abadia well knowing the state of his own army, and the strength of the country behind him, had formed his plans in case of such an attack. The division at Bañeza withstood a charge of lancers, and fell back in good order to Castro Contrigo, from whence its retreat was unmolested to Puebla de Sanabria, the place appointed.

The other divisions fell back from four in the evening, when the enemy first presented themselves, till night had closed, when they were all collected in Castrillo. The next day the French entered upon the mountains behind Astorga in pursuit. The points of Manzanal and Molina Seca were well defended, and though the Spaniards retired at both points before superior numbers, they brought off with them the eagle of the sixth regiment of infantry, which Abadia, in the name of the army, dedicated to Santiago, and deposited in the chapel of that saint, in his cathedral at Compostella. Seeing the force of the enemy, and divining their purpose, he fell back to Ponferrada, covering, with his little cavalry, a considerable body of men who were crippled for want of shoes, and in the most dismal state of nakedness and want. The ferry in Valdeorras, that gorge through which the river Sil entering Galicia carries with it all the waters of the Bierzo, was the point of re-union. The

CHAP.
XXXIX.

1811.

*August.**Aug. 25.**Retreat of
Abadia.*

CHAP. artillery at Villafranca was ordered back into the interior,
 XXXIX. three regiments took a position upon the heights of Val-
 1811. carcel to cover the roads from that town, and another de-
 August. tachment was stationed at Toreno for the double purpose of
 assisting the reserve and watching Asturias. Abadia himself
 took a position at the Puente de Domingo Florez. In the Vale
 of Orras he hoped to find provisions, meaning, as soon as he
 should have collected enough for three days, and received shoes
 for his men, to act upon the offensive, in co-operation with the
 Portugueze general Silveira.

*Lord Wel-
 lington ob-
 serves Ciu-
 dad Ro-
 drigo.*

The French hoped, that while Dorsenne was dispersing
 the Galician army, and getting possession of that important
 province, Lord Wellington would make some incautious move-
 ment upon Salamanca, and expose himself to Marmont's supe-
 rior numbers, and far superior cavalry, in the open country.
 Lord Wellington knew better in what manner to relieve Galicia.
 Immediately upon his failure at Badajoz, his attention had been
 directed to Ciudad Rodrigo, and orders were given for bringing
 a battering train and siege stores up the Douro to Villa de
 Ponte, whereby much of the difficulty experienced in Alentejo
 for want of means of transport was avoided. General Hill had
 been left with 14,000 men to guard that frontier; the rest of the
 army was collected on the Agueda; and Lord Wellington fixing
 his head quarters at Fuente Guinaldo, kept his troops there in a
 healthy country, and rendered it impossible for the enemy to
 throw supplies into Ciudad Rodrigo, unless they advanced
 with an army strong enough to give him battle. Marmont, in
 consequence, recalled Dorsenne to join him, that they might
 raise the blockade, and supply the fort with provisions for a
 long time. Dorsenne, indeed, could not have advanced without
 danger of having his retreat cut off; even in his own account,
 wherein he asserted that the Galician army was entirely dis-

*Dorsenne
 recalled
 from Gali-
 cia.*

persed, and could not possibly resume the offensive, he pretended to have occasioned them no greater loss than that of 300 killed and wounded, and 200 prisoners: but in reality no dispersion had taken place; if he had pursued his original plan of descending upon Lugo and Coruña, Abadia would have been in his rear, and the French knew by experience what it was to encounter the peasantry of Galicia, armed against them, and thirsting for vengeance. Dorsenne therefore retired more rapidly than he had advanced, leaving behind him some of his wounded, and provisions enough to supply Abadia's army with three days' consumption, . . . a booty of no little consequence in the deplorable state of the Spanish commissariat. The Spaniards in their turn advanced, and fixed their head quarters in Molina Seca, where they had won the eagle four days before; and the French derived no other advantage from their expedition, than the possession of Astorga, which they once more occupied, and repaired its ruined fortifications.

The relief of Ciudad Rodrigo was an object not less important to the French in this part of the country than that of Badajoz had been on the side of Extremadura, and equal exertions were made to effect it. Lord Wellington had formed the blockade to make these exertions necessary, not with any serious intention of attacking the town, an operation for which he was not yet prepared. Two important objects were fulfilled by making the enemy collect their force upon this point. It relieved Galicia, and it drew from Navarre General Souham's division, which had been destined to hunt down Mina. Lord Wellington was perfectly informed of Marmont's plans; the only thing doubtful was the strength of the enemy, and upon that head reports were as usual so various, that he determined to see them, being certain of his retreat, whatever their superiority might be, and ready to profit by any opportunity which might

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XXXIX.

1811.

*August.**Aug. 31.**Movements
of the
French to
throw sup-
plies into
Ciudad
Rodrigo.*

CHAP.

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1811.

Sept. 22.

be offered. As soon, therefore, as the French commenced their movements with the convoy of provisions from the Sierra de Bejar, and from Salamanca, he collected his army in positions from which he could either retire or advance without difficulty, and from whence he could see all that was going on, and ascertain the force of the hostile army.

The third division occupied a range of heights on the left of the Agueda, between Fuente Guinaldo and Pastores, having its advanced guard on the heights of Pastores, within three miles of Ciudad Rodrigo. The fourth division was at Fuente Guinaldo, which position had been strengthened with some works. The light division was on the right of the Agueda, its right resting upon the mountains which divide Castille and Extremadura. The left, under General Graham, who, having joined Lord Wellington's army, had succeeded Sir Brent Spencer as second in command, was posted on the Lower Azava; D. Carlos d' España and D. Julian Sanchez observed the Lower Agueda, and Sir Stapleton Cotton, with the cavalry, was on the Upper Azava in the centre. The fifth division was in the rear of the right, to observe the pass of Perales, for General Foy had collected a body of troops in Upper Extremadura. On the 23d, the enemy appeared in the plain near the city, and retired again: the next morning they advanced in considerable force, and before evening collected on the plain their whole cavalry, to the amount of 6000, and four divisions of infantry; the rest of their army was encamped on the Guadapero, immediately beyond the hills which surround the plain; and on the following day an immense convoy, extending along many miles of road, entered the town under this formidable escort.

*The allies
fall back.*

On the 25th, fourteen squadrons of their cavalry drove in our posts on the right of the Azava. General Anson's brigade charged them, pursued them across the river, and resumed the

posts. But their chief attention was directed toward the heights on the left of the Agueda ; and they moved a column in the morning, consisting of between thirty and forty squadrons of cavalry, fourteen battalions of infantry, and twelve guns, from Ciudad Rodrigo, against that point. The cavalry and artillery arrived first, and one small body sustained their attack. A regiment of French dragoons succeeded in taking two pieces of cannon ; the Portuguese artillerymen stood to their guns till they were cut down ; and the guns were immediately retaken by the second battalion of the fifth regiment under Major Ridge. When the enemy's infantry were coming up, Lord Wellington saw they would arrive before troops could be brought to support this division, and therefore he determined to retire with the whole on Fuente Guinaldo. The 77th, which had repulsed a charge of cavalry, and the second battalion of the 5th, were formed into one square, and the 21st Portuguese regiment into another, supported by General Alten's small body of cavalry, and by the Portuguese artillery. The enemy's horse immediately rushed forward, and obliged our cavalry to retire to the support of the Portuguese regiment. The 5th and 77th were then charged on three faces of the square ; Lord Wellington declared, that he had never seen a more determined attack than was made by this formidable body of horse, and repulsed by these two weak battalions. They halted, and received the enemy with such perfect steadiness, that the French did not venture to renew the charge.

In the evening, Lord Wellington had formed his troops into an *echelon*, of which the centre was in the position at Guinaldo, the right upon the pass of Perales, and the left at Navedeaver. In the course of that night, and of the ensuing day, Marmont brought his whole army in front of the position. Fuente Guinaldo stands on an extensive plain, and from the convent there

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XXXIX.

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September.

CHAP. the whole force of the enemy, and all their movements, could be
XXXIX. distinctly seen. Their force was not less than 60,000 men, a
1811. tenth part being cavalry, and they had 125 pieces of artillery.
September. There was no motive for risking a battle, for the happiest result
would only have been a profitless and dearly-purchased victory,
as at Albuhera. Lord Wellington therefore retired about three
leagues. No movement was ever executed with more ability in
the face of a superior enemy ; . . yet even this, performed with
consummate skill and perfect courage, without hurry, without
confusion, and almost without loss, presented but too many of
those sights which make the misery of a soldier's life. The sick
and hungry inhabitants of the villages were crawling from their
huts, too well aware of the fate which awaited them if they
trusted to the mercy of Buonaparte's soldiers ; women were sup-
plicating our troops to put their children in the provision cars ;
and the sick and wounded were receiving medical assistance,
while they were carried over a rugged and almost impassable road.

Lord Wellington formed his army, after this retreat of
twelve miles, with his right at Aldea Velha, and his left at Bis-
mula : the fourth and light divisions with General Alten's ca-
valry in front of Alfayates, the third and seventh in second line
behind it. Alfayates, though now one of the most wretched of
the dilapidated towns in Portugal, was once a Roman station,
and has since been considered as a military post of great im-
portance. It is about a league from the border, standing so as
to command an extensive view over a beautiful, and in happier
times a fertile, country. Here Lord Wellington stood by the
castle (one of the monuments of King Diniz), observing the
enemy with a glass. Marmont had intended to turn the left of
the position at Guinaldo by moving a column into the valley of
the Upper Azava, and thence ascending the heights in the rear
of the position by Castillejo ; from this column he detached a

division of infantry and fourteen squadrons of cavalry to follow the retreat of the allies by Albergaria, and another body of equal strength followed by Forcalhos. The former drove in our piquets at Aldea da Ponte, and pushed on to the very entrance of Alfayates. Lord Wellington, with General Stuart and Lord Robert Manners, stood watching them almost too long; for the latter, who retired the last of the three, was closely pursued by ten of the enemy's dragoons, and might probably have been taken, if his horse, being English, and accustomed to such feats, had not cleared a high wall, and so borne him off.

General Pakenham, supported by General Cole, and by Sir Stapleton Cotton's cavalry, drove the enemy back through Aldea da Ponte upon Albergaria; the French being reinforced by the column which had marched upon Forcalhos advanced again about sunset, and again gained the village, from which they were again driven. But night had now come on; General Pakenham could not know what was passing on his flanks, nor was he certain of the numbers which might be brought against him; and knowing that the army was to fall back farther, he evacuated Aldea da Ponte during the night. The French then occupied it; and Lord Wellington, falling back one league, formed his army on the heights behind Soito, having the Sierra das Mesas on their right, and their left at Rendo on the Coa. Here ended his retreat. Marmont had accomplished the object of throwing supplies into Ciudad Rodrigo, and could effect nothing more. Lord Wellington was not to be found at fault. He had fallen back in the face of a far outnumbering enemy, without suffering that enemy to obtain even the slightest advantage over him. The total loss of the allies on the 25th amounted to twenty-eight killed, 108 wounded, twenty-eight missing. On the 27th, fourteen killed, seventy-seven wounded,

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CHAP. nine missing. The hereditary Prince of Orange was in the
 XXXIX. field, being then for the first time in action.

1811. While the British took their position behind Soito, the

October.

*The French
retire.*

*Marmont
boasts of his
success.*

French retired to Ciudad Rodrigo, and then separated, Dorsenne's army toward Salamanca and Valladolid, Marmont's toward the pass of Baños and Plasencia. Marmont boasted in his dispatches of having forced Lord Wellington to abandon an intrenched camp, and driven him back with great loss and confusion; "The Spanish insurgents," he added, "have felt the greatest indignation at seeing themselves thus abandoned in the north as well as in the south; and this contrast between the conduct of the English, and the promises which they have incessantly broken, nourishes a natural hatred which will break out sooner or later." "We should have followed the enemy," said Marshal Marmont, "to the lines of Lisbon, where we should have been able to form a junction with the army of the south, . . . which is completely entire, and has in its front only the division of General Hill, . . . had the moment been come which is fixed for the catastrophe of the English." Soult, of whose unbroken strength Marmont thus boasted, was at this time devising measures for destroying the army which Castaños had recruited, or rather remade, since it had been so miserably wasted after Romana's death. General Girard, therefore, with a division of about 4,000 foot and 1,000 cavalry, was sent into that part of Extremadura which was still free, thus to confine Castaños within narrower limits, and deprive his army of those rations which it still, though with difficulty, obtained, and which were its sole means of subsistence; for, in the miserable state of the Spanish commissariat and Spanish Government, their armies subsisted upon what they could find, and had little or nothing else to depend upon.

Girard took his position at Caceres, extending as far as Brozas. Of the spirit in which his detachment acted, one instance will suffice. He sent a party against the house of D. Jose Maria Cribell in Salvatierra, an officer in the service of his country ; they carried off his wife in the fifth month of her pregnancy ; plundered the house, even to the clothes of her two children, one five years old, the other three, and left these children naked to the mercy of their neighbours. The presence of such a force greatly distressed the country, and produced the intended inconvenience to Castaños ; that general, therefore, concerted with Lord Wellington a movement for relieving this part of Extremadura by striking a blow against the enemy. The execution was entrusted to General Hill, with whom a Spanish detachment was to co-operate under Camp-Marshal D. Pedro Augustin Giron.

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October.

Girard in
Extrema-
dura.

General Hill, with such a portion of his force as was thought sufficient for the service, moved from his cantonments in the neighbourhood of Portalegre on the 22d of October, and advanced toward the Spanish frontier. On reaching Alburquerque he learned that the enemy, who had advanced to Aliseda, had fallen back to Arroyo del Puerco ; and that Aliseda was occupied by the Conde de Penne Villemur with the rear of the Spaniards. At that place, the allies and the Spaniards formed their junction the next day. The French occupied Arroyo del Puerco with 300 horse, their main body being at Caceres. Penne Villemur, on the 25th, drove back their horse to Malpartida, which place they held as an advanced post. At two on the following morning the allies began their march upon this place, in the midst of a severe storm ; they arrived at daybreak ; but the enemy had retired in the night. Penne Villemur, with the Spanish cavalry, and a party of the second hussars, followed them, skirmishing as far as Caceres, supported by the Spanish

General
Hill moves
against
him.

CHAP. infantry under D. Pablo Morillo. Girard, as soon as he knew
 XXXIX. that the allies were advancing, retired from that city, and Ge-
 1811. neral Hill received intelligence of his retreat at Malpartida, but
 October. what direction he had taken was uncertain. In consequence of
 this uncertainty, and of the extreme badness of the weather, the
 British and Portugeze halted for the night at Malpartida, the
 Spaniards occupying Caceres.

Oct. 27. The next morning General Hill, having ascertained that the
 enemy had marched on Torremocha, put his troops in motion,
 and advanced along the Merida road, by Aldea del Cano, and
 the Casa de D. Antonio ; for as this was a shorter line than that
 which Girard had taken, he hoped to intercept him and bring
 him to action. On the march he learned that the French had
 only left Torremocha that morning, and that their main body
 had again halted at Arroyo Molinos, leaving a rear-guard at
 Albala. This proved that Girard was ignorant of the move-
 ments of the allies, and General Hill therefore made a forced
 march that evening to Alcuescar, a place within four miles of
 Arroyo Molinos, where he was joined by the Spaniards from
 Caceres. Every thing confirmed the British general in his opi-
 nion that the enemy were not only ignorant of his near approach,
 but also off their guard ; and he determined upon attempting to
 surprise them, or at least bringing them to action, before they
 should march in the morning. The troops, therefore, lay under
 a hill, to be out of sight of the enemy ; they had marched the
 whole day in a heavy rain, the rain still continued, and no fires
 were allowed to be made.

Arroyo
 Molinos.

Arroyo Molinos is a little town situated at the foot of one
 extremity of the Sierra de Montanches ; this mountain, which is
 every where steep and appears almost inaccessible, forms a cove
 or crescent behind it, the two points of which are about two miles
 asunder. The Truxillo road winds under the eastern point ;

the road to Merida runs at right angles with that to Alcuescar, and that to Medellin between the Truxillo and Merida roads. The ground between Alcuescar and Arroyo Molinos is a plain, thinly scattered with cork trees and evergreen oaks; and General Hill's object was to place a body of troops so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy by any of these roads. At two in the morning, the allies moved from their comfortless bivouac; it was dark, the rain was unabated and the wind high, but in their backs: but this weather, severe as it was, was in their favour, for it confirmed the French in their incautious security. When Girard had first advanced into Extremadura, he felt some uneasiness at the neighbourhood of General Hill, and demanded succour, saying, that unless he was reinforced, he should not be able to resist in case the English should attack him. But the little enterprise which the British and Portuguese army had hitherto displayed, seems to have lulled him into a contemptuous confidence; and there was no distinguished Guerilla leader to disturb the enemy in this part of the country, since D. Ventura Ximenes fell in a rencontre near Toledo.

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The allies moved in one column right in front upon Arroyo Molinos, till they were within half a mile of it: the column then closed in a bottom under cover of a low ridge, and divided into three, the enemy not having the slightest intimation of their approach. The left column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, marched direct upon the town; the right, under Major-General Howard, broke off to the right so as to turn the enemy's flank, and having marched about the distance of a cannon-shot toward that flank, moved then in a circular direction upon the farther point of the mountain crescent. Penne Villemur, with the Spanish horse, advanced between these two columns, ready to act in front, or to move round either of them, as occasion might require; he had found a good road, but the English horse, owing

The French surprised and routed there.

CHAP. to an error, which, in so dark and tempestuous a night, might
XXXIX. easily have been more general, had gone astray, and were not
1811. yet come up. The French had had a piquet about a mile from
October. the town, which would have given the alarm, if it had not retired
just before the head of our column came to the spot; for Girard
had ordered the troops to be in motion at an early hour. One
brigade of his infantry had marched for Medellin an hour before
day-light: and when the allies were close at hand, Girard was
filing out upon the Merida road; the rear of his column, some of
his cavalry and his baggage, being still in the town. A thick
mist had come on, the storm was at its height, and the French
general marched with as little precaution as if he had been in a
friendly country. When he heard that an enemy was approach-
ing in the mist, he laughed, and said, "the English were too
fond of comfort to get out of their beds in such a morning; . . it
could only be an advanced party of the Spaniards;" . . but while
he was ordering his men to chastise these insurgents, the Highland
bagpipes played, "*Hey, Johnny Coup, are ye waukin yet?*" and
the 71st and 92d charged into the town with three cheers. Their
orders were not to load, nor to halt for prisoners; but to force
through every obstacle between them and the enemy, without
turning to the right or left.

A few of their men were cut down by the French cavalry,
but they soon drove the enemy every where before them at the
point of the bayonet. The enemy's infantry, which had got out of
the town, formed into two squares, with their cavalry on their
left, between the Merida and Medellin roads, by the time our
two regiments had forced their way to the end of the town.
Their right square being within half musket-shot, the 71st
promptly lined the garden walls, while the 92d filed out and
formed in line on the right, perpendicularly to the enemy's right
flank, which was much annoyed by the well-directed fire of the

71st. Meantime, one wing of the 50th occupied the town and secured the prisoners, some of whom were surprised over their coffee; and the other wing, with a three-pounder, which was all the artillery the allies had brought, skirted the outside of the town, and fired with great effect upon the squares. General Howard's column was moving round their left. Penne Villemur meantime engaged the enemy's cavalry, till Sir W. Erskine came up and joined him; they then presently dispersed the French horse, and charged their infantry repeatedly, "passing through their lines," said a serjeant, "just like herrings through a net." The French were now in full retreat, when, to their utter dismay, General Howard's column appeared, and cut off the road. There was no resource, but to surrender or disperse; all order was at an end...the cavalry fled in all directions, the infantry threw down their arms, and clambered up the mountain, ...where, inaccessible as the way appeared, they were pursued by General Howard, till the British became so exhausted, and so few in number, that he was obliged to halt and secure his prisoners. Morillo, with the Spanish infantry, one English and one Portugueze battalion, having ascended by the Puerto de las Quebradas, in a more favourable direction, continued the pursuit farther, and met with more resistance; but they drove the enemy from every position which they attempted to take, and pursued them many leagues, till within sight of the village of St. Anna, when, being completely exhausted with their exertions, they returned, having counted in the woods and mountains upwards of 600 dead.

In this brilliant affair, General Brun, the Prince de Aremberg, two lieutenant-colonels, thirty other officers, and 1400 men, were made prisoners. The British and Portugueze loss amounted only to seventy-one, that of the Spaniards was very trifling. The whole of the enemy's artillery, baggage, and com-

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CHAP. missariat was taken, the magazines of corn which they had
 XXXIX. collected at Caceres and Merida, and the contribution of money
 1811. which he had levied upon the former town. A panic was struck
 October. into the enemy, to such a degree, that Badajoz was shut for two
 days and nights, all the fords of the Guadiana were watched,
 and every detachment ordered to rendezvous at Seville.

This expedition was less important in itself, than as it was the first indication of a spirit of hopeful enterprise in the British army ; it seemed as if that army had now become conscious of its superiority, and would henceforth seek opportunities of putting it to the proof. For the Spaniards it was a well-timed success, when all their own efforts tended only to evince more mournfully the inefficiency of their troops and the incompetence of their generals.

*Marques
 del Palacio
 appointed to
 the com-
 mand in
 Valencia.*

The Marques del Palacio had been appointed captain general of the kingdoms of Aragon, Valencia, and Murcia. He announced his coming in a proclamation from Alicante, of a very different character from those which had so greatly contributed to support the cause of Spain. "From the moment," said he, "that I set foot in this country, and knew the fall of Tarragona, my spirit, far from being cast down, seemed as if it had taken fresh courage to run to danger as well as to victory. Do not hold me arrogant and vain, for my hopes are not rested upon the arm of flesh. From afar I see the walls of Valencia of burnished and impenetrable brass ; and the more secure, inasmuch as the enemy cannot perceive them. I see also a cloud of protection over the whole kingdom, whereof that which for forty years protected the people of God was but a type and a figure. The brazen walls are the Valencian breasts, which have loyalty for their stamp and shield of arms ; and the cloud which protects us is the Queen of Angels, . . she who is the general of the best appointed army, our adorable and generous Madre de

Desamparados, *Mother of the helpless*, with her omnipotent Son. CHAP.
 Heaven itself has given the greatest proof of this truth, and of XXXIX.
 its predilection for the city and kingdom of Valencia. Is there 1811.
 any other capital in all Spain which has not been entered by October.
 some army of this Corsican robber, this impious tyrant? Is there
 any other province which has twice repelled the enemy from
 its centre, without walls and without armies? Heaven and this
 invincible Deborah, or Judith, have saved us, and will save us,
 if our conduct is not unworthy of her protection. Wonder not
 at this language from a soldier! I am a Christian; I am an old
 Spaniard; and I am persuaded that they are not earthly vic-
 tories, but bolts from heaven which reach the wicked, such as
 the Corsican and his generals, whose principles are bad, and
 whose conduct is worse. I resign, therefore, my staff to this
 Sovereign Queen; she has been the general who has delivered
 the kingdom thus long: she it is who will deliver all that is
 placed under this staff, no longer mine but hers, and the Lord's,
 who is the God of battles."

It would be wronging the Marques to break off here, for in
 other parts of his address he spoke in the proper language of a
 Spaniard and a general. "This is a holy war," said he, "in
 which we must fight like the Maccabees. Let him who feels for
 the public cause join us, and take arms, and offer himself as a
 sacrifice, and put forth his hand, and advance, and attack, and
 triumph. Confide in the Government, and it will confide in you.
 If there is conduct in the chiefs, there will be conduct in the
 people; moderation in the expenditure, and there will be plenty
 in the army; order in private families, and it will display itself
 in public actions; activity in individuals, and the army will be
 invincible. Let there be obedience, union, fidelity, justice, and
 truth, and God will fight with us."

Unfortunately, there were many in Valencia upon whom

CHAP. the first part of this address was likely to have more effect than
 XXXIX. the second. A friar, preaching in the Plaza Catalina, said to
 1811. his auditors, "If the Cortes think of abolishing our holy order,
 and that of our sisters the nuns, obey them not, ye armed
 Valencians, but oppose such mandates like lions. We are the
 servants of God, whom you must obey rather than man. The
 English themselves, though they have an excellent constitution,
 must eventually fall for want of the blessing of the Catholic
 faith. Ask not for cannon and gunpowder, but rather fly to
 your altars; and instead of any vain attempt to resist the vic-
 torious French by force of arms, implore the aid of heaven,
 which alone can avert the heavy calamities that threaten you."
 Zaragoza is as Catholic a city as Valencia, but it was not by
 such sermons as this that the heroism of the Zaragozans was
 excited and sustained!

*Blake takes
 the com-
 mand.*

Zaragoza had defended itself without any other reliance than
 what the inhabitants placed in themselves. Valencia prepared
 for its defence under very different circumstances. The Regent,
 General Blake, embarking with all the force he could collect,
 had landed at Almeria to take the command in those provinces,
 which, since the fall of Tarragona, were so seriously menaced.
 From thence he proceeded to Valencia, with full powers, civil
 as well as military, and the whole strength of the executive au-
 thority, to carry into effect whatever measures he might think
 needful. The collected force under his command was more
 than equal in number to that of the invaders; one division
 of 6000 men, taking its name from the field of Albuhera,
 had attained discipline upon which the officers could rely, and
 reputation which every effort would be made to support. Some
 of the generals also stood high in public opinion; Lardizabal
 had distinguished himself in Lapeña's expedition; and Zayas
 was thought by the English, as well as by his own countrymen,

one of the best officers in the Spanish service. But Blake himself inspired no confidence wherever he went; he had the reputation of being an unfortunate general; and what credit he acquired in the battle of Albuhera had been lost by his subsequent movements in the Condado de Niebla. The Valencians, therefore, were unwilling to receive him, and would fain have persuaded the Marques del Palacio to retain the command, to which, in these times of insubordination, a popular election would have been considered as conferring a legitimate right; but the Marques had been bred in a better school, and though he had some reason to complain of the manner in which he was thus suddenly superseded, demeaned himself toward his successor with a frankness and cordiality deserving a better return than they obtained. In the course of more than thirty years' service, it had been his good fortune never to incur the slightest disaster in any command which he had held; twice during the present war, having been appointed to armies which he found incomplete and ill-equipped, he had placed them upon a respectable footing; and being then removed from the command, they had presently under his successors been dispersed or destroyed; he was popular, therefore, because no miscarriage could be laid to his charge. Embarking from Cadiz for Alicante on the day that Tarragona was taken, he brought with him no supplies either in men, arms, or money, nor was any thing sent after him; it seemed as if the eastern provinces were left to their own resources; and Alicante and Orihuela, from whence he might have drawn supplies, were separated from his government. The Murcian army consisted nominally at this time of 20,000 foot and 5000 horse; he asked for 3000 of these men and 600 cavalry, and they were refused. The effect of this was, that feeling he had no external support to look for, he formed his plans for defence upon the nature of the country, and that moral resist-

CHAP.
XXXIX.

1811.

October.

CHAP.
XXXIX.

1811.

October.

ance, in which the strength of the Spanish cause consisted : but Blake coming with the entire confidence of the executive Government, of which he was a member, had the Murcian forces at his command, and seemed to think his military means so fully sufficient, that he disregarded all other resources. The Marques would have defended the strong ground through which the enemy must pass before they could attack Murviedro. Between that town and Valencia is a labyrinth of water-courses, gardens, plantations, and deep narrow roads, through which no force could penetrate against the resistance of a determined people ; .. and if that resistance had been overcome, he would have cut the dikes and inundated the country. These plans he communicated to Blake, who never bestowed a thought upon them, contemplating no measures which were not in the ordinary course of tactics, and thinking, that if the punctilios of his profession were correctly observed, nothing farther could be required on the score of honour or of duty.

Murviedro.

Murviedro is an open town twelve miles east of Valencia, but its fortress, called the Castle of San Fernando de Sagunto, was, both for its natural strength and artificial defences, a most formidable post. D. Luis Maria Andriani commanded there with a garrison of 3500 men, who had volunteered for its defence. The name which that fortress bore, and the knowledge of the resistance which upon that spot had been made against Hannibal, as it might well have given confidence to its defenders, induced Suchet to expect greater difficulty in its conquest than any which he had yet overcome. The Roman theatre here, which was one of the most perfect remains of the ancients, and the other antiquities of this sacred spot, were held in such proper estimation by the Spanish Government, that in 1785, under the ministry of the Conde d'Aranda, an officer was appointed to preserve them. When it was deemed necessary to fortify the

place, the engineers condemned the theatre; the conservator appealed to the Cortes, and the Cortes unanimously agreeing that it would be a reproach to the nation if this precious monument should be destroyed, addressed the Regents, requiring them to give orders for its careful preservation: but such considerations could no longer be allowed, when the paramount interests of the nation were at stake, and instructions were given to make any demolition which might be required for the security of the place. Andriani entered upon his command there in the middle of September, and a few days afterwards the French from Tortosa and from Aragon began their march toward Valencia. Suchet had with him all the disposable troops from Aragon and Catalonia, .. withdrawing many of the less important garrisons, and smaller detachments, in full confidence that there was neither energy enough in the general Government of Spain, nor union enough among the provincial authorities, to take advantage of the opportunity which was thus afforded them. He arrived before Murviedro on the 21st, and took possession of the town. Blake, who had advanced thither to see that the garrison was complete, and the place provided for defence, offered no resistance when the enemy approached, but retired within an intrenched camp, on the right of the Guadalaviar; it rested with its right upon the sea, and covered the city of Valencia; he had the Murcian army behind him in reserve. The divisions of Obispo and Villacampa, under Carlos O'Donnel, had been recalled from the frontiers of Castille and Aragon: these remained in the field and formed his left; 4000 men occupied Segorbe and Liria, and Bassecourt, with about 2000, was in Requeña and Utril; besides these forces the commander-in-chief had 1600 cavalry, part of them veteran troops.

CHAP.
XXXIX.
1811.

September.

*Suchet takes
possession of
the town.*

Against such means of resistance Suchet would never have

CHAP. ventured to advance if he had not despised the Valencians.
 XXXIX. With an abundant population, brave and patriotic enough to
 1811. offer themselves to any danger and submit to any sacrifices, . .
 September. and with resources greater than those of any other province
 from its redundant fertility, Valencia had scarcely made an
 effort in favour of its neighbours. When, at the earnest requi-
 sition of the British naval commander on that coast, a body of
 its troops had been detached into Catalonia, they were embarked
 without muskets, because there was an established regulation,
 that before they left the province their arms must be deposited
 in the arsenal. After arms had been provided for them, it was
 judged necessary to march them into Aragon ; but they refused
 to enter that kingdom, because they had not been sent with that
 intention, and in consequence they returned to Valencia without
 having faced the enemy. Whenever, indeed, the Valencian
 army had faced them, some glaring misconduct had appeared,
 and some lamentable disaster been the necessary result. The
 spirit of provincialism ceased to paralyse them when the enemy
 was within their own territory, but Suchet still calculated upon
 want of discipline in the men, and want of skill in the leaders :
 some reliance too he placed upon those means of seduction by
 which France had triumphed as often as by her arms.

*The French
 repulsed in
 an assault.*

*Mem. 2.
 161.*

The day after he reached Murviedro, he assaulted the fort
 at two in the morning ; in three places the escalade was at-
 tempted, but the French were repulsed at all points with the
 loss of their ladders, and of more than 400 killed and wounded.
 Suchet was induced to make this dangerous attempt by his
 engineers, who discovered two old breaches which had not been
 effectually repaired, and who were sensible of the great dif-
 ficulties they should have to encounter in a regular siege. His
 men too, he says, since their exploits at Tarragona, regarded it
 as pastime to march to an assault ; but the way there had been

prepared for them by corruption. They kept possession of the town, broke through the party walls of the houses, that they might communicate without exposing themselves to the garrison's fire, barricadoed the streets, and planted guns in those houses which looked toward the fort. This was not effected without loss, and they had not yet brought up their battering train; it was to come from Tortosa, and the little fort of Oropesa in their rear commanded the road. Suchet gave directions for reducing this, and acted in the meantime against the troops in the field. Obispo was attacked on the 30th at Seneja, and driven back upon Segorbe; there he rallied, but reinforcements came to the enemy, which again gave them the superiority; they entered Segorbe in pursuit of his broken troops, put all who resisted to the sword, and drove him towards Liria. The next object of Suchet was to drive Carlos O'Donnel's division beyond the Guadalaviar. On the night of October 1st he marched against it; the advanced guard was attacked and routed at Betero; the main body at Benaguacil. Little loss was sustained by the Spaniards in these actions, but they did not contribute to raise the character of the Valencian troops in the eyes of their enemies; and Suchet, who knew that the struggle would be with Blake, endeavoured to provoke that general into the field, by reproaching him for having remained idle in Valencia while two divisions of his army were defeated.

He had made himself, however, already so far master of the field, as to continue his operations against Murviedro without interruption. Oropesa surrendered on the 11th, after a cannonade of a few hours; Captain Eyre, in the *Magnificent*, had just arrived to assist it, but he came only in time to bring off the garrison of a tower about a mile distant. Artillery and tools could now be safely brought from Tortosa; and a week afterwards a practicable breach was effected. Twice in the

CHAP.
XXXIX.

1811.

*October.**Oropesa
taken by
the enemy.**Oct. 11.*

CHAP. course of a day and night the French attempted to storm it,
 XXXIX. and were repulsed with great slaughter. The fort, though,
 1811. according to the inveterate habit of procrastination which has
 October. for centuries been the reproach of Spanish policy, its works
 were incomplete, yet was capable of making a very formidable
 resistance; for it was so constructed as to form four parts, each
 of which might be defended after the others were taken. Blake
 calculated upon the impetuosity of the enemy, the steadiness
 of the garrison, and the patriotism of the governor; the two
 former did not deceive him: and he had laid down for himself
 a wise plan of operations; which was to abstain from battle, in
 hope that the French would weaken themselves in the siege, and
 might be compelled to retreat by movements upon their flank
 and on the side of Aragon.

*A second as-
sault re-
pelled.*

*Guerrilla
movements
in aid of
Murviedro.*

It was part of this plan to surprise the French in Cuenca, and thus cut off Suchet's communication with Madrid; this expedition was committed to General Mahy, with whom the Conde de Montijo was to co-operate. The attempt proved ineffectual, and Mahy returned with his division to join the commander-in-chief. In Aragon the Spaniards were led by men of a different stamp, and their movements would have led to very different results, if the spirit of provincialism, and that insubordination which long habits of military independence can scarcely fail to produce, had not frustrated fair beginnings, and bright prospects of success. A decree of the Cortes had attached the Guerrilla parties to the armies of their respective districts, and given rank to their leaders, leaving them to pursue their own system of warfare at their own discretion, but subjecting them thus to a military superior whenever they should be called upon. By virtue of this decree, Duran and the Empecinado, who commanded, the one in Soria, the other in Guadalaxara, each with the rank of brigadier, had been ordered by Blake to

unite and enter Aragon, which Suchet had drained of troops for his expedition against Valencia. It was not easy to bring these irregular companies under any restraint of discipline: the Junta of Guadalaxara were not willing to part with the Empecinado's band; the men themselves were not willing to leave what they considered as their own district; disputes broke out among them when their leader was not present; they turned their arms upon each other at Villaconejos: after an affray in which some were killed and many wounded, the rest dispersed, were overtaken by the French, and suffered great loss; and Cuenca was in consequence again entered by the enemy, who committed their usual enormities there. The Empecinado, however, was soon heard of again: he formed a junction with Duran, and their collected force was computed at about 4000 men. With the greater part of this force they appeared before the city of Calatayud, where the enemy had a garrison of between 800 and 900 men. Not expecting so bold a measure on the part of the Guerrillas, the French upon sight of them sent out a detachment, who took post upon an eminence before the city, where there was a ruined castle. Of that detachment about fifty were killed, and as many made prisoners, not a man escaping. The garrison then, and all the persons connected with them, took shelter in the convent of the Mercenarios. This edifice had been fortified, and was one of those posts which gave them military possession of the country. The Spaniards had no artillery, and having in vain attempted to burn it, began to mine. This was a branch of warfare in which they had little skill and less experience;.. on the third day the mine was ready; it was exploded, and produced no effect; two others were immediately commenced. Meantime a reinforcement of 200 foot and fifty horse, the precursors of a larger force from Zaragoza, came to relieve the besieged..the Empecinado hastened to meet them, routed them,

CHAP.
XXXIX.
1811.

*Dispersion
of the Em-
pecinado's
troops.*

*M. del Pa-
lacio, Tras-
lado a la
Nacion Es-
panola,
p. 19.*

*His subse-
quent suc-
cesses in
conjunction
with Duran.
Sept. 26.*

CHAP. and chased them as far as Almunia, taking the colonel who
 XXXIX. commanded, and more than 200 of their muskets and knapsacks,
 1811. which they threw away to disencumber themselves in flight.

Oct. 3.

On the sixth day of the siege, the match was laid to the second mine, which produced little more effect than the first: the third, however, was more successful; it brought down part of the wall of the church, and the French then capitulated, on condition that the officers should be sent to France on their parole. Five hundred men were made prisoners, and about 150 killed and wounded were found in the convent. There were found here provisions and money which had been collected by the intrusive government: the grain was sold at a fair price to the inhabitants of the district for seed; this Duran and the Empecinado thought necessary, that they might lessen as much as possible the evils arising from the state of waste to which that part of the country was abandoned. Soon afterwards more than 3000 French arrived, hoping to recover the plunder; but the Guerrilla chiefs gave them no opportunity of effecting this, and the next day the enemy returned into Navarre, whither they were recalled to resist Espoz y Mina.

A price set upon the heads of Mina and his officers.

Aug. 21.

General Reille, with two divisions, had used his utmost endeavours to destroy this most enterprising of the Guerrilla chiefs; and Mina, compelled once more to break up his little army into small bodies, had for three and fifty days eluded the enemy, by continual marches and counter-marches among the mountains, suffering hunger, nakedness, and every kind of fatigue and privation, with that unconquerable spirit of endurance which is the characteristic virtue of the Spaniards. To effectuate his long-desired object, the French general, in the spirit of the wicked government which he served, set a price upon the heads of these gallant men, offering 6000 dollars for that of Mina, 4000 for Cruchaga's, and 2000 each for those of Gorriz, Ulzurrun, and Cholin. This detest-

able expedient failed also. A traitor, by name D. Joaquin Geronimo Navarro, then offered to treat with the Guerrilla chief, and win him over to the intruder's cause ; or, if he failed in this, to seize him at a conference. Mina obtained intelligence of this second part of the plot, and when he was invited to confer with Navarro upon matters which, it was said, nearly concerned his own interest, and that of his men, and the welfare of the kingdom, he replied, that Navarro must come and treat with him in person. The traitor accordingly appointed a meeting at the village of Leoz, whither he came, accompanied by D. Francisco Aguirre Echechuri, D. Jose Pelon, and Sebastian Irujo de Irocin. Mina, with his adjutant Castillo, met them, partook of a supper which they had prepared, listened to their proposals : then being beforehand in the intended surprisal, seized them, called in his assistants, and delivered them over to a council of war, by whose sentence they were put to death.

CHAP.
XXXIX.
1811.

Sept. 14.

Lord Wellington's movement upon Ciudad Rodrigo at this time compelled Marmont to withdraw his troops from Navarre. Immediately Mina reunited his men, and occupied Sanguesa. "Vengeance," he cried, "for the victims who have been sacrificed because they performed their duty to their country ! While some of these are at rest in the grave, others in dungeons, or led away into captivity in France, I will take vengeance for their wrongs. Arms and ammunition, arms and ammunition, . . . I ask arms and ammunition of the nation and of all Europe, for public and for private vengeance ! My division will carry on the war as long as a single individual belonging to it shall exist." From Sanguesa he looked about him where to annoy the enemy with most effect : while Duran and the Empecinado were employed on the right bank of the Ebro, he thought he might act upon the left, by cutting off the French garrisons. The first which he assailed consisted of forty foot and seventy horse at Egoa de

CHAP. los Caballeros, who kept close within their fort, in fear of such
 XXXIX. a visit. While he was mining the fort, the enemy during the
 1811. night broke through the wall on the opposite side, and fled. The
 sudden cessation of their fire gave cause for suspecting what
 they had done; they were pursued, and twenty of the cavalry
 were all who effected their escape to Zaragoza. He then
 marched against Ayerbe, and began to mine a convent which
 the French had fortified there. While he was thus employed,
 1100 French, with forty horse, came from Zaragoza to relieve the
 besieged, and cut off the Navarrese, who were only 900. Mina
 drew off his men as soon as he heard of their approach, and
 posted the infantry upon a height above the road; sending out
 parties to harass the enemy, and then fall back upon the main
 body. The French advanced, mocking the brigands, as they
 called them, and telling them to go to Valencia for bayonets,
 and they encouraged each other to attack with the bayonet,
 saying the brigands were without that weapon: but they were
 repulsed in their attempt to win the height, leaving nineteen
 dead and forty-nine wounded upon the field. They then pro-
 ceeded to Ayerbe, received a supply of ammunition there, and
 being joined by twenty horse from the garrison, took the road
 to Huesca. Mina, though inferior in numbers, was superior in
 cavalry, having 200 horse, and of this superiority he made full
 use. With 160 horse he followed close upon the rear of the
 enemy, and impeded their march in the plain till his infantry
 came up. Part under Cruchaga got upon their left flank, an-
 other column under Barena menaced them in the rear, a flank
 company supported this movement, and on the right and in front
 Mina brought his cavalry. Unlike the French generals, who,
 whenever they boasted of victory, showed the baseness of their
 own nature by depreciating and vilifying their opponents, Mina
 bestowed the highest praise upon the courage and discipline of

*Mina's suc-
 cess at
 Ayerbe.*

Oct. 16.

the enemy in this action. They formed themselves into a square, closing their files with the utmost coolness as fast as the men fell. Three times the Spaniards broke them, pouring in their fire within pistol-shot. They formed a fourth time; Cruchaga then, after pouring in a volley, attacked them with the bayonet; at the same moment they were assailed in the same manner by the rest of the infantry; they were again broken, and the cavalry began to cut them down. The commander, seventeen officers, and 640 men laid down their arms and were made prisoners. The French cavalry also surrendered; but thinking that they saw a favourable opportunity for escaping, they wounded some of the unsuspecting Spaniards, and rode off. This conduct met with its merited punishment; they were so closely pursued, that five only reached Huesca, and two of those were cut down at the gates; the remaining three were all who escaped of the whole detachment. Among the Spaniards Lizarraga fell, who commanded the cavalry that day. Mina, whose horse had been shot under him, immediately advanced to Huesca; the garrison had fled, leaving behind them some of their effects, and five Spanish officers, who thus received their liberty from the hero of Navarre.

CHAP.
XXXIX.
1811.

Mina was now embarrassed with his prisoners; he marched them to the coast, in hopes there to find means of embarking them for Coruña, and fortunately the Iris, Captain Christian, was in sight, and took 400 of them on board. While he was thus employed, Cruchaga learnt that the French had collected considerable stores of grain in Tafalla, relying in perfect security upon the fortifications, where they had mounted four pieces of cannon, and upon the situation of that city on the road to Zaragoza, within reach of succour from Pamplona and Caparrosa. From Sanguesa he watched the motions of the French. By a rapid march he reached S. Martin de Ujue, two short hours

*Cruchaga
carries off
the enemy's
stores from
Tafalla.*

CHAP.
XXXIX.

1811.

distant from the city, and he took such effectual means for keeping his movements secret, that no intelligence could be given to the enemy. At day-break, he approached Tafalla with that silence which he said was peculiar to his troops; they surprised the guard, the French retired within their fort, and Cruchaga entered with music before him as in triumph, and loaded the grain upon beasts which he had brought with him for the purpose. It had not been his intention to attempt any thing against the enemy's works: but his men heard that a priest, a number of peasants, and about thirty women, were confined in a fortified convent, because they had relations in the service of their country, or were suspected of favouring their country's cause; and they attacked the convent. The French abandoned it, and fled to their other works, leaving good spoil behind them to the conquerors. They, however, rejoiced more in having delivered their countrymen from these oppressors, than in the important stores which they obtained by the day's expedition; and before they left Tafalla, they drew up in the centre of the city, and the band played, to comfort, Cruchaga said, the hearts of the Spaniards!

Mina's object in soliciting for military rank.

Mina had obtained military rank for himself and his officers, and was now colonel and commandant-general of the division of Navarre, under which appellation his troops were considered as attached to the seventh army under Mendizabal. Pre-eminent as were the services of this chief and his followers, they did not obtain this rank without repeated solicitations, and the direct interference of the Cortes; for the Regency at first would only concede them the title of *urbanos**, or local militia.

* *Por Urbano se debe entender en mi concepto*, said Sr. Aner in the debates upon this subject, *aquel que se halle armado para conservar la tranquilidad de los pueblos, y quando mas para la defensa interior de una provincia, sin tener que salir jamas de ella.* Diario de las Cortes. T. 4. p. 103.

The fitness of this designation was well exposed by Sr. Terreros: CHAP. XXXIX.
 “ They,” said he, “ who go among the mountains hunting the wild beasts of France, and bathing their weapons in French blood, are local militia! and they who live at home and drag their sabres at their heels in coffee-houses are regulars and veterans!” . . . Mina’s object in soliciting rank in the regular army was, that his men, when they fell into the hands of the enemy, might not be put to death as insurgents; but, like the Empecinado, and Manso, and Ballasteros, he found that men who were equally destitute of honour and humanity could only be made to observe the ordinary usages of war by the law of retaliation. Repeatedly and earnestly had he applied to the French generals, conjuring them to respect the laws of war; nor did he cease to remonstrate till farther forbearance would have been a crime. In the course of two days, twelve peasants were shot by the French in Estella, sixteen in Pamplona, and thirty-eight of his soldiers, and four officers, were put to death: Mina then issued a decree for reprisals, exclaiming, that the measure was full. He began his manifesto by contrasting his own conduct with that of these ferocious invaders; then declared war to the death and without quarter, without distinction of officers or soldiers, and especially including by name Napoleon Buonaparte. Wherever the French might be taken, with or without arms, in action or out of it, they were to be hung, and their bodies exposed along the highways, in their regimentals, and with a ticket upon each specifying his name. Every house in which a Frenchman should have been hidden should be burnt, and its inhabitants put to death. If from any village information were given to the enemy that there were volunteers there, such volunteers not amounting to eight in number, five hundred ducats should be levied upon that village for the information; and if any volunteer in consequence should have

*His decree
for repri-
sals.*

CHAP. fallen into the hands of the French, four of that village should
XXXIX. be chosen by lot and put to death. Mina's anxiety not to bring
1811. the inhabitants into danger is apparent in this decree; he seems
to have thought that if as many as eight volunteers were in one
village, the imminent hazard of concealing them might exempt
the people from punishment for informing against them. He
declared Pamplona in a state of siege, and the villages and
buildings within a mile round the walls; within this line no
person was to pass on pain of death; the parties who should be
stationed to observe it were ordered to fire upon any one who
trespassed beyond the bounds assigned, and if they apprehended
him, wounded or unwounded, to hang him instantly upon the
nearest tree. All persons who wished to leave that city should
be received with the humanity of the Navarrese character; they
were to present themselves to him in person, . . . if a whole family
came out, it was sufficient that the head should appear. De-
serters of all ranks were invited by a promise that they might,
at their own choice, either serve with him, or go to England,
or return to their own country; in either of which latter cases,
he undertook to convey them to one of the ports on the coast;
and he decreed the punishment of death against all who should
kill or betray a deserter, or refuse him shelter and assistance.
All persons were forbidden to go beyond the limits of their
respective villages without a passport from the Alcalde or
Regidor, signed by the parochial priest, or by some other in-
habitant in places where no priest resided; whoever should be
apprehended without one was to be shot: the innkeepers were
charged to demand the passport from all their guests, and seize
every person who could not produce one, and deliver him over
to the first Guerrilla party. If any village should pay, or influ-
ence the payment of the forty *pesetas* per week, which the enemy
had imposed upon the parents and relations of the volunteers,

(the name by which Mina always designated his followers), the property of the magistrates, priests, and influential persons of that village should be confiscated at discretion. And in requital for this imposition of the Intrusive Government, he imposed a weekly mulct of twice that sum upon the parents, brothers, and kinsmen, of those persons who were in the employ of the French at Pamplona. This decree was to be circulated in all the cities, towns, valleys, and *cendeas* (parochial, or district meetings) of Navarre; it was to be proclaimed every fifteen days, and to be read by the officiating priest in every church on the first and third Sundays of every month; wherever this duty was omitted, the magistrates, priests, *escribanos*, or town-clerks, and two of the influential inhabitants, were declared subject to military punishment. He dated this decree from the field of honour in Navarre, and the Government ratified it by inserting it in the Regency's Gazette.

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The movements of the Guerrilla leaders on the Ebro, as well as in Navarre and Upper Aragon, made Suchet feel that he had placed himself in a situation in which every day that deferred his success increased his danger; nor was he without uneasiness on the side of Catalonia, where the Catalans carried on their warfare with such vigour, that the French could aim at nothing more than preserving and provisioning their fortified posts. His communication with Tortosa was interrupted by the armed peasantry; scarcity began to be felt in his camp, and he was obliged to detach 4000 men to protect a convoy going from Zaragoza. It was Blake's hope that Duran, the Empecinado, and Mina, might threaten that city, and perhaps succeed in delivering it from its oppressors. The plan was well concerted, and if it had been executed, Suchet would hardly have ventured to maintain his ground in the kingdom of Valencia. The attempt, however, was not made; for some differences arose

*Duran and
the Empeci-
nado sepa-
rate.*

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*Blake de-
termines to
give battle.*

*Battle of
Murviedro.*

between Duran and the Empecinado, and instead of forming a junction with Mina, they separated from each other. By this time Murviedro was closely pressed, a battery of eight four-and-twenty pounders had been constructed, and the governor made signals of distress. The Spaniards were eager for battle; and Blake foregoing his first and better resolution, consented to gratify them, in the hope that one victory, when victory certainly appeared attainable, and would be of such immense importance, might repay him for the many disasters which he had sustained. He advanced, therefore, on the 24th about noon, and took post for that night on the height of El Puig, his right resting on the sea, and his left upon Liria.

The country between Valencia and Murviedro is like a closely-planted orchard, bounded by the sea on the right, and on the left terminating at some distance from the foot of the mountains which separate Valencia from La Mancha, Cuenca, and Aragon. Three great carriage roads cross this land of gardens; and by these three roads the attack was to be made; for though, from the nature of the ground, the left wing could not be united with the centre and the right, it was thought that this would be a less inconvenience than to leave open either of the three roads. It was of especial consequence to occupy the left road, that of Betera; for should Suchet, as might be expected, endeavour to anticipate the attack, he might otherwise send his main body in this direction, where the mountains would cover them, and the open country give free scope for his cavalry and for those manœuvres, in which Blake knew but too well the superiority of the enemy.

On the next morning the army was put in motion. Zayas commanded the right, Lardizabal the centre, Carlos O'Donnell the left, consisting of the Valencian division under Miranda, and the Aragonese under Villacampa: Mahy, with the Murcian

division, was to support this wing ; Blake, with another body of reserve, remained upon El Puig. The left wing was to begin the attack, relying upon the support which they would receive from the centre and the other wing, who were to accompany the movement and cover them on the right ; this, it was thought, would be a resource in case of a want of firmness on their part, which would not have been the case, had a different disposition been preferred. If there was an error in Blake's disposition, it was in thus trusting the principal attack to that part of his army upon which he had least reliance.

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Suchet, who desired nothing so much as an action, prepared to meet his antagonist, leaving six battalions to continue the siege. At eight in the morning his sharp-shooters were briskly driven back ; and from that moment, he says, he knew that he had to contend with troops very unlike those of Valencia. Some strong columns outflanked him on the left, and his right, which was a league distant from the main body, was outflanked also by O'Donnell. Both armies began their movements at the same time : about half way between them on the left of the Spaniards, where the fate of the battle was to be decided, was a ridge of ground, which offered some advantage, and which both parties endeavoured to gain. The sharp-shooters of O'Donnell's division running with eagerness towards this point, drove back that part of the French cavalry which covered the enemy's advance : they got possession, and were supported by two battalions and some field-pieces ; but their ardour had been inconsiderate, for they had separated too much from the columns, and the French, who knew how to avail themselves of every opportunity which was offered, speedily dislodged them by a well-supported charge.

This error was fatal ; for the want of discipline was felt in leaving the ground, as it had been in winning it ; one battalion

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after another, after a feeble resistance, was thrown into disorder, and abandoned the field. It was now that Mahy with the reserve should have endeavoured to support them and retrieve the day, but the order for him to attack did not arrive in time, and he did not advance in time without it: and seeing that the chief efforts of the enemy would now be directed against him, and that his cavalry abandoned him on their approach, he immediately commenced his retreat. While the fate of the left wing was thus decided, Suchet broke through the centre; not without a brave struggle on the part of the Spaniards. D. Juan Caro, the brother of Romana, who commanded a body of cavalry on the left of the centre, made a desperate charge against the enemy's horse, though they were supported by artillery, and defended by a mud wall. The Spaniards leaped the wall, Colonel Ric of the grenadiers leading the way, and cut down the French at their guns. The enemy's reserve came up, and the second line of the Spaniards, which should have supported them, having been unhappily detached to reinforce the vanguard, the guns were retaken, and Caro himself was made prisoner.

The centre of the Spanish army was now defeated; Lardizabal, however, supported the character which he had gained at Santi Petri, and, collecting some cavalry, checked the enemy and covered the retreat of his troops. But it was on the right that the Spaniards displayed most resolution; and had all the army behaved like Zayas and the division of Albuhera, Blake's highest hopes might have been accomplished. They, though unsupported on their left, cleared the road before them, and when the day was lost in the other part of the field, repeatedly repulsed the superior forces which were brought against them. By the account of Suchet himself, the action was maintained here with great slaughter; they covered their left with a battalion in mass, and stood their ground till their cartridges were

consumed, . . . Zayas then sent for more, but Blake ordered him to retreat. This movement was admirably executed, all the wounded were removed, and so little were the men dispirited, that twice they demanded to be allowed to charge with the bayonet. They occupied the houses in the village of Puchole, and fired from the roofs and windows; but here by an error, for which the commandant of the imperialists of Toledo was suspended, the remains of the Walloon battalion were surrounded and made prisoners. When the fugitives had reached Tuna, the reserve was ordered to retreat, and Zayas brought them off in the face of the enemy.

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This was the best action which had yet been fought by the Spaniards, but it was most unfortunate in its results, and the issue proved but too plainly that it ought not to have been hazarded. By the French account 4639 prisoners were taken, four stand of colours, and sixteen pieces of cannon; the killed and wounded were estimated at 2000 men; on their own part they acknowledged only 128 men killed and 596 wounded. Suchet was struck by a ball on the shoulder, General Harispe had two horses killed under him, and two others of the French generals were wounded: the manner in which they exposed themselves, and the number of officers of rank whose names appeared among the wounded, prove that the victory was not achieved without difficulty, nor without greater loss than the official account admitted.

The garrison of Murviedro, when they saw the battle commence, threw their caps into the air with shouts of joy, calling to their countrymen to come on to victory. In the evening, Suchet, leaving his army a league from Valencia, returned to the camp; a breach had been made during the day, which was not yet practicable, but by the fire of some hours longer would

*Murviedro
surrendered*

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2. 191.

have been rendered so; the French general had no inclination to assault the walls again;...it was of consequence, he said, to profit by the victory which had been gained under the eyes of the garrison;...and the governor's want of constancy, or perhaps of integrity, enabled him to do this most effectually; for Andriani had no sooner satisfied himself that General Caro was really taken prisoner, than, as if the victory of the French had destroyed all hopes, he capitulated with more than 2500 men. "Thus," said the French, "we became masters of a place which had so long resisted Hannibal." Had Andriani been as true to the cause of his country as the soldiers under him, the second siege might possibly have become as famous as the first. A successful assault could only have put the enemy in possession of a fourth part of the fort, when there would have been three more breaches to make, and three more attacks. It was the governor's duty to have resisted to the last extremity: but to that extremity he was not reduced. By Suchet's own statement, the place was in no danger, and notwithstanding all the efforts of his engineers and all their skill, nothing could be less certain than the success of a new assault.

Blake, in the orders which he issued on the following day, said that he was dissatisfied with certain corps, and with some individuals, and that as soon as their cowardice was juridically proved, he would punish them with all the rigour of national justice. But in general he declared, that the conduct both of officers and men, and especially that of the division under Zayas, had been satisfactory. "For himself," he said, "he was sufficiently accustomed to the vicissitudes of war, not to be surprised at the ill success of the action, and he was not the less confident of being able to repel the invasion of the enemy." But Blake did not feel the confidence which he affected. He confessed after-

wards, that after the fall of Tarragona, the loss of Valencia was to be apprehended; but that the brilliant manner in which the defence of Murviedro was begun, the forces which its defence gave time for assembling, and the spirit of the officers and troops, had given well-founded and flattering hopes, which continued till this battle extinguished them. From that moment, he said, nothing but what was gloomy presented itself; only some political revolution, or other extraordinary event, which should deprive Suchet of his expected reinforcements, could save Valencia; and his plan was to defend the lines which had been formed for its protection as long as possible, without entirely compromising the safety of his army.

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Valencia stands in an open plain, upon the right bank of the Guadalaviar, about two miles from the sea. Its old ramparts were at this time in good preservation; but works of antiquity are of little use against the implements of modern war. They were thick walls of brick-work, flanked with round towers at equal distances, and without moats. The river flows at the foot of the walls the whole extent of the eastern side, separating the city from its suburbs; the suburbs, being of later date than the town, are more open and commodiously built, and contain a larger population; including them, the number of inhabitants is estimated at 82,000. The adjoining country is in the highest state of cultivation; and the city, from its history, its remains of antiquity, and the customs of the people, is one of the most interesting and curious in the whole Peninsula. In no part of Spain, nor perhaps of Christendom, were there so many religious puppet-shows exhibited; nowhere were the people more sunk in all the superstitions of Romish idolatry, and, if the reproaches of even the Spaniards themselves may be credited, there was as little purity of morals as of faith. It is a proverbial saying,

Valencia.

CHAP. that in Valencia the meat is grass, the grass water, the men
 XXXIX. women, and the women * nothing. But if the Valencians were,
 1811. as a censurer has said of them, light equally in mind and body,
 December. the cause has been wrongly imputed to their genial and
 delicious climate; the state of ignorance to which a double
 despotism had reduced the nation, and the demoralizing prac-
 tices of the Romish church, sufficiently account for their de-
 gradation.

The Guadalaviar at Valencia is about an hundred yards wide; it is usually kept low, because its waters are drawn off by canals, which render the adjoining country like a rich garden; but in the rainy season the stream is so strong, that it has frequently swept away its bridges. There are five of these, fine structures, and so near each other, that all may be seen at once. Two had been broken down, and the other three were covered by *tetes-de-pont*. There had been ample time to provide for defence, and much labour and much cost had been bestowed upon the works which were deemed necessary. A small ditch filled with water was made round the wall, with a covered way; works also were constructed to defend the gates; but the Valencians chiefly relied upon their intrenched camp, which contained within its extensive line, the city, and the three suburbs upon the right bank. These works were fortified with bastions, and mounted with 100 pieces of cannon; they extended from the sea to Olivette; but as the point in which they terminated was weak, because it could be attacked in the rear by the left bank, other interior works were commenced, for the purpose of insulating

* *La carne es yerva, la yerva agua,
 Los hombres mugeres, las mugeres nada.*

this from the rest of the line. The engineers relied also upon their command of the river, meaning to cover the approaches by inundations, and to fill the fosses of their camp, which might easily be done, the ground being a low plain intersected by numerous canals.

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Suchet summoned the city the day after his victory, saying, that he had taken 8000 prisoners, many generals, and the greater part of Blake's artillery, and calling upon the governor to save Valencia from the calamities and outrages which a vain resistance must inevitably draw upon it, and of which all the fortresses besieged and taken by the French presented terrible examples. He promised an amnesty for the past, offered the people his special protection, and assured them that the French would endeavour, by generous proceedings, to make them forget the evils of war, and the horrible anarchy in which they had so long been plunged. Blake published this summons, and did not think proper to reply to it; at the same time he appealed to the people as witnesses of the valour with which the troops had fought, and the good order in which they had effected their retreat, for the purpose of occupying their former position.

Suchet summons Valencia.

The enemy soon closed upon the city, and established themselves in the suburb called Serrano, on the left bank of the river, not, however, without considerable opposition. They won their way foot by foot, and carried the last house by sapping and mining. Had the spirit of which the people here gave proof been properly fostered and directed, Valencia would have been safe. Having gained the suburb, they formed a contravallation of three strong redoubts, having seven feet water in their ditches, with two fortified convents and some houses, to confine the besieged within their *têtes-de-pont*. The fire of the Spaniards was well-directed to annoy them during these operations; but the loss inflicted

He establishes himself in the suburb, and in the port.

CHAP. upon the enemy by no means counterbalanced the advantage
 XXXIX. which they had gained, in possessing themselves of the fortified
 1811. convents in the suburb. Next they occupied the Grao, which
 is the port of Valencia.

December.

Suchet's left was now at the Grao, his right at Liria, and his centre in the suburbs. Using every possible exertion to ensure success, he brought up in the course of December 100 four-and-twenty pounders, thirty mortars and howitzers; and when this formidable train was ready, and his reinforcements had arrived, he put the army in motion for decisive operations. On the night between the 25th and 26th of December, two bridges were rapidly constructed by the engineers, a league from Manisses, above all the sources of the different waters, in order that the troops might not be engaged in a labyrinth of canals. Blake had posted his infantry from the sea to Manisses, and his cavalry on more elevated ground above that village, to cover his left. He had fortified the villages of Mislata, Quarte, and Manisses, on the banks of the river, and connected them by lines with artillery. His great object was to keep possession of Quarte and S. Onofre; as long as that was done, and the cavalry retained its position, it would be in his power either to risk a general action, drawing from Valencia all the troops for that purpose; or to evacuate the city, and leaving only a small garrison for the purpose of capitulating, draw off and save the great body of the army. And even if the enemy should succeed in turning the left wing, and thus cut off his retreat by the great road, it was scarcely possible, he thought, that the two Cullera roads should be intercepted on both sides of the lake of Albufera.

Dec. 26

The general's hopes were, as usual, frustrated by the misconduct of those in whom he trusted, and by the rapidity of Suchet's movements. At daybreak the two bridges were com-

pleted, three divisions of infantry and the whole of the horse passed, and drove back the Spanish cavalry; and the French getting possession of the sluices, turned the waters of the canals into the river, and thus deprived Valencia of one means of defence on which she had relied. Another division crossed the river between Quarte and Mislata to occupy the Spaniards in front. Here Zayas again displayed that resolution, and that military skill, which made him more, perhaps, than any other man at this time the hope of the Spanish armies; but the troops on the left, where Mahy commanded, gave way, as they had done in the former action; they abandoned the intrenchments at S. Onofre, . . the vital points of the line, . . without even waiting for an attack, and retired from Manisses almost upon the first fire. Mahy, with about 5000 men, reached Alcira, abandoning the artillery; the rest of the division was unaccounted for; the loss in killed could have been little or none, and the French made no boast of the numbers which they had taken; they who were missing then must mostly have dispersed in their flight, the unavoidable consequence when men have lost all confidence in their leaders.

The investment of Valencia was completed before the close of the day; and Suchet, again turning against the Spaniards those advantages of which they had so little availed themselves, secured himself every where by the canals and fosses with which the ground was intersected. Still the lines remained which the Valencians had for three years been employed in constructing; but after the labour, and the cost which had been expended upon them, when the hour of need came they were found, or thought to be, untenable. Blake, with the troops who were without the city, might still have effected a retreat; but he wished to save as much of the army as possible, and to prepare the people for a catastrophe which they had never looked on to, and to which

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*The army
endeavours
to escape.*

*Xativa sur-
rendered.*

he perceived they would not be induced to submit, till they felt the uttermost necessity. Such, indeed, was their disposition, that men like Santiago Sass, and D. Pedro Maria Ric, and such women as the Countess Burita, would have protected them better than Blake with his army and all his lines and defences.

A council of war was held, and it was agreed unanimously that the army should endeavour to effect its escape on the night of the 28th. They went through the gate of S. Jose; but before they had gone far, the advanced posts discovered them; about 300 men made their way to the mountains under favour of the darkness, about as many more were killed or drowned in the canals, and the rest withdrew within their intrenchments, having no confidence in the works, nor in their general; and their general having none in them, nor in himself, nor any hope from without or from within. An event more discouraging than the surrender of Murviedro occurred the day after this attempt, for the town of St. Philippe, half way on the road to Alicante, was given up without opposition to Suchet's advanced guard. This place had distinguished itself in the War of the Succession for its inflexible fidelity to the Austrian party. The inhabitants defended themselves, as Marshal Berwick relates, with unheard-of firmness, maintaining street by street and house by house, for eight days after his troops were within the walls; in revenge for which he razed the town; all the surviving inhabitants were removed to Castile, and forbidden on pain of death ever to return; and Philip, when a new town was erected on the ruins, abolished its old name of Xativa, and imposed upon it that of St. Philippe... Even the new race of inhabitants felt this name as a reproach; and but a few months before this cowardly surrender, the Cortes, at their petition, had passed an edict restoring the old appellation. It was just restored in time to be disgraced. The French found a great quantity of provisions

and a million of cartridges, . . . hoarded there for this shameful end!

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While the enemy succeeded thus, almost without opposition, in every thing they attempted, Blake resolved to make a second trial at escape; but the people compelled him to give up this project, and remain in patient expectation of a fate which he no longer made an effort to avert. This he calls an inconsiderate popular movement; but the people, who saw their works as yet untouched, above 16,000 regular troops to defend them, including the best officers and artillerymen in the service, with artillery and military stores in abundance, and the population of the city ready and eager to bear their part in the defence, might have encouraged a general to hope, and ought to have inspired him with a more heroic despair. Suchet opened his trenches on the first night of the new year; on the fourth they were advanced within fifty toises of the ditch. Blake then called another council, the result of which was, that the lines were abandoned, and the troops retired into the city, taking with them their field artillery, but leaving eighty pieces behind.

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Blake abandons the lines and retires into the city.

The French general says, that the astonishing desertion from the Spanish army induced Blake to abandon these vast and important works. Blake himself assigned no such cause, but the desertion must undoubtedly have been very great, . . . a commander who feels no hope can excite none. The suburb of Quarte was immediately seized by the enemy, and Suchet bombarded the city during the whole of the fifth. The next morning he sent in a summons, "thinking," he says, "that an army which had just abandoned works of such strength, mounted with eighty-one pieces of cannon, would call loudly for capitulation, now that they saw the effects of a bombardment upon a city which at that time contained no fewer than 200,000 souls." The summons was in these words: . . . "General, the

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The city a second time summoned.

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laws of war assign a period to the sufferings of the people ; this period has arrived. The imperial army is now within ten toises of the body of your fortress ; in some hours several breaches may be effected ; and then a general assault must precipitate the French columns into Valencia. If you wait for this terrible moment, it will no longer be in my power to control the fury of the soldiers, and you alone will have to answer to God and man for the evils which must overwhelm Valencia. The desire to spare the total ruin of a great city determines me to offer you an honourable capitulation : I engage to preserve to the officers their equipages, and to respect the property of the inhabitants. It is unnecessary for me to add, that the religion we profess shall be revered. I expect your reply in two hours, and salute you with very high consideration."

Suchet expects a desperate resistance.

Blake replied, " Yesterday, perhaps before noon, I might have consented to change the position of the army, and evacuate the city, for the sake of saving its inhabitants from the horrors of a bombardment ; but the first twenty-four hours which your excellency has employed in setting it on fire have taught me how much I may depend upon the constancy of the people, and their resignation to every sacrifice which may be necessary, in order that the army may maintain the honour of the Spanish name. Your excellency may consequently continue your operations ; and as to the responsibility before God and man, for all the misfortunes which the defence of the place occasions, and all those which war brings with it, it cannot attach to me." This reply led Suchet to apprehend he should have to encounter a Zaragozaan resistance. " The general," said he in his dispatches, " is no longer the master ; he is obliged to obey the decisions of a fanatical Junta, composed of seven persons, five of whom are Franciscan monks, and the other two butchers of Valencia ; the same who, about three years ago, directed the massacre of 400

French families that were ordered out of the country. I therefore continue my operations with vigour against the place, which at this present moment counts a population of 200,000 souls. Five of the principal chiefs of the insurgents are now within its walls, with all their property, and whatever fanatics or madmen are yet left in Spain. The engineers will open their works under the walls. The artillery raises formidable batteries; and, notwithstanding the rains, it will in a few days be able to make a breach in the last enclosure. The army is waiting with impatience for the attack, and if we should have to make a war of houses, as at Zaragoza, it will be rendered of short continuance, by the ability and rapidity of our miners."

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Had the Valencians resorted to this mode of defence, Suchet's miners would have found themselves engaged in an extraordinary subterranean war, among the Roman sewers; but after relying so long upon the army, and a military defence, it was too late to organize the people for that better system, which, if it had been determined upon from the first, might have proved successful, and which, even in its most disastrous termination, would have added as much to the strength of Spain as to the honour of Valencia. But Blake had nothing of the heroic character which had been displayed so eminently in Zaragoza and Gerona. He was a soldier, skilful enough in his profession, to have held a respectable, perhaps a high rank, if he had commanded well-disciplined troops; and now at the last he performed all that the code of military duty requires. Three days and nights Suchet bombarded the city, which was so utterly unprovided for such an attack, that the people had not even cellars in which to take shelter: the enemy continued their approaches, till they had effected a lodgment in the last houses of the suburbs, and placed mines under two of the principal gates. Blake then offered to give up the city, on condition that

He bombards the city.

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he might march out with the army. Such terms were of course rejected; a council of war was therefore held, and terms of capitulation proposed, to which Suchet agreed the more readily, because, according to the system of Buonaparte, he meant to be bound by them no farther than suited his interest, or his inclination. The troops were to be made prisoners of war, the inhabitants and their property protected, and no inquiry made into the conduct of those who had taken an active part in the war. In one point the Spanish general exceeded his powers; forgetting that he was no longer in a situation to act as one of the Regents, and that even his free and voluntary act would have required the consent and approbation of the other members of the executive, he agreed that the French prisoners in Majorca, Alicant, and Carthagena, should be exchanged.

Jan. 9.

Blake surrenders the city to the army.

This capitulation delivered into the hands of the enemy 16,131 effective troops of the line, besides about 2000 in the hospitals, 1800 cavalry and artillery horses, twenty-two generals, Zayas and Lardizabal among them, 893 officers, and 374 pieces of cannon. The most irreparable loss was that of fifty good artillery officers, formed in the school of Segovia, nearly 400 sappers and miners, and 1400 old artillerymen. The battle of Ocaña drew after it more disastrous consequences, but the loss in itself had been far less severe. Thus terminated General Blake's unfortunate career; his failure at Niebla was the only one of his many misfortunes which was disreputable, but all experience was lost upon him: often and severely as he had felt the want of discipline in his troops, his obstinacy was not to be overcome, and he never would consent that the Spanish army should be brought into an efficient state of discipline by the English, though he had seen that a similar measure had delivered Portugal, and must have known that it would as certainly deliver Spain. But though the loss of a general, thus incorrigible in error, and whose continual ill

fortune was such as almost to deprive the army under him of all hope, could not be regretted for the sake of Spain, Blake himself, amid all his errors and misfortunes, maintained the character of a brave man, and it was not possible to read his last dispatch without some degree of respect as well as compassion. "I hope," said he, "your highness will be pleased to ratify the exchange which has been agreed upon, and to transmit orders in consequence to Majorca. As to what concerns myself, the exchange of officers of my rank is so distant, that I consider the lot of my whole life as determined; and therefore, in the moment of my expatriation, which is equivalent to death, I earnestly entreat your highness, that if my services have been acceptable to my country, and I have never yet done any thing to forfeit the claim, it will be pleased to take under its protection my numerous family."

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Suchet observed the capitulation like a Frenchman of the new system. He had promised that no man should be molested for the part which he had taken; but no sooner was he master of the city, than he sent 1500 monks and friars prisoners into France, and executed in the public square some of those who were most distinguished for their zeal in the national cause.

CHAPTER XL.

ATTEMPT ON ALICANTE. PENISCOLA BETRAYED. NEW REGENCY. TARIFA UNSUCCESSFULLY BESIEGED BY THE FRENCH. RECAPTURE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOZ.

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January.

*Attempt on
Alicante.*

M. SUCHET was rewarded for his services with the title of Duc d'Albufera, and with a grant of the revenues arising from the lake of that name near Valencia, and from the domains adjoining. He was told that he had now to obtain possession of Alicante and Carthagená, and then the only remaining points from which the war could be kept up on that side of Spain would be closed. It was, indeed, considered at Cadiz, that Alicante might soon be expected to fall in consequence of the loss of Valencia; and Carthagená was regarded as so insecure, that the Conde de la Bisbal suggested the propriety of occupying the heights which command it by a British force. Before this precaution was taken, a premature demonstration against Alicante had the effect of putting the inhabitants upon their guard. To secure the success of Suchet's operations against Valencia, Marshal Marmont, pursuant to Buonaparte's instructions, had sent General Montbrun, with two divisions of infantry and one of horse, to cooperate with him, by manœuvring against the corps of Mahy and Freyre, which he was either to cut off or compel to return into Alicante; but his orders were, at all events, to rejoin the army of Portugal from which he had been detached by the twentieth of the month at latest. Montbrun

reached Almanza on the day that Valencia capitulated; nevertheless, in opposition to Suchet's advice, he persisted in advancing to Alicante, which he summoned to surrender, and then throwing in a few shells, commenced his return toward Madrid, having raised the spirits of the Spaniards by this unsupported and unsuccessful attempt, and afforded to a more vigilant enemy an opportunity which was not lost.

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1812.

January.

Suchet followed up his success by sending a division against the little town and port of Denia, which, though protected by a respectable fortress, was surrendered without resistance: he then sent General Severoli against Peniscola, a place so strong by nature, and so well secured by art, that it had obtained the name of Little Gibraltar, and was, in fact, impregnable by any regular attack. But General Garcia Navarro commanded there: he had been taken prisoner in 1810, had escaped from France, was trusted with this important post, and now betrayed his trust, and entered the Intruder's service, saying, he would rather share the fate of his country and submit to the French, than act under English orders. As this man was one of the basest traitors who deserted his country in its need, so was he the most unlucky in timing his treason; for so great a change was presently effected in the relative situation of the contending powers, as to make it apparent even to himself that he had taken the losing side, and would have only perpetual infamy for his reward. About the same time, but in a very different manner, the Spaniards lost General D. Martin de la Carrera, who had distinguished himself in the recovery of Galicia, and had borne throughout the war an honourable name. He now commanded the cavalry of the Murcian army: a French detachment from Granada under General Soult, the Marshal's brother, had entered the city of Murcia and were raising contributions there, when Carrera attacked them

Denia surrendered.

*Peniscola
betrayed by
Garcia
Navarro.*

*Carrera
killed in
Murcia.*

CHAP. with his advanced guard, gallantly, but unsuccessfully; for
 XL. though he took them by surprise, their numbers were greater
 1812. than he had expected to find, and he fell in the market-place,
 January. fighting bravely till the last. The French having sacked the
 city abandoned it during the night, and on the morrow Carrera
 was interred with all the honours which the inhabitants could
 bestow. On that day month his exequies were performed in
 the cathedral as a public solemnity, the General D. Jose
 O'Donnell, with Generals Mahy, Freyre, and other officers
 attending; the foundation of a monument to his memory was
 laid upon the spot where he fell; and O'Donnell and the other
 officers, touching the stains of his blood with their swords, swore
 like him to die for their country whenever the sacrifice of their
 lives should be called for, and added to that vow, one of per-
 petual hatred towards the French.

*New con-
stitution.*

*Change of
Regency.*

The Cortes, meantime, as if they were equally certain that the
 country would be delivered from its merciless invaders, and that
 no measures which they could take would accelerate the deliver-
 ance, employed themselves with unhappy diligence in forming
 a new constitution: a small but zealous minority succeeded in
 dictating this to their reluctant but less active colleagues; and
 in its details, as little regard was paid to the opinions and feel-
 ings of the people, as to the rights of the aristocracy and the
 fundamental principles of the government. The public were
 far more interested in a change of the Regency.. for the re-
 moval of Blake after his manifold misfortunes was considered
 as a gain, even though accompanied with the loss of an army.
 The new Regency consisted of the Duque del Infantado, at that
 time ambassador in England; D. Joaquin Mosquera y Figueroa,
 who was one of the Council of the Indies; D. Juan Maria Villa-
 vicencio, a lieutenant-general in the navy; D. Ignacio Rodriguez
 de Rivas, of the royal council, and the Conde de la Bisbal. A

new army was set on foot in Murcia, to supply the place of that which had been carried into captivity with Blake; and the national hopes were raised by successes in other quarters, as brilliant as they were at this time unlooked for.

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XL.

1811.

October.

Ballasteros
retreats to
the lines of
St. Roque.

Ballasteros had been appointed to the command in Andalusia following a system of war like that of the Guerrillas, which was best suited both to his own talents and the indiscipline and wretched equipment of his troops, he had inflicted more loss upon the enemy than they sustained from any of the regular Spanish armies. In vain did M. Soult boast repeatedly of defeating and putting him to flight; the men who dispersed to-day collected again on the morrow: and while the French were rejoicing for having routed him at one point, they heard that he had re-appeared in force at another, and made himself felt when he was least dreaded. In September he landed at Algeziras to act in aid of the mountaineers of Ronda: a movement was then planned by the enemy for cutting him off, and for getting possession of Tarifa, an important point which they had hitherto neglected, as if in full expectation that no measures for securing it would be thought of by the Spaniards and their allies till it should be too late. After some slaughter of the peasantry and some partial actions, General Godinot advancing with 5000 men from Prado del Rey, found Ballasteros well posted in front of Ximena: he retired to collect a stronger force, and having been joined by two columns under Generals Barroux and Semele advanced again with from 8 to 10,000 men, meaning to march upon St. Roque, occupy the coast, and get possession of Tarifa by a *coup de main*. Ballasteros, who had not half that number in a state of discipline on which any reliance could be placed fell back upon the heights of St. Roque, and took a position on the right of the town: four days afterwards the French appeared, and endeavoured to bring on an engagement; but Ballasteros knew

Oct 10.

CHAP. his own weakness: he fell back upon the old Spanish lines, and
 XL. all the inhabitants of St. Roque flying from their town, took
 1811. shelter under the guns of Gibraltar. The French invited them
 October. to return to their houses, with promises of security and protection; but better experience had now taught the Spaniards what French protection meant, and they threw themselves upon the compassion of their allies. Rations were allotted both for them and the Spanish troops, and the reservoirs and tanks were emptied for their use.

Tarifa attempted by the French.

So busy and so stimulating a scene had not been witnessed from Gibraltar since the last siege of the rock. The fugitives, without any other accommodation or means of subsistence than what charity could supply them, were scattered about in all directions near the bay-side barrier; the French occupied the heights, and Ballasteros, with his hardy and half-naked bands, remained under protection of the rock, waiting in hope that want would soon compel the enemy to retire, for previous arrangements had been made for annoying them in the rear and cutting off their supplies. Godinot was not more successful in his design of seizing Tarifa. Aware that such an attempt would be made, and warned by the example of Tarragona to take measures for resisting the enemy in time, the Spanish government dispatched a force under D. Francisco de Copons to garrison the town; and 1000 British infantry, with a detachment of artillery under Colonel Skerritt, embarked at the same time for the same service. This, it was supposed, would also operate as a diversion in favour of Ballasteros. The British troops landed on the very day that Ballasteros fell back under the rock; but a strong easterly gale delayed the Spanish part of the expedition. On the 18th about 1500 of the enemy advanced against Tarifa by the pass of La Pena; but the road could be commanded from the sea, and our vessels fired upon them

with such effect that they turned back. Godinot meantime felt severely the want of supplies; for the mountaineers of Ronda, and the parties which Ballasteros had appointed for that purpose, intercepted his communications and cut off his detachments. Three days, therefore, after his ineffectual demonstration against Tarifa, he retreated by Ximena upon Ubrique. Ballasteros was soon at his heels, and falling upon the division which composed the rear-guard, put it to flight, pursued it for three leagues, and brought away prisoners, knapsacks, and arms in abundance. He soon obtained a more important advantage: dividing his army for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, he collected it by a general movement from different directions to one point, in the village of Prado del Rey, and marching from thence by night, surprised Semele at daybreak. This general had taken his station at Bornos upon the right bank of the Guadalete, with 2000 foot, 160 horse, and three pieces of artillery. All the mules and baggage fell into the hands of the Spaniards; about 100 prisoners were taken, and the corps was put to flight. This fresh misfortune proved fatal to Godinot, whom Soult recalled to Seville. On his arrival in the evening he went to rest; early the next morning he came out of his chamber, took the musket of the sentry unobserved, and blew out his own brains.

The plans of Marshal Soult, however, were not to be frustrated by partial reverses, though they were impeded by them. France has rarely or never had an abler man in her service than this general, nor one who might have attained a higher reputation, if his consummate abilities had not been devoted to the service of a tyrant, and sullied by cruelties which bring disgrace upon France and upon human nature. He had lost Tarifa by relying too confidently on the supineness and inattention of the allies. The French entered it when they first over-ran Andalusia; and having, as they thought, taken pos-

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October.

Nov. 5.

Oct. 5.

CHAP. session, passed on to other points of more immediate import-
 XL. ance. The governor of Gibraltar, General Colin Campbell,
 1811. seized the opportunity, and occupied it with about 250 men and
October. thirty gunners under Major Brown of the 28th. A few weeks
 afterwards, a thousand French arrived to garrison it: the general
 hatred of the Spaniards prevented them from getting any
 information but what their own people, and the few traitors
 whom they had seduced, could supply; and their troops were
 under no little surprise when they found the gates closed against
 them. They drew up below the eastern hills, within musket-
 range, and poured their bullets into the town; and they en-
 tered the suburbs, where several of our men were killed; but
 they were without artillery, and seeing a detachment issue
 through the sea-gate to take possession of the south-east hills,
 and bring some guns to bear upon their flank, they hastily re-
 tired, and made no farther attempt to occupy the place, till this
 time.

Tarifa.

Tarifa is believed to have been a settlement of the Phœni-
 cians. It derives its present name from Tarik, who first led the
 Moors into Spain, and who is said to have built the castle.
 The town had long been declining, till the late wars in which
 Spain had been involved with England in consequence of her
 unhappy connexion with France gave it a new importance: for
 a little island which stands out boldly into the Straits off the
 town rendered it a favourable station for gun-boats; and during
 the late war these boats inflicted greater losses upon the
 trade of Great Britain than it suffered from all the fleets of all
 her enemies. There were two half-moon batteries and a martello
 tower on the island; but when the Spaniards at the commence-
 ment of this dreadful struggle formed their alliance with Great
 Britain, these works, with the whole line of defence along the
 Straits, were dismantled, lest the French should at any time
 turn it against the best ally of Spain. The enemy occupied no

point which in so great a degree commanded the Straits ; and Soult was now the more desirous of obtaining it, because he was at this time negotiating with Morocco, and the possession of Tarifa, which is only five leagues distant from Tangiers, would render it impossible for England with all her naval means to prevent him from receiving corn ; and thus the difficulty of supplying the French armies would be greatly lessened, if not altogether removed.

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The little garrison which had saved this important place was withdrawn for the expedition under Generals Lapeña and Graham, and when the latter re-entered the Isle of Leon, he left Tarifa uncovered ; but General Colin Campbell a second time secured it, by sending thither the marines from the ships at Gibraltar. Soon after it was re-garrisoned, Major King of the 82nd was appointed to the command, and he and the Spanish governor, D. Manuel Daban, delayed not to take precautions against a danger, the approach of which now began to be apprehended. Picquets were placed at La Pena, at Facinas, and Port Alanca, and provisions were laid in for a siege. The first movement of the enemy indicated their ultimate object ; D. Antonio Begines de los Rios, an officer who had distinguished himself during General Lapeña's expedition, and who was now stationed at Algeziras, made a representation of the approaching danger, and General Campbell directed that some field works should be thrown up on the island to secure a retreat, in case a retreat should be unavoidable. These works excited some jealousy in the governor ; but Major King explained to him their use and necessity ; and Ballasteros, who inspected them about the same time, expressed in animated terms his gratitude to the British nation, seeming at that time, like a brave and generous man, to feel no petty suspicions, or lingering of old prejudices, or resentment of false and ill-directed pride.

Tarifa re-garrisoned by the English.

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October.

Col. Skerret
and Copons
arrive there.

In the middle of October, Colonel Skerret arrived with about 1200 men, and took the command of the garrison; and in a few days D. Francisco de Copons followed him with 900 Spaniards and about 100 cavalry. The Spanish general demanded that the keys of the town should be given up to him, and Colonel Skerret would have acceded to this, if it had not been represented, that his predecessors had kept possession of the keys, first to guard against any treachery; secondly, because the brother of the governor was in the French service; and, thirdly, as it was more conformable to the honour of the British nation. The validity of the two former reasons had been but too often proved; the latter might well have been dispensed with; on the part of England there was no point of honour implicated, and the British officer acted as he did for the welfare and security of Spain. The question was referred by Colonel Skerret to Governor Campbell's decision, and the rapid approach of the enemy, and the hearty co-operation of the allies against him, removed all jealousies which otherwise might have arisen.

The French
invest the
town.

The French advanced in such superior numbers, that little attempt could be made to oppose or impede them. They took possession of the surrounding hills on the 19th of December, and lighted fires, which were supposed to be for the purpose of misleading our gun-boats; for these vessels annoyed them materially by keeping up a brisk fire upon the pass of La Pena and the hills near the beach. By the following night the town was closely invested, after a warm day's work, in which the artillery on both sides played with destructive effect. One of the enemy's shells killed an artillery driver and eight artillery horses; fourteen Spaniards were killed by another. The allies lost seventy-one in killed and wounded; the loss of the enemy was also great. Four ten-inch mortars on the island were seen to

do terrible execution ; one of their shells burst in the centre of a column, and towards evening, when the enemy were most heated and exposed themselves most, they were evidently checked by the unexpected resistance which they met with. The siege was now fairly commenced, and the cavalry and staff-horses, as no longer useful, were sent to the island, from thence to be embarked on the first opportunity. An account of the enemy's force was obtained from a serjeant who was brought in prisoner ; there were 11,000 men, he said, with eighteen pieces of cannon, long sixteen-pounders, and two howitzers ; Marshal Victor commanded. The prisoner entreated that he might not be given up to the Spaniards. When he was asked whether he thought the French would succeed in the siege, he replied, " that their Emperor Napoleon had given them positive orders to take the place, and he generally provided means adequate to the end in view." The man appeared sensible and well informed ; this confidence in the wisdom with which their operations were directed was probably common to the whole French army, and it constituted half their strength.

The allies were not equally confident that they should be able to defend the place ; and the commanding officer of the flotilla surveyed the coast of the island, to fix upon a spot for embarking the garrison, if they should be compelled to evacuate both posts. A precaution of this kind, if it had been publicly known, might have contributed, by disheartening the men, to produce the catastrophe which it seemed to anticipate ; but it was the duty of the commanders to think of the worst result, while they hoped and acted for the best ; and when they remembered what weak walls and insufficient works were opposed to a numerous enemy, experienced in all the arts of war, and more especially in the attack of fortified places, it was not without good reason that they thought it expedient to provide a

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October.

*Doubts
whether the
town could
be defended.*

CHAP. place for embarkation. Hitherto, however, the defence had
 XL. been well and fortunately conducted; and the fire of the gun-
 1811. boats and from the island was so well directed, that great part
 of the enemy's stores and their heavy artillery had not yet been
 able to come through the pass of La Pena. By daybreak on
 the 24th, the French had brought their approaches within 400
 yards, immediately opposite the north-east tower. That morn-
 ing an express arrived from Cadiz, with orders for Colonel
 Skerret to embark his brigade; a council of war was held, but
 not for the purpose for which such councils under such cir-
 cumstances are usually convened; . . a right spirit prevailed
 among the British officers, and they determined that the place
 should not be abandoned. To go once in his life, as Colonel
 Skerret had done, to the relief of a besieged town, and see its
 imminent distress, without bearing part in its defence, was
 sufficient grief for a brave and generous man; the French had
 insulted and vilified him for not having done at Tarragona what
 no want of will prevented him from doing; opportunity was
 now given him of showing them his real character, and he did
 not fail to improve it.

On the night between Christmas eve and Christmas day, the
 French broke ground opposite the east tower at 400 yards
 distance, and on the following night they strengthened their
 approaches at all points, and advanced 150 yards nearer to the
 east and north-east towers. At both points they opened a fire
 from a number of wall-pieces, and fired musketry and wall-
 pieces through pyramids of earth-sacks from the summit of
 one of the hills. Thence they poured their bullets over the
 whole town, but the men were so well covered that little hurt
 was done. The fire of the garrison was equally brisk and more
 successful; . . it was not, however, possible to prevent the enemy
 from advancing in works, carried on upon the perfect rules of

art; and in case it should be found impossible to maintain Tarifa, final arrangements were made for the order of retreat, and signals established with the island, to signify when the island was to fire on the breach, the suburbs, and on the town, so that our troops might be saved from any error in the possible confusion, and as much loss as possible inflicted on the assailants.

A heavy fire was opened on the 29th from two batteries; one bore upon the flotilla boats, which were then at anchor in the eastern bay, and they were fain to cut their cables and put to sea. This battery then threw shot and shells to almost every part of the island. The men received little hurt, for they were at work at the traverses; but two of the female inhabitants of the town, who had taken refuge there, were wounded, one losing a leg, and several horses and mules were killed. The other was a breaching battery planted in the valley, nearly opposite the Retiro tower, at three hundred yards distance. By the evening a breach about five feet wide was made to the right of this tower. The eastern tower was as yet untouched, but the enemy approached it by sap within fifty yards. Some of the inhabitants were killed and wounded in the course of the day retreating to the island. The men suffered little, for they were ordered to keep under cover. Their spirit was manifested upon an occasion which might have led to the worst consequences. One of our artillery officers spiked two guns; the troops were exceedingly indignant when it was whispered among them, and they expressed their discontent at the apprehension of being made to abandon the town, without having a fair set-to with the enemy. General Copons appeared highly enraged when he was informed of what had been done; and the temper which both Spaniards and English displayed at this circumstance

CHAP.
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December.

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1811.

Dec. 30.

*The garri-
son sum-
moned.*

taught them how well each might rely upon the other in this their common cause.

The next day, by ten in the morning, the breach had been enlarged to three and twenty yards, and about noon a flag of truce arrived; . . it was a service of danger to carry it, the day being so foggy, that the flag could scarcely be seen. General Leval, who commanded the besieging troops, summoned the governor, saying, "that the defence made by the fortress under his command had sufficiently established that fair name which is the basis of military honour; that in a few hours the breach would be practicable, and that the same honour which had prompted him to resistance, imposed it now as a duty upon him to spare the lives of a whole population, whose fate was in his hands, rather than see them buried amid the ruins of their town." Copons answered in these words: "When you propose to the governor of this fortress to admit a capitulation, because the breach will shortly be practicable, you certainly do not know that I am here. When the breach shall be absolutely practicable, you will find me upon it, at the head of my troops to defend it. There we will negotiate." After receiving this reply, the French renewed their fire upon the breach, but most of the balls passed through it into the houses which stood opposite.

*The French
repulsed in
an assault.*

Preparations were now made on both sides for the assault, and at eight on the following morning the enemy advanced from their trenches in every direction. 2000 of their men moved by the bed of the river in front of the breach; the 87th regiment flanked the breach to the north and south, leaving two companies in reserve to bayonet the assailants if they should leap the wall. This, however, was not much to be apprehended; for the town is built in a hollow, and in that part the wall on the

inside was fourteen feet lower than on the out. The breach
 opened into a narrow street, which had been barricaded
 on each side, and was well flanked and secured with *che-
 veaux de frize*, for which the iron balconies, commonly used
 in Spanish towns, furnished ready and excellent materials.
 When Colonel Gough saw them advancing, he drew his
 sword, threw away the scabbard, and ordered his band to
 strike up the Irish air of *Garry-Owen*. The men immediately
 cheered, and opened their fire. The 47th, who lined a wall
 which descended from the south-east tower, and flanked the
 enemy's columns, did the same, and the carnage made among
 the enemy was such, that they halted for a moment, as if dis-
 mayed, then ran to the edge of the breach. This they saw was
 impracticable, and hurrying off under the wall, they made a
 dash at the portcullis. Here the barricade was impenetrable,
 and finding themselves in a situation where courage could be of
 no avail, and where they were brought down by hundreds, they
 fled. Colonel Gough seeing them fly, bade his band strike up
St. Patrick's day, and the men were so inspirited, that it was
 scarcely possible to restrain them from pursuing the fugitives up
 to their very trenches*.

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The enemy suffered severely in their flight; hand-grenades
 from the houses were thrown upon those who fled by the wall,
 in hope of security, and a six-pounder on the north-east tower
 flanked them. The two leading officers of the column remained
 under the wall, and were taken prisoners. A flag of truce was
 soon sent, to ask permission to bury the dead. About 500 had
 fallen; and it was a miserable sight to see the wounded crawling
 under the breach: about forty, many of whom were officers,

* "Colonel," said one of the 87th, the regiment which took the eagle at Barrosa, "Colonel, I only want to *taich* 'em what it is to attack the *Aiglers*."

CHAP. were brought into the town. On the part of the garrison ten
 XL. were killed and seventeen wounded.

1812. The old year was now terminated with triumph and rejoicing
 at Tarifa, but the new one came in with mourning. A dreadful
 storm of wind and rain came on from the eastward, and two
 Spanish gun-boats, full of fugitives from the town, were
 wrecked under the guns of the island. Two and forty persons
 perished. The inhabitants, who were huddled on the eastern
 side of the island, were overwhelmed by the surge, all lost their
 property, and many of them their lives. Many more perished
 by the storm than had fallen in repelling the assault. The
 weather, however, brought with it some compensation to the
 Spaniards for this destruction; the few shells which the enemy
 threw during the day fell dead, giving proof that their ammu-
 nition had suffered, and neither that day nor the next did they
 make any farther attempt on the breach, nor move any of their
 guns to batter a more assailable point. During the night of the
 first, the wind blew up many of the tents on the island, and
 exposed the men to the storm. On the second, the rain in-
 creased, and the wind fell; in the course of the ensuing night,
 a party sallied, and found the lower trenches of the enemy so
 flooded by the rains, that their piquets had abandoned them.
 Some deserters now came in, and declared that two regiments
 had refused to assault the breach a second time; that the suffer-
 ings which they endured from the weather had excited a mu-
 tinous expression of discontent among the foreigners in their
 army, and that Victor had, in consequence of these things,
 thought it necessary to send for Soult, who was arrived, and
 now at the convent of La Luz. Other deserters confirmed this
 account, and added, that there were about 1000 sick, and that
 the swelling of the rivers cut off their supplies, and was likely to
 cut off their retreat.

January.

*Effects of a
 storm on
 both parties.*

The besieged did not rely too confidently upon their good fortune, and these favourable tidings, which all appearances, as far as they could, seemed to corroborate. Ballasteros, with 2000 of his best troops, embarked at Algeziras, to assist in the defence of Tarifa; but the weather prevented him from sailing, and the commander seeing that the enemy were removing their guns higher up, and expecting that another breach would be made, applied to General Colin Campbell for a reinforcement. The light companies of the 9th regiment were immediately dispatched, and landed in the course of the day, and in the following night farther succours arrived. Toward evening, a column of the enemy was seen advancing from La Luz, and a deserter brought intelligence that they proposed to attack at the same time the town, the island, and St. Catalina, ... a conical hill on the land side of the isthmus, which was occupied as an outwork to the island; if they failed in these simultaneous attacks, they meant to raise the siege. About an hour after night had closed, they approached close to the eastern wall, and poured a fire of musketry into the town; the whole of the garrison immediately repaired to their alarm posts, and the guards on the wall returned their fire with good effect. It was intended only for a feint, and the enemy presently withdrew. About midnight, the garrison were again called out by a firing on all sides of the town; the firing suddenly ceased, and a little before daybreak, it was discovered that the enemy had retreated during the darkness. When morning opened, nothing but their rear guard was in sight; the light troops pursued them as far as the river Salado, ... memorable as the place where the Moors made their last great effort for the conquest of Spain, and where they received from the allied armies of Castille and Portugal one of the greatest and most important defeats which history has recorded.

The French buried their cannon and left behind them great

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1812.

January.

Jan. 4.

CHAP. XL. 1811. part of their stores, and what they attempted to remove, the weather and the state of the roads compelled them to abandon upon the way. Their loss was computed at not less than 2500 men, . . . a number exceeding that of the garrison. The siege had continued seventeen days; the wall in front of the town was but a yard thick, and incapable of bearing heavy artillery; a breach had been open in it for seven days. Here for the first time, the French learned in what manner Englishmen could defend stone walls, and Lord Wellington was about to show that they could attack them with the same spirit and the same success.

*G. Hill
occupies
Merida.*

General Hill, after his surprisal of the French at Arroyo Molinos, had returned to his cantonments in Alentejo watching an opportunity for a second blow. Toward the end of December, he made a rapid movement upon Merida in the hope of surprising them there also, but this was in part frustrated by the accident of falling in with a detachment which was on a plundering excursion, and which retreating with great skill and bravery before our advanced guard, gave the alarm. Upon this, the enemy evacuated the city, leaving unfinished the works which they were constructing for its defence, and abandoning a magazine of bread and a considerable quantity of wheat. The British general, then hearing that Drouet was collecting his troops at Almendralejo, marched upon that town: but the French had retired, leaving there also a magazine of flour; the state of the weather and of the roads, which were daily becoming worse, prevented General Hill from pursuing; having, therefore, cleared this part of Extremadura of the French (for they retreated to the south), he cantoned his troops in Merida and its vicinity, and waited for other opportunities and a fairer season.

*Attempt to
carry off
Soult.*

The Guerrillas failed about the same time in an attempt which, if it had proved successful, would in the highest degree have gratified the vindictive spirit of the Spaniards. Zaldivar

laid an ambush for Marshal Soult, and if a goatherd had not apprised him of his danger, that able commander would have been at the mercy of men as merciless as himself. A successful achievement by D. Julian Sanchez perhaps induced Zaldivar to undertake this well-planned, though less fortunate, adventure. That chieftain, soon after the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, formed a scheme for driving off the cattle, which had been introduced into the city, and were driven out every morning to graze under the guns of the place. He not only succeeded in taking the greater part of them, but made the governor, Regnauld, prisoner, who with a small escort had crossed the Agueda, thinking himself perfectly safe, within sight of the fort and under its guns. About the same time an accident occurred, which showed the gratitude as well as the enterprise of the Spaniards. Colonel Grant, of the Portuguese army, who had on many occasions distinguished himself, was surprised at El Aceuche, and made prisoner. D. Antonio Temprano, who commanded a squadron of hussars, obtained intelligence that he had passed through Oropesa, on the way to Talavera; "and because," he said, "of the singular estimation in which this officer deserved to be held for his services," he determined, if it were possible, to rescue him: for this purpose he placed an ambush within shot of Talavera during five successive days; and on the fifth, succeeded in delivering Colonel Grant and a Portuguese officer, his companion in misfortune, at a time when they both expected to be consigned to hopeless captivity.

That Temprano's detachment should have remained five days so near a populous city like Talavera, and no information be given to the French garrison, is one of the many proofs which were daily occurring, how entirely the Spanish people hated the government which Buonaparte was endeavouring to force upon them. Meantime, even from Madrid, in spite of

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1811.

Oct. 15.

*Col. Grant
rescued by
the Guer-
rillas.*

*State of
feeling at
Madrid.*

CHAP. the vigilance of a French police, and the rigour of a military
XL. government, which, knowing itself to be detested, sought only
1811. to maintain itself by fear, the inhabitants found means of send-
ing not only intelligence, but even supplies, to their brethren in
arms. It is related in one of the Spanish journals, as a proof
of the patriotism of the capital, and the confidence which the
Spaniards there placed in each other, that a lady gave into the
hands of a carrier, whom she met in the street, and had never
seen before, a large bundle of lint and bandages, for the nearest
military hospital of her countrymen, and it was accordingly de-
livered to the Junta of Leon, to be thus disposed of. Romana's
army was clothed by contributions from Madrid.

The ambition of the French government has been at all
times well seconded by the activity and talents of its subjects,
and by that lively interest, which more than any other people
they feel for the glory of their country; but its policy has always
been counteracted by other parts of the French character. While
the Intrusive Government and the generals upon every occasion
reminded the Spaniards that they were orthodox Roman ca-
tholics like themselves, and that the English were heretics,
endeavouring thus, by raising religious animosities, to excite
disunion between them and their allies, they could not refrain
from outraging the feelings of the Spaniards, by the grossest
mockery of all things which were held sacred. Masquerades were
given at Madrid on the Sundays in Lent, and the people were
shocked at seeing masks in the characters of nuns, friars, and
clergy in their surplices, in the public places of promenade, and
at the theatre. They were still more offended at beholding one
in episcopal habits, and another with a cope, and the other
habits of the altar. At Albarracin and Orihuela, the French
gave balls, and exhibited a bull-fight on Holy Thursday, the
cost of which they levied upon the villages round about. "The

robbery," said the Spaniards, "can surprise no one after our long experience of their insolence and rapacity; but that which wounds to the quick a feeling and pious soul, is the atrocious and sacrilegious insult which these wretches offer to human nature, and to the religion of that God whom they profess to adore. Common banditti commit murder after robbery, ... but to suck the blood of a victim, to expose him to a thousand torments, and to compel him after all to outrage religion, the only consolation and hope which he has left, and to make him with his last tears deplore the most sacrilegious of their excesses, this is peculiar to Buonaparte and his soldiers."

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The conduct of the French in other respects was such as heightened this feeling of abhorrence; every where the people groaned under their exactions, their cruelties, and their intolerable insolence. It seemed as if it were the wish of Buonaparte and his ferocious agents utterly to depopulate a country which they found it impossible to subdue. Dreadful as war always is, no ordinary war could have brought upon any nation such complicated miseries. It was impossible for those even who would have been contented to bow, like bulrushes, before the storm, to obtain security by any course of conduct; the orders of the Intrusive Government were met by counter orders from the legitimate authority; and they who obeyed that authority were, on the other hand, exposed to the penalties enacted in the Intruder's name. Buonaparte and his wicked agents expected to govern Spain by terror, little thinking, when the plan of usurpation was laid, that the character of the nation would compensate for the imbecility of its rulers; that his system of terror would be met by counter terrors; and that the people for whom he proclaimed there was no safety but in obedience would, on their part, proclaim that obedience, when carried farther than mere passive and inevitable submission to

*State of the
country.*

CHAP. immediate force, was a crime which would draw upon the tem-
 XL. porizing and the timid, the very evil they sought to avert.

1811. Nothing but that patient, persevering, obstinate, inflexible, and
 invincible spirit of local patriotism which for more than two
 thousand years has distinguished the Spaniards above all other
 nations, could have supported them through such a struggle ;
 while the allies, by whom, under Providence, their deliverance was
 to be effected, were acquiring confidence in their own strength,
 and experience, and some of that wisdom in which at the beginning
 of the contest they were lamentably wanting. But, meantime,
 the sufferings of the Spaniards were of the severest kind, and
 as general as they were severe. There was scarcely a family
 in the Peninsula, from the highest to the lowest, of which some
 member had not been cut off by the sword. The affluent were
 deprived of their property ; the industrious of their employ-
 ment ; men of letters were bereaved of the books and papers
 which had been the occupation and delight of their laborious,
 and honourable, and disinterested lives ; and they who had
 grown grey in convents were driven out to beg for bread among
 those who were themselves reduced to want.

The Intruder, meantime, was in a condition which was truly
 pitiable, if one who had allowed himself to be made the osten-
 sible cause of such wide-spreading misery and desolation had
 not forfeited all claim to pity. This phantom of a king had
 neither money to pay his ministers and dependents, nor autho-
 rity over the armies which acted in his name. The Frenchified
 Spaniards who composed his ministry, and the French generals,
 agreed in despising him, . . . this being almost the only point in
 which they agreed : on the part of Urquijo, Azanza, and their
 colleagues, there was some commiseration mingled with their
 contempt ; their object had been to effect a change of dynasty,
 under the protection of France, not to reduce Spain to the state

of a province; and they could not perceive that Joseph Buonaparte was the mere puppet of his perfidious brother, without self-reproaches and unavailing regret. For their own sakes, therefore, they preserved the forms of respect toward him, but the generals were restrained by no such feeling; they set his orders at nought, and looked only to France for instructions. The object of the officers was to enrich themselves by pillage; that of the commanders was to carve out dukedoms, and provinces, and principalities, which they might govern by the sword while Buonaparte lived, and perhaps maintain for themselves by the same tenure after his death.

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Sick of his miserable situation, the Intruder went to France, to represent the deplorable state of Spain, and press upon Buonaparte the necessity of providing an adequate support for the government which he had established, if he could not send into the Peninsula such a force as should expel the English, and bear down all resistance. He himself perhaps would have rejoiced if Buonaparte would have executed his old threat of annexing Spain to the French empire, and treating it openly as a conquest, . . . for Joseph had neither the talents nor the temper of an usurper; without virtue to refuse obedience to his tyrannical brother, and yet without those vices which would make him heartily enter into his plans, his only resource was in sensualities, for his criminal compliance had left him no other consolation. This propensity he would far rather have indulged in retirement and security; but the views and wishes of his ministers were widely different: the direct usurpation of Spain by Buonaparte would have reduced them at once to insignificance, and placed them upon a level with Godoy, whom they, perhaps, as well as their worthier countrymen, regarded as a traitor; for certain it is, that among these unhappy men there were some who began their career with good feelings, and a sincere love of their country, and who

The Intruder goes to France.

CHAP. XL. were betrayed by error and presumptuousness, and their connexion with France, into guilt and infamy. They dreaded nothing so much as Joseph's retirement, and rejoiced in his return to Spain as at a triumph.

*Distress
both of the
Intrusive
and Legiti-
mate Go-
vernment.*

It suited not the immediate policy of Buonaparte to displace his brother. Moscow instead of Madrid occupied at this time his ambitious thoughts, and supplying with men the Intrusive Government, he left it to shift as it could for means. So distressed was Joseph for money, that the plate of the royal chapel at Madrid was sent to the mint, though such an act would make him at once odious for sacrilege and contemptible for poverty in the eyes of the people. In want of other funds for his emissaries to America, he sent a large quantity of quicksilver to be sold at Alicante; the governor there discovered for what use the produce was designed, and seized 1,700 *arrobas*, and the agents who had it in charge. A great effort was made to pay some of the public arrears on Buonaparte's birth-day, the fifteenth of August, for which day St. Napoleone had been foisted into the Spanish calendar. 100,000 *reales de vellon* were paid on this anniversary to the ministers. Lledo, the comedian, received 18,000, and 100 each were distributed to some ladies of rank, who were reduced to petition the Intruder for bread! A bull-fight was given at Madrid on this day, at which all the bulls were white; long preparation therefore must have been necessary for collecting them: D. Damaso Martin, the Empecinado's brother, carried off from the meadows of Puente de Viveros 300, which had been destined for these ferocious sports in the capital.

The legitimate government, meantime, was not less distressed than that of the Intruder: as far as the contest lay between them, it was carried on on both sides almost without any certain revenue on which either could rely. The chief resources of the Spaniards, at the commencement of the struggle, had been in

America, and these had been cut off by a series of deplorable events, in which it is difficult to say which of the opposite parties was most culpable. This was now the fourth year of the war; the spirit of the people, and the defects of their military system, had been abundantly proved; nothing was wanting but to remedy those defects by raising an army under the direction of Lord Wellington, who had delivered Portugal, and might by similar means speedily and certainly have delivered Spain. Many causes prevented this; one is to be found in a jealousy or rather dislike of England, which had grown up in the liberal party with their predilection for republican France, and which continued with other errors from the same source, still to actuate them. The pride of the Spanish character was another and more widely influencing cause; the Spaniards remembered that their troops had once been the best in the world; and this remembrance, which in the people so greatly contributed to keep up their spirit, in the government produced only a contented and baneful torpor which seemed like infatuation. The many defeats, in the course of four years, which they had sustained, from that at Rio Seco to the last ruinous action before Valencia, brought with them no conviction to the successive governments of their radical weakness and their radical error. After Lord Wellington had driven Massena out of Portugal, it was proposed that the command of the frontier provinces should be given him, and that an army should be raised there under him: it was debated in a secret sitting, and rejected by an hundred voices against thirty.

“There are three classes of men,” said Dueñas, “who will break up the Cortes, unless the Cortes breaks down them: they who refuse to acknowledge the sovereignty of the nation, calling it a mere chimera, and saying there is no sovereignty except that of the king; they who distrust our cause, and say that the few

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CHAP. millions who inhabit Spain cannot make head against all
 XL. Europe; and, lastly, they who imagine, that as the French have
 1811. conquered while they despise God, we may do the same." The
 deputy's fears of the first and third of these classes were ground-
 less, and there were but few of the second, . . but few Spaniards
 who despaired of Spain. Nothing, however, could tend so much
 to increase their number as the conduct of the government; it
 might well be feared that a system, if system it could be called,
 which trusted to its allies, and to the events that time and chance
 might bring forth, would at length exhaust the hopes and the con-
 stancy, as well as the blood, of the Spaniards. All considerate
 persons could not but perceive that the present government was
 in no respect more efficient than that of the Central Junta had
 been, which, for its inefficiency, would have been broken up by
 an insurrection, if it had not prevented such a catastrophe by a
 timely abdication. As a remedy for this evil, the Cortes thought
 at one time of taking the executive into their own hands, and
 administering it by a committee chosen from their own mem-
 bers; but the resemblance which this bore to the system pursued
 by the French National Convention, during the worst stage of
 the revolution, deterred those who favoured it from bringing
 forward a proposal that would reasonably have alarmed the
 greater part of the assembly, and have disgusted the nation.
 They who were of opinion that the Regency would be more
 effective, if vested in a single person than in three or five, knew
 not where that person was to be found who should unite legiti-
 mate claims with individual qualifications. Cardinal Bourbon
 occurred to them, but as one who had neither the personal re-
 spectability, nor the capacity desired. The Infante D. Carlos
 was supposed to possess sufficient strength of character, and it
 was not doubted, that if opportunity of attempting to escape
 could be offered him, he would be not less desirous to avail

*Schemes for
strengthen-
ing the
govern-
ment.*

*Cardinal
Bourbon.*

*The Infante
D. Carlos.*

himself of it than Ferdinand had, luckily for himself, been found of shrinking from the danger; but the failure in Ferdinand's case had greatly increased both the difficulties and dangers of such an attempt. There remained the princess of Brazil, whose right to the Regency, under existing circumstances, was admitted by the Council of Castille. She had spirit and abilities equal to the charge; but on the other hand, she was known to be of an intriguing and dangerous disposition, . . . one who, being, by reason of her station, sure of impunity in this world for any thing which she might be inclined to commit, believed that her father-confessor could at all times make her equally secure in the next, and was notoriously disposed to make full use of these convenient privileges whenever any personal inclination was to be gratified or any political object to be brought about. Yet with this knowledge of her character, those British statesmen who were best acquainted with the affairs of the Peninsula at that time, and with what advantages we might carry on the war there, if it were vigorously pursued, and what were the impediments which in far greater degree than the entire force of the enemy impeded our progress, agreed in opinion, that it should be the true policy of England to support her claim, regarding the possible consequences in Portugal, of her appointment to the Spanish Regency, as a consideration of inferior moment. There would yet be a difficulty concerning the place to be fixed on for her residence: Lisbon it could not be; . . . pre-eminently fitted as that city was to be the capital of the united governments, the ill-will between the Portuguese and Spaniards, which the circumstances of the present war unhappily had not tended to diminish, rendered this impossible; and for the same reason, Cadiz was hardly less objectionable. It was thought, therefore, that the princess might best reside at Madeira, and govern in Spain through a Vice-Regent. The conduct of the Cortes in

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The Princess of Brazil.

CHAP. XL. arrogating the title of Majesty, and exercising, as, in fact, they did, the executive government through successive Regencies
 1812. which they nominated and dissolved at pleasure, made persons who were otherwise averse to it, accede to this scheme as involving fewer inconveniences than any other which could be proposed.

*State of the
 Portugueze
 government.*

Some change also, and of the same kind, appeared to be not less desirable in Portugal. The arrangement which placed the Portugueze army under a British general, introducing at the same time a large proportion of British officers into that army, and that which placed the whole military establishment under a British commander in chief, had been necessary, and the Portugueze themselves were sensible that it was so. But it was not wisely done to put the Portugueze fleet under a British admiral, nor to make the British ambassador a member of the Regency; in the first instance, a great expense was incurred in time of extreme want; in both, some offence was given to national feeling, and in neither was there any advantage gained. Sir Charles Stuart was in no enviable situation; there was a constant opposition between him and the Souzas, who had great influence at the court of the Rio, whose intentions were not to be suspected, and whose abilities were of no common order, but whose deep prepossessions prevented them from adapting their views to the actual circumstances of the country. When he exerted himself to rectify habitual disorders, and provide for demands which were continually recurring, and which it was ruinous to neglect, the whole host of intriguers was in action against him, and he incurred the dislike of the prince, of whose ear his opponents had possession: on the other hand, the repeated complaints from head quarters against the misconduct of the Portugueze government under which the native army was mouldering away more rapidly than it had been

formed, seemed to include him of course among the persons upon whom the blame was laid. Yet his colleagues, as well as he, were more to be pitied than condemned, for what they left undone. The whole revenues of the house of Braganza were at this time remitted to Brazil, . . . no unfit arrangement, as the family was there to be supported. But the court received also the revenues from Madeira and the Western Isles, and the establishments in Africa, and yet called for money from Portugal! It had left so great a part of the old court establishment there that the expenses of that part exceeded the whole produce of the crown lands; and it was continually sending persons from Brazil, to be provided for at home; . . . this, at a time, when Portugal with only half its former revenues, and with a ruined people, had to support an army fourfold more numerous than in its days of prosperity!

The prince of Brazil was jealous of his prerogative; . . . and there were those about him who lost no opportunity of insinuating that England aimed at establishing a permanent influence over the government of Portugal. This was so old an art of faction, that even from new circumstances it could derive no strength; and although, if he were at Lisbon, he would be within reach of the insidious proposals of the French, who would have no difficulty in finding intriguers to second them, yet, on the whole, those persons whose opinions carried most weight thought it desirable that he should be urged to return, his presence nearer Lisbon being as necessary as that of the princess was deemed to be at Cadiz. But the statesmen who advised this seem to have overlooked the circumstances of Brazil, where at that time the presence of the court was the only check upon the revolutionary spirit which was then gathering strength; that consideration alone, must have detained the prince there; and if the claim of the princess had been more popular than

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CHAP. XL. it was at Cadiz, the conduct of the Portuguese diplomatists on this occasion was sufficient to ruin it.

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M. Wellesley's views.

Marquis Wellesley, whose views were always comprehensive, thought that nothing of importance could be done in the field, unless an efficient Spanish army were raised of 30 or 40,000 men. To expect any thing from it under its present establishment, he argued, would be to deceive ourselves; . . any thing short of a thorough reform under a British commander and British officers, Great Britain providing also for the pay and subsistence of the whole, would be fruitless; and this we could not afford. But we might take into our pay an army of 30,000 men, and assist Spain with a loan of five or six millions for raising another; a much larger sum would be saved by this expenditure if it shortened the war a single year; and that it might be so shortened no one who had faith in British courage, and knew the capacity of the British commander, could doubt. But Marquis Wellesley had not that ascendancy in the cabinet to which in the opinion of his admirers he was entitled, and which, perhaps, he had expected to assert. His colleagues might have acted with more vigour, if their tenure of the government had been more secure; the sense of that insecurity, and the constant struggle wherein they were engaged at home, made them regard difficulties as insuperable, which would have disappeared if they had had sufficient confidence in themselves.

This want of energy must have been fatal, if Lord Wellington had not been eminently qualified for the arduous situation in which he was placed. Both his mind and body were equal to all that was required from them. He rose about four, and after a slight breakfast was usually on horseback from daylight till about the hour of noon. He was then employed till three, in transacting business with the officers of the army, or in writing his orders and letters, answering every dispatch and letter as it

was brought before him. At three he dined, was on horseback again at five, till evening closed, and was then employed in business till ten, when he retired to rest. Mortifying as it was, having in himself glorious anticipations of what he could effect with adequate means, at the same time to feel himself crippled for want of them, no embarrassments ever had the effect of perplexing his judgement, or leading him to despond; but making his preparations with long forethought, he waited the opportunity for attempting whatever his means allowed him to undertake.

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The force with which he intended to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo consisted of 17,000 British, and 14,000 Portugueze, . . so inferior to what Marmont might bring into the field against him, that every thing depended upon secrecy in his plans, and celerity in their execution. That he would undertake the siege was what every officer who reasoned, or talked about the ensuing campaign, could not but conclude; but when it was his intention was not communicated even to those persons in whom he placed most confidence, and of whom he entertained the* highest opinion. The works of Almeida which Brennier had demolished, when with so much credit to himself he abandoned the place, were restored; British and Portugueze troops in equal numbers

*Lord Wel-
lington pre-
pares for
the siege of
Ciudad
Rodrigo.*

* One of those friends obtained leave to go to England at the beginning of the winter. Upon rejoining the army after the capture of the place, he expressed his sorrow to Lord Wellington that his request should have been granted at a time when an enterprise of such importance was contemplated. Lord Wellington replied to this effect: "Perhaps, . . you did me better service by your absence, than you could have rendered had you been on the spot. Have you never said that your presence was required at home for your own family affairs, and that it was your intention to ask leave as soon as the campaign was over and nothing more was to be done? And do you suppose that Marmont had not heard this, and known of your departure?"

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1811. being employed upon them, and receiving working money, and such of them as were bricklayers or stonemasons, and acted as artificers, double pay. This, which the French might consider a defensive measure, was for the purpose of providing a safe depôt for the battering train. That train was conveyed up the Douro forty miles, farther than the boats of the country had navigated the river before, our engineers having removed the impediments which rendered it innavigable. There had been such difficulty in obtaining means of transport, that for this reason alone, Lord Wellington had been obliged to undertake feeding all the Portuguese troops that were incorporated in the British divisions. The system of the Portuguese commissariat was to embargo carts and cattle for this service, . . . a grievous evil to the owners, who knew that they were likely never to be paid, and that their beasts would probably be worked to death; unless, therefore, they were closely watched, they, as might be expected, deserted, and left the supplies to take their chance. Nor, when British faith was pledged for payment of the commissariat accounts, was there any perceptible amendment, so long as the means of transport were to be supplied by the local authorities: these authorities showed little alacrity in executing the orders of government, and the people as little in obeying their requisitions: for the magistrates being delivered from immediate danger had relapsed into that apathy which had long pervaded every department of the body politic. There were 20,000 carts in Alentejo, and yet, when Lord Wellington was on that frontier, it was with difficulty that 600 could be procured for the service of the army. The institutions of the country were excellent; but government could not enforce the laws, and the magistrates would not: the British were the only persons who observed them, and by that observance, subjected themselves to serious inconvenience; they depended upon the civil magistrate, who

neglected his duty, and they were then left to shift for themselves. To prevent this evil, a waggon train was now attached to the British commissariat, and upwards of 600 carts, each capable of carrying eight hundred weight, and upon a better construction than the primitive carts of the country, were built at Lisbon, Porto, and Almeida. To this latter place the battering train was conveyed towards the close of November; and when relying upon Lord Wellington's comparative weakness, and the improbability of his attempting any serious operation at that season, Marmont had detached Montbrun to the eastern coast, and Dorsenne had ordered two other divisions to Asturias and the Montaña; the allied troops began to make fascines and gabions at their respective head quarters, on the 27th of December; and the 6th of January was fixed for the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo.

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The time of year, and the exhausted state of the country, contributed to deceive the French: they did not suppose that Lord Wellington would, in the depth of winter, undertake an operation of such importance, nor that his army could long endure the privations to which they must be exposed. Every thing which could serve for the support of man or beast had been consumed for miles and miles around; and on that part of the frontier there was little grain at any time, the tract for corn commencing at Salamanca and its neighbourhood, where the enemy were cantoned. The allied troops were four days together without bread; and the officers purchased it at the rate of three shillings the quartern loaf, and at one time five. The horses, though hardy as if they had never stood in a stable, and rough as if never groom had laid his hand upon their coats, began to fail; all the straw having been consumed, they had nothing to subsist on except coarse long grass pulled up from under the trees, and so thoroughly sun-dried that little nourishment was left in it.

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January.

CHAP. XL. Because of this scarcity, the three brigades of cavalry took the
 1812. outpost duty in rotation, ... and the regiments lost about fifty
 horses each by starvation.

January.

A heavy rain fell on the first night of the new year; and the weather continued so inclement till the fifth, that the investment was necessarily deferred till two days later than the time originally fixed. General Mackinnon's brigade marching from Aldea da Ponte to Robledo, six and twenty miles through a continued oak forest, had in many places to make their way knee deep in snow; between 300 and 400 men were left on the road, of whom some died on the march, several afterwards of fatigue. There was no camp-equipage with the army, nor cover near the town: the troops were therefore cantoned in the nearest villages, and it was regulated, that the light, first, and third divisions, should alternately take the duties of the siege, each remaining four and twenty hours on the ground.

Ciudad Rodrigo.

Ciudad Rodrigo stands in the middle of a plain some sixteen miles in circumference, surrounded by hills, which rise gradually, ridge behind ridge above each other on every side, far as the eye can reach. From those heights, at a distance of ten or twelve miles, the movement of the British army might be perceived; but the enemy seem at this time to have exercised no vigilance, and voluntary information was never given them by the Spaniards. The city is on a rising ground, on the right bank of the Agueda, which in that part of its course forms many little islets. The citadel standing on a high mount has been likened, for its situation, to Windsor Castle. The works were old, and in many respects faulty; and the suburbs, which are about three hundred yards from the town on the west, had no other defence, at the time of the former siege, than a bad earthen intrenchment hastily thrown up; but the French had made strong posts of three convents, one in the centre of the suburbs,

and one on either flank ; and they had converted another convent just beyond the glacis on the north-west angle of the place into an infantry post. Being thus supported, the works of the suburbs, bad as they were, were thought fully capable of resisting a *coup de main*. The ground is every where flat and rocky except on the north, where there are two pieces of rising ground, one at the distance of six hundred yards from the works, being about thirteen feet higher than the ramparts, the other at less than a third of that distance, nearly on a level with them : the soil here is very stony, and in the winter season water rises at the depth of half a foot below the surface. The enemy had provided against an attack on this side, by erecting a redoubt upon the higher ground, which was supported by two guns, and a howitzer in battery on the fortified convent of S. Francisco at four hundred yards distance : and a large proportion of the artillery of the place was in battery to fire upon the approach from the hill.

On this side, however, it was deemed advisable to make the attack, because of the difficulty of cutting trenches in a rocky soil, and the fear of delay in winning the suburbs, . . the garrison being sure of relief if they could gain even but a little time. On this side too it was known, by Massena's attack, that the walls might be breached at a distance from the glacis ; whereas, on the east and south it was doubtful, because of a fall in the ground, whether this could be done without erecting batteries on the glacis : but here a small ravine at the foot of the glacis and its consequent steepness, would conceal the workmen during their operations for blowing in the counterscarp, a circumstance which had great weight in forming the plan of an attack, where not a single officer had ever seen such an operation performed.

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Colonel
Jones's
Journal of
the siege,
p. 82-3.

Colonel
Jones's
Journals,
84.

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A redoubt
carried.

Time was of such importance, and such preparations had been made before the army moved from its quarters, that ground was broken on the very night of the investment. At nine that night, a detachment under Lieutenant Colbourne of the 52d attacked the redoubt on the upper *teson* or hill. Lieutenant Thomson (of the Royal engineers) preceded the detachment with a party of men carrying ladders, fascines, axes, &c.: he found the palisades to be within three feet of the counter-scarp, and nearly of the same height: fascines were immediately laid from the one to the other, by which, as by a bridge, part of the storming party walked over. When they came to the escarpe, which was not revêted, the men scrambled up, some of them sticking their bayonets into the sods, and so entered the work; while another party went round to the gorge, where there was no ditch, and forced the gate. Only four of the garrison escaped into the town, and only three were killed; two officers and forty-three men were made prisoners; the loss of the assailants was six men killed, three officers and sixteen men wounded. A lodgement was then made on the hill near the redoubt, and with little loss, because the enemy directed their fire chiefly into the work; and a communication was opened to it.

The siege was carried on with extraordinary vigour; and Lord Wellington calculating upon intelligence which he received, that Marmont would advance to relieve the place even before the rapid plan of operations on which he had determined could be carried through, resolved to form a breach, if possible, from the first batteries, and storm the place with the counter-scarp entire, if he could not wait until it should be blown up. The weather increased the difficulties of the undertaking: while the frost continued, men could not work through the

night; and when it broke, they who were employed in the sap worked day and night up to their knees in water, under the declivity of a hill down which the rain had poured. Of 250 mules attached to the light division, fifty died in conveying ammunition to the breaches, . . . destroyed by being overworked, and by want of needful rest and sufficient food. The garrison were encouraged, not only by the confident expectation of relief, (for they knew Marmont was strong enough to effect it, and could not suppose that, for want of foresight, he had disabled himself for attempting it in time,) but also by the failure of the allies at Badajoz, and the inferiority of our engineering department. They omitted no means of defence, and neglected no opportunity which presented itself. On the night, between the 13th and 14th, the convent of Santa Cruz, in which they kept a strong guard, was attacked and taken. From the steeple of the cathedral which commanded the plain, and where there was always an officer on the look out, they noticed a careless custom, that when the division to be relieved saw the relieving division advancing, the guards and workmen were withdrawn from the trenches to meet it; sore weariness and pinching cold were present and pressing evils, which made them overlook the danger of leaving the works unguarded at such intervals. Profiting by this, some 500 men made a sortie at the right point of time, upset most of the gabions which during the preceding night had been placed in advance of the first parallel, penetrated some of them into the right of that parallel, and would have pushed into the batteries and spiked the guns, had it not been for the steady conduct of a few workmen, whom an officer of engineers collected into a body: on the approach of part of the first division, they retired into the town.

Captain Ross of the engineers, one of the directors, was killed by a chain shot from St. Francisco's: he was brother to

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January.

Convent of
Santa Cruz
taken.

Jan. 14.

Captain
Ross killed.

CHAP. that excellent officer who afterward fell at Baltimore, and was
 XL. himself a man of great professional promise, uniting with mili-
 1812. tary talents, a suavity of manners, and a gentleness of disposi-
 tion, especially to be prized in a profession where humanity is
 so greatly needed. His friend and comrade, Lieutenant Skel-
 ton, was killed at the same time, and buried with him, in the
 same grave, in a little retired valley, not far from the spot where
 they fell. Colonel (then Captain Jones, to whose history of the
 war, and more especially, to whose Journals of the Sieges this
 work is greatly indebted), placed a small pedestal with an in-
 scription to mark the grave, and with prudent as well as chris-
 tian feeling, surmounted it with a cross. That humble monu-
 ment has, because of its christian symbol, been respected; . . Spa-
 niards have been seen kneeling there, and none pass it without
 uncovering their heads.

*St. Fran-
 cisco's taken
 and the
 suburbs.*

A howitzer placed in the garden of St. Francisco's convent
 so as to enfilade one of the batteries, had caused many casual-
 ties and impeded the progress of the work. The convent also
 looked into the rear of the second parallel. Two guns which
 were opened upon this edifice on the 14th, at the same time that
 twenty-five were opened against the walls of the place, did not
 drive the enemy from their advantageous post; a party, there-
 fore, of the 40th regiment was ordered to force into it at dusk,
 and as soon as they had escaladed the outer wall, the French,
 leaving their artillery, retired into the town, not from the con-
 vent only, but from the suburbs, which were immediately occu-
 pied by the 40th.

The batteries had injured the wall so much on the second day,
 as to give hopes of speedily bringing it down. A fog compelled
 them to cease firing on the 16th; the engineers took advantage
 of the cover which the fog afforded them, and placed fifty
 gabions in prolongation of the second parallel. That parallel

was pushed to its proper extent on the left in the course of the night, and the lower *teson* crowned by it. The sappers also broke out the head of the sap: but they could do nothing on the hill, and but little in the sap, because of their inexperience, and because the enemy's artillery knocked over their gabions, nearly as fast as they could be replaced. Yet, the assistance which the engineers derived from the men of the third division, who had been instructed in sapping during the summer, was invaluable, and enabled them to push the approaches three hundred yards nearer than at the attack of Badajoz, under a much heavier fire. An unusual length of time was nevertheless required for throwing up the batteries, owing to the small front of the work, against which the enemy directed an incessant fire of shell; they fired during the siege 11,000 shells and nearly 10,000 shot upon the approaches: their practice was remarkably accurate, and not one shot was fired at them in return. "It was not unfrequent to have three or four large shells in the course of an hour explode in the middle of the parapet of a battery, each having the effect of a small mine, and scattering the earth in every direction. In consequence of this dire destruction, the parapets were of necessity made of a great thickness." But on the other hand, a confidence was felt both by the officers and men, which they had not partaken at either of the former sieges; the officers had sufficient means at their disposal, and the men seemed to perceive that the operations were differently conducted. The artillery was excellent, as well as ample in quantity, and its effect was materially improved by a circumstance in which accident corrected an actual defect of science. There happened to be a considerable quantity of shot in the fortress at Almeida, and of all calibres; when there was such want of transport for bringing shot from the rear, it became of great importance to take as many of these as could

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Col. Jones's
Journal of
Sieges, 102.

Ib. 103.

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Sir H.
Dickson, in
Sir Howard
Douglas's
Treatise on
Naval Gun-
nery, p. 84.

be made serviceable: shot of a larger size than what are commonly employed were thus accidentally brought into use, and some 2000 or 3000 of what are termed very high shot were brought forward during the latter days of the siege. The consequence was, that because the windage was thus diminished, the firing became so singularly correct, that every shot seemed to tell on the same part of the wall as the preceding one; whereas, when shot of the ordinary size were fired at the same distance, some struck high and others low, although the pointing was carefully the same.

On the 17th, a breach had been made, and the guard in the second parallel kept up a continued fire through the night, to prevent the garrison from clearing it. At daylight following, a battery of seven twenty-four pounders opened upon an old tower; and next day when this tower had nearly been brought down, and the main breach appeared practicable, Lord Wellington, after a close reconnoissance, resolved upon giving the assault at seven o'clock that evening. The enemy were perfectly prepared; they had constructed intrenchments on the ramparts near the breach, by means of cuts through the *terre-plein*, perpendicular to the parapet, with a breast-work in rear of them, to enfilade and rake the whole: so that if the assailants gained the summit of the breach, their alternative must be either to force the intrenchments, or get down a wall sixteen feet in depth, at the bottom of which impediments of every kind had been arrayed.

The place
taken by
assault.

At dusk the columns of attack were formed, and they moved forward at the rising of the moon. 150 sappers, under the direction of Captains M'Leod and Thomson, royal engineers, and Captain Thompson of the 74th, advanced from the second parallel to the edge of the ditch, each man carrying two bags filled with hay, which they threw into the ditch, reducing its depth thus from nearly

fourteen feet to eight. Major General Mackinnon followed close with his brigade, consisting of the 45th, 74th, and 88th, . . . the men jumped into the ditch upon the bags; the enemy, though not yet wanting in heart, wanted the coolness of deliberate courage: they had accumulated shells and combustibles upon the breach, and at the foot of it, but they fired them too soon, so that the tremendous discharge was mostly spent before the troops reached their point of action. Ladders were instantly fixed upon the bags; they were not sufficient in number, the breach being wide enough for an hundred men abreast; but the short delay that this occasioned produced no evil, for the 5th arrived from the right to take part in the assault, and their eventual success was facilitated by the speedier progress of the light division on the left. That division moved simultaneously with Mackinnon's column from behind the convent of St. Francisco against the little breach, under a heavy fire of musketry from the ramparts, by which Major General Craufurd, who commanded, and was considerably in front, animating his men and leading them on, was mortally wounded. The counter-scarp here was not so deep, the breach was not obstinately defended, and no interior defence had been prepared, so that the assailants carried it without much difficulty, and began to form on the ramparts. Meantime Major General Mackinnon's brigade, aided by the 5th, after a short but severe struggle gained the summit of the great breach. Giving up the breach, where first one mine was sprung and then a smaller, though neither with much effect, the enemy retired behind a retrenchment, where they stood their ground resolutely, and a severe contest ensued. But Brigadier General Pack, who had been ordered with his brigade to make a false attack upon the southern face of the fort, converted it into a real one; and his advanced guard under Major Lynch, following the enemy's troops from the

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*Craufurd
mortally
wounded.*

CHAP. advanced works into the *Fausse Bray*e, made prisoners of all
 XL. opposed to them: and while the garrison was thus disheartened
 1812. on one side, the success of the light division on the other took
 January. from them all hope as soon as it was known: they gave way at once,
 and the retrenchment was carried. The brigade then dividing
 to the right and left, General Mackinnon said to Ensign Beres-
 ford, "Come, Beresford, you are a fine lad, we will go toge-
 ther!"... these were the last words which he was heard to utter,
 for presently some powder exploded: Beresford was blown up,
 but fell without much injury into the arms of Mackinnon's
 aide-du-camp Captain Call. Mackinnon himself was among the
 many brave men killed by the explosion, and in him the nation
 lost an officer of the highest promise in the British army.

*Mackinnon
 killed.*

The enemy were now driven at the point of the bayonet into the great square, and were pursued from house to house, till they threw down their arms and called for quarter; and this was granted them, in the first heat of the onslaught, when, as they afterwards confessed, judging from what they themselves would have done, they expected nothing else than to be massacred. The place was won about nine at night: the troops, British and Portuguese, spread themselves all over the town, and got at the stores; but fortunately a guard was placed in time over the spirit-magazine, in which fifty pipes of good cogniac were found: had the men got at these, the amount of deaths would have been increased. It was a scene of wild disorder till daylight. The night was miserably cold, and the men crowded into the ruined houses to make fires: these rotten edifices soon caught the flames, and the conflagration became dreadful. Very little booty was to be gained in a town which the French had sacked, and which, indeed, had been deserted before they occupied it upon their conquest; what the men found was wholesome as well as welcome after their late hard fare, and they were

seen each carrying three or four loaves stuck upon his bayonet. The enemy had pulled down many of the houses for firewood, and those which were nearest the ramparts had been demolished by our guns, though especial care had been taken to spare the town by battering it only in breach.

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The governor, General Banier, was made prisoner, with seventy-eight officers and 1700 soldiers. Great quantities of ammunition and stores were found, a well-filled armoury, and an arsenal abundantly supplied; 109 pieces of ordnance mounted on the ramparts; and, moreover, the battering-train of Marmont's army, consisting of forty-four guns with their carriages. The loss of the allies consisted of three officers and seventy-seven men killed, twenty-four wounded and 500 during the siege; six officers and 140 men killed, sixty and 500 wounded, in storming the breaches. Craufurd's wound, though severe, was not thought dangerous, but it proved fatal on the fifth day. He had entered the army at the age of fifteen, and in the course of two and thirty years few officers had seen so much or such varied service. Early in life his abilities and professional zeal were noticed by his then colonel, Sir Charles Stuart, than whom no man was better qualified to appreciate them. During peace he pursued the study of his profession in all its branches upon the continent for three years, then went to India, and there distinguished himself in two campaigns under Lord Cornwallis. He was employed on a military mission with the Austrian armies during the years 1795, 1796, and 1797, and again in 1799; was made prisoner in the ill-planned and not more happily executed expedition against Buenos Ayres; and afterwards commanded the light division of Sir John Moore's army in Spain. With that miserable retreat his course of ill fortune terminated. He joined Sir Arthur Wellesley the day after the battle of Talavera; sustained a severe attack

General
Craufurd.

CHAP. from very superior numbers and in a perilous position upon the
 XL. Coa ; signalized himself at Busaco ; rejoined his division after a
 1812. short absence, when the troops were drawn up for action at
 January. Fuentes d'Onoro, and was saluted by them with three cheers in
 presence of the enemy. " I cannot report his death," said Lord
 Wellington in his dispatch, " without expressing my sorrow and
 regret that his majesty has been deprived of the services, and I of
 the assistance of an officer of tried talents and experience, who
 was an ornament to his profession, and was calculated to render
 the most important services to his country." He was buried
 with all military honours in the breach before which he received
 his mortal wound.

*General
 Mackinnon.*

Mackinnon also had been interred in the breach which he
 had won ; but this was done hastily, by some pioneers under Ge-
 neral Picton's orders, and the officers of the Coldstream guards, in
 which regiment he had long served, removed his body to Espeja,
 and there deposited it with due honours. In Craufurd the army
 lost one of its most experienced officers ; in Mackinnon one of
 the greatest promise, in whom were united all the personal
 accomplishments, intellectual endowments, and moral virtues
 which in their union constitute the character of a perfect sol-
 dier. He was one of those men whom the dreadful discipline
 of war renders only more considerate for others, more regard-
 less of themselves, more alive to the sentiments and duties of
 humanity. He was born near Winchester in 1773, but his father
 was chief of a numerous clan in the Hebrides. His military educa-
 tion was commenced in France, his family having removed to
 Dauphiny because of his elder brother's state of health ; and
 Buonaparte, then a military student, was a frequent visitor at
 their house. It is one of the redeeming parts of Buonaparte's
 character, that he never forgot his attachment to that family ;
 that during the peace of Amiens he invited them to France,

where they might receive proofs of it; and that when he heard of General Mackinnon's death, he manifested some emotion. He entered the army in his 15th year, served three years as a subaltern in the 43d, was employed at the commencement of the war in raising an independent company, and then exchanged into the Coldstream guards. During the Irish rebellion, he was attached to the staff as major of brigade to Sir George Nugent; and distinguishing himself greatly in that horrible service, was distinguished also for his humanity. He was in the expedition to the Helder, volunteered to Egypt, and was at the siege of Copenhagen. In 1809 he joined the army in Portugal, was at the passage of the Douro, and had two horses killed under him at Talavera; how ably he conducted himself when left in charge of the wounded after that action has been related in its proper place. At Busaco he displayed so much skill and promptitude, that Sir Arthur, immediately after the battle, returned him thanks in person. He distinguished himself also on many occasions during Massena's retreat, and led that last charge against the French at Fuentes d'Onoro which drove them finally from the ground. The unwholesome heat in the vicinity of Badajoz induced some recurrence of a disease with which he had been attacked in Egypt, and he returned for a few weeks to England there to recruit his health. In 1804 he had married a daughter of Sir John Call: she planted in his garden a laurel for every action in which her husband was engaged: and when in his last visit she took him into the walk where they were flourishing, he said to her, that she would one day have to plant a cypress at the end. Perhaps this country has never sustained so great a loss since the death of Sir Philip Sydney.

Without delay the approaches were destroyed and the works repaired. On the 27th the place had been again rendered defensible. Marmont was at Toledo when he received the first

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*January.**Marmont's
movements
during the
siege.*

CHAP. tidings of its investment. Hastening to Valladolid, he stated
 XL. in his dispatches to France on the 16th, that he had collected
 1812. five divisions for the purpose of throwing supplies into Ciudad
 January. Rodrigo, but finding that force inadequate, he had been fain
 to recall two divisions from the army of the north: with these
 he should have 60,000 men, and events might then be looked
 for as momentous in their results as they would be glorious for
 the French arms. Massena had been a month in reducing that
 fortress; the calculation was, that it might hold out against a
 regular siege, to which there should be no interruption from
 without, four or five and twenty days; Marmont expected to
 be in good time if he came to its relief on the 29th; . . but his
 army was not collected at Salamanca till the 24th; and when
 he announced to his own government the loss of the place, in
 which he said there was something so incomprehensible that he
 would not allow himself to make any observation upon it, it
 was too late to make any movement for its recovery. The
 weather, which had so often been unfavourable to the allies,
 favoured them on this occasion; heavy rains, which cut off their
 communications, and which would have rendered it impossible
 to fill in the trenches and close the breaches, did not commence
 till four days after the place had been rendered secure against a
 sudden attack; and Marmont, whose battering-train had been
 captured with it, could attempt nothing more.

Castañes was present at the siege, and to him as Captain-General of that province the place was given up. Before its capture, the Alcaldes of 230 *pueblos* had repaired to his headquarters, to testify their own fidelity and that of their respective communities. Lord Wellington bore testimony in his dispatches as well to the loyalty and general good-will of the Spaniards in those parts, as to the assistance he had derived from Brigadier Alava; and from Julian Sanchez and D. Carlos de España, who

with their two bands had watched the enemy on the other side the Tormes. A thanksgiving-service for the reconquest was performed with all solemnity at Cadiz; and the Cortes, in conformity with the proposal of the Regency, conferred upon Lord Wellington the rank of a Grandee of the first class, and the title of Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo. The tidings could not have been more unexpected by Buonaparte himself, than it was by the opponents of administration in England. At the commencement of the session, they, in their old tone of dismay, had repeated their denunciations of discomfiture and utter failure: ministers were again arraigned by them for their obstinate blindness, . . . for their wanton waste of money and of the public strength, and for persisting in flattering and fallacious language when they had brought the nation to the very brink of ruin! Sir Francis Burdett said, that whatever had been done by England for the rights of the King of Spain (who had resigned his whole pretensions to Buonaparte), nothing had been done for the Spanish people; that even if the cause of Spain had been honourably undertaken by the British government, it had now become perfectly hopeless; our victories were altogether barren, and the French were making regular and rapid strides towards the subjugation of the Peninsula: but these evils, he said, arose from the system of corruption which an oligarchy of boroughmongers had established; and as things now were, the progress of France was more favourable to liberty than the success of England would be! With more curious infelicity in his croakings, Mr. Whitbread observed, that Lord Wellington after pursuing Massena to the frontiers had been obliged to fall back; that his attempt upon Ciudad Rodrigo had proved abortive; that every thing which we could do for Spain had already been done; and though the first general of the age and the bravest troops in the world had been sent to her

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January.*Lord Wellington made Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo.**Speeches of Sir F. Burdett and Mr. Whitbread.*

CHAP. assistance, nothing had been accomplished, and, in short, the
 XL. French were in military possession of Spain. A month had not
 1812. elapsed after the delivery of these opinions, before the thanks
 of Parliament were voted to Lord Wellington for the recovery
 of Ciudad Rodrigo, he was created an Earl of the United King-
 dom, and an additional annuity of 2,000*l.* granted to him in
 consideration of his signal services. In the course of the debate,
 Mr. Canning took occasion to state that a revenue of 5,000*l.* a
 year had been granted to Lord Wellington by the Portuguese
 government when they conferred upon him the title of Conde
 de Vimeiro; that as Captain-General of Spain, 5,000*l.* a year
 had been offered him, and 7,000*l.* as Marshal in the Portuguese
 service; all which he had declined, saying, he would receive
 nothing from Spain and Portugal in their present state; he had
 only done his duty to his country, and to his country alone he
 would look for reward.

January.

*Vote of
 thanks to
 Lord Wel-
 lington. He
 is created
 an Earl.*

*Prepara-
 tions for
 the siege of
 Badajoz.*

The Earl of Wellington was already preparing for a more
 arduous siege. Eighteen 24-pounders had been reserved at
 Lisbon for this service, when the battering-train intended for
 Ciudad Rodrigo was sent from the Tagus to the Douro. These,
 with some iron guns which the Russian fleet had left there, and
 with the engineer's stores, were embarked at Lisbon in large
 vessels, as if for some remote destination, then transhipped at
 sea into smaller craft, and conveyed up the Sadam to Alcacere do
 Sal. Fascines and gabions were prepared at Elvas. The line
 of supply was changed from the Douro to the Tagus; and as
 the Beira frontier must for a while be left open to the enemy's
 incursions, directions were given for forming a temporary depot
 at Celorico, the nearest point where it could be deemed safe,
 and a grand magazine beyond the Douro. Ciudad Rodrigo was
 in some degree provisioned, as well as rendered thoroughly de-
 fensible against any attack that the French had means of

making; and the troops were then put in motion, glad to remove from an exhausted country, where the labour of procuring forage amounted to constant occupation for the cavalry, none being to be found except the straw which the peasants had reserved and endeavoured to conceal, as the only subsistence left for their remaining cattle. Corn was so scarce that the very few officers who could afford such an expenditure paid the enormous price of fourteen dollars the *fanega* for it, in prudence, as well as in mercy to their beasts; and the owner, loading his horse with his own precious provender, performed the march himself on foot. One division of infantry remained on the Agueda, covered by a few cavalry posts. The main body proceeding by rapid marches to the Tagus crossed it, some at Abrantes, some at Villa Velha. Lord Wellington having completed his arrangements at Ciudad Rodrigo, and given it finally over to the Spaniards, set out for Alemtejo on the 5th of March, and on the 11th his head-quarters were fixed at Elvas. On the 16th, the preparations being completed, a pontoon bridge was thrown across the Guadiana about a league below Badajoz; and the light, 3rd, and 4th divisions under Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard, Generals Picton and Colville, crossed and invested the place without opposition. General Graham, with the 1st, 6th, and 7th divisions of infantry, and Generals Slade and Le Marchant's brigades of cavalry, advanced to Los Santos, Zafra, and Llerena, to oppose any movements on the part of Marshal Soult; while Sir Rowland Hill with the 2nd division, General Hamilton's Portuguese division, and a brigade of cavalry moved from their cantonments near Alburquerque to Merida and Almendralejo, thus interposing between Soult and Marmont if the latter should march from Salamanca with the intention of forming a junction as in the preceding year.

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Prepara-
tions for its
defence.

The governor, G. Baron Philippon, had obtained intelligence from his spies of the preparations which were making at Elvas, and had apprised Soult accordingly that there was probably an intention of again besieging Badajoz; but it was not till the day before Lord Wellington arrived at Elvas that he knew a battering-train had been collected there, and that the allies were concentrating their forces near the Alemtejo frontier. He had before this applied for a supply of powder and shells, a convoy of which was twice sent from Seville, and twice by Sir Rowland Hill's movements forced to put back, though the Comte d'Erlon, General Drouet, had been charged to protect it. The place had been greatly strengthened since the last unsuccessful siege, especially on the side which had then been attacked. Upon the spot where the allies had planted their breaching-battery against Fort St. Christoval, a lunette had been constructed by Marshal Soult's orders: its ditches were cut in the rock to the depth of $14\frac{1}{2}$ feet below the *Verme*: a powder-magazine and a bomb-proof for fifty men had been constructed there, and every means taken for securing it against a *coup-de-main*. The Tête-de-Pont also had been strengthened, and its communication with Fort St. Christoval repaired, so that on that side the place presented a most formidable appearance. The Pardaleras too had been repaired and strengthened, and magazines established in the castle into which, and into the citadel, it was the governor's intention to retire if the place should be rendered no longer tenable. The enemy had also formed galleries and trenches at each salient of the counterscarp in front of what they supposed would be the point of attack, that they might form mines under the breaching-batteries, and afterwards sink shafts for other mines, whereby to destroy the works in proportion as the assailants should gain them, and thus leave only a heap of ruins

if the place should be taken. No foresight indeed had been wanting on the governor's part. The peasantry having taken flight at the first siege and left their lands uncultivated, he had given directions for ploughing them with the oxen which were intended for slaughter, and they were sown by the soldiers within a circle of 3,000 yards: the kitchen gardens had also been distributed among the different corps and the officers of the staff, and in these they had a valuable resource. Wood was wanting for blinds and for palisades, for these had been almost wholly destroyed during the former siege: they had no means of transport for it, and it could only have been procured from a dangerous distance: to make charcoal, they were fain to dig up the roots of olive-trees which had been burnt. A convoy of some threescore mules laden with flour arrived a few days before the investment, when the garrison had about five weeks' provisions in store. The miserable townspeople were worse provided: most of those who could remove without exposing themselves to extreme distress had left the city before it was first attacked; others forsook it now, who had experienced the horrors of two former sieges, . . . old men, women, and children, carrying what little had been left them, were on the road in every direction, flying from a renewal of these horrors. The population was reduced from 16,000 to little more than a fourth of that number, who thought better to abide the worst where they had a place wherein to lay their heads, than to perish as wanderers.

Though the allied army had now no want of means as in the former siege, they had no miners, nor was there any person there who had ever seen such duty performed; the sappers too had had very little experience. The only course which could be pursued was to batter from a distance the Trinidad bastion where the counter-guard in its front had not been finished: this could be done

CHAP. from the hill on which the Picurina redoubt stands ; and that
 XL. redoubt must be carried and connected with the first parallel.

1812. The plan was so hazardous, and so little according to rule, that

March.

Colonel
 Jones's
 Journals,
 298.

“ it never was for a moment approved by any one employed in drawing it up, or in the execution of it.” No one doubted its success more than Lord Wellington himself ; but it was deemed necessary to reduce Badajoz, and there was no chance of reducing it by any other course.

Siege of
 Badajoz.

On the night of the 16th the besiegers broke ground during a storm of wind, with heavy and uninterrupted rain. It was so dark that nothing could be seen by the enemy, and the tempest prevented them from hearing the working parties, who under these favourable circumstances were not discovered till daylight, although only 160 yards from the covered way of the fort. The ensuing night also was well employed. The weather continued so rainy that the trenches were knee-deep in mud and water. Had the soil been heavier, it would not have been possible to bring up the heavy artillery ; manual assistance, as well as sixteen bullocks, being required to draw along each piece. It was a severe service for the three divisions, who had to go through more than double the work which had occupied four at Ciudad Rodrigo ; and their tents were far from being proof against such rain. On the 18th the garrison made a sally with 1,500 infantry and forty horse : they formed unobserved in the communication from the lunette St. Roque to the Picurina, then pushed forward, and were in the parallel before the workmen could stand to their arms ; at the same moment the cavalry came round the right flank of the parallel at a hand gallop, and were presently in the depots, a thousand yards in rear of the trenches. There they made great confusion among the unarmed men, but retired on the appearance of troops before they could destroy any thing. They took two or three officers prisoners, tied them to their

saddles, and cantered off with them some hundred yards, but on their falling from fatigue let them go. The infantry meantime filled in a small part of the parallel before the coverers came to the relief of the working parties: they were then driven back in great confusion, carrying off about 200 intrenching tools. But this sortie cost the allies about 150 men in killed and wounded; the commanding engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, being among the latter.

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The weather, which had at first covered the operations of the allies, continued now so rainy as to impede them: the trenches were filled with water, and there was no possibility of draining them, the ground being a dead level; it was necessary to empty them and make an artificial bottom of fascines. On the 21st the enemy advanced two field-pieces on the right of the Guadiana to enfilade the parallel: such an intention having been apprehended on the preceding day, the parallel had been thrown back during the night; these guns, therefore, did little mischief, and they were compelled to withdraw them by a few riflemen posted on the banks of the river. But on the following night they threw up cover for three field-pieces there, brought them out soon after daybreak, and kept up a very destructive fire throughout the day, their shot pitching into the parallel at a range of 1,400 yards. The inconvenience of having left the place open on that side was then felt, and the 5th division was ordered from Campo-mayor to invest it. That evening the trenches were again filled by one of those showers in which the rain seems rather to pour down in streams than to fall in drops: the pontoon bridge was carried away by the rise of the Guadiana, and the current of that river became so rapid that the flying bridges could with difficulty work: it became doubtful, therefore, whether the army could be supplied with provisions, and whether guns and ammunition could be brought over for the

CHAP. attack; and it began to be seriously apprehended, that if the weather
 XL. continued thus to favour the enemy the siege must be raised.

1812. An immediate improvement relieved that apprehension: the
 March. trenches were rendered passable during the night; the morning was fine: it was apparent that the enemy had mistaken the intended point of attack, for they had large parties employed in strengthening places against which nothing was designed: the batteries were so advanced that there seemed no doubt of their opening on the morrow, when at three in the afternoon the skies again began to pour down; every part of the trenches was again filled with rain: no advance could be made next day, the ground being so completely saturated that the water stood every where in pools, .. the earth was too wet to retain any form, the revetements of the batteries fell, no solid foundation upon which to lay the platforms could be obtained, and the guns could not be brought across the fields. But on the following afternoon the weather became fine; the batteries were completed in the course of the night; they opened on the forenoon of the 25th; and being now secured by a good parallel, and the batteries enfilading all the faces and flanks of the place which bore on Fort Picurina, it was determined to assault that fort that night.

The enemy, as soon as they perceived what point was immediately threatened, took every means for strengthening it, and abandoning their works on the right bank deepened the ditch of the Picurina, and strengthened the gorge with a second row of palisades: they also formed galleries communicating with each other, and brought a reverse fire to flank the ditches. Under the three angles of the glacis they placed fougasses, and arranged upon the parapets loaded shells and barrels of combustibles, which were to be rolled among the assailants at the moment of assault; and that each man might have several pieces to discharge, 200 loaded muskets were ranged along the interior

crest of the parapet. With these preparations the governor calculated upon a good defence. Six batteries played upon the fort and the town, and were answered from a greater number of guns: the Portuguese gunners stood to their cannon with as much coolness, and directed them with as much precision, as the British: it was impossible to say whether the guns of the besiegers or of the besieged were best served, and this uninterrupted roar of artillery was continued till sunset with great destruction on both sides. Captain Mulcaster of the engineers, an officer of great ability, was killed in the parallel by a cannon-shot.

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Major-General Kempt, who commanded in the trenches, directed the assault of the fort. Two detachments of 200 men each were formed in the parallel: both were to quit it at the same time by signal; the one under Lieutenant Stanway, on the extreme left, to move round the right flank of the work and endeavour to force the gorge; the other under Lieutenant Gipps, from an opening about the middle of the parallel, to move direct upon the communication from the town to the fort, leave 100 men there to prevent succour from being sent, and with the other hundred to march upon the work with the two-fold purpose, of aiding the left detachment in forcing the gorge, and of preventing the garrison from escaping. Another 100 men under Captain Holloway, R. E., were formed in one of the batteries to assist the others by a front attack, if they should find much difficulty in forcing in at the gorge. About ten o'clock the signal was made: the left party reached the gorge undiscovered; but when they attempted to cut down and force over the palisades, so heavy a fire of musketry was opened upon them that none could effect it. That half of the right detachment which proceeded to the gorge was received also with such a fire, that their attempts to get over the palisade were fruit-

CHAP. less : instead of persevering in the desperate endeavour, they
XL. drew round to the left flank of the work where the ditch was
1812. not flanked, fixed their ladders against the escarpe, and were
March. presently on the top of the parapet overlooking the enemy, who
defended the rear : at the same moment Captain Holloway's
party from the battery forced in at the salient angle, .. but
both that officer and Lieutenant Gipps were wounded. The
garrison seeing the assailants within the works ran into a guard-
house, and there barricadoed themselves : the troops were not
prepared to dislodge them ; they had lost their leaders ; and
while they were uncertain how to proceed, a report arose that
a large detachment was coming from the town to relieve the
fort. It seemed in their confusion as if they were on the point
of abandoning the place ; and the garrison supposing this to be
the case, came out of the guard-house. But at that critical
moment General Kempt by great exertions restored their con-
fidence : they turned upon the enemy, and of the 300 who com-
posed the garrison scarcely any escaped. They fought reso-
lutely to the very last, their officer setting them a brave ex-
ample : several threw themselves into the water and were
drowned, about 70 only were made prisoners. The loss of the
assailants was greater : four officers and 50 men were killed,
15 officers and 250 men wounded. It was found, upon
inspecting the fort, that the batteries had done very little to
facilitate its capture ; and the engineers said, that had they been
aware how little it was injured, they would not have recom-
mended the escalade so soon. The advantage which had been
gained was of great importance ; but those successes are dan-
gerous in their consequences, as well as dearly bought at the
time, in which courage performs what ought to be the effect of
skill.

The enemy, who undervalued the skill of our engineers, and

had such an opinion of British valour that they thought nothing too rash or too desperate for it to undertake, supposed that a general assault was intended. And about the time when the Picurina had been carried, the alarm-bell rang in the town, rockets were thrown up, and a random fire of musketry and cannon was opened from every part of the works. Presently, the alarm of a sortie was given by a drum beating in the lunette of S. Roque; the guard of the trenches commenced a heavy fire, this occasioned a heavier firing from the town, which again increased that from the trenches, and it was not till long after midnight that the vain alarm on both sides subsided. It had not been without some cause; a battalion had been ordered out to succour the fort, but so late as to sustain a heavy fire from it, which compelled them to retire with the loss of twenty men. A lodgement was then formed on the *terre-plein* of the fort, which lodgement was knocked to pieces in the course of the following day, by a constant and very heavy fire from the town; but before night the sappers completed a fresh one. Other batteries were now constructed, and the enemy then perceiving that the Trinidad and Santa Maria bastions were the objects of attack, used all possible means for strengthening them.

The enemy imputed the loss of the Picurina to the misconduct of its garrison; the captain of artillery had been wounded in the course of the day, and relieved by one who was thought not to have shown equal courage: no use had been made of the loaded shells and combustibles; but if the fort had been well defended, the governor thought the allies would have failed, as they did in their assault during the former siege. A singular stratagem was now practised by the commanding officer of the engineers, Colonel Lamarre, which, if accident had not frustrated it, would have cost the allies dear. Captain Ellicombe, going at dusk to adjust the lines of direction of the sap

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CHAP. XL. for the night, found those returns which were already begun, in
 1812. a good line, clear of enfilade, but that which was marked by the
 March. white line and not yet commenced, fell in the direct enfilade of
 three guns: this he mentioned as a lucky discovery, and it was
 supposed to have been the effect of accident, the line it was
 thought having, at the time of laying it down, caught unobserved
 in the dark against some stone or bush. But it was afterwards
 ascertained that a soldier had been sent out from the place
 just as evening closed, to remove it, and bring it directly under
 fire.

It was against the lunette of S. Roque that these works were
 intended; could the enemy be driven thence, a dam which
 retained the waters of an inundation might be broken down,
 and the works might then be pushed much nearer to the place.
 More skill and more courage could not have been displayed
 than were manifested by the garrison, animated as they were by
 former success, and by the expectation of being speedily re-
 lieved. On the other hand, Lord Wellington was not without
 cause to apprehend that a second battle of Albuhera might be
 to be fought. On the 30th of March it was understood that
 Soult was advancing, and the fifth division was therefore with-
 drawn from before St. Christoval and marched to the front,
 some Portuguese cavalry being stationed to watch the town on
 that side. Two breaching batteries opened next day on the
 Trinidad bastion, but these produced no considerable effect, and
 the sappers had made little progress against S. Roque's, when
 April 4. Marshal Soult advanced to Llerena. It was then intended to leave
 ten thousand men for guarding the trenches, and to give him
 battle with the remainder of the army: the covering army was
 about to fall back on Talavera. But at noon on the 5th, Lord
 Wellington reconnoitred the trenches and thought they might
 immediately be assaulted; in the afternoon he determined to

defer the assault till the following day, and meantime endeavour to break the curtain between the Trinidad counterguard and an unfinished ravelin. Fourteen guns opened upon this curtain at daylight; in two hours the walls were brought down, and by four so practicable a breach, as it appeared, was formed, that the assault was ordered for ten o'clock that night. The attack was to be at three points: that of the castle by escalade; those of the Trinidad and S. Maria bastions by storming the breaches. The castle was to be assailed by the 3rd division under Major-General Picton; La Trinidad by the 4th under Major-General Colville, and Santa Maria by the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard. At the same time, S. Roque's was to be assaulted by a party from the trenches, and the 5th division to alarm the enemy by threatening the Pardaleras and the works towards the Guadiana.

Meantime the French were indefatigable in preparing for defence. They imputed it as a gross fault to the British engineers that they had not destroyed the counterscarps, an operation which there was no time for performing, even if it had been possible to perform it without men more accustomed to such labours than any in the allied army: but because this had been impossible, the enemy were enabled to form at the foot of their counterscarps, and behind the breaches the most formidable obstructions which destructive ingenuity could devise. Night and day they were employed in clearing away the rubbish, destroying the ramps of the covered way, and making retrenchments behind the trenches. The fallen parapets were replaced with fascines, sand-bags, and wool-packs; casks filled with tarred straw, powder, and loaded granades, were arranged along the trenches, and large shells with them. Immediately in front of the breaches at the foot of the counterscarp, sixty fourteen-inch shells were placed in a circular form, about four

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CHAP. yards apart, and covered with some four inches of earth, and
XL. a communication formed to them with powder hoses placed
1812. between tiles in the manner of mine-tubes. *Chevaux de frize*
April. were formed of sabre-blades;...all the artillery stores were
turned to account; even a large boat was lowered into the ditch
and filled with soldiers to flank one of the breaches, where it
was of great use.

An extraordinary circumstance, which might be called accidental, contributed greatly to the terrible effect of these formidable preparations. The Spaniards at some former time intending to have strengthened Badajoz, had commenced their improvements, as usual with them, upon a great scale, and, as usual also, left them unfinished. Thus they had so greatly widened the ditch as to include within it the covered way and part of the glacis of the original trace; designing to build a ravelin to this front, this old glacis and covered way in the space which was to be occupied by that work were not removed, and they remained in the ditch like an ill-shapen rock. The interior of this being the old counterscarp, the front of it, where it had been cut down to admit of building the new one, was very steep and difficult of ascent. The light and 4th divisions, at the hour appointed, entered the covered way without difficulty; bags of hay were then thrown down, and ladders placed down the counterscarp: they descended readily, and the ditch was presently filled with men. The 4th division, which was on the right, mistook these old works in the ditch for the breach, cheered each other up, and mounted with alacrity; but when they had reached the summit they found themselves there exposed to the fire of the whole front, with a difficult descent before them, the space between them and the foot of the breaches appearing like a deep ditch; there were in reality very deep excavations in many parts of it, sufficiently extensive to prevent an indiscriminate rush forwards:

and water had been introduced along the counterscarp, by means of which all approach to the breach either in the face or curtain was precluded, except by passing over the seeming rock, between which and the foot of the breach the space was so restricted that a body of men could advance in only a very small front. The night was very dark, and this it was felt would render any confusion irremediable; but confusion presently arose, for the engineer who led the light division was killed before he got to the ditch, and being the only person who knew the way to the breach which they were to have assaulted, they were directed too much to the right, got upon the same summit where the 4th stood hesitating and perplexed, and thus the confusion was increased, and both crowded towards the great breach, instead of taking each its own. They had only five or six ladders to descend by, which could take only four at once, and this close under the main force of the garrison, selected and placed there as at the post of danger, and most of them having three spare muskets, with people to load them in the rear as fast as they could be discharged. The assailants were so thickly crowded on the glacis and in the ditch, that it was not necessary to aim at them; but fire-balls were cast among them, which effected the double mischief of increasing their confusion, and rendering all their movements as distinctly visible as if it had been noon-day; the oldest soldiers declared that they had never before been exposed to so rapid and murderous a fire. Major-General Colville fell among the first, severely wounded in the thigh, . . the last sound which he heard before he fainted was the voice of Captain Nicholas of the engineers, exhorting his men in the ditch. That young and excellent officer, whose charge it was to lead the 4th division to the breach, after twice essaying to reach the top, fell wounded by a musket which grazed his knee-pan, a bayonet thrust in the great

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muscle of his right leg, his left arm broken, and his wrist wounded by musket-shot;...yet, in that state, seeing his old friends and comrades, Colonel Macleod and Captain James, fall, and hearing the men ask who should lead them to the third onset, he rallied, and ordered two of his men to bear him up in their arms. Two brave fellows attempted this most perilous service; they had just reached the top when one of them was killed, and at the same moment, Nicholas received a musket-ball, which passed through the chest, breaking two of his ribs upon the way, upon which he fell from the top to the bottom of the breach mortally hurt, and receiving further injury from bruises in his fall.

Never were brave men exposed to slaughter under more frightful circumstances. The breach would not admit of more than fifteen abreast: the assailants repeatedly reached the summit, though the slope was covered with planks full of spikes. There they found the entrance closed with *chevaux de frize* which it was neither possible to break down nor to cut away, nor to get over. Many gashed their hands in attempting to pull them down at the muzzle of the enemy's muskets, from which a new species of shot, which the soldiers called musket-grape, was poured in upon them in one continuous discharge;...it consisted of slugs fastened together, and resembled grape-shot in miniature. Under this incessant fire, shells, hand-grenades, bags of powder, and every destructive form of missile or combustible that ingenuity could invent, were hurled into the ditch. Gunpowder, it is said, had never, since the hour of its discovery, been employed with more terrific and terrible effect. The explosions frequently created a light more vivid than broad day, which for a moment was succeeded by utter darkness, ...and then again the whole ground seemed to be vomiting fire under their feet and every where around them, while they had no possible means either of defending themselves or of retaliating. The

officers led their men so close to the enemy's guns, that they felt the wadding as well as the ball; when one fell another took his place: but as it had been impossible to recover from the first confusion, the men could not be moved like a machine in collective strength; individual efforts were all that could be made, and these, though made with devoted courage, were necessarily vain, the best and bravest putting themselves forward, and sacrificing themselves; till at length the troops, knowing it hopeless to make any farther effort, and yet too high spirited to retreat, stood patiently in the ditch to be slaughtered. It was not till more than two hours after the commencement of this carnage, that Lord Wellington, being made acquainted with their situation, ordered these two divisions to be withdrawn and to be formed a little before daylight for a fresh assault. He might well indeed conclude, that after the blood which had already been shed there, success was to be purchased at any cost; and certainly there would have been much more chance of success in the second attempt than in the first, when it might be made in good order, and when the enemy's trains had been fired, and their combustible preparations expended.

This might probably have been his determination, if no advantage had been obtained in any other part; but immediately before he gave this order, he received intelligence, that the 3rd division was in possession of the castle. Major-General Kempt, who led this attack, was wounded in crossing the river Rivellas below the inundation, a fire having been opened upon them from the whole of the eastern works, as soon as they reached that stream. It was General Philippon's intention, if the breaches should be forced, to retire into the castle, which had the strength of a citadel: with this and the *tête-du-pont*, and Fort Christoval, he might yet have held out some days, and give time thereby for those movements which he supposed would again be

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CHAP. made for his relief. With this view he had strengthened and
 XL. stored it; all its gates had been built up, and the ramparts were
 1812. covered with large Spanish shells, stones, beams, and whatever
 April. could be thrown upon the heads of the assailants. By means of
 these preparations, a most obstinate resistance was opposed to
 the escalade, and for a considerable time all who attempted to
 rear the ladders were destroyed. At length an entrance was
 forced up one ladder at an embrasure; the defence immediately
 slackened, and other ladders were quickly reared, with that alacrity
 which the feeling of success inspires. An officer of the German
 Legion, Girsewald by name, who was remarkable for his bodily
 strength, was one of the first who mounted. A French soldier
 fired at and missed him, then made a thrust with the bayonet;
 Girsewald, with his left-hand, parried the bayonet and seized
 it, and held it so firmly, that the exertions which the Frenchman
 made for recovering his weapon, assisted him in mounting, till
 he got high enough to aim a blow in his turn, with which he
 severed his antagonist's head from his shoulders. A false report
 having been made to Philippon that one of the bastions had
 been entered by the assailants, the falsehood of that intelligence
 made him doubt and hesitate when he heard they were escalad-
 ing the castle. Two companies which he intended to order thi-
 ther, by some mistake either in giving or understanding the order,
 went to the breaches instead, where they were not wanted; and
 four others, which took the right direction, arrived too late: the
 castle had been taken; they were received by a heavy fire of
 musketry, and dispersed with loss. One of the last shots which
 were fired struck Girsewald on the knee; he would not let the
 limb be amputated, and therefore the wound proved fatal.

The 5th division were not less successful, though the party
 with the scaling ladders lost their way, and Lieutenant-General
 Leith could not, in consequence, move till it was after eleven

o'clock. The bastion of S. Vicente which he attacked was fully prepared for defence, and the troops were discovered when on the glacis; yet they forced in by escalade. Major-General Walker then advanced along the ramparts to fall on the rear of the enemy who were defending the breaches; the troops, when driving the French before them, were opposed by a single field-piece placed on the *terre-plein* of the curtain; the gunner lighted a port-fire as they approached: at the sudden blaze of light, one who was among the foremost in pursuit cried out "a mine!" That fearful word ran through the line of pursuers; the very men who had so bravely won the bastion, as if their nature had been suddenly changed, took panic, and in spite of their General's efforts, who was severely wounded while endeavouring to rally them, were driven back by the bayonet to the place whereat they had entered: but by this time the reserve had formed there, the pursuers in their turn were checked, and the British marched immediately to the breaches, from which the defenders then dispersed, seeing that all was lost. This attack might have been spared if any signals had been agreed upon by which Picton's success should have been made known; for want of such concertment, General Leith's attack was made after the *escalade* had succeeded; he met with the same opposition as if the fate of the place had not been decided in another quarter, and thus Badajoz may be said to have been twice carried that night. Philippon with his staff retired into Fort Christoval, and surrendered in the morning.

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Col. Jones's
Sieges, 303.

The place was plundered during the remainder of the night and on the following day, nor could order be restored till the day afterwards. The doors were forced by firing through the locks, and most of the inhabitants had placed a table immediately in the entrance of their houses, with a candle and a bottle of brandy, supposing that this would content the soldiers: the consequence

CHAP. was that, excited as they already were, they became half mad
 XL. with the fiery spirit. But whatever excesses they committed,
 1812. their excitement took the form of good fellowship toward their
 April. defeated enemies; and they were seen walking about with the
 French soldiers, arm in arm, inviting them to drink, and taking
 every care of them. As soon as fresh troops could be brought
 up from the corps of observation, they were marched in, and
 order was then restored. 59 officers and 744 men were killed
 on the night of the assault; 258 officers wounded and 2600
 men; the total number of killed and wounded during the siege
 was 5000. The garrison consisted of nearly 5000, of whom
 about 3500 were made prisoners.

*Soult ad-
 vances to re-
 lieve the
 place, ... and
 retreats.*

On this occasion the French Marshals had been less alert
 than during the former siege, and they had not acted so well in
 concert. Marshal Soult left Seville on the first, with all the
 force he could collect. On the 4th he reached Llerena; and
 having arrived at Villa-Franca, two marches only from Badajoz,
 on the 8th, he there learned that the city had been taken on
 the night of the 6th. The inhabitants reported, that his chagrin
 at this intelligence was manifested in fits of intemperate anger, and
 that he broke nearly all the plates and dishes within his reach.
 Before daylight he commenced his retreat; the allied cavalry
 immediately followed his march, and on the 11th, attacked his
 rear guard (consisting of General Drouet's cavalry, 2500 in
 number) at Usagre, and drove them to Llerena, killing many,
 and bringing away about 150 prisoners, and nearly as many
 horses. It was believed throughout this part of the country,
 that Ballasteros had entered Seville; and the people giving,
 with their characteristic credulity, implicit belief to the idle
 rumour, made rejoicings every where for the supposed success,
 and seemed wholly to disregard the recapture of Badajoz.

If Ciudad Rodrigo had been provisioned at this time as it

ought to, and as Lord Wellington expected it would have been, his intention was immediately after the capture of Badajoz to have advanced upon Seville with 40,000 men; that movement would instantly have raised the siege of Cadiz, and Soult might probably have been obliged to withdraw from Andalusia, and take up a defensive position on the Tagus. But the British Commander's operations were still crippled by the insufficiency of his means; the Spaniards were not to be relied on for any exertions however necessary for their own deliverance; the Portuguese were paralysed by the poverty to which the government and the nation were reduced; and the British ministry were not yet sufficiently encouraged by success and by popular opinion, to increase their efforts and therewith an expenditure already unexampled in amount. Marshal Marmont, meantime, supposing that Soult would be able to raise the siege of Badajoz, thought the opportunity favourable for an attempt upon the Beira frontier. Lord Wellington had foreseen this, and had little means of providing against it. Relying, however, upon the officers whom he had left in command at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, for all that could be done by vigilance and sound judgement, he had directed General Bacellar to collect the Portuguese militia corps and march thither, . . . Sylveira to protect the Tras-os-Montes, and Brigadier-Generals Sir Nicholas Trant and Sir John Wilson to cover that part of Beira extending from the Douro along the Coa to Sabugal, with especial orders to look to the safety of a considerable magazine of ammunition at Celorico. Bacellar fixed his head-quarters at Lamego; the two Anglo-Portuguese Brigadiers had about 3500 men, but only a single squadron of dragoons between them, and but a small proportion of the men had served with them in the former campaigns. In Portugal, the militia is a service in which no man willingly either enters or continues, for they receive only half the pay of

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*Marmont
enters
Beira.*

*Arrange-
ment for
the defence
of that
frontier.*

CHAP. the regular soldier, and half the ration of provisions, and are
 XL. clothed at their own expense. This body is composed wholly of
 1812. married men, or of widowers having children, these being the
 April. only persons exempted from the conscription: such men were
 naturally anxious and desirous of returning home, whenever,
 by means of favour or of corruption, they could obtain leave;
 in the interval of the campaign, their places were supplied by
 others of the same class; two-thirds at least of the whole number
 consisted of such raw recruits, and the others had not been ex-
 exercised one day since they were disbanded in the spring of the
 preceding year.

*Marmont
 deterred by
 a feint from
 assaulting
 Almeida.*

Marmont did not know how weak a force could be brought
 into the field rather to observe his movements than to oppose
 them; but he knew that Ciudad Rodrigo was ill-stored with
 provisions, and that the injury which Brennier had done to the
 fortifications of Almeida when he abandoned that place had
 been insufficiently repaired. Advancing, therefore, from Sala-
 manca with about 20,000 men, including 1,200 cavalry, he sum-
 moned Ciudad Rodrigo: the Spaniards had made so little pro-
 gress in repairing the works, that he might probably have car-
 ried it by escalade; but the French had now lost something of
 their confidence; he was afraid of committing himself, and
 leaving one division to blockade it, proceeded with the rest of
 his army towards Almeida. Colonel Le Mesurier commanded
 in that fortress, and its safety depended much more upon the
 character of its commander than upon its own strength or that of
 the garrison, which consisted entirely of militia. Trant, arriving
 with his division upon the Coa just at this time, and receiving
 intelligence there of the enemy's movements, proceeded without
 delay to occupy the position of the Cabeço Negro, which Lord
 Wellington had occupied during Massena's operations against
 Almeida; the French were already arriving before that place,

and it was with difficulty that a corps of between 7 and 800 Spaniards under D. Carlos d'España escaped their close pursuit and effected a junction with this body of Portuguese. It was of great consequence to communicate with Colonel Le Mesurier now. Trant, though exposed to the fire of the French advanced posts, effected this, and during a short interview, they agreed upon the course to be pursued in case Almeida should be seriously threatened; and also, that during the night an attempt should be made to impose upon the French by making show as of a considerable force upon the left bank of the Coa. Accordingly, fires were kindled to the right and left of the position; and the enemy, deceived by this easy stratagem into a belief that a corps of British troops was present, gave up their intention of assaulting the fortress; they only threw forward a reconnoitring party upon the glacis, which the Governor drove back with loss.

Had Marmont assaulted the place, he might probably have captured it, and would have found there a battering train, which would have enabled him to break ground before Ciudad Rodrigo. On the following morning he withdrew, and leaving Almeida in the rear proceeded to Sabugal, where he established his head-quarters: it was now at his option either to advance upon the Tagus by Castello Branco, or by Guarda upon the Mondego and Celorico; but his operations had neither been well concerted, nor were they vigorously pursued. His advanced guard followed the first hussars, who had been left under Major-General Alten in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, through Lower Beira, but at a distance; and they entered Castello Branco, that officer having fallen back thither, and retiring from thence before them with Brigadier-General Le Cor's brigade of militia which had been stationed there. The hospital and the stores were removed beyond the Tagus. The enemy did not cross the

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*Advance of
the French
to Castello
Branco and
their re-
treat.*

CHAP. river in pursuit, and when Alten and Le Cor recrossed, the
 XL. French retreated, evacuating the city two days after they had
 1812. taken possession of it.

April.

*Marmont
 attempts to
 surprise the
 Portuguese
 at Guarda.*

Meantime, Bacellar, who had removed his head-quarters to Celorico, instructed Trant and Wilson to occupy Guarda, relying upon Dumouriez' erroneous opinion of the advantages of a position which Lord Wellington afterwards pronounced to be the most treacherous one in Portugal. They, though they were not at that time aware of the defects of the ground which they were ordered to take, would far rather have moved behind the Mondego, from whence the magazines at Celorico might have been better protected. The French were dispersed over a large extent of country for the purpose of procuring provisions, and for plunder; but Marmont, having collected about 10,000 of his men and half his cavalry, on the evening of the day on which his advanced guard retired from Castello Branco, advanced upon Guarda, expecting to surprise the Portuguese divisions there. An hundred men under a Captain and two Lieutenants had been stationed about half a mile in front of the town, on the Sabugal road. Marmont himself advancing with 500 cavalry, surprised and captured the out picquet of the party, and pushed on within 200 yards of the city, but hearing the drums beat to arms and being unsupported by infantry, he thought it prudent to fall back upon his main force. The Portuguese, who at that moment could have offered little resistance even to a less formidable enemy, soon drew up on the outside of the town, towards the danger; it was just at daybreak, and they ascertained the great superiority of the French in time to commence their retreat. Guarda being untenable, and the troops having only rations for the present day, and depending upon Celorico for supplies which would now be cut off, Trant, therefore, in concurrence with Wilson's opinion, resolved to retire behind the

Mondego, which was about six miles distant. Two battalions were continued in position, while the remainder retired through the town, and took up ground in its rear unobserved by the enemy; but no sooner were the whole set in motion than the French cavalry followed, threatening to charge the columns. The ground for about five miles was entirely open; but a regiment was successively halted in echelle for the protection of the troops in march, and by this means the movement went on in perfect order, till the moment when all danger seemed to be at an end.

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Immediately before the road to Celorico reaches the Mondego, it descends a sloping ground, much broken and covered with wood. The enemy's horse was by this time pressing them close; Trant, therefore, halted his rear-guard of one battalion within the wood, about an hundred yards from the summit of the hill, where they could not be attacked by cavalry, and where by making a stand, they might have gained time for the rest of the troops to ford the river and form on the opposite side. But it had not ceased raining for some hours, and when they were ordered to fire upon some of the French who dismounted, and were firing their carabines upon them, very few of the firelocks went off; the men instantly lost confidence, and every one thought to escape unnoticed by favour of the ground. Trant presently found himself with not more than an hundred men besides the officers of his staff and of the regiment. The panic which these fugitives spread was increased by the small party of Portugueze cavalry, which having been employed thus far in watching the enemy, retreated with too much precipitation through the rear-guard, glad to find themselves in comparative safety among the trees; and some of them escaping to the main body, it was supposed from their report that the whole of the rear-guard had been cut off. All efforts of the officers were in

*Flight of
the Portu-
gueze mili-
tia by the
Mondego.*

CHAP. XL. 1812. April. vain ; they took to flight ; the enemy's cavalry descended the hill unopposed, and made about 200 prisoners without killing or wounding a single man. Five colours were lost in this rout, the bearers having either hid them in the wood, or thrown them into the Mondego ; and a few men were drowned in hurrying over the river. Some of the fugitives hastened to Celorico declaring that the enemy were in full pursuit, and continuing their flight, they spread the same report all the way to Coimbra. It had this ill effect at Celorico that the officer in charge of the depôt there set it on fire, concluding hastily, that what these persons reported as eye-witnesses, must to its whole extent be true. But night had closed opportunely for the Portuguese ; their officers succeeded in rallying them beyond the river, and the French did not attempt to pass, waiting till the morning : during the night Marmont received unwelcome tidings that Badajoz had fallen, and that Lord Wellington was on his way to the north ; he therefore retraced his steps towards Sabugal, concentrated his army there, and then commenced his retreat upon Salamanca, raising the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy in this expedition had robbed and murdered the inhabitants as usual ; but they derived no advantage from it whatever, having attempted more than they could execute, and leaving unattempted what they might have achieved.

*Marmont
retreats.*

Marshal Beresford noticed the conduct of the militia in the severest terms ; and it is worthy of remark, that the order which contained this censure found its way into the *Moniteur*, . . . of so much consequence was it deemed at Paris to depreciate the Portuguese soldiers now when the French had begun to find them formidable. An *alferes* and two serjeants were brought to trial at Coimbra, for cowardice, and for spreading fearful and false reports upon their flight : they were condemned to death and executed. The Porto militia regiment in which the panic

had begun was deprived of its colours till it should recover its character in the presence of the enemy ; two other regiments which had lost theirs were not to have them restored till, in like manner, they had effaced the stain of their late conduct ; and the Penafiel militia, which had lost one and preserved the other, was ordered to deposit that other with the *Camara* of their town till they should have approved themselves worthy to be intrusted with it again. As this was the only instance in which the Portuguese had disgraced themselves since their military establishment had been reformed, it was treated with the greater severity.

Lord Wellington, as soon as he heard of Soult's retreat, had put his army in motion toward the Beira frontier. He established his head-quarters at Fuente Guinaldo ; the troops were cantoned between the Agueda and the Coa ; and though the magazines at Celorico had been destroyed, those beyond the Douro sufficed for their supply. Here, therefore, they rested awhile to recruit their strength. Their means of transport were employed in provisioning Badajoz, and Lord Wellington prepared to follow up the brilliant successes of the campaign.

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1812.
April.

Lord Wel-
lington re-
turns to
Beira.

CHAPTER XLI.

MARQUIS WELLESLEY RESIGNS OFFICE. OVERTURES OF
PEACE. MURDER OF MR. PERCEVAL. NEGOTIATIONS
FOR FORMING A NEW ADMINISTRATION. SIR ROWLAND
HILL'S SUCCESS AT ALMARAZ. BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

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*Marquis
Wellesley
resigns
office.*

*Restrictions
on the Re-
gency ex-
pire.
Feb. 13.*

THE year which had commenced thus auspiciously for the British arms was distinguished also by important events both at home and on the continent, . . . events which materially affected the conduct and the issue of the war. Early in the year Marquis Wellesley resigned the seals of his office: he could not prevail upon his colleagues in the cabinet to place such means at the disposal of Lord Wellington as might enable him to follow up his advantages with every human certainty of complete success; and he was impatient of continuing in a subordinate station to Mr. Perceval, whom he seems to have estimated far below the standard of his worth. The seals were put into the Earl of Liverpool's hands till a successor should be appointed. At this time the restrictions on the Regency were about to expire, and the Prince addressed a letter to his brother the Duke of York, saying how much it would gratify him if some of those persons with whom the habits of his public life had been formed would strengthen his hands and constitute a part of his government; and authorizing him to communicate his wishes to Lord Grey, who would make them known to Lord

Grenville. "The national faith," said the Prince, "has been preserved inviolate towards our allies; and if character is strength, as applied to a nation, the increased and increasing reputation of his Majesty's arms will show to the nations of the continent how much they may still achieve when animated by a glorious spirit of resistance to a foreign yoke. In the critical situation of the war in the Peninsula, I shall be most anxious to avoid any measure which can lead my allies to suppose that I mean to depart from the present system. Perseverance alone can achieve the great object in question; and I cannot withhold my approbation from those who have honourably distinguished themselves in the support of it. I have no predilections to indulge, . . . no resentments to gratify, . . . no objects to attain but such as are common to the whole empire."

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February.

It was not likely that this communication to the two joint leaders of the opposition would bring them to act in concert with Mr. Perceval, whom having tried and proved, the Prince would not now have abandoned. Earl Grey had said, in the debate on the address, "he should feel unhappy if he departed from that house without declaring that he retained all the opinions which he before held on subjects of great magnitude, . . . opinions confirmed by experience and the evidence of facts, . . . opinions which he should ever be ready to maintain and defend, the system that had been adopted having been, in fact, the source of almost all our present and impending calamities." Lord Grenville's language on the same occasion had been to the same purport: "The framers of the Prince Regent's speech," he said, "were the very men who by their obstinate blindness had brought the country to the brink of ruin, and who, in the midst of the distresses they themselves had occasioned, still held the same flattering and fallacious language. He would protest against a continuance of those measures which had brought such calamities on the

*Communication from
the Prince
to the lead-
ers of
opposition.
Jan. 7.*

CHAP. country, . . . calamities so real and momentous, that they must
 XLI. soon press themselves with irresistible force on their lordships'
 1812. attention, whether or not they were willing to give them the
 February. consideration they deserved. People might choose to close
 their eyes, but the force of truth must dispel the wilful blind-
 ness ; they might choose to shut their ears, but the voice of a
 suffering nation must sooner or later be heard. He still retained
 his objections to every part of the system which he had so often
 condemned ; he still deprecated that wanton waste of money and
 of all the public resources, when it was more necessary than ever
 to husband them with the most provident care."

*Reply of
 Lords Grey
 and Gren-
 ville.*

The two lords framed their reply to the Duke of York's communication in conformity with these declared opinions :
 " No sacrifice," they said, " except those of honour and duty, could appear to us too great to be made, for the purpose of healing the divisions of our country, and uniting both its government and its people. All personal exclusion we entirely disclaim ; we rest on public measures ; and it is on this ground alone that we must express, without reserve, the impossibility of our uniting with the present government. Our differences of opinion are too many and too important to admit of such an union : . . . they embrace almost all the leading features of the present policy of the empire." Then touching upon the state of Ireland, " We are firmly persuaded," they said, " of the necessity of a total change in the present system of government in that country."

The great body of the nation dreaded at this time nothing so much as any change in the ministry which would bring the despondents into office ; they therefore regarded this refusal of the Prince Regent's overture with the greatest satisfaction : but it gave offence to others of that party, who looked upon themselves with some reason as having been included

in the overtures, and were of opinion that they ought to have been consulted before such an answer was returned; there might have been a distribution of loaves and fishes; and though the two lords were not hungry, they were: . . . this the public learned from their complaints. The seals of the foreign department were now accepted by Lord Castlereagh, who while out of office, instead of entering into opposition, had supported the measures of a cabinet whose general course of policy he approved, and in whom the ministry, if they gained little accession of strength in public opinion, obtained an active and useful colleague, on whose intrepidity and honour and straight-forward integrity they could rely.

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March.

Lord Boringdon, however, thought proper to move in the House of Lords for an address to the Prince Regent, requesting that he would endeavour to form a cabinet which might effectually call forth the resources of the empire. "The motion was founded," he said, "on his deep sense of the alarming evils which threatened the safety of the nation, and on the imperative necessity of obtaining an efficient administration capable of averting them; . . . for the darkest and most gloomy prospects now surrounded us; dangers were pressing upon us on every side, and at this same time the means of averting them were weakened." The Catholic question was largely introduced in the ensuing debate; a party in Parliament using that question as a means for harassing the administration, while men of worse intentions but far greater foresight employed it as an engine by which they expected to separate Ireland from England, eradicate the Protestant Church in one country, and finally subvert the constitution of the other. But the public looked with much more interest to the opinions concerning the war expressed by those who, notwithstanding their late refusal of office, were supposed to be expectant of it; and upon this point Earl Grey's sentiments seemed to have undergone some modification. "Cer-

Lord Bo-
ringdon's
motion.
March 19.

CHAP. tainly," he said, " he was not prepared to affirm that it was
XLI. expedient to recal our troops immediately home, but certainly
1812. he did not wish to proceed in that expensive mode of warfare
without having some military authority as to the result of it.
March. He thought, and most decidedly, that a reduction of our ex-
Speech of penditure was called for by reflections of the most urgent and
Earl Grey. powerful kind, ..but if any thing like a certainty of success
could be shown in the schemes that were devised, then all his
hesitations would be removed, and he should consider even the
most extensive scale of foreign operations as recommended by
the principles of economy itself. He felt warmly the justice of
that cause which we were maintaining in the Peninsula. No
cause related in the annals of mankind ever rested more entirely
on sentiments of the most honourable feeling, or was more con-
nected (if circumstances were favourable) with principles of
national advantage. The spectacle exhibited was the most in-
teresting that could engage the sympathies or the attention of
the world ; and it was impossible not to wish to afford assist-
ance to the noble struggle of a free people, against the most
unparalleled treachery, the most atrocious violence, that ever
stained or degraded the ambition of despotic power. But
those principles upon which the prosecution of that war could
be defended must be reduced to a mere speculative theory,
unless supported by adequate exertions from the Spanish people
and the Spanish government. Without that necessary co-
operation, all our efforts must prove useless. The success of
our arms during the last two years had been called complete :
he could coincide in no such declaration, knowing, as every
other man knew, that the defence of Portugal must be imprac-
ticable after Spain should be entirely subdued. We had un-
questionably achieved much, and in the capture of Ciudad
Rodrigo he concurred in the admiration justly due to the great
commander who conducted that important enterprise. But

when he looked to another part of that kingdom, and saw Badajoz in possession of the enemy, . . . when he looked to Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia, . . . he was at a loss to discover what new prospects of success had dawned upon the Spaniards. Those conquests opened to the enemy a free communication between all their divisions, and they would soon be enabled by that circumstance to bring the whole weight of their united forces against the British. He did think, too, that ministers had been culpably negligent in not having exerted in that quarter the means actually in their power, by employing a considerable naval force for the purpose of lending our allies more effectual succour. Such a system, if properly conducted, would in all probability have enabled the Catalans to expel their invaders. Where then were the symptoms of this boasted success? Lord Wellington, at the head of 62,000 as effective men as were ever led into the field, had been compelled to remain on the defensive! With a force greater than that commanded by the Duke of Marlborough at the most splendid era of our military history, Lord Wellington had found himself limited to the pursuit of a defensive system!"

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Lord Boringdon's motion met with little support, and the tidings of Lord Wellington's success at Badajoz contributed to confirm the confidence which the great majority of the public felt in the existing administration. The fall of that fortress was so decisive a proof of British enterprise and courage, that Buonaparte would not allow it to be mentioned in the French newspapers; and under his vigilant despotism the French people could know nothing more of public affairs than he thought proper to communicate. At this time he was preparing for an expedition upon a greater scale than any which he had before undertaken, and to a greater distance than he had yet advanced in his career of conquest. An overture for peace to the British

*Overture
from the
French go-
vernment.*

CHAP. government, upon grounds which he knew to be inadmissible,
XLI. served now, as on former occasions, for a prelude to this new
1812. drama of his ambition. His Majesty the Emperor, the Duc de
April 17. Bassano said in a communication to Lord Castlereagh, "being
constantly actuated by sentiments friendly to moderation and
peace, and moved by the awful circumstances in which the
world is at present placed, is pleased again to make a solemn
and sincere attempt for putting an end to the miseries of war.
Many changes have taken place in Europe during the last ten
years, which have been the necessary consequence of the war
between France and England, and many more changes will be
effected by the same cause. The particular character which
the war has assumed may add to the extent and duration of
these results. Exclusive and arbitrary principles cannot be
combated but by an opposition without measure or end; and
the system of preservation and resistance must have the same
character of universality, perseverance, and vigour. This might
have been prevented if the peace of Amiens had been observed."
Having referred then to the overtures which Buonaparte had made
in the years 1805, 1808 and 1810, the French minister proceeded
thus: . . . "I will express myself, sir, in a manner which your ex-
cellency will find conformable to the sincerity of the step that
I am authorized to take; and nothing will better evince the
sincerity and sublimity of it than the precise terms of the
language which I have been instructed to use. What motives
should induce me to envelope myself in formalities suitable to
weakness, which alone can find its interest in deceit? . . . The
affairs of the Peninsula and of the Two Sicilies are the points
of difference which appear least to admit of being adjusted . . .
I am authorized to propose an arrangement of them on the
following basis: . . . The integrity of Spain shall be guaranteed.
France shall renounce all intention of extending her dominions

beyond the Pyrenees. The present dynasty shall be declared independent, and Spain shall be governed by a national constitution of her Cortes. The independence and integrity of Portugal shall also be guaranteed, and the house of Braganza shall have the sovereign authority. The kingdom of Naples shall remain in possession of the present monarch, and the kingdom of Sicily shall be guaranteed to the present family of Sicily. As a consequence of these stipulations, Spain, Portugal and Sicily shall be evacuated by the French and English land and naval forces. With respect to the other subjects of discussion, they may be negotiated upon this basis, that each power shall retain that of which the other could not deprive it by war. Such, Sir, are the grounds of conciliation offered by his Majesty to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent. His Majesty, the Emperor and King, in taking this step, does not look either to the advantages or losses which this empire may derive from the war, if it should be prolonged; he is influenced simply by considerations of the interests of humanity, and the peace of his people. And if this fourth attempt, like those which have preceded it, should not be attended with success, France will at least have the consolation of thinking that whatever blood may yet flow, will be justly imputable to England alone."

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April.

This overture was answered as it deserved; Lord Castlereagh was instructed, before he entered into any explanations, to ascertain the precise meaning attached by the French government to its proposal concerning the actual dynasty and government of Spain. "If," said he, "as his Royal Highness fears, the meaning of this proposition is, that the royal authority of Spain and the government established by the Cortes shall be recognised as residing in the brother of the head of the French government, and the Cortes formed under his authority, not in the legitimate

*Lord Castlereagh's
reply.*

CHAP. sovereign Ferdinand VII., and his heirs, and the extraordinary
XLI. assembly of the Cortes, now invested with the power of the
1812. government in that kingdom, in his name and by his authority,

April. I am commanded frankly and explicitly to declare, that the
obligations of good faith do not permit his Royal Highness to
receive a proposition for peace founded on such a basis. But
if the expressions apply to the actual government of Spain,
which exercises the sovereign authority in the name of Fer-
dinand VII., upon an assurance of your Excellency to that
effect, the Prince Regent will feel himself disposed to enter
into a full explanation upon the basis which has been trans-
mitted; it being his most earnest wish to contribute, in concert
with his allies, to the repose of Europe; and to bring about
a peace which may be at once honourable not only for Great
Britain and France, but also for those states which are in amity
with each of these powers. Having made known, without re-
serve, the sentiments of the Prince Regent with respect to a
point on which it is necessary to have a full understanding pre-
vious to any ulterior discussion, I shall adhere to the instruc-
tions of his Royal Highness, by avoiding all superfluous com-
ment and recriminations on the accessory objects of your letter.
I might, advantageously for the justification of the conduct
observed by Great Britain at the different periods alluded to by
your Excellency, refer to the correspondence which then took
place, and to the judgement which the world has long since
formed of it. As to the particular character the war has
unhappily assumed, and the arbitrary principles which your
Excellency conceives to have marked its progress, denying as I
do, that these evils are attributable to the British government,
I at the same time can assure your Excellency, that it sincerely
deplores their existence, as uselessly aggravating the calamities
of war; and that its most anxious desire, whether at peace or at

war with France, is to have the relations of the two countries restored to the liberal principles usually acted upon in former times."

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April.

Mr. Perceval murdered.

No answer was attempted to this unanswerable reply; and the signal success of the British arms since the commencement of the year had so far raised the public spirit, that no attempt was made in Parliament to ground upon the failure of these overtures any accusation against the ministers for wantonly prolonging the war. With a great majority in both Houses, and a still greater in the nation, with the confidence also of the Prince Regent, which was now no longer doubtful, the administration seemed, for the first time since the king's malady, to be firmly established, when Mr. Perceval was shot through the heart, in the lobby of the House of Commons, by a madman. The murderer was a person who, having failed in some mercantile speculations at Archangel, and having been thrown into prison there, imagined himself wronged by the Russian government, and by the British government, because it had not taken up his cause, concerning which he had molested both governments with repeated and groundless memorials; for the business was entirely of a private nature, in which they could not interfere. He made no attempt to escape. "My name," he said, "is Bellingham; it is a private injury; it was a denial of justice on the part of government. I know what I have done. They have driven me to despair by telling me at the public offices that I might do my worst. I have obeyed them: I have been watching more than a fortnight for a favourable opportunity; I have done my worst, and I rejoice in the deed!" He had no personal enmity to Mr. Perceval, with whom, as it happened, he had not at any time communicated; and he would rather have had Lord Levison Gower for his victim, who, having been ambassador in Russia, ought, according to his opinion, to have interfered.

May 11.

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*May.**Conduct of
the popu-
lace.*

Bellingham was insane on the single point of his own imagined injuries ; but his insanity was of a kind, which for the sake of society, must not be pleaded in bar of justice before an earthly tribunal. The murder was committed on a Monday, and as the sessions had commenced at the Old Bailey, he was brought to trial on the Friday, and executed on the Monday following. On this occasion, it was seen to what a degree seditious journalists, the most nefarious that ever were allowed to make a free press their engine for mischief, had succeeded in corrupting no small portion of the ignorant and deluded multitude. When he was conveyed from the House of Commons to Newgate, in a carriage and under an escort, an attempt was made to rescue him, and the soldiers were hooted. The mob which collected next day in Palace-Yard uttered the most atrocious exclamations. Before it was known that Bellingham was an object of commiseration as well as horror, he was extolled in pot-houses as a friend to the people who had done them good service in killing a prime minister ; exulting anticipations were expressed that this was but the beginning, and that more such examples would follow ; healths were drunk to those members of Parliament, whose language at various times (whatever their intentions may have been) had been mischievous enough to bring upon them the stigma of such popularity : and in certain manufacturing places public rejoicings were made for the murder of a minister, who both in private and in public life was absolutely without reproach. In public life he was without fear also : this kingdom was never blest with a more intrepid nor a more upright minister ; he feared God, and therefore he had no fear of man. There were persons who upon his elevation alluded to the Knight of the Round Table, from whom his family derive their descent, and said that Sir Perceval was not the man who could sit in the “ Siege Perilous.” That seat,

however, he took, and filled it worthily ; and like his ancestor in the romance, he was qualified to do this by the purity as well as by the strength of his character. A sense of religious duty was the key-stone which crowned his virtues and his talents, and kept them firm.

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A grant of £50,000 for the twelve children of Mr. Perceval was voted by Parliament, with a pension of £2,000 to his widow, and to the eldest son, whose reversion was subsequently commuted for one of those sinecures, against which, if they were always thus properly bestowed, no voice would be raised. The loss of the murdered minister was thus repaired to his family, as far as it was reparable ; but how was his place in the cabinet to be supplied ? Overtures were made to Mr. Canning and Marquis Wellesley, as persons who were understood to act in unison, and who in their views of foreign policy differed in no respect from the existing ministers. They were informed that the Prince naturally looked to them, because he was desirous of continuing his administration upon its present basis, and also of strengthening it as much as possible by associating to it such persons in public life as agreed most nearly and generally in the principles upon which public affairs had been conducted. Lord Liverpool, by whom this communication was made, stated that his colleagues wished him to be appointed first Lord of the Treasury, and that their wish was known to the Prince, when his Royal Highness charged him with this negotiation ; he added also, that Lord Castlereagh was to retain his office, and act as leader in the House of Commons.

*Overtures
from the mi-
nistry to M.
Wellesley
and Mr.
Canning.*

May 17.

It is probable that Mr. Canning was offended at this latter intimation, though he manifested no such displeasure : it is probable that he thought himself disparaged when that part of the business of the House of Commons for which he could not but be conscious that he was preeminently qualified, was assigned to a

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person who was in oratorical powers greatly his inferior. Marquis Wellesley may also be supposed to have felt a kindred disappointment; he could number few followers in Parliament, but he had other friends, who for some time had been endeavouring with more zeal and activity than discretion, to persuade the nation that he was the only statesman capable of conducting the government at a crisis when the interests of all Europe were at stake. But in this, though they appealed to his vigorous and splendid administration in India, they altogether failed. No doubt was entertained of his surpassing abilities, nor of his comprehensive views, nor of the energy with which he was capable of acting upon them. But that was wanting on which the British people in the healthy and natural state of public feeling were accustomed to rely; he had to a certain degree their admiration, but not their confidence. And while his merits as an Indian governor were understood by those only who were conversant with Indian affairs, the villanous calumnies with which he had been assailed for his conduct in that distant country were more widely known, and were moreover fresher in remembrance.

M. Wellesley's reasons for declining them.

He gained no ground in public opinion by his conduct in the negotiation. The difference upon the Roman Catholic question between himself and the cabinet which he was invited to join, "was of the utmost importance," he said, "and would alone compel him to decline the proposition." But that question, though in its consequences more mischievous than any by which these kingdoms have been agitated since the Restoration, was of no pressing importance at that time, nor could all the arts and efforts of those who promoted it induce the nation to think it so. He asked also, whether all those persons designated by the name of the opposition were to be excluded from the proposed scheme of administration; "an inquiry which," he said,

“originated in his sincere conviction (founded upon an attentive observation of the general state of public opinion, and of the condition of the empire) that no administration which should not comprise some of those persons, could prove advantageous to the Prince Regent, conciliatory towards Ireland, and equal to the conduct of the war, on a scale of sufficient extent.” Marquis Wellesley must have been strangely deceived when he supposed that public opinion supported him in this notion: and it is even more remarkable that he should have expected those persons to co-operate with him in his vigorous plans for prosecuting the war, knowing as he did, that from the beginning they had considered it as hopeless, and had not less repeatedly than confidently predicted its total failure. Farther, the Marquis stated that the considerations which had induced him to resign office had since acquired additional force, and would constitute an insuperable obstacle to his acceptance of any station in the present administration. He had withdrawn from Mr. Perceval’s because his general opinions on various important questions had not sufficient weight in that cabinet to justify him towards the public, or towards his own character in continuing in office. “My objection,” said he, “to remaining in that cabinet arose, in a great degree, from the imperfect scale on which the efforts in the Peninsula were conducted. It was always stated to me that it was impracticable to enlarge that system. I thought it was perfectly practicable; and that it was neither safe nor honest towards this country or the allies to continue the present inadequate scheme. Since my resignation it has been found practicable to make some extension; but it is still intimated, that my views are more extensive than the resources of the country can enable the government to reduce to practice. I, however, still entertain the same views and opinions, without diminution or alteration; and I am convinced that a con-

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CHAP. siderable extension of the scale of our operations in the Penin-
 XLI. sula, and also an effectual correction of many branches of our
 1812. system in that quarter, are objects of indispensable necessity
 and of easy attainment. With such a decided difference of
 opinion in relation to the conduct and management of the war,
 my return into a cabinet composed as the present is, would
 offer to me no better prospect than the renewal of discussions
 which have hitherto proved unavailing."

*Mr. Can-
 ning's.*

Mr. Canning rested his refusal of office solely upon the Catholic question: "To accept it," he said, "would be to lend himself to the defeating of his own declared opinions on that most important question; opinions which were as far as those of any man from being favourable to precipitate an unqualified concession. But by entering into the administration while all consideration of that question was to be resisted, I should incur," said he, "such a loss of personal and public character as would disappoint the object which his Royal Highness the Prince Regent has at heart, and must render my accession to his government a new source of weakness rather than an addition of strength." Lord Liverpool had stated to Mr. Canning, that Lord Castlereagh had from motives of delicacy absented himself from the cabinet when the grounds on which the overture was to be made were discussed; and that he would be no obstacle in the way of arrangement. This was consistent with the manliness and generosity of Lord Castlereagh's character, and it was received in a corresponding spirit by Mr. Canning. "After the expressions," said he to Lord Liverpool, "with which you were charged on the part of all your colleagues, I should not be warranted in omitting to declare that no objection of a personal sort should have prevented me from uniting with any or all of them, if I could have done so with honour... I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of adding, that the manner of your com-

munication with us has entirely corresponded with the habits and sentiments of a friendship of so many years; a friendship which our general concurrence on many great political principles has strengthened, and which our occasional differences have in no degree impaired."

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If the failure of this overture disappointed the hopes which ministers had reasonably entertained of strengthening themselves by the accession of the two persons who were most in accord with them upon all points of foreign policy, it had no tendency to widen their differences; but just as it terminated, a statement of the causes which had induced Marquis Wellesley to resign found its way into the newspapers through the indiscretion of some of his friends. It spoke in no measured terms of his late colleagues: in his judgement, it was said, the cabinet neither possessed ability and knowledge to devise a good plan, nor temper and discernment to adopt what was recommended to them: . . . it said also that Marquis Wellesley could not pay any deference to Mr. Perceval's judgement and attainments without injury to the public service: that if his own opinions had been adopted, he might have been willing to have served with him, but would never have consented to serve under him in any circumstances: that he had offered to act under Earl Moira or Lord Holland, and made no exception to any person as prime minister but Mr. Perceval, whom he considered incompetent to fill that office, although sufficiently qualified for inferior stations. The publication of this statement would have been indiscreet at any time; but being published a few days only after the murder of Mr. Perceval, it excited a strong feeling of displeasure. Just at this juncture, Mr. Stuart Wortley moved in the House of Commons, that an address should be presented to the Prince, praying him to take measures for forming a strong and efficient government. This ill-judged motion was carried

M. Wellesley's statement.

Mr. Stuart Wortley's motion.

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May 23.

M. Wellesley charged to form an administration.

The ministers refuse to act with him.

Lords Grey and Grenville also decline.

by a small majority; and the Prince in consequence sent for Marquis Wellesley, and desired him to form a plan of an administration. The Marquis requested Mr. Canning, as the channel which might be most agreeable to Lord Liverpool, to inquire whether he and all or any of his colleagues would form part of a ministry constituted upon the principles of taking the Catholic question into early consideration, with a view to its final and satisfactory settlement, and of prosecuting the war in the Peninsula with the best means of the country. There was the strongest wish, it was added, to comprehend in the arrangement, without any individual or party exclusion whatever, as many as possible of such persons as might be able to agree in giving their public service to the country upon these two principles. With regard to the distribution of offices nothing was stipulated; every thing, therefore, was open to be arranged to the honour and satisfaction of all parties. An immediate answer was returned by Lord Liverpool, for himself and his colleagues, saying, that it was not necessary for them to enter into any discussion of the two principles, because they all felt themselves bound, particularly after what had recently passed, to decline the proposal of becoming members of an administration to be formed by Marquis Wellesley.

Marquis Wellesley made a similar communication to Lords Grey and Grenville, and through them to their friends, observing, that he neither claimed nor desired for himself any place in the new arrangement, looking upon himself merely as the instrument of executing the Prince's commands in this instance. Lords Grey and Grenville professed in reply, that they felt it to be the duty of all public men at such a moment, both by frank and conciliatory explanations of principle, and by the total abandonment of every personal object, to facilitate the means of giving effect to the late vote of the House of

Commons, and of averting the imminent and unparalleled dangers of the country. They cordially agreed with him upon the Catholic question. As to the second point, "No person," they said, "feels more strongly than we do the advantages which would result from a successful termination of the present contest in Spain; but we are of opinion, that the direction of military operations in an extensive war, and the more or less vigorous prosecution of those operations, are questions not of principle but of policy; to be regulated by circumstances in their nature temporary and fluctuating, and in many cases known only to persons in official stations; by the engagements of the country, the prospect of ultimate success, the extent of the exertions necessary for its attainment, and the means of supporting those efforts without too great a pressure on the finances and internal prosperity of the country. On such questions, therefore, no public men, either in or out of office, can undertake for more than a deliberate and dispassionate consideration, according to the circumstances of the case as it may appear, and to such means of information as may then be within their reach. But we cannot in sincerity conceal from Marquis Wellesley, that in the present state of the finances we entertain the strongest doubts of the practicability of an increase in any branch of the public expenditure." Lords Lansdowne and Holland concurred in this answer of the two opposition leaders. Earl Moira's reply was, "That a plan of government on the basis proposed would have his most cordial wishes; but that this declaration was not to imply any engagement on his part to accept office." In the subsequent correspondence, Marquis Wellesley and Mr. Canning said respecting the Catholic question, that they did not conceive any farther parliamentary proceeding to be necessary or practicable that session, than such as might be sufficient to ensure, either by compulsion upon a hostile administration, or

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by pledge from a friendly one, the consideration of the question during the recess, with a view to its being brought before Parliament by the recommendation of the Crown early in the ensuing session." Earl Grey replied to this, "That he should very reluctantly abandon the hope of passing a bill even during the present session for the repeal of the disabilities whereof the Catholics complained; but if this could not be done, he held it indispensable that the most distinct and authentic pledge should be given of the intention both of the executive government and of Parliament to take the matter up as one of the first measures of the next." Touching the conduct of the war, "It is impossible," said he, "to reduce a question of this nature to any fixed principle. Whatever we can say with our present means of information must necessarily be general and inconclusive. I can have no hesitation in subscribing to the proposition, that if it shall be found expedient to continue the exertions we are now making in the Peninsula, they should be conducted in the manner best calculated to answer their end."

M. Wellesley receives fuller powers.
June 1.

Here Marquis Wellesley's commission ended: but the ministers considered themselves as holding office only till their successors should be appointed; and in a few days the Marquis received full authority to form an administration on the two principles which he had laid down, and he was specially instructed to communicate with Lords Grey and Grenville. The Prince signified his pleasure that Marquis Wellesley should conduct the formation of the administration in all its branches, and should be first Commissioner of the Treasury; and that Earl Moira, Lord Erskine, and Mr. Canning should be members of the cabinet. A cabinet formed on an enlarged basis must be extended to the number of twelve or thirteen members; and the Prince wished Lords Grey and Grenville to recommend four persons if it consisted of twelve, five if it should consist

of thirteen; these persons to be selected by the two lords without any exception or personal exclusion, and to be appointed by His Royal Highness to such stations as might hereafter be arranged. It was added, that entire liberty had been granted to Marquis Wellesley to propose for the Prince's approbation the names of any persons then occupying stations in His Royal Highness's councils, or of any other persons. In reply, the two lords repeated their declaration, that no sense of the public distress and difficulty, no personal feelings of whatever description, would have prevented them from accepting with dutiful submission any situations in which they could have hoped to serve His Royal Highness usefully and honourably; "But the present proposal," they said, "could not justify any such expectation. We are invited," they pursued, "not to discuss with your lordship, or with any other public men, according to the usual practice in such cases, the various and important considerations, both of measures and of arrangements, which belong to the formation of a new government in all its branches, but to recommend to His Royal Highness a number, limited by previous stipulation, of persons willing to be included in a cabinet of which the outlines are already definitively arranged. To this proposal we could not accede without the sacrifice of the very object which the House of Commons has recommended, . . . the formation of a strong and efficient administration. . . . It is to the principle of disunion and jealousy that we object; . . . to the supposed balance of contending interests in a cabinet so measured out by preliminary stipulation. The times imperiously require an administration united in principle and strong in mutual reliance; possessing also the confidence of the Crown, and assured of its support in those healing measures which the public safety requires, and which are necessary to secure to the government the opinion and affections of the people. No such

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*June.**The two
Lords per-
sist in their
reply.**June 3.*

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hope is presented to us by this project, which appears to us equally new in practice and objectionable in principle. It tends, as we think, to establish within the cabinet itself a system of counteraction inconsistent with the prosecution of any uniform and beneficial course of policy. We must therefore request permission to decline all participation in a government constituted upon such principles, satisfied as we are that the certain loss of character which must arise from it to ourselves could be productive only of disunion and weakness in the administration of the public interests."

Earl Moira's letter to Earl Grey.

June 3.

This called forth an explanatory letter to Earl Grey from Earl Moira, who thought that the answer of the two lords conveyed an oblique imputation upon him, as a party involved in the procedure. "You represent the proposition," said he, "as one calculated to found a cabinet upon a principle of counteraction. When the most material of the public objects which were to be the immediate ground of that cabinet's exertion had been previously understood between the parties, I own it is difficult for me to comprehend what principle of counteraction could be introduced... With regard to the indication of certain individuals, I can assert, that it was a measure adopted through the highest spirit of fairness to you and your friends. Mr. Canning's name was mentioned because Marquis Wellesley would have declined office without him, and it was a frankness to apprise you of it; and Lord Erskine's and mine were stated with a view of showing, that Marquis Wellesley, so far from having any jealousy to maintain a preponderance in the cabinet, actually left a majority to those who had been accustomed to concur upon most public questions; and he specified Lord Erskine and myself, that you might see the number submitted for your exclusive nomination was not narrowed by the necessity of advertence to us. The choice of an additional member of

the cabinet left to you must prove how undistinguishable we consider our interests and yours, when this was referred to your consideration as a mere matter of convenience, the embarrassment of a numerous cabinet being well known. The reference to members of the late cabinet, or other persons, was always to be coupled with the established point, that they were such as could concur in the principles laid down as the foundation for the projected ministry; and the statement was principally dictated by the wish to show that no system of exclusion could interfere with the arrangements which the public service might demand. On the selection of those persons, I aver, the opinions of you, Lord Grenville, and the others whom you might bring forward as members of the cabinet, were to operate as fully as our own; and this was to be the case also with regard to subordinate offices. The expression that this was left to be proposed by Marquis Wellesley was intended to prove that His Royal Highness did not, even in the most indirect manner, suggest any one of those individuals. It is really impossible that the spirit of fairness can have been carried further than has been the intention in this negotiation. I therefore lament most deeply that an arrangement so important for the interests of the country should go off upon points which I cannot but think wide of the substance of the case."

This frank and manly remonstrance produced no effect upon the determination of the two lords. The objections stated in their joint letter "could not," they said, "be altered by a private explanation, which, though it might lessen some obvious objections to a part of the detail, still left the general character of the proceeding unchanged. They were, however, happy to receive it as an expression of personal regard, and of that desire which they readily acknowledged in Lords Wellesley and

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June 4.

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*M. Wel-
lesley re-
signs his
commission.*

Moira, and which was reciprocal on their own part, that no difference of opinion on the matter in question should produce on either side any personal impression which might obstruct the renewal of a conciliatory intercourse whenever a more favourable opportunity shall be afforded for it." Marquis Wellesley then thought it indispensably necessary for his public and private honour to declare in Parliament that he had resigned the commission with which the Prince had charged him. Something he lost in public opinion through the indiscretion of his friends, which had rendered it impossible for his former colleagues ever again cordially to unite with him; something on the other hand he gained by the unavoidable comparison which was drawn between the fair and explicit straight-forwardness of his overtures to the two lords, and the captious manner in which they had been received.

*Negotiation
with Earl
Moira.
June 5.*

Earl Moira now, after conferring with the Duke of Bedford, addressed a note to the two lords: "Venturing, as being honoured," he said, "with the Prince Regent's confidence, to indulge his anxiety that an arrangement of the utmost importance to the country should not go off on any misunderstanding, he entreated them to advert to his explanatory letter, and desired an interview with them, if they thought the disposition expressed in that letter were likely to lead to any co-operation. Should the issue of the interview be according to his hope, he would then solicit the Prince's permission to address them formally: the present mode he had adopted for the sake of precluding all difficulties in the outset." The two lords replied, "That they were highly gratified by the kindness of the motive on which Earl Moira acted; that personal communication with him would always be acceptable and honourable to them, but they hoped he would be sensible that no

advantage was likely to result from pursuing this subject by unauthorized discussion, and in a course different from the usual practice. Motives of obvious delicacy," they said, "must prevent their taking any step toward determining the Prince to authorize Earl Moira to address them personally. They should always receive with dutiful submission His Royal Highness's commands, in whatever manner and through whatever channel he might be pleased to signify them; but they could not venture to suggest to His Royal Highness, through any other person, their opinions on points on which His Royal Highness was not pleased to require their advice."

Earl Moira reported this to the Prince, and being then provided with the required formalities, he renewed his overture, but with diminished hope. "Discouraged," he said, "as he must be, he could not reconcile it to himself to leave any effort untried, and he had therefore adopted the principle of the two lords for an interview, though doubting whether the desired conclusion could be so well advanced by it as by the mode which he had suggested. He had now the Prince's instructions to take steps for the formation of a ministry, and was specially authorized to address himself to Lords Grey and Grenville, with whom, therefore, in company with Lord Erskine, he requested an interview." It was one characteristic of these remarkable negotiations, that whatever past in conversation between the parties was minuted, and that publicity was given to those minutes and to all the notes which were interchanged... a mode of proceeding neither prudent in itself nor as a precedent. At this meeting, what Earl Moira considered the preliminary points were satisfactorily disposed of; the two lords, it was declared, might pursue their own course of policy both with regard to Ireland and to the United States of America, and the majority which they were to have in the cabinet assured

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CHAP. them the same preponderance upon other questions. There
XLI. was, however, another preliminary which appeared to them of
1812. great importance, and which they thought it necessary to bring

June. forward immediately, lest farther inconvenient and embarrassing
delay might be produced, if this negotiation should be broken
off in a more advanced state: no restriction was laid on their
considering any points which they might deem useful for the
Prince's service; they asked, therefore, whether this full
liberty extended to the consideration of new appointments to
those great offices of the household which have usually been
included in the political arrangements made on a change of
administration; and they intimated their opinion, that it would
be necessary to act on the same principle now. Earl Moira
answered, "that the Prince had laid no restriction upon him
in that respect, and had never pointed in the most distant
manner at the protection of those officers from removal;" but
he added, "that it would be impossible for him to concur in
making the exercise of this power positive and indispensable in
the formation of the administration, because he should deem it
on public grounds peculiarly objectionable." To this Lords
Grey and Grenville replied, "that they also acted on public
grounds alone, and with no other feeling whatever than that which
arose from the necessity of giving to a new government that
character of efficiency and stability, and those marks of the
constitutional support of the Crown, which were required for
enabling it to act usefully for the public service; and that on
these grounds it appeared indispensable that the connexion of the
great offices of the court with the political administration should
be clearly established in its first arrangement." This decided
difference having been thus expressed on both sides, the conver-
sation ended here, with mutual declarations of regret: and here
also, to the great satisfaction of the public, ended all negotiations

with the two leaders of opposition, at the very time when, but for their own marvellous mismanagement, the government would have been delivered into their hands.

On the second day after this decisive interview, Lord Liverpool informed the House of Lords, that the Prince had been pleased to appoint him first Commissioner of the Treasury, and had authorized him to complete the other arrangements of the administration. This led to a conversation, in which Earl Moira stated what his views had been in these transactions . . and declared his determination to support the ministry, so far as they might act consistently with the principles which had guided his political life. He had called upon Marquis Wellesley to explain what he meant by asserting that dreadful personal animosities had manifested themselves in the course of the negotiation. The Marquis replied, "that he had used the words advisedly; and no better proof of the charge could be required than the language of Lords Liverpool and Melville, one of whom had expressly declined to be a member of any administration formed by him, and the other had stated his objection as a matter of personal feeling." Lord Harrowby made answer to this: . . "On the very day," he said, "on which Mr. Stuart Wortley's motion was carried, he and his friends had agreed to form part of an administration of which Marquis Wellesley was to have had the lead; but subsequent circumstances had made them alter that determination. The statement in which the Marquis accused his late colleagues of incapacity to conduct the government had wounded them through the memory of him who had just fallen by the hand of an assassin, whom they had considered as the life and soul of their cabinet, and whom they in the highest degree respected and esteemed; . . a man of unimpeachable integrity, who never wanted defence in the eyes of those who knew his value. That

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The old ministry is re-established.

June 8.

M. Wellesley's explanation.

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statement had produced feelings in himself and his friends which rendered it impossible for them cordially to unite with the Marquis in any administration." Marquis Wellesley replied, "that what had been just said confirmed the truth of his assertion, but he acquitted himself of any part in the publication of the statement. As soon as his resignation was known, some of his friends," he said, "took down in writing his account of it in the expressions which fell from him in the heat of conversation: though they had often been solicited to publish this, they had uniformly refused, and he himself was horror-struck when he saw it in the public newspapers: for the statement," he said, "was not his; it contained expressions which he would not have used in a document intended for the public eye, more especially at a moment when the country had just lost a man of the most irreproachable character, of the most perfect integrity, of the mildest heart, of the most amiable qualities, having, indeed, been distinguished by every private virtue. But it was no reproach to any man to be thought unfit for the supreme direction of government; and though he looked upon the act which deprived Mr. Perceval of his life as a stain on humanity, he never considered him, when living, as a fit person to lead the councils of this great empire. He admitted that he had never formally dissented in the cabinet from the opinions of his colleagues, though he had frequently put them in full possession of his own: he declared also, that there were many of their measures which he highly approved, and that he would give them his cordial support, as far as that could be done consistently with the deliberate opinion which he had formed on the great points of national policy: but he concluded by repeating, that they had opposed obstacles to the establishment of an efficient administration, and that those obstacles originated in personal feelings."

There was no tendency in this speech to conciliate, but it

was not likely farther to displease those whom Marquis Wellesley had already wounded, nor to wound others. Earl Grey then rose to make his explanation and his charges. "For himself," he said, "no man could be more anxious than he was, even as far as was consistent with his honour, to outstretch a feeble but a ready hand to save a sinking nation. But a strong suspicion had operated on his mind throughout the recent negotiations, that he and his friends were either not to be admitted into the cabinet at all, or, if admitted, to be bound down in such a manner that the public should be secured against the influence of the principles and measures to which, during their whole parliamentary existence, they had been pledged." Alluding then to Marquis Wellesley and Earl Moira, he said, "that though in his late intercourse with them he could discover nothing but an unceasing and earnest desire to conciliate, and a laudable anxiety for the general good, he nevertheless suspected that they themselves had been deceived, and were not aware of the secret management of which they had been made the instrument." Earl Moira replied with becoming warmth to the imputation, solemnly declaring, "that he had undertaken the negotiation without a single particle of reservation in the authority with which he was intrusted; that he had stated to Lords Grey and Grenville, beyond the possibility of misapprehension, that his instructions were of the most liberal and unlimited nature, and that the transaction from beginning to end had been conducted with a severity of fairness, if he might use the expression, which was perfectly unparalleled. I claim," said he, "of the noble Earl, a statement of the particular circumstances to which he alludes, that I may repel the assertion in as haughty a tone as he has ventured to make it. My lords, I feel that I have not deserved this reproach: it is a disgrace which I do not merit and which I cannot bear. If he can bring forward but

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*June.**Earl Grey.**Earl
Moira's
reply.*

CHAP. the shadow of a proof that even unknowingly I submitted to be
 XLI. made such an instrument, I shall bow my head to his reproof,
 1812. and to the degradation which must ensue. If he cannot, I shall
 June. repel the imputation as proudly as it was made. There was
 never in the most insignificant point the slightest reservation or
 hint of reservation: the powers given to me were complete and
 ample; and whenever limited, they were limited only by me
 from a sense of what was due to the public. I now call upon
 the noble Earl more satisfactorily to explain his meaning." But
 Earl Grey contented himself with hinting that he might find
 some future opportunity for a more distinct explanation; and he
 let it appear that he himself was the person to whom the authority
 for forming an administration ought, in his opinion, to have been
 intrusted. Lord Grenville, with more judgement, avoided all
 offensive topics in his speech; the points which Earl Grey and
 he had refused to concede were, he averred, of material and
 fundamental importance, and they never would consent to be-
 come members of a ministry founded on a principle which, in
 their deliberate opinion, was calculated to overthrow the prac-
 tice of the constitution.

*Mr. Stuart
 Wortley's
 second mo-
 tion.*

But it was in the House of Commons that it was made known
 with what hasty imprudence the two lords had broken off their
 negotiation with Earl Moira. Mr. Stuart Wortley, who ought
 to have learned from the result of his former motion how boot-
 less the repetition of such an experiment must prove, moved
 for a second address to the Prince, regretting that the first had
 not led to its expected consequences, and expressing the
 anxiety of the House that the arrangements for establishing an
 efficient administration should speedily be brought to a close.
 But the House was not disposed a second time to entertain such
 a motion. The temper in which Earl Moira's overtures had
 been rejected drew forth severe comments in the course of the

debate; and a statement which Lord Yarmouth made on the part of the household produced a strong impression both in and out of Parliament. "With respect to the household," he said for himself and his friends, "that it was their intention to resign their situations before the new administration should enter upon office. This intention," he affirmed, "was well known: they had taken every means of stating it in quarters whence it was likely to reach the interested parties, and in particular they had communicated it to one who took an active part in the negotiation, and with whom all who knew him confessed it was a happiness to spend their private hours." Mr. Sheridan, who was the person intended, confirmed this statement. "They took every means short of resignation," Lord Yarmouth continued, "to show that they never wished to have any connexion with the noble lords; and their intention originated in a wish to save the Prince from the humiliation which he must have experienced at seeing them turned out of office, . . . a humiliation which could only serve to convey an unfavourable impression against the government throughout the country. He did not speak in the name of one or two, but of all the officers of the household: they stated expressly to His Royal Highness, that they wished to resign and not to be turned out; and all they requested was, that they might know ten minutes before certain gentlemen received the seals that such a circumstance was to take place: before God he declared that this had been their intention, and that the only principle by which they were actuated was to save the Prince from humiliation; for they could not but consider the attempt at making this change in the household a preliminary to entering upon the negotiation as calculated to humiliate His Royal Highness in the eyes of the country."

The party who were in opposition seemed to think it preposterous that the existing ministers should presume to hold

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Lord Yarmouth's
statement.

CHAP. their offices. "It was monstrous," Lord Milton said, "to see
 XLI. men who were held up repeatedly to scorn and ridicule brave
 1812. public opinion and return into power!" Lord Castlereagh de-
 June. fended himself and his colleagues with considerable address, and
 Lord Cas- ably performed the not very difficult task of contrasting their
 tlereagh's conduct with that of their assailants. "The proposed address,"
 speech. he said, "contained no expressions to which he could hesitate
 in becoming a party, neither should he to the further expression
 of a hope that the Prince would avail himself of any opportunity
 for strengthening the present administration: . . . but such an address
 was uncalled for by any message from the Crown; it could lead
 to no practical result; its obvious import was to insinuate that
 the administration was not likely to possess the confidence of
 the country, and this insinuation was founded upon its structure,
 not upon its conduct; he could not then think it possible that
 the House would sanction it for no other purpose but to dis-
 qualify the government from the arduous task in which it was
 engaged. The late transactions would induce the House not
 again to push the principle which they had so strongly asserted.
 A proceeding so sudden was not to be found in English history
 as that which they had lately seen, when the House decided, not
 against a ministry who had proved themselves unworthy of con-
 fidence, but against an administration the formation of which
 was but in progress. This precedent he hoped future Parlia-
 ments would never follow; for those must be blind who could
 not see the calamitous consequences which the occurrences of
 the last three weeks were calculated to produce on our foreign
 and domestic relations. Three or four distinct negotiations had
 failed, and the Crown was obliged to call on the present cabinet
 to charge itself with the affairs of the country. It was his con-
 solation to think, that while on the one hand he and his colleagues
 had never stood between the Crown and the people, so on the other

hand they had never shown a disposition to shrink from the discharge of public duties, deterred as they otherwise might be by the accumulated difficulties which the late transactions had occasioned. For he could not help thinking that the course which had been pursued was most injurious, and might be fatal to the interests of the public. Never in former times had a negotiation between public men been exhibited to the eyes of Parliament and the country at large, and exposed to all the invidious comments which the malignity and the ignorance of mankind might pass upon them. For his part he could never augur well of any negotiation in which two men could not approach each other in a private room, although on public principles, without coming armed with pen and ink, and prepared to let every thing they might utter go forth immediately for the judgement of the public! The consequences in this instance would, he trusted, have the effect of preventing the recurrence of such scenes for the time to come. . . . It was a painful task for him to speak of the overtures from Marquis Wellesley, though he disclaimed any thing like personal animosity to him. The paper which had appeared he understood to have been published without the noble Marquis's consent; but after such a statement had appeared, describing as it had described Mr. Perceval and those who acted with him, he appealed to the House, whether gentlemen situated as his colleagues were could without degradation meet such an overture in any other way than that in which it had been met? He entertained the sincerest respect for Marquis Wellesley, with the highest admiration for his accomplishments and his talents; and those feelings were heightened by the consideration that he was the brother of the greatest soldier this country had produced. For him, therefore, it was peculiarly painful to be called on to decide on such an occasion; but when one answer only could be given by his

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June.

colleagues, thinking as he did, though not included in it, that the description which had been given of them was unjust, he must have abandoned every sense of duty if he had not been anxious to repel the charge." . . Having then touched upon Earl Moira's negotiation with the two lords, and observed that the question concerning the household had been taken up in a tone which the country would never countenance in those who approached the throne, he concluded thus : . . " And now all I have to say for ministers is, that they claim the constitutional support of Parliament till their actions seem to speak them unworthy of it ; and though the present government may not possess within itself all those attributes which we have heard given to broad and extended administrations, they have at least one recommendation to public confidence (and it is not a small one), that they have no disunion among themselves. We have no private ends to answer ; we are anxious to serve our country, to do our best, and to submit our conduct to the judgement of Parliament."

With these remarkable circumstances was that ministry formed, under whose administration the French were beaten out of Spain, and Buonaparte's empire overthrown. For the second time since the commencement of the war it had rested with the leaders of opposition whether or not they should take the government into their own hands ; and for the second time, by an overweening opinion of their own importance, and a most undue depreciation of those whom they expected to displace, they disappointed their own hopes, and in an equal degree the apprehensions of the nation. The sound part of the public, and they were a large majority, regarded the result with as much satisfaction as they had felt upon the recapture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz ; they looked upon it as tantamount to a great victory over the enemy, and the enemy would indeed have

seen in a contrary result the surest presage of their own success: for what more could the French ministers desire than that the British government should be conducted by men who from the beginning of the war in Spain up to this crisis had pronounced their own cause to be hopeless? That danger was no longer to be feared; and although the cabinet had lost its ablest member in Mr. Perceval.. the only member who united in himself powerful ability with sound judgement, and strength of character with strength of principle, and who commanded in an equal degree the respect of his opponents and the confidence of his friends, the opposition had lost more in the exposure of their temper and the total frustration of their hopes, which was as much the proper as the necessary consequence.

The only unfortunate circumstance in these transactions was, that Marquis Wellesley should have been excluded, or rather should have excluded himself, from a place in the ministry: whatever his own expectations might have been, his friends had expected to see him at its head; and had Lord Wellington been supplied with such reinforcements as in that event might have been looked for, it was believed in the army that in the course of the year he would have driven the French out of Spain. The Spanish Government was at this time little satisfied with Great Britain, because greater pecuniary assistance was not afforded them from resources which they supposed to be infinite. It was indeed the opinion of those whose opportunities of information enabled them to form a just opinion upon the subject, that the Spaniards could make no efficient exertion unless they were aided with two millions a year in money and one in provisions, which might be procured at Cadiz from America and from the Mediterranean by bills on England: but the British Government consented only to give £600,000 in the course of the current year, with arms and clothing for 100,000 men; at length it

CHAP.
XLI.

1812.

May.

*Pecuniary
assistance
to the Spaniards.*

CHAP. agreed that the money should be one million. The Spaniards
 XLI. did not remember with how little wisdom and effect the large
 1812. supplies which they had hitherto received had been expended;
 May. and in England sufficient allowance was not made for the peculiar difficulties in which Spain was placed; and while the errors of its successive governments were strongly perceived, sufficient credit was not given for the national spirit which had displayed itself with such unexampled and invincible endurance.

*Proposal
 concerning
 Spanish
 troops.*

Some persons there were who were of opinion that no sure progress could be made towards the deliverance of Spain unless a Spanish army were created on whose operations Lord Wellington could calculate and rely. But the opinion was abandoned upon farther knowledge of the Spaniards: the officers, with some rare and noble exceptions, were too ignorant, too idle, too prejudiced, and too proud, to receive instruction from their allies; and British officers could not be introduced in any useful number, for this would have offended the national pride. It was suggested by Mr. Tupper, who in his station as consul at Valencia had acted with great zeal and ability in the common cause, that the foreign regiments in the Spanish service might be taken into English pay, and officered by British officers. They still retained their foreign names, and were under foreign officers, but were chiefly composed of Spanish recruits: this, therefore, he argued, might be done without wounding the pride of the Spaniards, offending their prejudices, or injuring the interests of any class of men; whereas to place the Spanish army under the same subordination as the Portuguese, though the people, and especially the soldiers themselves, might like it, must be impossible, so great would be the opposition of the officers and of all the higher classes. This suggestion, for whatever reason, was either not entertained, or not found practicable; and the

only arrangement made at this time was, that the Spaniards allowed 5,000 men to be inlisted and incorporated with the allies. Some hope, however, was entertained from a diversion to be made on the eastern coast by a British force from Sicily in conjunction with a Spanish division, which by General Whittingham's recommendation had been formed in Majorca, and trained there under his directions. This force it was thought, if its operations were well planned and vigorously pursued, might compel the French to withdraw from the southward; and engaged as it was now evident that Buonaparte would be in his Russian war, the deliverance of Spain might be hoped for as now not long to be delayed.

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XLI.
1812.

*May.
Plan of a
diversion
from Sicily.*

At this time, when nothing could be expected from the Spanish armies, the Guerrillas acted in larger bodies than before, and engaged in more difficult enterprises than they had yet undertaken. Duran having obtained a plan of the fortifications of Soria from an architect who resided there, resolved upon attacking that city as an important post, from whence the French commanded a considerable extent of country. Soria, which stands on the Douro, near the supposed site of Numantia, and contained about 1,100 families in the middle of the last century, is surrounded by an old wall eighteen feet in height and six in thickness, to which some works adapted to a more modern art of war had been added; the suburb also had been fortified, and the castle strengthened. He approached the city by a circuitous route (during a most tempestuous night of wind and snow, which froze as it fell,) and reaching it at daybreak scaled the walls, forced the suburb, and obtained possession of the city. The enemy retired into the castle, and Duran prepared to besiege it, setting fire to four convents to clear the way for his operations.

Duran enters Soria.

March 18.

The adventurers had arrived in fortunate time, for the morrow

CHAP. was St. Joseph's day, when a ball and supper were to have been
 XLI. given in honour of the Intruder for his name's sake, and the
 1812. delicacies which had been prepared for this occasion served to
 March. regale these unexpected and unwelcome visitors. Battering-
 rams were employed with great effect against the old walls, that
 the city might no longer afford protection to the French; the
 public money was seized, great quantities of grain and biscuit
 dispatched by all the means of transport which could be found,
 and a contribution levied upon the inhabitants, for hitherto they
 had contributed nothing to the national troops, being under the
 yoke of the French, and thinking it evil enough to pay what
 the invaders exacted; but the Guerrillas admitted of no such ex-
 cuse: they supposed the people to be rich because it was a trading
 city, and many who had formerly been rich proprietors dwelt
 there; the contribution, therefore, was not likely to be lightly
 imposed. Duran enrolled also such men as he thought fit for
 service, ordered others who might have been serviceable to the
 enemy to leave the city, and retreated himself without loss,
 when a detachment arrived from Aranda to the succour of the
 garrison.

*Members of
 the Junta
 of Burgos
 seized by
 the French
 and put to
 death.*

March 21.

This enterprise led to a tragedy characteristic of the spirit in which the war was carried on on both sides. The French, who had come in time to save the castle of Soria, obtained intelligence that the Junta of Burgos were in a village called Grado; and there under the guidance of a Spanish traitor, Moreno by name, a party of 450 horse, making a march of fourteen leagues in less than four-and-twenty hours, surprised them early in the morning. Some twenty soldiers with their commander were found fast asleep, and made prisoners, as were three members of the Junta and the secretary of the Intendancy: but more persons escaped than were taken, though the enemy set every house on fire, with the intention of burning those who might

have hidden themselves. As soon as the news was known, Duran and the Junta of Soria sent to the French commander in that city, reminding him that the prisoners taken there had been treated with humanity, and threatening reprisals if the persons who had now been captured should be put to death. This was of no avail. The vice-president of the Junta, D. Pedro Gordo, who was the parochial priest of Santibañez, was inhumanly scourged by Moreno, . . . perhaps from some impulse of private enmity: the prisoners were then conducted to Aranda, from whence the soldiers contrived to effect their escape. Navas, the secretary of Gordo, and the two other members of the Junta, D. Jose Ortiz de Covarrubios, and D. Eulogio Jose de Muro, with a young lad, son of the former, were sent in irons to Soria, there to be tried by the criminal Junta of that city. The trial, which took place during the night, occupied five hours, all the formalities of justice being observed; and the boy, whom because of his youth it would have been monstrous to condemn, was acquitted; the other four were sentenced to death, and four priests were ordered immediately to attend them; but no more time was allowed than was necessary for bringing together and forming the soldiers who were to conduct them to the place of execution.

CHAP.
XLI.

1812.

*March.**April 2.*

The different behaviour of the sufferers was such as deeply to affect the spectators. Ortiz was greatly moved at the thought of leaving his son fatherless and destitute; but overcoming that emotion with a Spaniard's feeling, he commended the boy to God as the orphan's Father, and called upon the Lord to receive his soul as a victim for his religion and his country. The priest held a crucifix in one hand as he went to execution, and beat his breast incessantly with the other; and, while tears of ardent devotion streamed down his cheeks, implored with a loud voice forgiveness for his own sins and for those of the people.

*Circum-
stances
of the exe-
cution.*

CHAP. Muro, who was a much younger man than either, was of a weak
XLI. constitution, still further weakened by the fatigues he had un-
1812. dergone in the performance of his duties ; so that what with ill
April. treatment, and what he had suffered during twelve days' imprison-
ment, there seemed to be an entire prostration of his strength :
faintings and cold sweats succeeded each other, and it was
thought he would expire before he could reach the place where
he was to be put to death. He had asked earnestly for a cru-
cifix : the priest who attended him not knowing for what service
he had been summoned had improvidently left his house without
one ; he gave him therefore in its stead a rosary, with a medal
attached to it, on which was the image of Our Lady of the
Pillar. Muro had studied in the university of Zaragoza, where
it is said he had never omitted for a single day to visit and
adore the tutelary idol of that city ; and this trifling circum-
stance, which at any other time would have appeared to him
light as air, acted upon him now in a manner that might seem
miraculous or incredible to those who cannot comprehend the
force of imagination and the strength of a believing mind ;
for no sooner had he seen what image the medal bore, than, as
if by an influx of divine support, he put off all weakness, and
proceeded to the place of death with a firm step, and a cheerful
countenance, and ejaculations of jubilant devotion. When they
came to the foot of the hill on the top of which they were to
suffer, " Up, brothers !" he exclaimed, " up ! let us ascend this
our Mount Calvary, where it is vouchsafed to us that we should
imitate our Redeemer ! I pray and trust that this hour our
offences shall be blotted out by virtue of the blood which on his
holy Calvary he shed for our sins." In this spirit he knelt down
upon the fatal spot, raised his eyes to heaven, and presented his
breast to the soldiers. The Spaniards compared the circum-
stances of this man's death with what the French themselves

had related of Marshal Lasnes, how after he had received his mortal wound, a visit from Buonaparte comforted and for a while revived him: "Let patron," said they, "be compared with patron, client with client, and cause with cause!"

CHAP.
XLI.

1812.

April.

*Treatment
of their
bodies.*

The bodies of these victims were suspended from the gallows till the following day, when the French gave orders that they should be taken down and buried. But the execution had been an act of impolitic severity: after Duran's recent visit, the national cause would not have been popular in Soria, unless the national feeling had been thus provoked; and that feeling was now manifested in a manner which the invaders had not looked for. The clergy, the nobles, the different brotherhoods of the city, and the people assembled: the bodies were carried to the church of St. Salvador in procession, with a long line of tapers, and a most numerous attendance; they were then dressed in grave-clothes with becoming decency, that of the priest in his sacerdotal habits. So public and ostentatious a funeral was considered by the French an insult to their authority; soldiers, therefore, were sent to interrupt it, and some of the attendants were compelled to carry the bodies back to the gallows and hang them there again, the priest in his alb, the others in their shrouds; there they remained many days, and what the birds and the dogs had left was then buried at the foot of the gallows.

When D. Jose O'Donell, who commanded what was called the 2nd and 3rd army then in Murcia, received official intelligence of these executions, he wrote to Duran, as acting commander in Aragon and Soria, and instructed him to put to death ten prisoners, without distinction of rank, for each of the four victims, first apprising the nearest French commandant that he had received these orders, and should act upon them unless such reparation were made as might be deemed proper.

*Retaliatory
executions.*

CHAP. tionate to the offence. Without waiting for such instructions,
 XLI. the Merino had exacted vengeance upon a larger scale. Having
 1812. defeated a considerable body of the French who had marched
 April. from Aranda to collect requisitions, killed and wounded some
 150 and taken about 500 prisoners, he put 110 of them to
 death, twenty of these being in reprisals for each member of the
 Junta of Burgos; the others, at the rate of ten for each of his
 own people whom the French had executed. The other pri-
 soners were marched into Asturias where opportunity might be
 found for embarking them; but all the officers, twelve in num-
 ber, including the lieutenant-colonel, their commander, were
 reserved to be shot unless General Rey, who commanded at
 Burgos, would rescue them from that fate by delivering the
 traitor Moreno into the Merino's hands. The unhappy prisoners
 are said to have addressed a letter to Rey, entreating him to
 save their lives by complying with this proposal, for they well
 knew, that in these cases the Spaniards never failed to execute
 what they threatened: the issue has not been related, but may
 easily be guessed, as it was scarcely possible that the French
 commander should so far break his faith with a Spaniard in the
 Intruder's service as to deliver him to certain death.

El Manco.

There were no persons whom the Spaniards regarded with
 such hatred as those who had forsaken the national cause, and
 entered into the Intruder's service. Albuir, known as a Guer-
 rilla chief by the name of El Manco, had taken this course, and
 became therefore a special object of vengeance to his country-
 men: it is the only instance of any man who had acquired
 celebrity as a Guerrillero becoming a traitor, while in the
 officers of the army such cases were not unfrequent: this was
 because the regular officers were men, who having entered the
 service either as a matter of course or of compulsion, felt
 severely the poverty of the government, and often had little else

to do than to talk of its errors, complain of its abuses, and speculate upon its hopeless condition ; whereas the Guerrilla leaders led a life of incessant activity and animating hope, and most of them were impelled to that course by a strong feeling either of their country's injuries or of their own.

CHAP.
XLI.

1812.

April.

At this time, Lord Wellington's successes had animated the Spaniards with a hope of deliverance, and made the French more intent upon extirpating those persons who, by keeping up the national spirit in what they deemed the subjected provinces, occupied a large part of the invading force. They attempted to surprise the Junta of Aragon, as they had that of Burgos, and a detachment from Palombini's troops nearly effected this at Mochales, in the lordship of Molina : the Junta escaped, but the enemy sacked the village, stripped the women in the market-place, and hung the alcalde and two other persons ; in reprisals for whom, Jabarelli, the late commandant at Calatayud, and ten other prisoners, were shot by the Spaniards. Vicente Bonmati, the leader of a Guerrilla party, had been put to death at Petrel, in Valencia, with circumstances of peculiar cruelty ; the French having tied his hands, transfixed them with a bayonet, and then parading him through the streets, pricked him with their bayonets till he died. Upon this the Camp Marshal Copons, provincial commandant-general in that kingdom, gave orders to shoot the first prisoner who should be taken, and informed the nearest French commandant, that for every other such execution, twenty prisoners should be put to death. Such reprisals were but too characteristic of a vindictive people, capable of inflicting as well as enduring any thing ; but they were evidences also of that high-mindedness which the Spaniards retained in their lowest fortune ; never abasing themselves, never submitting to the insolent assumption of authority, nor for a moment consenting that might should be allowed to sanction injustice. Their

*Mutual re-
taliation.*

CHAP. parties, meantime, acquired a confidence from their own ex-
 XLI. perience, and from the success of their allies. Mendizabal
 1812. appeared before Burgos, and drove the enemy from the mo-
 May 5. nastery of Las Huelgas and the hospital del Rey. Duran
Guerrilla entered Tudela by escalade, and destroyed a battering train of
exploits.
 May 28. artillery which had been brought thither from Zaragoza, with
 the intent, he supposed, of laying siege to Ciudad Rodrigo.
 May 30. The Empecinado attacked the French in Cuenca; they with-
 drew from it in the night, and he destroyed their fortifications
 there, and set fire to the Inquisition. Mina received information
 that a strong convoy was about to set forth from Vittoria for
 France, escorting some prisoners taken from Ballasteros. He
 determined to intercept them upon the plains of Arlaban, which
 had been the scene of one of his most successful exploits in the
 preceding year; and in order to deceive the enemy, he wrote let-
 ters which were thrown into their hands, declaring his intention of
 marching upon the river Arga, to form a junction at the foot of the
 April 9. Pyrenees with two of his battalions. The enemy, supposing that
 this dreaded commander was far distant, began their march: his
 orders were, after one discharge to attack with the bayonet, and
 that no soldier should touch the convoy on pain of death, till
 the action was ended. It was of no long duration; the van-
 guard were presently slaughtered; the centre and the rear, con-
 sisting of Poles and of Imperial Guards, made a brave but
 unavailing resistance; from 600 to 700 were slain, 500 wounded,
 and 150 taken with the whole convoy, and about 400 prisoners
 set at liberty. M. Deslandes, the Intruder's private secretary,
 was in the convoy; he got out of his carriage, and endeavoured
 to escape in a peasant's dress, with which it seems he had pro-
 vided himself, in anticipation of some such danger; but this
 disguise cost him his life, which would have been saved had it
 been known in time who he was. His wife, an Andalusian lady,

with two of her countrywomen who were married to officers in the enemy's service, fell into Mina's hands. Very few would have escaped if the French had not erected a fort at Arlaban, in consequence of their last year's loss, and this served as a protection for the fugitives.

CHAP.
XLI.

1812.

April.

Some letters from the Intruder were found upon his secretary. One was to Buonaparte, reminding him how, when he returned to Spain at his desire twelve months before, his Imperial Majesty had told him, that at the worst he could quit that country in case their hopes should not be realised, and that then he should have an asylum in the south of the empire. "Sire," said he, "events have deceived my hopes; I have done no good, and I have no hope of doing any. I entreat your Majesty, therefore, to let me resign into your hands the right to the crown of Spain, which four years ago you deigned to transfer to me. I had no other object in accepting the crown than the happiness of this vast monarchy, and it is not in my power to effect that. I entreat your Majesty to receive me into the number of your subjects, and to believe that you will never have a more faithful servant than the friend whom nature has given you." There were other letters of the same date to his wife, whom he had left in Paris, and who was to deliver that which he had written to the Emperor only in case the decree for uniting to France the provinces beyond the Ebro should have been published; otherwise she was to await his farther directions. In another letter to her he said, that if the Emperor made war against Russia, and thought his presence in Spain could be useful, he would remain there, provided that both the military and civil authority were vested in him; otherwise his desire was to return to France. Should there be no Russian war, he would remain with or without the command, provided nothing were exacted from him which could make it believed that he

*Intercepted
letters from
the In-
truder.*

CHAP. consented to a dismemberment of the monarchy; provided also
 XLI. that troops enough and territory enough were left him, and
 1812. that the monthly loan of a million, which had been promised,
 April. were paid. In that case he would remain as long as he could, thinking himself as much bound in honour not to quit Spain lightly, as he should be to quit it, if, during the war with England, sacrifices were required from him which he neither could nor ought to make, except at a general peace, for the good of Spain, of France, and of Europe. A decree for uniting to France the provinces beyond the Ebro, if it arrived unexpectedly, he said, would make him depart the next day; and if the Emperor should adjourn his projects till a time of peace, he must supply him with means of subsistence during the war. But if he inclined either to his removal, or to any of those measures which must cause him to remove, it was then of great consequence that he should return to France on kindly terms with the Emperor, and with his sincere and full consent; and this was what reason dictated to him, and what was more conformable to the situation of the miserable country over which he had been made king, and to his own domestic relations. In that case, he asked from the Emperor a domain in Tuscany, or in the south, some three hundred leagues from Paris. The course of events, and the false position in which he found himself, so contrary, he said, to the rectitude and loyalty of his character, had greatly injured his health: he was growing old; nothing but honour and duty could detain him where he was, and his inclination would drive him away, unless the Emperor explained himself in a different manner from what he had hitherto done. There was also a letter to his brother Louis, expressing a hope to see him one day in good health, and with the happiness which arises from a good conscience. . . . That happiness the intrusive king Joseph might well envy! It is little excuse for him that he

was more weak than wicked, and in mere weakness had consented to be made the instrument of his brother's insatiable ambition. Even in these letters, where he manifested a full sense of his humiliating situation, no consciousness is expressed of its guilt. For the sake of his own credit, and no doubt of his own personal safety, he protested against any immediate dismemberment of Spain; but he would have been contented to serve his brother's purpose, by nominally retaining the kingdom, till a pretext could be found for dismembering it at a general peace.

CHAP.
XLI.
1812.

April.

But how long he should retain it depended upon something more than the will and pleasure of Napoleon Buonaparte, and this he was soon made to apprehend. Lord Wellington was not about to remain idle with his victorious army; he prepared for offensive operations, and the first step was to interrupt the communication between the armies of Soult and Marmont. All the permanent bridges on the Tagus below that of Arzobispo had been destroyed; and the only way which was practicable for a large army was by a bridge of boats at Almaraz, in the line of the high road, where the noble bridge erected in Charles the Fifth's time, at the city of Plasencia's cost, had been demolished. For the protection of this important post, the French had thrown up strong works on both sides of the river: they had formed a flanked *tete-du-pont* on the left bank, riveted with masonry and strongly intrenched; and on the high ground above it they had constructed a large and strong redoubt, called Fort Napoleon, with an interior intrenchment, and a loop-holed tower in its centre; here they had mounted nine pieces of cannon, and had garrisoned it with between 400 and 500 men. On the right bank, there was a redoubt called Fort Ragusa, in honour of Marshal Marmont, of the same strength and construction, except that the tower had a

Sir Rowland Hill's expedition to the bridge of Almaraz.

CHAP.

XLI.

1812.

May.

double tier of loopholes ; this flanked the bridge, and between the redoubt and the bridge there was a *flèche*. For farther security, the invaders had fortified an old castle commanding the Puerto de Miravete, about a league distant, being the only pass for carriages of any kind by which the bridge could be approached. A marked alteration of climate is perceptible upon crossing the narrow mountain ridge over which the road here passes. Coming from Castille, the traveller descends from this ridge into a country, where, for the first time, the gum-cistus appears as lord of the waste, . . the most beautiful of all shrubs in the Peninsula for the profusion of its delicate flowers, and one of the most delightful for the rich balsamic odour which its leaves exude under a southern sun ; but which overspreads such extensive tracts, where it suffers nothing else to grow, that in many parts both of Portugal and Spain it becomes the very emblem of desolation. The old castle stood at little distance from the road, on the summit of the sierra : the French had surrounded it by a lower *enceinte*, twelve feet high ; they had fortified a large *venta*, or travellers' inn, upon the road, and had constructed two small works between the inn and the castle, forming altogether a strong line of defence.

Sir Rowland Hill, to whom this important service had been intrusted, broke up from Almandralejo on the 12th of May, with part of the 2nd division of infantry, and six of the 24-pounder iron howitzers which had been used against Badajoz. The Marquis de Almeida, who was a member of the Junta of Extremadura, accompanied them, and from him and from the people, Sir Rowland received the most ready and effectual assistance which it was in their power to bestow. On the morning of the 16th they reached Jaraicejo, an old and decayed town, about eight miles from the summit of the pass ; and on the same evening they advanced in three columns . . the left,

under Lieutenant-General Chowne, toward the castle of Miravete; Sir Rowland himself, with the right under Major-General Howard, toward a pass through which a most difficult and circuitous footpath leads by the village of Romangordo to the bridge; and the centre, under Major-General Long, along the high road, to the Puerto. The artillery was with the centre: both the flank columns were provided with ladders, and it was intended that both should escalate the forts against which they were directed; but the difficulties of the way were such, that it was found impossible for them to reach their respective points before daybreak: as the enemy, therefore, could not be taken by surprise, Sir Rowland judged it best to defer the attack till they should be better acquainted with the position and nature of the works; and the troops bivouacked on the sierra. It was found that the castle, because of its peculiar situation, could not be carried without a long operation: a false attack therefore was directed to be made upon it by Lieutenant-General Chowne, and Sir Rowland, with the right, and the 6th Portuguese caçadores (about 2,000 men in all), on the evening of the 18th began to descend by the mountain path which he had originally proposed to take. They were provided with twelve scaling-ladders of sixteen feet in length; and he relied, as in this case he well might do, upon the valour of the troops, to supply the want of artillery. Although the distance was little more than six miles, the way was so difficult, that notwithstanding all the exertions of officers and men the head of the column did not arrive near the fort till it was break of day, and it was two or three hours later before the rear came up; but during this time the troops were completely concealed by the hill, and the feint against the castle had induced the enemy to believe that the bridge forts would not be attacked till the pass should have been forced, and a way made for the guns.

CHAP.

XLI.

1812.

May.

CHAP.
XLI.

1812.

May 19.

Could the attack have been made before day, it was intended that the *tête-du-pont* should have been escaladed, and the bridge destroyed, at the same time that Fort Napoleon was assaulted; but well knowing how much depended upon celerity, Sir Rowland did not wait till the troops who were appointed to this part of the operations could come up; with the first battalion of the 50th and one wing of the 71st, he escaladed the fort in three places nearly at the same time. At first a determined resistance was made, but the enemy soon slackened their destructive fire: they took to flight as soon as the assailants were on the top of the parapet; they abandoned the tower, and were driven at the point of the bayonet through their intrenchment, and through the *tête-du-pont*, and across the bridge. The commander of Fort Ragusa on the opposite bank, with a cowardice rarely shown among French officers, but with a selfish disregard for the soldiers which was too common among them, cut the bridge, in consequence of which many leaped into the river and perished, and 259 were made prisoners, including the governor and sixteen officers; and acting with farther folly in his fear, he evacuated his own fort, which was perfectly safe from any attack, and retired with his garrison to Naval Moral, three leagues off, for which he was brought to summary trial at Talavera and shot... Both forts were entirely destroyed by the conquerors, and the whole apparatus of the bridge, and the stores, which were in such abundance as to prove that this point had justly been considered a most important station by the enemy. The loss in this signal enterprise was, two officers and 31 men killed, 13 and 131 wounded.

The garrison ought to have been prepared for such an attack; for Marmont had apprehended it, and in that apprehension had marched a detachment to the Puerto del Pico, with the view of reinforcing Talavera in case the bridge should be

lost. Sir Rowland retired by Truxillo to his former position in front of Badajoz; and on the second day after his success, a division of the central army, under General d'Armagnac, crossed the Tagus by the Puente del Arzobispo, to relieve the isolated garrison at Miravete. Both Soult and Marmont had put their forces in motion as soon as they were informed of Sir Rowland's march: the latter arrived upon the Tagus too late to prevent the evil, and without the means of repairing it; the former, when he found that the allies had passed Truxillo on their return, gave up the hope of intercepting them. He returned to Seville, and, regarding with uneasy apprehension the enterprising spirit of an enemy whom he had once affected to despise, gave directions for strengthening the line of the Guadalete, lest a force should be landed at St. Roque's or at Algeiras, and endanger his communication with the besieging army before Cadiz. Bornos, as the most important point upon the line, was fortified with great care. Ballasteros thought to interrupt the progress of the works, and accordingly brought all the force he could muster, consisting of about 6,000, to attack the French division there of 4,500 under General Corroux. Collecting his troops at La Majada de Ruiz, and marching from thence early in the afternoon of one day, he succeeded in fording the Guadalete unperceived at dawn on the next. The attack was made bravely, but, with the usual ill fortune and ill discipline of a Spanish army, some mistake led to confusion, and confusion was followed by panic: the French were not strong enough to pursue them beyond the river, and Ballasteros retired with the loss of about 1,000 killed and wounded, and half as many prisoners, . . . a fourth of his whole force.

Meantime Badajoz had been fully supplied; the means of transport which had been used for that service were then employed in storing Ciudad Rodrigo; a month's consumption for

CHAP.
XLI.

1812.

May.

*Ballasteros
defeated at
Bornos.*

June 1.

*Lord Wel-
lington ad-
vances into
Spain.*

CHAP. the whole army was deposited there ; the bridge at Alcantara was
 XLI. repaired for a readier communication with Sir Rowland's corps ;
 1812. and on the 13th of June the army broke up from its cantonments
 June. on the Agueda. On the 16th they came up with the enemy,
 about six miles from Salamanca, on the Valmusa, and there was
 a skirmish with their cavalry ; in the evening the French with-
 drew across the Tormes, and the army bivouacked within a
 league of Salamanca.

Salamanca. When the earliest accounts of Spain begin, Salamanca
 was already a considerable place, and known by a name
 little different from what it bears at present. It fell to decay
 after the Moorish conquest, but was repeopled at the same
 time with certain other towns upon the Tormes by the
 Leonese in the 10th century, after the great battle of Si-
 mancas : in the 13th King St. Ferdinand removed thither
 the university from Palencia. It soon became one of the most
 flourishing seats of learning in Christendom, and continued
 to be so till Spain rejected the light of the reformation. In
 its best days it is said to have contained no fewer than 8,000
 native students, and 7,000 from foreign countries : when the
 present war began, the number little exceeded 3,000, among
 whom a few Irish were the only foreigners. The population
 consisted of some 3,400 families : it had once been much greater.
 But Salamanca was still an important and a famous place :
 popular fiction had made its name familiar to those who are
 unacquainted with its history ; while to the antiquary, the hi-
 storian, and the philosopher, it is a city of no ordinary interest.
 The Roman road which extended from thence to Merida, and so
 to Seville, may still be traced in its vicinity : its bridge of twenty-
 seven arches, over the Tormes, is said to be in part a Roman
 work. The Mozarabic liturgy is retained in one of its churches.
 Its cathedral, though far inferior to some of the older edifices,

whether of Moorish or Gothic architecture, in Spain, is a large and imposing structure. Twenty-five parish churches are enclosed within its walls, twenty convents of monks or friars, eleven of nuns: these, with its numerous colleges, give it an imposing appearance from without, and a melancholy solemnity within. Nowhere, indeed, were there more munificent endowments for education, and for literature, and for religion; and nowhere could be less of that happy effect which the benefactors in their piety had contemplated: the philosophy which was taught there was that of the schoolmen, the morality that of the casuists, the religion that of the Inquisition. It is a popular belief in Spain, that the Devil also has his college at Salamanca, where students of the black art take their degrees in certain caverns, every seventh being left with him, in earnest of the after-payment to which they all are bound.

CHAP.
XLI.

1812.

June.

The city stands in a commanding situation, on the right bank of the Tormes, a river of considerable magnitude there, which rises near the Sierra de Tablada in Old Castille, and falls into the Douro on the Portuguese frontier, opposite Bemposta. The country round is open, without trees, and with a few villages interspersed, in which the houses are constructed of clay. On the left of the river there are extensive pastures, on the right a wide and unenclosed corn country. The pastures are common, and the arable land occupied after a manner not usual in other parts of Spain: it is cultivated in annual allotments, and reverts to the commonalty after the harvest.

The Tormes.

Marmont had apprehended this advance of the allies, and had applied for reinforcements without effect. He showed some cavalry and a small body of infantry in front of the town, and manifested an intention of holding the heights on the south side of the Tormes; but in the evening of the 16th the enemy with-

The allies enter Salamanca.

CHAP. drew over the river, and the allies bivouacked within a league of
 XLI. Salamanca. The French retired from that city during the night,
 1812. leaving some 800 men in the fortifications which they had constructed there. These works commanded the bridge; the left
 June. column of the allied army therefore crossed at the ford of El Campo, a league below the city, the centre and the right at the ford of Santa Martha. The utmost joy was expressed by the inhabitants when the English entered, and women crowded to thank Lord Wellington and bless him for their deliverance. Some aching hearts there were among those who had connected themselves by marriage, or by looser ties, with the enemies of their country, but the general feeling was that of perfect and grateful joy; for though this city had suffered none of the immediate evils of war, its consequences had been severely felt there. During the three years of its captivity, the French had demolished thirteen of its convents and twenty-two of its twenty-five colleges; the people had been compelled to labour upon works erected for their own subjugation; and the last act of the enemy before they left the city was to set fire to such houses as obstructed the defence of their works, .. consisting of a fort and two redoubts. For the same reason, they had previously demolished the Convent of St. Augustine, the colleges of Cuenca and Oviedo, and the magnificent King's College. The fort was formed out of the Convent of St. Vicente, a large building in the centre of the angle of the old wall, on a perpendicular cliff over the Tormes. The windows had been built up and loopholed; on both sides it was connected by lines of works with the old wall. There was a fascine battery in a re-entering angle of the convent, not enclosed by these lines, and this was protected by a loopholed wall, with a palisade in front. The demolition of so many substantial edifices supplied timber of the best quality, and in abundance, for gates, drawbridges, palisades, and splinter proofs;

*Siege of the
forts there.*

*Col. Jones's
Sieges,
158-9.*

and the whole was well flanked in every part. The ground to the south, which was toward the bridge, fell by a steep descent: at the bottom was a small stream flowing to the Tormes; and on the opposite bank the convents of San Cayetano and La Merced had been converted with great skill into two redoubts, with well-covered perpendicular escarpes, deep ditches, and casemated counterscarps; they were also full of bomb proofs, made by supporting a roof horizontally and vertically with strong beams, and covering it with six feet of earth. These works were seen at once to be far more respectable than Lord Wellington had expected to find, his information amounting to little more than that some convents had been fortified. It was necessary to reduce them before the army could advance, but the means of attack had been provided on this inadequate knowledge: they consisted of only four iron eighteen-pounders and four 24-pounder iron howitzers, with an hundred rounds for each. The engineers had only 400 intrenching-tools, without any stores; there were present three engineer officers, with nine men of the corps of royal military artificers; and the works were soon found to be even more formidable than they appeared.

The sixth division broke ground before the fort. The left wing of the army moved to Villares de la Reyna, a league in advance of Salamanca; the right and centre bivouacked on the Tormes, near Santa Martha, on the right bank. Lieutenant-Colonel Ponsonby's brigade followed the retiring enemy, and skirmished with them for two leagues. A battery was erected for breaching the main wall of the fort. It was nearly full moon; little could be done therefore during the first night. An attempt to blow in part of the counterscarp opposite to the intended breach was frustrated by the vigilance of a dog; and an attempt at mining it failed also, the party being ordered to withdraw in consequence of the loss sustained by a

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plunging fire from the top of the convent. On the second night two batteries were completed: they opened the following morning, and beat down part of the wall; but the enemy's musketry fired with great effect from loopholes in the upper windows, and their fire was more than ordinarily destructive, because of the large openings of the embrasures which were necessary for such short pieces as the howitzers. More ammunition was sent for to Almeida. Early on the third day, the lower part of the convent wall, three feet and a half thick, was pierced through, and at a single shot half the length of that face of the building came down, bringing the roof with it, and laying the interior open: the men were seen firing through the loopholes at the moment of its fall, and they of course were buried in the ruins. Carcasses were then fired into the convent to set it on fire, but the enemy's precautions prevented them from taking effect.

*Marmont
moves to re-
lieve them.*

Marmont at this time moved forward from Fuente Sabuco, making the most display of the force which he could then bring together: it was estimated at about 16,000 men. He advanced as if with a determination of giving battle, firing artillery the whole way to give the forts notice of his approach. Lord Wellington immediately formed the allied army upon the heights: his left, where the rains had formed a deep ravine, rested on a chapel; his centre was in the village of S. Christobal de la Cuesta, and his right on another eminence in front of Castellanos de los Moriscos. . . The advanced posts retired before the enemy with little loss; there was a considerable cannonade on both sides; the enemy's cavalry were dislodged by our guns from the position in which they had halted; and Marmont, after manœuvring for some time in front of the position, took up ground in the plain below it, near the village of Villares, and just out of cannon-shot, his right resting upon the great road to Toro, his left in Castellanos de los Moriscos. The allies were under arms

at daylight, expecting an attack. In the course of the day the French received reinforcements, but not sufficient to justify them in bringing on an action, scarcely in exposing themselves to one. Both armies remained quiet in front of each other, the allies on the heights, the French close under their position, occupying Castellanos de los Moriscos in force, and having a considerable bivouac between that village and another on their right: both villages were soon completely unroofed for firewood, and there were wells in both, whereas the allies were badly off for wood and water, which were brought to them in insufficient supply from Salamanca. There was not a tree on the position; but the midsummer sun was less powerful than it usually is in that country, and the troops did not suffer from heat.

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During the night, the French occupied an eminence on the right flank of the allies. Sir Thomas Graham was directed to dislodge them. The 58th and 61st carried the hill immediately, and drove them from the ground with considerable loss. The enemy's troops got under arms, expecting a general attack, but they made no attempt to regain the hill. They retired in the night, and on the following evening posted themselves with their right on the heights near Cabeza Velloso, their left on the Tormes at Huerta, their centre at Aldea Rubia, their object in this movement being to communicate with the garrison. Lord Wellington therefore changed the front of his army, placing the right at S. Martha, and the advanced posts at Aldea Lingua; and he sent Major-General Bock's brigade of heavy dragoons across the river in order to observe the fords. By this time a battery which had been opened on the Cayetano redoubt had beaten down the palisades and injured the parapet; and when night closed, 300 men from the 6th division were ordered to attack it by escalade. The undertaking was difficult, and the men seemed to feel it. Major-General Bowes went forward

June 23.

CHAP. with the storming party: he was wounded, returned to the
XLI. attack as soon as his wound was dressed, and was then killed.

1812. The enemy made so resolute a resistance, that only two ladders
June. were reared against the redoubt, and no one mounted them.

120 men were killed or wounded in this unsuccessful attempt. On the following evening, a truce was made for removing the killed and wounded; till then the French would neither allow them to be removed, nor remove them themselves.

June 24. There had been a report on the preceding afternoon, that the enemy had crossed at Huerta. Lord Wellington was on the hill at Aldea Lingua by daybreak. It was certain that they had made some movement, but the morning was so foggy that nothing could be seen. Soon Major-General Bock's brigade was heard skirmishing, and from their fire it was evident that they were losing ground. The French had crossed about two in the morning in considerable force; and when the fog cleared General Bock was seen retiring in the best order before superior numbers, who had also the advantage of having artillery with them. Lord Wellington, upon the first certainty that the enemy had passed the Tormes, ordered the 1st and 7th divisions, under Sir Thomas Graham, to cross and take up a position to the right in front of Santa Martha, and Major-General Le Marchant's brigade of cavalry was sent to support General Bock; the rest of the army he concentrated between Castellanos de los Moriscos and Cabrerizas, keeping the advanced posts at Aldea Lingua. The French, who had crossed with 10,000 infantry and fourteen squadrons of horse, gained possession of Calvarasa de Abaxo; but seeing the disposition which was made for their reception, they did not venture upon an attack. About three in the afternoon they began to withdraw, and before night they had repassed the river to their former position. The allies also recrossed.

Both armies remained quiet during the following day, but on the next night a communication was carried along the bottom of the ravine between the redoubts and the fort, and a piquet was lodged under the gorge of S. Cayetano. On the morrow a supply of ammunition arrived, and red-hot shot were then fired against San Vicente. By the third shot the roof of a large square tower on the convent was set on fire and consumed; but the conflagration did not spread, and during the day wherever fires broke out they were speedily extinguished. The inhabitants said that the powder in the fort was well secured; but no activity on the enemy's part could long counteract the means of destruction which were now employed. Hot shot were fired during the whole night: by ten in the morning the convent was in flames. At the same time a breach had been effected in the gorge of S. Cayetano: the troops were formed in readiness for assaulting it, when a white flag was hoisted there, and the commanding officer offered to surrender that and the other redoubt in two hours, which time he asked for that he might represent his situation to the commandant in San Vicente. Lord Wellington offered him five minutes to march out, in which case he should preserve his baggage; but it presently appeared that he was only negotiating for the sake of gaining time, as in fact he could not venture without the commandant's sanction to carry into effect the capitulation which he had offered. He was ordered, therefore, to take down his white flag. The commandant meantime sent out a flag of truce, and proposed to surrender San Vicente in three hours: five minutes were allowed, and as at the expiration of that short term there was no appearance of their coming out, both redoubts were stormed, and carried with little resistance. The troops moved forward against the fort: a few shot were fired from it, by which six

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*July.**Surrender
of the forts.*

CHAP. men were killed or wounded; but with that the resistance
 XLI. ended: the enemy even helped the Portuguese caçadores into
 1812. the work, and Lord Wellington allowed them to march out
 June. with the honours of war, but to be prisoners of war, the officers
 retaining their personal military baggage, and the soldiers their
 knapsacks. There were 36 pieces of cannon in the forts, with
 large depôts of clothing, and military stores of every kind: these
 were consigned to the Spaniards, and the works were destroyed.
 The prisoners were somewhat more than 700; the loss of the be-
 siegers about 450.

*Marmont
 falls back
 upon the
 Douro.*

Marmont commenced his retreat at midnight, as if, said the Spaniards, he had only come thither to witness the capture of his fort, and see the illumination made by it when on fire. At daylight their column was nearly out of sight, and their rear-guard moving off the ground. During this tarriance, the French, considering that part of Spain no longer as a subjected but as a hostile country, had acted in the same spirit of disgraceful barbarity as had rendered their name execrable in Portugal; and when they departed, they left the villages of Castellanos de los Moriscos, Huerta, Babila Fuente, Villoria, and Villaruela in flames: where they did not burn the villages, they sacked the houses, and murdered those who had ventured to remain in them; and where they did not trample down the standing corn, they set fire to it. The popular feeling had been strongly manifested during the operations against the forts: not only were all necessaries and accommodations for the wounded abundantly supplied, but women of all ranks offered their services to attend on them. High mass was performed this day in the cathedral, at which Lord Wellington and most of the general officers attended. Lord Wellington gave a dinner in Salamanca, and the Junta a ball in the evening; but some of the principal in-

habitants absented themselves, because they were partisans of the French, and others from a prudential fear, lest the enemy should return, and again obtain possession of the city.

The French withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes, and retired towards the Douro in three columns...one upon Toro, and the others upon Tordesillas. The allies broke up the next day, following their march, and encamped upon the Guarena. On the morrow Marmont had collected his force, as if with an intention of making a stand on the right bank of that river; his rear was on the hills in front of Alaejos: they moved off before the advanced guard could come up. The allies bivouacked every night in an open country, without a tree to shade them, and where it was necessary to seek for wood at the distance of several miles, the inhabitants frequently using straw for fuel. The enemy continued to fall back toward the Douro, closely followed by one who would let no opportunity escape him. On the 2nd of July their cavalry were on the plain toward Tordesillas, and they had a considerable force of infantry in Rueda; but they were compelled to withdraw from thence, and the town was occupied by the advance of the allied army. On the following day, this part of the army was ordered into the plain, as if with a view of attacking Tordesillas; while the left column, strengthened by the brigades of Generals Bock and Le Marchant, moved on Pollos, where there is a ford. There was some cannonading on the part of the enemy there, and an affair of light troops; and some of the allies passed the river, but they were withdrawn at night: it was then seen that there was no intention of forcing the passage, and orders were given for the distribution of the army. Lord Wellington fixed his head-quarters at Rueda. The French occupied Tordesillas in force: they had a considerable bivouac in the rear of that town, and the bridge there was fortified.

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June 29.

Lord Wel-
lington ad-
vances to
the Douro.

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1812.

*June.**The Douro.*

After the recapture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, Marmont could not be surprised that the forts at Salamanca fell, even if he had known with what scanty means they had been attacked; and as he had not been brought to action, his army took credit to themselves for having braved a superior force. The French had lost much of their confidence in battle against the English, but they still relied upon their skill in manœuvring; and Marmont, knowing that he should soon have the advantage in numbers, availed himself of all the opportunities which the nature of the country afforded him for gaining time. He was in possession of the line of the Douro. That river rises in the Sierra de Orbion, in Old Castille, issuing from a large and deep tarn, high on the mountain: passing the site of Numancia, it comes to Soria, and so to Berlanga, Osma, and Santesteban de Gormas: in this part of its course its banks are remarkable for the jessamine with which they are profusely clothed. Having left Aranda, it passes by the Cistercian monastery of Valbueno, a place denoting by its name the happy circumstances of its position, and where the monks used to account among the goodly things which had fallen to their lot the barbel and trout with which the Douro supplied them. The Pisuerga, having already received the Arlanza and the Carrion, joins it by Simancas; and though it brings the larger body of water to the junction, loses its name there. The Douro then makes for Tordesillas: for the first ten leagues of its way its course is s. s. w., then westward till it reaches this old city, where it bends to the southward for a few leagues, passing S. Roman de Hornija, the now obscure burial-place of Chindasuintho, one of the most powerful of the Wisigoth kings; then it resumes its western course, waters Toro and Zamora, cities of great name in the Spanish annals, and having collected all the rivers of Leon on its way, enters Portugal. Of all the rivers in the Peninsula, the

Douro has the longest course. From its junction with the Pisuerga, till it receives the Tormes on the frontier of Portugal, it flows through a wide valley, the right bank for the most part skirting the heights. The French were in possession of all the bridges, and from the mouth of the Pisuerga to Zamora there is but one point favourable for passing an army from the left in presence of an enemy: that point is three leagues above Toro, at Castro Nuño, where there is a good ford, a favourable bend in the river, and advantages of ground. There could be little hope, therefore, of striking an efficient blow against Marmont so long as he kept his force concentrated behind the Douro, and it was in his power to cross the river at any of its bridges or fords whenever he might think that opportunity invited.

But the French, according to the barbarous system which Buonaparte pursued, were without magazines, and trusted to their command of the country for subsistence: Marmont therefore had this anxious object to distract his attention; and the Guerrillas were actively employed both upon his flanks and rear in intercepting his supplies, and in occupying troops who would otherwise have reinforced him. Two parties under Sorniel and Bourbon, with 700 cavalry, were on the right; D. Julian Sanches, with 500, on the left; while Porlier displayed his usual activity on the side of Asturias; and Mina and Duran in Navarre and Aragon: on that side their efforts were effectual; but General Bonnet joined him from the north, and increased his force to 47,000 men, thus making it numerically superior to that of the allies. Lord Wellington's situation was at this time an anxious one: he had counted upon the aid which the Galician army might have given him in occupying some of the enemy by besieging Astorga; in that undertaking, however, they were more dilatory than had been intended; and he was now aware that the force intended to cooperate with

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Colonel
Jones's
account of
the war, 2.
100.

Marmont
reinforced
by G. Bon-
net.

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him by acting upon the eastern coast was upon so small a scale, that he could place little hope upon it, and no reliance. The French suffered at this time nothing for want of magazines or means of transport, because they took what they wanted, and preyed upon the country. The British Government would not, even in an enemy's territories, carry on war upon so inhuman and iniquitous a system; but it exposed its army to privations, and its general to perplexities and difficulties which might have paralysed any weaker mind than Lord Wellington's, by the parsimony with which it apportioned his means. When he advanced from Salamanca, there were but 20,000 dollars in the military chest: the harvest was abundant, but how was bread to be obtained without money?...and the same want would be felt in bringing his supplies from Ciudad Rodrigo, and other places in the rear of that fortress. The very difficulty of removing his wounded to the frontier of Portugal was sufficient to deter him from seeking an action on the Douro.

*Lord Wel-
lington re-
tires before
him.*

On the 15th and 16th, Marmont concentrated his troops between Toro and San Roman: two divisions crossed the bridge at Toro on the evening of the 16th, and Lord Wellington moved the allies that night to Fuente la Peña and Canizal, intending to concentrate them on the Guarena. But it was ascertained next day, that during the night the enemy had repassed the bridge, and destroyed it after them; then making forced marches to Tordesillas, which is six leagues above Toro, crossed again there, and early on the morning of the 18th were on the Trebancos. Marmont might well applaud himself both for the celerity and the skill of these movements: he had marched forty miles; had opened his communication with the army of the centre, which was then moving from Madrid to support him; and by advancing in force on Castrejon he endangered the light and 4th divisions, with Major-General Anson's brigades of cavalry, which

there had not been time for calling in. The enemy commenced a very heavy cannonade against the cavalry; they were scattered about in squadrons, and so escaped without much loss; and immediate measures had been taken to provide for their retreat and junction. The troops at Castrejon maintained their post till the cavalry joined them; then they retired in perfect order to Tordesillas de la Orden, and thence to the Guarena, having the enemy's whole army on their left flank or in their rear; and the French getting possession of the heights above that river, before the allies had crossed, brought forty guns to bear upon them, under the fire of which they joined the army on the left bank. Four streams which unite about a league below Canizal, form the Guarena; the French crossed at Castrillo, a little below the junction, and manifested an intention to press upon the left of the allies; with this view they endeavoured to occupy a ridge above Castrillo, but Lieutenant-General Cole's division advanced to meet them with the bayonet; they gave way; the cavalry charged, General Carrier and between 300 and 400 men were made prisoners, and one gun taken. In the course of the day, the allies lost about 100 in killed, 400 wounded, and 50 prisoners; but the check which Marmont received made him more circumspect in his movements.

The allies took up a position for the night on the Guarena, from Castrillo on the left, to beyond Canizal on the right. The enemy occupied the opposite side of the valley with their whole force. Both armies remained quiet till two in the afternoon of the following day, when the French withdrawing all their troops from the right marched by Tarazona, as if with an intention of turning the right of the allies. Counter-movements were consequently made; the artillery fired at the enemy's advance, and in that dry season the corn took fire in several places, and burnt for a mile in extent. Lord Wellington expected a battle on the

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CHAP. plain of Vallesa in the morning, and made every preparation
 XLI. for it; the men bivouacked in two lines in order of battle, and
 1812. stood to their arms at daybreak, ready to receive an attack; but

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as soon as it was light, the enemy were seen moving in several columns to their left, on Babilafuente; the allies made a correspondent movement to the right: at any moment either commander might have brought on a general action; but it was a game of skill in which they were engaged, not of hazard. Marmont's march was estimated at five leagues, that of the allies at four, being in the inner circle; they moved in parallel lines, frequently within half cannon shot. The enemy encamped that night at Babilafuente and Villamela; the allies at Cabeza Velloso, the 6th division and a brigade of cavalry being upon the

July 21.

Tormes at Aldea Lengua. On the following day, the French crossed that river by the fords near Alba and Huerta, and moved by their left towards the road leading to Ciudad Rodrigo. In the evening the allies crossed also, part by the bridge at Salamanca, part by the ford of Santa Martha. A dreadful storm came on of thunder and lightning with heavy rain; the different divisions of infantry were seen by the lightning marching to their ground, their muskets reflecting the flashes. The 5th dragoon guards had just got to their ground; many of the men had lain down; their horses were fastened together by their collars for the night, but terrified by the lightning, they set off full gallop and ran over the men, eighteen of whom were hurt; and two and thirty horses were lost, having probably gone to the enemy's lines.

It was evident from Marmont's manner of manœuvring, that he did not mean to attack the allies, unless at such advantage as might seem to render his success certain; and it seemed not less evident, that by pursuing this system, turning their flank and keeping possession of the heights, he would drive them to the

frontier if they continued to act upon the defensive. All the stores which were at Salamanca were ordered to the rear of the army, and the inhabitants were in the utmost consternation, apprehending, not without good apparent reason, that they should presently be brought under the yoke of the French again. Lord Wellington had placed the troops in a position, the right of which was upon one of two heights called the two Arapiles; and the left on the Tormes below the ford of Santa Martha. The enemy had still a large corps above Babilafuente, on the right of the river; for this reason, the 3rd division and Brigadier-General D'Urban's cavalry were left on the same side at Cabrerizos; and Lord Wellington thought it not improbable, that when Marmont should find in the morning that the allies were prepared for him on the left of the Tormes, he would alter his plan, and manœuvre by the other bank. In the course of the night he was informed that the cavalry and horse-artillery of the army of the north had arrived at Pollos to join Marmont, and that they would effect a junction with him the next day, or the day after at latest. During the night the enemy took possession of Calvarasa de arriba, and of a height near that village called Nuestra Señora de la Peña; the allied cavalry were in possession of Calvarasa de abaxo, which is between three and four miles from the upper village, and nearer the river.

The last night's storm had not cleared the atmosphere, and the morning rose threateningly, in clouds. The French were early in motion, and from the manner in which they marched and countermarched their troops, it was impossible to divine what might be their intention. Soon after daylight, detachments from both armies attempted to gain the yet unoccupied Arapiles hill; but the enemy had been concealed in the woods nearer that point, and their infantry were discovered on the summit when the allies were in the act of advancing to it: their detachment

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Battle of
Salamanca.*

CHAP. was also the strongest. By occupying this point they mate-
 XLI. rially strengthened their own position, and were the better
 1812. enabled to annoy that of the allies. Early in the day, the light
 July. troops of the 7th division and the 4th *caçadores* of General Pack's
 brigade were engaged with the enemy on the height of N. Señora
 de la Peña, which they gained and kept through the day. But
 the possession of the farther Arapiles by the French made it ne-
 cessary for Lord Wellington to extend the right of his army to
 the heights behind the village of that name, and to occupy that
 village with the 4th division under Lieutenant-General Cole.
 Doubtful as Marmont's intentions still were, the British com-
 mander judged that his objects were on the left of the Tormes,
 and therefore he ordered the 3rd division and D'Urban's cavalry
 from the other bank, and placed them behind Aldea Tejada.

During these movements the French kept up a heavy can-
 nonade and fire of light troops. The day, meantime, had cleared.
 Their force was formed in columns of attack in rear of the
 Arapiles hill, the left resting upon an extensive wood; thence
 they could either by a rapid march interpose between Lord
 Wellington and Ciudad Rodrigo, or wait an opportunity for de-
 bouching from behind the Arapiles, and separating the corps of
 his army. Marmont was too skilful a tactician himself not to
 perceive that all his movements were watched by one who well
 knew how to counteract them; nevertheless, hoping to deceive
 his antagonist, he marched a strong force to the right and
 formed columns of attack opposite the 5th division, which was
 in rear of the village of Arapiles. Lord Wellington soon per-
 ceived that nothing serious was intended by this manœuvre, and
 returned to direct the operations of his right, which he now
 threw back to that side of the Arapiles, forming nearly a right
 angle with that which he had occupied in the morning.
 About two in the afternoon the French Marshal perceiving that

his last demonstration had produced no effect, pushed forward his columns rapidly to the left, with the intent of turning the right flank of the allies, and interposing between them and Ciudad Rodrigo. Till now, the operations of the day had induced a belief in the British army that it was intended only to meet manœuvre by manœuvre, and to continue their retreat as soon as it was night. Indeed, the army of the centre with the Intruder at its head was on the way to join Marmont within three days' march, and a considerable body of cavalry and horse artillery was still nearer. But Lord Wellington had anxiously been looking for the opportunity which was now presented him: he was at dinner when information was brought him of this movement which was made under cover of a heavy cannonade, and accompanied with skirmishers in his front and on his flank, and with a body of cavalry who made the British dragoons and light troops give way before them. But the generals of division had either misunderstood or ill executed their commander's intentions, and they weakened their line by dangerously extending it: Lord Wellington at once perceived this; he rose in such haste as to overturn the table, exclaiming, that Marmont's good genius had forsaken him: in an instant he was on horseback, and issued his orders for attack.

The right he reinforced with the 5th division, placing it behind the village of Arapiles, on the right of the 4th, and with the 6th and 7th in reserve. These having taken their stations, he ordered Major-General Pakenham to move forward with the 3rd and General D'Urban's cavalry, and two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons under Lieutenant-Colonel Hervey, in four columns, to turn the enemy's left on the heights, while Brigadier-General Bradford's brigade, the 5th division, under Lieutenant-General Leith, the 4th, under Lieutenant-General Cole, and the cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton, should attack them

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CHAP. in front, supported in reserve by the 6th and 7th under Major-
XLI. Generals Clinton and Hope, and D. Carlos d'España's Spanish
1812. division; Brigadier-General Pack, with the 1st and 16th Por-
tugueze regiments, was to support the left of the 4th division, by
attacking the hill which the enemy held. The first and the light
divisions occupied the ground on the left of the Arapiles in reserve.

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As soon as the formation was effected, the attack commenced from the right. Major-General Pakenham moved along a valley at a quick rate, crossed the extended left of the enemy, almost before they were aware of his intention, drove them back in confusion and overthrew every thing before him. Brigadier-General D'Urban's Portugueze cavalry and Lieutenant-Colonel Hervey's squadrons of the 14th, supported him in the most gallant style, defeated every attempt which was made upon his flank, cut in upon the enemy's broken infantry, and put numbers of them to the sword. The attack in front was made with equal ardour: the fifth division had been exposed for about an hour to a continued and heavy cannonade; no orders were ever more welcome to the soldiers who were stretched on the ground to avoid its effects, than those which bade them advance against the enemy. The distance was more than a mile, up a steep height crowned by twenty pieces of cannon, and their left had to pass through the village which formed a considerable obstruction; they advanced in perfect order, not firing a shot till they had gained the summit, from whence the guns which had annoyed them were hastily withdrawn, nor till they had received the fire of the enemy, who were formed into squares to resist them. When they were within some thirty yards the word was given to fire and charge; this instantly threw the squares into disorder; the heavy cavalry coming up on the right increased their confusion; they fled then, and in their flight fell in with the remains of their extreme left, flying before Major-General Pakenham's division.

Lieutenant-General Leith was severely wounded in the act of breaking into the squares. Pakenham and the cavalry constantly bringing up their right, so as to outflank the points on which the French attempted to make a stand, drove them from one height to another and made above 3000 prisoners. The 4th and 5th divisions acquiring in like manner strength upon the enemy's flank in proportion as they advanced, carried height after height, till at length the enemy's left rallied on their centre; and on the last height, after its crest had been gained, one division of their infantry charged Cole's division, which, after a severe contest, in which Cole was wounded, gave way.

This temporary success was owing to the failure of Pack's attack upon the Arapiles; it was bravely made, but the Portuguese failed to carry it against the disadvantage of such strong ground; the attempt, however, was not without some good effect, for it occupied troops who would otherwise have been engaged against General Cole in his advance, and who were not now at leisure to oppose him, till, notwithstanding this temporary success, it was too late. Beresford, who happened to be on the spot, directed a brigade of the 5th division which was in the second line, to change its front, and bring its fire on the enemy's flank; while thus engaged he was wounded. Three British generals had thus been disabled, and in a most successful charge against a body of infantry, Major-General Le Marchant was killed, at the head of his own brigade. Lord Wellington now ordered up the 6th division under Major-General Clinton. That division marching under a heavy fire deployed at the foot of a hill, and beginning then to fire regular volleys, suffered severely as it advanced; it was vigorously attacked by a body of cavalry which had been concealed behind the Arapiles, and for some minutes the contest appeared doubtful; but when Clinton was enabled to form his two right batta-

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CHAP. lions into line, and charge, the French again lost heart, and
XLI. abandoned the important point which they had till then main-
1812. tained. Their right still resisted, having been reinforced by the
troops who now withdrew in good order from the Arapiles, and
by those who had fled from the left.

July.

They re-formed and took up their ground with equal promptitude and skill almost at right angles to their original front, the infantry along the crest of the hill in line, supported by heavy close columns in reserve, the cavalry in masses on their flanks, and the artillery posted at the advanced knolls, so as to sweep the whole face of the height. The 1st and light divisions were ordered against these, with two brigades of the 4th to turn their right, while the 6th supported by the 3rd and 5th attacked the front. Clinton advanced up the rocky and steep height in line, without firing a shot, and under a murderous fire of musketry and artillery: but he charged with the bayonet, drove them from a commanding conical eminence, and captured two guns. Their flank was attacked at the same time; and then, beaten at all points, they fled through the woods towards the Tormes, cavalry, infantry, and baggage all mixed together. The defeat was complete, and so would have been the destruction, if darkness had not opportunely covered their flight. Lord Wellington, with the 1st and light divisions, and Major-General William Anson's brigade of the 4th, and some squadrons of cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton, pursued them towards Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, as long as any of them could be found together; but night soon put an end to the pursuit, and enabled great numbers who had been taken prisoners to escape. A sentinel mistook Sir Stapleton Cotton in the dark for an enemy, fired, and wounded him.

This memorable battle, which lasted from three in the afternoon till ten at night, took place within sight of the city; the

ground with its heights rising gradually one behind another, forming, as it were, a fine theatre for such a spectacle. On the part of the allies, nearly 5000 were killed and wounded. General Le Marchant's loss was greatly regretted: he was a native of Guernsey, who having served in the light dragoons under the Duke of York, in the years 1793 and 1794, applied himself with zeal and ability to the study of his profession, introduced the Hungarian sword exercise into the British army, and drew up a manual for the use of the cavalry, which was published by the war-office. The royal military college was in great measure planned by him; he was appointed lieutenant-governor of that institution, and discharged the duties of the office till 1811, when he could no longer retain it, being promoted to the rank of Major-General. He then joined the army in Portugal in command of a brigade, but had not been long in that country, when the unexpected death of his wife rendered it necessary that he should return to England for the arrangement of his domestic affairs: that mournful business having been performed, he rejoined the army, and shortly afterwards fell, being in the 47th year of his age. His eldest son, who was an ensign in the guards, was at his side when he fell. The Prince Regent manifested with proper munificence his sense of General Le Marchant's worth, by granting a pension of £300 to that son, £100 to each of three younger sons, and £120 to each of his five daughters... The loss of the French was very great; besides the dead and wounded, they left 7000 prisoners on the field. Eleven guns and two eagles were taken: it is said, that more than ten were captured, but that there were men base enough to conceal them, and sell them to persons at Salamanca, who deemed it good policy as well as a profitable speculation, to purchase them for the French. Marmont was disabled early in the action, Bonnet also was wounded, and the command then devolved upon

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CHAP. General Clausel, who was wounded also, but not so as to in-
XLI. capacitate him. Generals Ferey, Desgraviers, and Thomieres
1812. were killed.

July.

At break of day, the pursuit was renewed with the same troops, and with Major-General Bock and Anson's brigades, which had joined them during the night. The first and light divisions were ordered to the ford of Huerta, Lord Wellington having supposed that the enemy must make their passage there, because the castle at Alba de Tormes was occupied by the Spaniards; but the troops who garrisoned it had, without his knowledge, been withdrawn, so that Clausel, making a most rapid march during the night, crossed the river there without molestation. Having crossed in pursuit, the cavalry came up with the enemy's rear-guard of horse and foot between Garci Hernandez and Peñarandilla: a detachment from the 11th and 16th dragoons charged their cavalry, which fled, and left the infantry to their fate. Major-General Bock, then, with the heavy brigade of the King's German legion, attacked them, when posted upon a hill in square, and in what is described as one of the finest charges that was ever seen, rode completely through them. The whole body, consisting of three battalions, were made prisoners, the brigade losing in the charge 30 killed and nearly 50 wounded. In the course of the day, the enemy were joined by 1,200 cavalry belonging to the army of the north, who, though too late to be of any greater service, covered the retreat of their centre to Peñaranda de Bracamonte: one column went by Macotora; the other which had crossed the Tormes at Encina and Huerta moved on El Campo and Cebolla. They had their head-quarters at Flores de Avila, ten leagues from the field of battle, for a few hours on the second night, and hastened from thence by Arevalo, towards Valladolid. Their dead were found in many places by the roadside, and their stragglers met with as little mercy from the

peasantry as they had been accustomed to show; yet many of their rear-guard who were taken were without arms, having thrown them away as impediments in their flight.

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July.

The pursuit was continued on the 24th; but the enemy made exceedingly long marches, and had little to encumber them while hastening to their resources both in men and means, and the pursuers having to bring up their supplies far from behind could not keep up an equal pace. On that day they only came up with the rear-guard, which hastened away at their approach. On the following the advance halted for the army to close up; Colonel Arentschild's brigade entered Arevalo; and a non-commissioned officer's patrol captured two officers and 27 men of Joseph's own cavalry, in Blasco Sancho, between Arevalo and Avila. The Intruder had reached that place, hastening with the army of the centre to join Marmont upon the Tormes; he was met there with tidings of the defeat, and then turned toward Segovia, as if retreating upon Madrid: soon however receiving fuller advices, he endeavoured to divert the pursuers by threatening an advance upon their flank. The routed army, meantime, whose movements were conducted with great ability by Clausel, concentrated themselves on the right bank of the Douro, between Puente de Duero and the other bridge at Tudela de Duero; they crossed the river as soon as the allies advanced towards them, hastened to Valladolid, and making no tarriance there, continued their retreat to Burgos. Lord Wellington entered Valladolid on the 30th amid the acclamations of the people. There he discontinued the pursuit, and prepared to march against the Intruder, with the intention of either bringing him to action, or driving him from Madrid.

Meantime, a squadron under Sir Home Popham which sailed

CHAP. from Coruña, to co-operate with the Guerrillas, and occupy
 XLI. the enemy upon the side of Biscay, rendered all the service
 1812. which had been expected from it. Sir Howard Douglas and
 General Carrol embarked in the Venerable with Sir Home.

July.
Proceedings
of Sir
Home Pop-
ham on
the coast of
Biscay.

They arrived off Lequeitio on the 18th of June, where the French had possession of a hill-fort, commanding the town, and strong enough to resist any body of infantry; they had also 200 men fortified in a convent within the town, and into this the garrison retired when the Pastor D. Gaspar Jauregui arrived with his party to act in concert with the squadron. The convent might have been destroyed by the ships, but the town must in that case have suffered also; it was determined, therefore, to attack the fort, which was so situated that the enemy thought it quite inaccessible to cannon. They knew not what British seamen are capable of on shore. At a time when the sea broke with such violence against the rocks at the foot of the hill, that it was doubtful whether a boat could reach the land, Lieutenant Groves succeeded in landing a gun there. It was hove up for a short distance by a moveable capstan; but this was too tedious an operation, and it was dragged to the summit by six and thirty pair of oxen, 400 of the Pastor's men, and 100 seamen, headed by the Honourable Captain Bouverie. It was immediately mounted; the first shot was fired at four in the afternoon, and so well was it served, that by sunset a practicable breach was made. The Guerrillas volunteered to storm; they were repulsed in the first attempt, but succeeded in the second, and such of the enemy as escaped on the opposite side got into the convent. In the course of the evening the sea had abated, a landing was effected upon the island of S. Nicholas, from whence the convent could be battered without damage to the town; three carronades were planted there; at

dawn, a 24-pounder was brought to the east side of the town, within 200 yards of the convent, and another was in the act of being landed upon the island to bombard it, when the French commandant beat a parley, and surrendered with 290 men. The Guerrillas had lost 50 in killed and wounded, not a man belonging to the squadron was hurt. The muskets, stores, and three small guns which were found there were given to the Pastor. Two 18-pounders in the fort were rendered useless; the fort itself was demolished and the convent blown up. The next morning a column of 1100 men was seen which had arrived within two leagues of Lequeitio, but hearing from the peasantry that the English had disembarked 2000 men, they retired. Some intercepted letters were now transmitted to Sir Home, by which the commandant at Guernica was instructed to prepare rations for a French general and 2600 of the Imperial Guards.

The squadron was now to have co-operated in an attack upon Bilbao, but the wind proved unfavourable for getting round Cape Machichago, and part of the ships fetched the anchorage of Bermeo. The enemy had retired from that place, leaving a small magazine of provisions in a fortified convent; these were distributed to the poor; and the battery on the hill and all the fortified places which the French had occupied were destroyed: the works at Plencia were in like manner demolished, and the batteries on each side of the inlet below the bar of the Ybeyzabal, or Narrow River, the beautiful and tranquil stream which forms the port of Bilbao: on one side were the castle of Galea, and the batteries of Algorta and Begona; on the other the batteries of El Campillo, Las Quersas and Xebiles. Early on the following morning some parties of the enemy entered the destroyed batteries of Algorta, but retired upon the squadron's making a disposition to stand up the inlet; they then formed in the plain, and were found to consist of

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1812.

June 23.

June 24.

CHAP. 2000 men at Algorta, while 400 were sent to Puerta Galetta.
 XLI. Three of the British sloops closed with the fort there, silenced
 1812. it, and drove them from thence. It was supposed that this was
 the corps for which rations had been ordered at Guernica, and
 that it had been thus drawn off from its original destination.

July 2. The squadron then made for Guetaria; two companies of
 marines were landed for the purpose of reconnoitring the place,
 previous to an intended attack, but the Guerrillas who were
 expected to co-operate were engaged with the enemy in a dif-
 ferent quarter; parties of the French were seen crossing the
 hills; the intention, therefore, was relinquished, and the marines
 re-embarked without loss. Sir Home then sailed for Castro,

July 6. where Sir George Collier had landed a company of marines to
 assist Longa in a concerted attack. Longa was there at the
 time and place appointed; more marines were landed, and guns
 with hearty exertions of well-directed skill were drawn up
 heights that might have seemed inaccessible to men less earnest
 in their duty. They were placing them in a battery to the east
 of the town, when 2500 of the enemy appeared on the heights
 of S. Pelayo; the parties upon this were re-embarked, and Longa
 found it necessary to change his ground, after which he sus-
 tained an action, in which no advantage was gained over him.
 Somewhat disheartened by this, the French marched into the
 town that evening, and were driven out of it on the morrow by
 the fire of the squadron: they then took post on the hills, and
 under favour of the night retired towards Laredo. The castle
 then surrendered with 150 men, and having been put in a state
 of defence, was garrisoned by the marines and Spanish artillery-

July 10. men of the Iris. Their next attempt was a combined attack

July 11. upon Puerta Galleta, which was abandoned because the enemy
 were found to be in greater strength than had been expected;
 the French on their part failed equally in endeavouring to re-

cover Castro. Their moveable column had now been drawn by a feint to Santona; from thence it could not reach Guetaria in less than four days; another attempt therefore was made upon that place in concert with the Pastor, and with one of Mina's battalions. The latter, after two days' severe march, did not arrive till it was too late; for when the enemy's guns on one side had been silenced, and a battery was ready to open upon them on the other, intelligence was received that a considerable body of French troops was hastening thither by forced marches. The Guerrillas maintained a brave action against them, till the superiority of the enemy's numbers was ascertained, and made it necessary for them to retreat; but this action prevented the re-embarkation of the British in time, so that two guns were in consequence destroyed, and 32 men made prisoners.

These operations of Sir Home Popham's squadron were of service in many ways. Troops were thus occupied who would otherwise have joined Marmont before the battle of Salamanca; the corps which relieved Guetaria was recalled from that direction, and Caffarelli was prevented from sending the infantry who were to have assisted in driving the English to the Tagus. The ports which were liberated lost no time in conveying supplies to the free parts of the kingdom, and vessels from them arrived daily at Coruña laden with corn and wine. And the Guerrillas as well as the regular troops of Spain received a countenance and support which enabled them to hold towards the enemy the language of confident hope. Renovales, who was Commandant-General in Biscay, addressed a letter to the French Governor of Bilbao, General Roquet, remonstrating against the cruelties which General Mouton had committed with his column: "for the security of a fortress," he said, "or to prevent an insurrection, the rules of military precaution might render it proper to put some few persons of respectability in confinement; but that cottages

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1812.

July 19.

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July.

and private dwellings should be outraged, and that peaceable persons should be tortured by stripes, by the bayonet, and by fire, was what no laws of war could justify. The Spaniards were a people who might be softened by generosity though not subdued by it; but if this system of terror were persisted in towards them, . . . if it were still to be war at the knife's point, the Biscayans, instead of yielding a foot to him, would meet him half way in such warfare. Four and twenty officers were in his hands, and should suffer for the next act of cruelty on the part of the French. He concluded, by assuring Roquet that the day was not far distant when Bilbao would be delivered, and that he, Renovales, would then, at the head of 10,000 Biscayans, fulfil his duty as he had hitherto done, and first of all towards himself.

CHAPTER XLII.

LORD WELLINGTON ENTERS MADRID. THE FRENCH RETIRE
FROM ANDALUSIA. SIEGE OF BURGOS, AND RETREAT OF
THE ALLIES.

BUONAPARTE could keep the French people ignorant of the course which events had taken in Portugal and Spain ; but even the vigilance of his military tyranny could not prevent the Spaniards from knowing that the allies, having driven out the French from the one kingdom, had entered the other, and had recovered the two strong places of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. Fresh appeals were made by the Intrusive Government to the fears and jealousies of a people whom they now began to apprehend it would be found impossible to subdue. “ What would it avail them, it was asked, if they were to set up Infantado, or the Empecinado, or Ballasteros, or any other of their countrymen for king ? Wherefore should they persist in an obstinate and unavailing resistance after the Bourbon dynasty had been extinguished by that great man whom Providence had appointed to regenerate Spain, and who for their happiness had selected Joseph to reign over them ? Why did they not rally round his throne ? ” The Spaniards only ridiculed such appeals ; and the French themselves, in derision, called Joseph King of the Highways, as one whose authority extended no farther than his

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July.
*Appeal of
the Intruder
to the Spa-
niards.*

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patroles and armies could enforce it. His was indeed a miserable condition; the brother, of whose wicked will he had, in despite of his own understanding and heart, consented to become the instrument, regarded him with displeasure, because he had met with a resistance which was not to be overcome; the nation upon which he had been insolently intruded, regarded him with deeper hatred than perhaps had ever before been co-existent with the feeling of sincere contempt; the army by which alone he was supported despised him, and the French generals scarcely kept up towards him a semblance of respect.

*State of
Madrid.*

But odious as the usurpation was every where, it was rendered peculiarly so at Madrid, by the presence of the Intruder, and of his ministers. Being the seat of the Intrusive Government, more of those traitors were collected there who had made the miseries of their country a means for their own advancement; and as the commanders in other parts cared little for the necessities of the court, heavier imposts were exacted from the inhabitants, at the very time when a remission of taxes was announced in edicts, which, if intended to be executed, were never carried into effect. The duties payable upon the entrance and exit of wheat, rice, and pulse of every kind were repealed by a decree, but continued to be exacted as before, and at the same time, new duties were imposed upon wine, oil, meat and vegetables. A loan of 20 million reales was soon exhausted, a contribution of eight millions was then demanded from the trading part of the people; and an equivalent proportion was taken in kind from the occupiers of land. Eight per cent. upon the value of houses was first required, then ten, and then fifteen; the poorest artisan was compelled to take out an annual license for the exercise of his calling; even the water carriers were subjected to this tax. Having collected a great quantity of grain,

the Government sold it at a price more suited to its own wants than to the condition of the people; the hospitals were crowded with sick and starving poor; and of the persons who died during the first six months of this year, two-thirds perished in consequence of misery and want. Patient endurance was all that the people of Madrid could oppose to their oppressors; but they lived in firm belief that the day of deliverance would come, believed every rumour of success on the part of their countrymen and their allies, and with the same determined will, discredited whatever was related of their reverses. They looked upon the account of Ballasteros's defeat at Bornos as so much exaggerated that it was unworthy of belief; and with more reasonable incredulity when it was reported that Marmont had totally defeated the allies and taken 20,000 prisoners, while the French and their partisans congratulated each other upon the news, they required dates and details, and assured themselves that it was nothing more than one of the enemy's customary falsehoods.

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July.

Indeed, before the battle of Salamanca, it was made sufficiently apparent by circumstances which the French were unable to conceal, that however confidently they might expect some great success, they had as yet obtained none. The garrison at the Puerto de Miravete, which had been relieved after the destruction of the bridge at Almaraz, was withdrawn now, the Puente del Arzobispo was abandoned, and they withdrew also from Talavera, which was immediately entered by the Medico. Most of their garrisons at the same time withdrew from La Mancha, and they were followed by those miserable people, who, having accepted offices, whether high or low, under the Intrusive Government, dared not remain without French protection in any place where they were known. Exertions were made for fortifying Toledo; and in the works which were carried

*Measures
of Joseph
before the
battle of
Salamanca.*

CHAP. on for the same purpose at the Retiro, the people of Madrid
 XLII. saw unequivocal proof, that the French apprehended at least
 1812. the possibility of an advance of the allies upon the capital.

July.

To prevent that danger, they had thus collected their forces from all quarters, thinking then to attack Lord Wellington with such superior numbers as would render success certain: but Joseph and M. Jourdan were too slow in moving from Madrid, and meantime Marmont had been too confident of his strength and of his skill. If he had delayed his passage of the Tormes only for two days, till the army of the centre should have joined, the enemy persuaded themselves that Lord Wellington could not have escaped from utter defeat, and that that victory would have secured the entire conquest of Spain.

*Advance of
the allies.*

The event could not be kept secret at Madrid; every one knew what no one dared publish; and while false intelligence was sedulously spread abroad by the Intrusive Government, and the police was more than ordinarily active in arresting suspected persons, every one congratulated his friends and neighbours upon a victory the extent of which was magnified in proportion to their hopes. They entertained no doubt but that Marmont had been killed, and his whole army destroyed. Lord Wellington moved from Cuellar on the 6th of August, leaving General Clinton's division there, and General Anson's brigade of cavalry to observe the line of the Douro. He arrived at Segovia on the 7th, and at S. Ildefonso on the 8th, the beautiful summer retreat of the kings of Spain: there he halted one day that the right of the army might have time to come up. The passage of the Guadarama mountains was effected without opposition. Brigadier-General D'Urban, with the Portuguese cavalry, the first light battalion of the German Legion, and Captain M'Donald's troop of horse artillery, drove in on the morning of the 16th, about 2000 French cavalry; they moved toward

Naval Carnero, and returned from thence in the evening with the Intruder himself, to make a reconnoissance. D'Urban formed the Portuguese cavalry in front of Majalahonda, and ordered them to charge the enemy's leading squadrons, which seemed too far advanced. The Portuguese pushed on, but unexpectedly disgraced themselves; their officers set them a brave example but in vain, and the Visconde de Barbacena, who behaved remarkably well, was taken prisoner; the men turned about shamefully, fled through the village, and left the guns behind them which had been moved forward for their support. M'Donald's troop exerted themselves to bring them off, but owing to the rough ground, one carriage was broken, two were overturned, and thus the three fell into the enemy's hands. The German dragoons who had been formed behind the village rallied the fugitives, charged the enemy, and stopped their progress, but suffered considerable loss. In this affair, about 200 men were killed, wounded, or taken, and 120 horses. The left of the allied army being not three miles distant, two brigades of horse and foot moved forward to support the troops in advance; the French retired as soon as they saw them, and withdrew during the night, leaving the guns. The piquets of the allies took post that evening on the mountains, in sight of Madrid.

The enemy, who from Madrid had been looking through telescopes toward the passes of the Guadarama, had seen D'Urban's detachment on the evening of the 9th. Orders were then given and revoked by the resident members of the Government, with the precipitation of fear: it was determined to abandon the capital on the following morning, and the adherents of the Intruder prepared in all haste for their departure; some selling their goods for any price that could be obtained for them others, intrusting them to the care of their friends, and not a few soliciting the compassion of those who had been found

CHAP.
XLII.

1812.

August.

*Affair at
Majalahonda.*

*The enemy
retire from
Madrid.*

CHAP. faithful to their country. The families of these unhappy men were
 XLII. objects of compassion even to the populace, notwithstanding the
 1812. indignation which was felt at the men themselves, who bitterly re-
 August. pented now, not so much their guilt, as their short-sightedness
 in supposing that they had taken the stronger side. The troops
 under whose protection they retired would have saved them
 from any outrage or insult if any had been intended; but they
 had not proceeded far from the gates before many of them were
 plundered by these protectors. Two of Joseph's ministers en-
 tered Madrid with a strong escort the next day, for the sup-
 posed purpose of destroying papers, and securing effects which
 could not be carried away in the hurry of the removal. They
 retired in the evening, and on the morning of the 12th, all the
 troops who remained shut themselves up in the Retiro. The
 shops which, during the two preceding days, had been closed
 were then opened, and Madrid became a scene of such joy as
 had never been witnessed in the days of its proudest prosperity.
 The allies Soon after middle day, the allies began to enter through streets so
 enter. crowded with gratulating multitudes, that the officers who were
 on horseback at the head of their men could scarcely make their
 way, and scarcely keep their seats, so eagerly did the Spaniards
 press to shake hands with them, as if nothing but an English
 mode of greeting could make their exultation and their hearty
 welcome sufficiently intelligible.

The new
 constitution
 proclaimed.

Madrid had lost more than two-thirds of its inhabitants since
 its occupation by the French, but an influx of people from all
 the surrounding country now filled it as if there had been no de-
 population; and amid this multitude, on the following day, the
 new constitution was proclaimed by D. Carlos de España, who
 was appointed governor of the capital and province, . . a charge
 for which no one could be better qualified by clearness of
 judgement, and promptitude in executing what he saw to be

right. Their acclamations were hushed as soon as they knew what they were called upon to hear; and the deep silence with which they listened to the constitutional act was interrupted only by the enemy's cannon from the Retiro, which seemed rather like a salute in honour of the ceremony, than an enemy's artillery employed in defence of their last hold in the capital. The act was received with exultant delight; young minds and generous ones, whose natural ardour enabled them to believe what they eagerly desired, persuaded themselves that the Spaniards had now established their freedom as well as achieved their independence; the happy days of Athens and of Sparta, they said, seemed to be restored; and the people of Madrid already appeared like a nation accustomed to liberty, and to deliberate concerning their own interests.

On that evening Lord Wellington invested the Retiro, where Marshal Jourdan, with little prudence, had left a garrison of 1700 men. At the eastern extremity of Madrid, Philip II. had a small palace, or rather house of retreat, pleasantly situated by the Prado or public walk, on a rising ground, and immediately adjoining the convent of S. Geronimo. Philip IV. took a fancy to the site; and Olivares, whose chief object seemed to be that of amusing his royal master at whatever cost, purchased adjacent land enough for a large palace, with its gardens and a park four miles in circuit; and such enormous sums were lavished upon the edifice and the grounds, that the additional imposts which were required for this expenditure, or artfully, perhaps, imputed to it, were one of the causes which provoked the revolt in Catalonia, and occasioned the separation of Portugal from the Spanish monarchy. The palace contained a theatre, spacious itself, and opening into the gardens, which might thus be made upon occasion a continuation of the scene; in this theatre the master-pieces of the Spanish drama were represented before a court

CHAP.
XLII.
1812.

August.

*The Buen
Retiro.*

CHAP. who delighted in dramatic literature; and Ferdinand VI. gratified his dear Queen Barbara's hereditary love of music, ^{XLII.} with Italian operas, performed under Farinelli's direction. 1812. Formerly, the Buen Retiro contained a large collection of pictures by the greatest masters of Italy, Spain, and the Low Countries; many of these were transferred to other palaces when this began to be neglected, and the French had now made spoil of the rest. But there were ceilings painted by Luca Jordano, which were not removable; and in a compartment of that in the great saloon, Spain was pictured, ruling the terrestrial globe, . . . a dream of ambition which her kings of the Austrian line had entertained, which the craftiest as well as the wildest heads among the Romish clergy encouraged, and which many circumstances seemed to concur in favouring, when, under the blessing of Providence, the Dutch, by their patriotic and religious virtue, averted that evil from the world. Two other noted works of art were still to be seen in the Buen Retiro; one, remarkable for its design, was a bronze statue of Charles V. trampling upon the Spirit of Reformation which lay, personified as Heresy in chains, at his feet; the other, which for the surpassing skill of the sculptor was even more remarkable, was an equestrian statue of Philip IV. cast by Pietro Tacca of Florence, weighing, it is said, not less than nine tons, and yet supported only by the hind legs, the horse being in the act of galloping. Within the precincts of the palace were many pavilions which used to be assigned to the courtiers when the court resided there. The gardens were of that formal style in which art allows as little as possible of nature to be seen, . . . where water is brought at great expense to spout from fountains and fill circular fish-ponds, the gardener exercises his topiary genius upon trees and shrubs, and humble evergreens are compelled to grow in fantastic patterns, like a vegetable carpet. The park

was a thick wood, with broad avenues, a central pond having a pavilion in its centre, and a larger piece of water at its termination, on which gilded gondolas awaited the king's pleasure when he was disposed to take the diversion of fishing, his retinue beholding the sport from the little pavilions which decorated its sides. Like all the other palaces of the kings of Spain, the Buen Retiro was a place in which a meditative beholder was forcibly reminded of the vanity of human greatness. Those kings, above all other European sovereigns, had been loved and revered by their people; their palaces were among the wonders of the modern world, and no expenditure, no efforts of ingenuity and art had been spared in embellishing their summer retreats: but these things had been grievously compensated, not alone by the never-ending anxieties of state, and the gloom of disappointed ambition, but by a more than ordinary share of the afflictions incident to human nature, coming upon themselves or their families, .. maladies of body and of mind alike incurable and painful; .. madness, fatuity, weak intellects, .. conscious of their weakness, and of the awful responsibility in which their birth had placed them, .. morbid consciences, and broken hearts.

After the accession of Charles III. the Retiro ceased to be a royal residence, and part of its buildings were converted into a royal manufactory of porcelain. Its park, however, continued to be a fashionable promenade, the more agreeable, because carriages were not allowed to enter; but the French had now made it a depôt for their artillery stores, the victims whom they arrested for political offences were confined there, and they had fortified it as a military post, but with less judgement than their engineers had displayed on any other occasion. The outer line was formed by the palace, the museum, and the park wall, with flèches thrown out in part to flank it; the second was a bastioned

CHAP.
XLII.
1812.
August.

*Surrender
of the Re-
tiro.*

CHAP. line of nine large fronts, but with no outworks except a ravelin
 XLII. and a lunette; the interior was an octagonal star fort, closely
 1812. surrounding what had been the porcelain manufactory. The
 August. garrison was far too small for the outer enceintes, and Marshal
 Jourdan had therefore left written orders, that if they were
 seriously attacked, they should confine their defence to the star
 fort, which, however, itself would be rendered nearly indefensible
 if the manufactory were destroyed. A copy of this order was
 found, and on the night of the 13th, Major-General Pakenham
 drove in their posts from the Prado and the botanical garden,
 made them retire from the outer enceintes, broke through the
 wall in many places, and established his troops in the palace.
 In the morning arrangements were made for driving them from
 August 14. the bastioned lines, and for battering the manufactory; but the
 governor saw that resistance was useless, and he surrendered.
 The number of prisoners taken there and in the hospital
 amounted to 2500, and there fell into the hands of the allies 189
 pieces of cannon, and above 20,000 stand of arms, with a great
 quantity of ammunition and stores of all kinds. The eagles
 also of the 13th and 51st regiments were found there, and sent
 to England.

*The consti-
 tion sworn
 to.*

The inhabitants of Madrid, who looked upon this strong hold
 of their oppressors as a Bastille, were desirous of thronging
 thither to see the place where so many of their countrymen had
 been sacrificed; but this was not permitted, both the British
 commander and the Spanish authorities seeking as much as
 possible to prevent any thing which might excite the vindictive
 feelings of the people. That same day, the churches in every
 parish were opened for administering the oath of fidelity to the
 new constitution; and multitudes crowding thither with an
 eagerness which might well have excited apprehension of its
 stability, swore to they knew not what. Napoleon, it was said,

had promised to regenerate them, and they were regenerated; for through his means, who had intended nothing less, the Spaniard had been converted from a slave to a citizen; the superstitious had thrown off his prejudices, the coward his fears, the credulous his credulity; the idle had become industrious, the selfish man generous, and the reckless one had learned to think. While those who knew little of history and less of human nature exulted thus in the persuasion, that the habits of a whole people might be changed as lightly as an inconsiderate man changes his opinion, and that inveterate evils may suddenly be cured by legislation as if by miracle, and leave no scar behind; the general joy was kept up by fast following tidings from all parts of successes, which, though little more than the necessary consequences in most instances of the battle of Salamanca and the occupation of Madrid, were considered each by the multitude as an important achievement in itself. On the same day that the Retiro was surrendered, the French withdrew from Toledo to join the army of the centre, with which the Intruder was retreating towards Valencia: they destroyed their artillery, and all the ammunition which they could not carry; and hardly had they left the city before the Abuelo's party entered, and the bells rung, and the squares and streets were illuminated. Guadalupe was attacked by the Empecinado, and after a vain resistance, above 700 French were made prisoners there. The enemy retired from Logroño, and Duran hastened thither and destroyed its outer fortifications, its fort, and its inquisition. A detachment was sent from Zaragoza to bring away the garrisons from Tarazona and Borja, and destroy the works there.

General Foy, with 6000 infantry and 1200 horse, part of Marmont's army, now under his command, moved from the neighbourhood of Valladolid with the intent of raising the blockade of Toro and Zamora, and the siege of Astorga. The


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G. Foy's
movement.

- CHAP. XLII.  1812. August 17. garrison at Tordesillas, consisting of 250 men, had previously surrendered to Santocildes. The Spaniards retired from before Toro at their approach, in good order and with little loss; the enemy bringing off their garrison, were then joined by another body of equal force, and proceeded towards Astorga; 300 of their cavalry were sent forward to that city, but when they entered it they found that the Spaniards had withdrawn, and had marched the garrison, consisting of 1200 men, prisoners towards Coruña: for Castaños knowing that a force was advancing which his army was in no condition to meet, had successfully employed the easy artifice of representing to the commander that relief was impossible, and resistance hopeless, and thus he had induced him to surrender. August 18. Foy was at Baneza, half way between Benevente and Astorga, when he received this mortifying intelligence; he August 21. then turned back to the Ezla, and marched upon Carvajales, thinking to surprise the Conde de Amarante, who with the militia of Tras-os-Montes, then serving voluntarily beyond their own frontier, was blockading Zamora; the Conde retreated without August 29. loss, and the French general bringing off the garrison marched for Tordesillas.

*Measures
of police at
Madrid.*

Some of the traitors who had made themselves conspicuous in the Intruder's service, fell into the hands of their countrymen at Guadalaxara; others who were conscious that they had been weak rather than wicked, and that in submitting to him for their own good, they had not aggravated the crime by injuring those who had persisted in their duty, presented themselves voluntarily to the newly constituted authorities in Madrid, thinking it better to take the chance of mercy, than to fly they knew not whither, without resources, without friends, and without the consolation which those who act righteously find in their own hearts. There were writers on this occasion who cried for vengeance in a most ferocious spirit. They called upon the people of Madrid to

prepare graves for their guilty countrymen who had thus presented themselves at the foot of the gallows! They advised them to go to the governor, and with one voice require justice upon these wretches, as what the nation was entitled to demand; . . . the sword for some, chains for others, and strict confinement till the conclusion of the war for those who were suspected, and who, if they were left at large, might act as secret agents for the French. This atrocious language failed of its intended effect, for the presence of the allied troops maintained order; and a vigilant police had been established, not for the oppression of the people, but for their security.

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No needless severity was used. D. Carlos d'España made known by an edict, that persons of both sexes in that capital carried on a correspondence with those unhappy Spaniards who had followed the French, and that in this manner they supplied the enemy with intelligence; all such communication, therefore, was prohibited to all persons, on pain of being brought before a council of war, and condemned irremissibly to suffer the punishment appointed for spies. The families of the fugitives, and of those who had enriched themselves by the purchase of what the Intrusive Government called national goods, were ordered to remain in their houses, under the word of three respectable sureties, and not to leave them except for the purpose of attending their religious duties; but their wives and daughters were advised to retire into a convent, as the course which consisted best with their own honour, and with that of their husbands and fathers, for whom they might there offer up their prayers, supplicating Providence to bring them in its mercy back to the path of duty which they had forsaken.

How to deal with the *juramentados*, as those Spaniards were called who had entered into Joseph's armies, was a question which now became of great importance. Hitherto it had been

CHAP. possible to execute the rigour of the law, and put to death those
 XLII. who were taken in arms against their country ; but the tide had
 1812. now turned, it might reasonably be expected that they would
 August. eagerly desert a cause in which they had never heartily engaged, and the policy of thus recruiting the Spanish army, instead of driving these men to despair, was so evident, that Alava, immediately on the occupation of Madrid, issued a proclamation, as commissary for the Government, inviting them to accept the free pardon which the Cortes had offered them on the publication of the new constitution. Great numbers in consequence came over. Another measure of the Intrusive Government, which was not less obvious and dangerous in its possible results, than the scheme of raising a Spanish force to be employed in the subjugation of Spain, was that of selling or otherwise disposing of confiscated houses and lands, and thus binding the new possessors to their allegiance by the only tie which they would not be likely under any circumstances to break. They had contrived thus to connect with the French interest many who would have been unwilling or unable to purchase property of this description ; for under pretext of embellishing the capital, they pulled down about a fourth of it, and by way of compensating the owners of the demolished dwellings, assigned among them in exchange the houses of those who adhered to the national cause. This policy the Cortes met by a timely decree, declaring all purchases of confiscated estates null, and empowering the rightful owners to enter upon them whenever the fortune of war should permit, and authorising them to exact from the intrusive proprietors the mean profits, and the amount of any waste which they might have committed.

Lord Wellington's situation.

Lord Wellington was now enjoying the highest reward which can fall to the lot of a successful commander. He was living in a palace, the most magnificent in Europe, from which

he had driven an Usurper; and the blessings of the people accompanied him wherever he went. The municipal authorities gave a bull-fight in his honour, and when he appeared in the royal box, the air rung with the repeated shouts of not less than 12,000 spectators. He could not walk abroad by daylight because of the pressure of the multitudes who gathered round him; even in the dark when he went into the Prado, though he and his suite were dressed in blue great coats in hopes of escaping notice, they were generally recognized and followed by crowds, the women pressing to shake hands, and some even to embrace them. Welcomed as he was with overflowing joy by a grateful people as their deliverer, his satisfaction would have been complete, if the same difficulties with which he had struggled since the commencement of the war had not still impeded his plans; for he was still embarrassed by the want of adequate means, and disappointed in his hopes of co-operation. He was without money. The United States of America had declared war against Great Britain, with no just cause, nor even plausible pretext for hostilities. Lord Wellington received the news of this declaration immediately after the battle of Salamanca. The troops in Portugal depended in great measure for corn upon the importation from America to that country; and he deemed it necessary, without delay, to make large purchases at Lisbon, that the subsistence of the army might not be endangered. But this required a great expenditure, the effect of which was now severely felt, for no pecuniary resources were to be found in Madrid. The inhabitants fed the garrison, and the produce of the sequestered and crown lands was readily given up to the allies, on promise of future payment; but when money was required for the military chest, a few thousand dollars were all that could be procured upon the most unquestionable security, and of this sum much was in base coin.

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*August.**Col. Jones's
account of
the war, 2.
122.*

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*August.**Anglo Sici-
lian army.*

Lord Wellington had counted with as much confidence as he ever allowed himself to place upon arrangements which were not wholly under his own control, on the promised co-operation of an expedition to the eastern coast. The most urgent solicitations from that part of Spain for aid had long been disregarded by the British Government; and the Catalans, who of all the Spaniards made the greatest and most persevering exertions in their own defence, had been left from the commencement of the struggle until this time with no other help than occasional supplies of money and arms, scantily apportioned, and the assistance of a few ships of war. And now, when the strong fortresses one after another had fallen, and the British Government at length resolved to withdraw part of its troops from Sicily, where the intrigues of that poor kingdom, and the expectation of chances in Italy which were little likely to occur, and of little importance if they had occurred, had unduly detained them; only 6000 men were detached from Sicily, without cavalry, and a considerable number of them consisting of such foreigners as could be enlisted in the Mediterranean. Lieutenant-General Maitland was appointed to the command, and they sailed in company with a squadron from the Mediterranean fleet under Rear-Admiral Hallowell. The common opinion was that they were destined for Corfu, because heavy artillery was embarked with them.

*Majorcan
division.*

The Majorcan division of Spanish troops which was to co-operate with them, was supposed to be in a more efficient state than any of the Spanish armies. This division had been raised upon the suggestion of General Whittingham, Majorca being a safe place, where they might be properly trained before they were brought into the field; but the materials were not so unexceptionable as the design. Some 250 Germans who had been made prisoners with Dupont's army, were taken from the island

of Cabrera as volunteers; though, if free-will had influenced them, they would, like the Swiss, have entered the Spanish service upon the first opportunity, instead of remaining two years in that miserable place of confinement. Majorca itself supplied so few willing soldiers, that criminals who had been transported thither from Catalonia and Valencia were enlisted, . . . fellows of such a description, that those who were not deemed capable of service were kept in prison: discipline, however, and equitable treatment, of which even bad men are sensible, made them better than was expected. Cuesta sent to this division all who were discharged from the hospitals; and as runaways from the routs in Valencia and Murcia could be collected or caught, they were shipped for Majorca, and incorporated in this hopeful force. No officer however was appointed without secret and strict inquiry into his character. Other difficulties, which might not so probably have been anticipated, impeded the equipment of this division. The plan was unpopular in the island, the more so, perhaps, because it was set on foot by an Englishman who was also invested with the command. Upon Cuesta's death, the situation of affairs was critical; the authorities withheld all supplies from the troops, who were also threatened as well as insulted in pasquinades: convents had been converted into barracks for their use, and this may possibly have been one cause of offence. An agreement had been concluded with the Dey of Algiers for a supply of horses, but it was broken off for want of money, the Superior Junta of Majorca disregarding all orders from the Regency. The institution of a military academy was another cause of dislike, owing to the habits of insubordination which prevailed in Majorca, as in every other part of the Spanish dominions. By prudent conduct, however, impediments were removed, and dislike softened or overcome;

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July 24.

*The expedi-
tion arrives
on the coast
of Cata-
lonia.*

*Defeat of
the Spa-
niards at
Castalla.*

June 21.

the troops were clothed and armed by Great Britain, and their hospital supplied: and when the expedition from Sicily called for them at Palma, 4500 men embarked, in a state of efficient discipline.

The fleet made for the eastern coast of Spain, and on the first of August anchored in the bay of Blanes, at the mouth of the Tordera. The enemy occupied Tosa, and had a redoubt there which covered the town and protected the coast. On that and the following day, demonstrations of landing were made; but upon an interview with Eroles, it was found that any such measure would be worse than useless, with so inadequate a force. That able Spaniard saw that it was better for the Catalans to be left as they had so long been to their own exertions, than to give the French an opportunity of bringing superior numbers against a British expedition: and it was agreed that the best service which such a force could then perform was to secure the city of Alicante, at that time endangered in consequence of a defeat which Joseph O'Donell had suffered in its vicinity. He had endeavoured to drive the vanguard of Marshal Suchet's army, under General Harispe, back upon the Xucar, from the line which it occupied at Castalla and Ibi, and other points of the mountainous country; but as usual, when the Spaniards were brought forward in regular war, against well-disciplined and well-commanded troops, some of the officers either misunderstood their orders or executed them ill, and some of the men losing courage as soon as they lost hope, threw into confusion those who were braver than themselves; their loss amounted to 4000 men, being little less than the whole number which they attacked, and they left more than 10,000 muskets in their flight. Suchet, who was the most enterprising and successful of all the French generals in Spain, would have taken advan-

tage of this shameful defeat, and endeavoured to obtain possession of Alicante, if the force at his disposal had not been greatly diminished. Buonaparte had withdrawn all the Poles in his service from the peninsula, for the Russian campaign ; and this deprived him of six thousand of his best troops, at a time when his army was otherwise greatly weakened by sending succours to Caffarelli in Navarre, and by the increased exertions which it was necessary to make against Duran and the Empeñinado, Villacampa and Bassecourt. Before the battle of Salamanca, the Intruder, in his dreams of triumph, informed Suchet that he must prepare for marching towards Madrid, and then accompanying him to the Tagus ; and he ordered him to form a camp of 8000 men between Albaceyte and San Clemente ; such a force it was impossible for him to spare ; he could not venture to weaken himself farther than by detaching 1500 men to Requena and Cuenca, to relieve General Darmagnac, and he represented to Joseph that he could not move for Madrid with one of his divisions, unless he received orders to evacuate Valencia. The last orders from Paris were to direct all his efforts to the preservation of the countries under his command, and to keep his force concentrated. General Maitland knew less of Marshal Suchet's actual strength, than of his relative superiority to any force that could be brought against him ; the best course, therefore, seemed to be that upon which he resolved ; to secure the important fortress and port of Alicante, both as a place of arms from whence future operations might be undertaken, and as a rallying point for the wreck of Joseph O'Donnell's army. Thither accordingly the Anglo-Sicilian expedition sailed : contrary winds and bad weather retarded it some days upon the passage, but on the evening of August the 9th they anchored in the harbour, and on the following day the troops were landed.

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*August.**The expedition lands at Alicante.*

The French who were in sight of the fortress retired upon

CHAP. this, and formed their line in Chichona, Ibi, Castalla, Biar and
 XLII. Villena. But Suchet saw that this position would not be tenable
 1812. against General Maitland's corps; he concentrated his divisions,
 therefore, about St. Philippe; fixed his head quarters in that
 city; threw up field works there, and upon the high road from
 Valencia to Madrid; and constructed a bridge of boats over the
 Xucar, near Alberique, which he secured with a *tête-du-pont*.
 His intention was not to fall back without fighting, provided the
 allies should attack him only in front, and were not too greatly
 superior in numbers. But the superiority was soon on his own
 side: the allies took the field on the 14th, and occupied the
 country from which the enemy retired; on the 18th they re-
 ceived intelligence that the Intruder with the force which he
 could bring together was about to join the army of Valencia,
 and then it became necessary for General Maitland to fall back
 to his position in front of Alicante.

August.
 The French
 fall back to
 the Xucar.

The French
 withdraw
 from San-
 tander.
 August 2.

They are
 driven from
 Bilbao.

The expedition which was to have effected a diversion in
 the east of Spain, was thus for the time rendered useless, not
 having been upon a sufficient scale to accomplish the purpose
 for which it was designed. Meantime the squadron on the
 north-east coast proceeded successfully, acting in concert with
 some of the ablest Guerrilla leaders. Caffarelli found it pru-
 dent to withdraw his garrisons from Torrelavega and Santander,
 lest they should be made prisoners; the latter place was entered
 by Porlier; the constitution was proclaimed there while salutes
 of joy were fired by the Spanish troops and the British vessels;
 and Renovales made good his word to General Rouget by driving
 him from Bilbao, and defeating him in an attempt at recovering
 it. There also the constitution was proclaimed. The *Te Deum*
 was performed in Santiagos church, and the Cid Campeador in the
 theatre; and all the unmarried men from the age of 17 to 45,
 were enrolled for Mendizabal's army. On that side there had

been no want of exertion, and no disappointment; but the Galician army, from which more might have been looked for, considering the resources of the province, served for little more than to manifest the gross incapacity or negligence with which affairs of the greatest moment were conducted: nominally it amounted to 30,000 men, and nearly that number were supposed to be mustered, paid and fed, and yet 11,000 infantry and 350 horse were all that Santocildes had under his command, and these were badly disciplined and miserably equipped.

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August.

*State of the
Galician
army.*

On the night of the eighth day after the entrance of the allies into Madrid, the news of that event reached Cadiz, where it excited among the inhabitants the joyful hope of being speedily delivered from the blockade; and deeper emotions in those exiles who had left their houses and families in the metropolis. On the 24th, the French broke up the siege; they threw shells during the preceding night; those which were filled with lead and discharged from howitzers with a velocity of about 2000 feet per second, ranged to the astonishing distance of three miles. They burst their guns by overcharging them, placing their muzzles one against another and exploding them by means of portfires and trains; and thus almost the whole of their artillery between Chiclana and Rota, consisting of 600 pieces, were rendered unserviceable. Many, however, were left uninjured for the Spaniards to take possession of, as well as thirty gun-boats, and a great quantity of stores. The necessity of this retreat had been foreseen by Soult as soon as he was informed of the battle of Salamanca. Before that action he had been meditating another attack upon Tarifa, as a place from whence he could easily communicate with Tangiers and the Barbary coast, and thus secure supplies for feeding the army under his command. Sir Rowland Hill's movements withdrew him from this project: and after Marmont's defeat he

*The French
break up the
siege of Ca-
diz.*
August 20.

*Sir How-
ard Doug-
las's Naval
Gunnery,
p. 61.*

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*Movement
of La Cruz
Mourgeon
and Col.
Skerrett
upon Se-
ville.*

prepared to abandon Seville, but to hold the Carthusian convent there, which he occupied as a citadel. Strong working parties were employed in adding to its defences, while at the same time the French packed up their public documents and their private plunder for removal. But on this occasion the Spaniards were on the alert.

As early as the middle of August the enemy had blown up the Castle of Niebla, and retired from the whole county of that name; and on the very day that they broke up from before Cadiz, Camp Marshal D. Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon, in concert with Colonel Skerrett, judged it advisable to make a forward movement on Seville, and for this purpose to force the corps of observation at San Lucar la Mayor, consisting of 350 cavalry and 200 foot. Brigadier-General Downie was second in command of the Spanish force. This officer was born in Stirlingshire, and commenced his military career by accompanying Miranda in his first expedition to Venezuela, an adventure for which those foreigners who were taken in it paid the forfeit of their lives. He joined Sir J. Moore's army as Assistant Commissary-General, was with Sir Arthur Wellesley in the campaign of 1809, and in the ensuing year, having entered the Spanish service, raised with the approbation of his own government, the loyal legion of Extremadura, and was appointed Colonel-Commandant thereof. The legion was armed and clothed by the British Government, and he revived in it the old Spanish costume, . . . or something resembling it; and several of the young nobility are said to have entered it on that account. By this and by his character, which in some respects resembled their own, he made himself popular among the Spaniards; insomuch, that the Marquesa de Conquista, the representative of the Pizarros, presented him with the sword of her ancestor, the famous or infamous conqueror of Peru.

They marched from Manzanilla with 800 men, consisting of the 1st regiment of guards, the 87th, and a Portugueze regiment, accompanied by 600 Spanish troops: the Spaniards attacked on the right, the British and Portugueze on the left: the enemy were driven through the streets, leaving some killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the allies took post at San Lucar without the loss of a man. Leaving his advance in that town, and the British and Portugueze on the right bank of the river San Lucar, the Spanish general returned to Castilleja del Campo, being the place whither the persons from whom he received intelligence directed their communications. Various and contradictory accounts were brought thither on the morning of the 26th concerning the intentions of the enemy in Seville; but in the afternoon he received positive information that Soult, with the greater part of his force, was about to move by way of Alcala upon Marchena. Arrangements were immediately made, that the troops should collect at San Lucar, and after two hours' rest there, proceed towards Seville at three on the following morning, in the hope that by this movement they might accelerate the retreat of the French, and save Seville from being plundered. On arriving at Espartinas, they ascertained that Soult had left the city with 5000 foot and 500 horse. General Mourgeon, upon this, sending out some Guerrillas to cover his flanks, proceeded, and arrived on the heights of Castilleja de la Cuesta, immediately above Seville, at six in the morning. The French occupied some olive grounds close to the village, and some forty infantry garrisoned the redoubt of Santa Brigida from which the guns had been withdrawn. They were driven from the olive grounds into the plain, where for awhile the cavalry, 100 in number, protected the retreat of the foot, some 150: but they were so pressed by the Spanish vanguard and annoyed by an English field-piece, that they took to flight, and many of the

CHAP.
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August.

August 27.

CHAP. men were made prisoners. The redoubt was attacked at the
 XLII. same time, with more bravery than judgement, and the Spa-
 1812. niards sustained some loss; the columns then advanced into the
 August. plain, by which the redoubt was turned and its communication
 cut off: and Colonel Skerrett ordered it to be masked by a de-
 tachment of Portugeze.

*The French
 driven from
 Seville.*

The Spaniards then made a detour to the right, in order to reach the bridge of Triana by the road of S. Juan de Alfarache, and thus intercept the retreat of the enemy and prevent them from cutting or burning the bridge. Skerrett, meantime, advanced a field-piece to keep in check the enemy's fire at one of the gates opposite; and after allowing time for the Spanish column to arrive, the British and Portugeze advanced to the attack in front, the cavalry and artillery at a gallop, supported by the grenadiers of the guards and the infantry following. The enemy abandoned the gate; the British and Portugeze entered the suburb, and advanced near to the bridge as rapidly as possible; they were checked at the turn of the street by a fire of grape-shot and musketry; the grenadiers advanced to their support; the Spanish cavalry under D. José Canterac, (whom Mourgeon, foreseeing the necessity, had ordered to leave the column and hasten straight through the suburb, arrived at this point of time,) and the allies, drove every thing before them. They advanced to the bridge under a heavy fire. The enemy had retired from the plain in three columns, with two pieces of artillery and 200 horse; and had taken a position with the river on their right, and their rear resting on the suburb; two guns were brought to bear on them by Captain Roberts of the artillery; they were driven from their position, and then made a stand upon the bridge, which they hoped to defend long enough to gain time for destroying it. Downie with his legion twice attempted to force a passage, and was twice repulsed, and each

time wounded. In a third attempt, he leaped over the chasm which the enemy had then made; and at the same moment a grape-shot shattered his cheek-bone and destroyed one of his eyes. He fell from his horse, stunned by the wound; when his recollection returned he found himself a prisoner, but in time to throw Pizarro's sword among his own people. On their part the attack was kept up with so much spirit, aided as they now were by some guns well placed and well worked, that the enemy could not extend the breach which they had made: and the inhabitants, even while their fire continued, set all the bells ringing, displayed hangings from their balconies as for a festival, hastened to the bridge and laid planks across the chasm, and enabled their deliverers to pass. The French then retired to the Triunfo and there again made a stand; but soon retreated through the city, and leaving it by the Puerta Nueva and the Puerta de Carmona took the direction of Alcala. They left there two pieces of artillery, many horses, much baggage, and some two hundred prisoners. The deliverers could make no speed in pursuing them, for the streets were crowded with rejoicing multitudes, and their previous exertions as well as their want of cavalry would have made it imprudent to continue the pursuit. Downie was treated with great barbarity by his captors. Miserably wounded as he was, he was tied upon the carriage of a gun, and in that condition dragged along with them in their retreat; and this is said to have been done by General Villatte's direction. Having taken him some forty miles, and not expecting him to survive, they left him in a hut, taking, however, his parole not to serve again in case of recovery, till he should have been regularly exchanged.

By this well-timed enterprise, Seville was saved from the contribution which would have been exacted from it, and the

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devastation which was threatened. A division of French troops, about 7000 in number, from the blockade of Cadiz, passed by during the following night; they meant to have taken up their quarters there; but supposing that it was occupied by Sir Rowland Hill's force, they had no inclination to encounter such an enemy, and moved hastily to their right, on Carmona. Ballasteros had hung upon their flank from Ronda, and continued to harass them till they reached Granada. From thence Soult concerted his movements with Suchet and the Intruder. Sir Rowland meantime was ordered to the Tagus with his corps, there to connect its operations with the main body of the allied army, and the British troops from Cadiz were embarked for Lisbon.

*Rejoicings
at Seville.*

On the second day after the deliverance of Seville, the constitution was proclaimed there in the Plaza de S. Francisco with the same success as in other parts of Spain. A bull fight also was exhibited, for the twofold purpose of gratifying the people in what to the disgrace of the Spaniards was their favourite diversion, and of raising money for the troops. Among other rejoicings, the Inquisition prepared to celebrate a thanksgiving festival; but General Mourgeon intimated to them that he had no authority to re-establish them, and that they would not be suffered to appear as a corporate body. By the retreat of the French from Andalusia, a large and populous, and most productive province reverted to the legitimate government: but, though its resources were thus increased, there was little ground for hoping that they would be directed with more ability than in the earlier part of the struggle. There was the same generous and devoted sense of duty to their country in individuals; the same strong spirit of nationality in the great body of the people; but on the part of the government there were the same embarrassments to contend with; the same inexperience which the

frequent changes in administration allowed no time for curing, and the same incapacity which no experience could cure. The ablest heads were more intent upon carrying into effect their own theories of political reformation, than of devising means to complete the deliverance of the country. The indiscretion with which they hurried on measures that the people were wholly unprepared for, provoked a strong resistance in the Cortes itself; and the obstinate bigotry of the one party was not more manifest than the presumptuous confidence, and the political intolerance of the other. A jealousy of the English prevailed even in persons whose hatred of the French could not be doubted; and in some it seemed to acquire strength in proportion to the celebrity which Lord Wellington had obtained; the people however rendered justice to his merits, as in such cases they will always do when they are not artfully misled; the Great Lord was the appellation which they commonly gave him, and no indication was wanting of that national gratitude which he so well deserved. The Regency had conferred upon him the order of the Golden Fleece; and through their hands the Condessa de Chincon, D. Maria Teresa de Borbon, presented him with the collar of the order, which had belonged to her father the Infante D. Luiz; that it had been her father's, she said, was the only thing which made it valuable to her; but for its intrinsic value it was a princely present.

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*Honours
rendered to
Lord Wel-
lington.*

A subject not less characteristic than curious had been brought before the Government. The barefooted Carmelites in Cadiz presented a memorial, stating that Philip III. and the Cortes of 1617, had chosen St. Teresa for patroness and advocate of Spain, under the Apostle Santiago, that the nation in all its emergencies might invoke her, and avail itself of her intercession. At that time the saint had only been beatified; but her canonization shortly afterwards took place, and then the Cortes of 1626

*St. Teresa
appointed
co-patroness
of Spain.*

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published the decree, which was confirmed by Pope Urban VIII., without prejudice to the rights of Santiago, St. Michael the Archangel, and the most Holy Virgin. Jealous, nevertheless, of the imperscriptible rights of their own saint, the chapter of Compostella exerted their influence at Rome with such success, that the decree was suspended against the wishes both of the King and Cortes. That wish, however, continued in the royal family; and Charles II., in a codicil to his will, declaring that he had always desired to establish the co-patronship of St. Teresa for the benefit of his kingdom, charged his successors to effect it. The Carmelites now urged that at no time could it more properly be effected than at the present, when her potent patronage was needed against invaders, who sowed the seeds of impiety wherever they carried their arms. This memorial was referred to a special ecclesiastical commission; and in conformity to the opinion of that commission the Cortes elected St. Teresa patroness and protectress, under Santiago, of those kingdoms; decreed that her patronship should forthwith take effect; enjoined all archbishops, bishops, and prelates, to see that the correspondent alterations should be made in the ritual for the saint's day; and required the Regency to give orders for printing, publishing, and circulating this decree. The community of the barefooted Carmelites then returned thanks for this appointment of their Mother the Saint. "It was a decree," they said, "which would fill all the natives of those kingdoms with consolation and hope, and they flattered themselves that from that moment Spain would experience the powerful intercession of its new protectress." "My great Mother, S. Teresa de Jesus, Co-patroness of the Spains!" exclaimed the prior, in an address which was printed among the proceedings of the Cortes, "the very idea makes me eternally bless the law that sanctions it. This has been a business of much time, an affair of some ages,

a work of many and mighty hands; but the glory of completing it has been reserved for the fathers of the country, for the congress of lights, for your majesty the Cortes, which has been the glorious instrument of this work of the Eternal. And it was fitting that the country of heroes should have the heroine of nations at its head, who like another mother of the Macca-bees should encourage its sons to triumph and to glory. This Deborah is not less sage than she who judged Israel, not less valiant; and the Baraks who will come forward under her protection will not be intimidated by danger. She is not a Moabite to pervert the armies of Israel. She is a Jael who will destroy the forces of *Sennacherib*; a Semiramis who will overthrow the hosts of the sanguinary Cyrus. At the sight of this fortunate Esther, Spain would lift her head and conceive higher hopes. The unanimous consent of the whole nation, the vows of the Spaniards of both hemispheres, would rise to heaven, and uniting themselves at this moment with the intercessions of their great Co-patroness, form that imperious voice which commands the winds and the tempests, rules the seas, makes itself felt in the dark regions of the abyss, and ascending the eternal mountain of the Lord, puts aside the decree of extermination that threatens us, substitutes for it that of our aggrandizement and elevation, and brings a blessing upon those judicious, prudent, and sage Mordecais, whose wise resolution has been the cause of this portent." In this language did the descendants of the Prophets who dwelt on Mount Carmel, the children of the great Teresa, offer upon the altar of gratitude the incense of their respect and veneration to the Cortes!

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*Diario de
las Cortes,
t. 14. pp.
56. 94. 96.
103.*

While one set of unbelievers promoted this act of superstition, and another condescended to it, a decree of more consequence was obtained from the Spanish Government, which had become sensible that the war must now be carried on upon

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Lord Wel-
lington ap-
pointed
Commander
-in-Chief of
the Spanish
armies.

one plan of operations, under the direction of a single mind, and that a mind equal to the emergency had been manifested in Lord Wellington. The Cortes therefore conferred upon him the command in chief of the Spanish armies, during the co-operation of the allied forces in the defence of the peninsula; and the Marquis signified his acceptance of the charge, subject to the Prince Regent's approbation, "the delay of obtaining which," he said, "would not impede his operations, because, upon all occasions on which he had communicated with the Generals and Commandants of the Spanish troops, he had received from them the utmost attention, and all the assistance which they could afford him. The Prince's consent was not delayed; and in signifying it, his Royal Highness expressed his satisfaction in the measure, as considering it to be a just and signal proof that the Spanish nation rightly appreciated the military talents and reputation of Lord Wellington, and that the Cortes had taken a comprehensive view of the manner in which the war ought to be conducted.

His situa-
tion at
Madrid.

Lord Wellington meantime had more reason to be satisfied with the approbation of his own Government, than with the support that it afforded him. Successful as his campaign had thus far been, there had been a loss of time in it, for want of means, and that want had occasioned much to depend upon the chance of circumstances; whereas, had there been an adequate force under his command, the results would have depended as far as possible in war, upon his own sagacity, and the superiority of British troops. An additional force of 15,000 men, with which to have covered the northern frontier during the siege of Badajoz, would have enabled him to fulfil his first intention of marching upon Seville, after the fall of that fortress; the campaign might then have been commenced two months earlier, and time would have remained, after having

freed the south of Spain, for operations in the centre and north. Having been compelled to abandon that intention, lest Marmont should recover Ciudad Rodrigo and overrun the north of Portugal, he had succeeded to his utmost hopes in the plan which he had of necessity adopted, not of choice. After that success, the want of adequate means left him as little choice as before. To have marched into Valencia against the collected armies of Soult, Suchet, and the Intruder, would have rendered it impossible to keep up his communications with Portugal; and except on that communication he could have no safe dependence for supplies. There was moreover the weighty consideration that the yellow fever had broken out in Murcia, and had approached so near to Alicante, that the most rigorous precautions were deemed necessary for preserving that part of the country from the contagion. But independent of all other considerations, he had neither sufficient troops to attack the united forces in the south, nor sufficient money to subsist his army beyond Madrid. Of the 70,000 dollars which he had borrowed there, he was obliged to make over half to the Portuguese, for the relief of their pressing necessities; and he had raised the loan on condition of repaying it at the expiration of a month. By acting in the north he should keep open his communication and his retreat; and in the north also the reinforcements, which after the tidings of his success he was sure would be expedited by all possible exertions, might join him before the enemy could move against him with their combined forces, from all quarters. The Intruder had with him 14,000 men, Suchet had 28,000 disposable in the field, and the army of the south, under Soult, consisted of 55,000; in all 97,000: in the north, there were the army of the north 10,000 strong, and the remains of Marmont's army, now under Clausel, estimated at 25,000. Against this force, which had resumed its activity, it was resolved to act;

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CHAP. and to this determination there was the farther motive, that if
 XLII. the Galician army were put in possession of Burgos, the castle
 1812. there might enable it to make a stand upon that front, and with
 August. the assistance of a British and Portugeze corps to hold the
 army of Portugal in check while he should be engaged in active
 operations in the south. The castle would thus become a *tête-*
de-cantonment to this corps of observation, and the French when
 deprived of it would not possess any strong post on the great
 line of communication between France and the interior of
 Spain, this castle commanding the only good road for artillery,
 and for the movement of convoys.

Lord Wel-
 lington
 moves to-
 ward Bur-
 gos.

Accordingly, on the 1st September, Lord Wellington de-
 parted from Madrid, leaving the two divisions which were most
 in need of rest in garrison there. Sir Rowland was ordered
 to the Xarama, so to cover the capital on that side; and Bal-
 lasteros was requested to join him, in case Soult, whose retreat
 from Andalusia was not yet known, should move on Madrid;
 otherwise to be in readiness for acting upon the Marshal's line
 of march. The troops collected at Arevalo, moved from thence
 on the 4th, and on the 6th crossed the Douro at the fords of
 Herrera and El Abrojo; the enemy withdrew from Valladolid
 at their approach, crossed the Pisuerga, blew up the centre
 arch of the bridge, and retired along the right bank of that
 river to Dueñas. Some skirmishing took place in front of that
 town, and the cavalry picket drove the enemy out, and esta-
 blished themselves there on the night of the 10th. On the fol-
 lowing day, Lord Wellington entered Palencia, where the English
 as usual were received with joyful acclamations, and where the new
 Constitution was proclaimed. From thence he communicated
 with Santocildes, and there learned from him to how small a force
 the Galician army amounted, and how little that force could
 be relied on. With all Lord Wellington's experience of Spanish

The French
 withdraw
 from Val-
 ladolid.

co-operation, he had not expected this ; knowing both the ability and good-will of Castaños, he hoped to have found the army in a state of such efficiency that he might have stationed it at Burgos in a few days, and then without loss of time have returned to Madrid, there to prepare for the contest which might be expected in that quarter. The Galician army joined at Pampaliega on the 16th ; the 11,000 of whom it consisted were then separated into three divisions, and each was directed to march in rear of a British division, no doubt being entertained but that they would behave well if they were not exposed to heavy attacks of the enemy's cavalry.

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The allies now moved up the beautiful valley of the Pisuerga, from Valladolid, along the right bank of the river, to the place where it receives the Arlanzon ; and then along both banks of the Arlanzon, up its valley toward Burgos. It is a tract of country in which nature seems to invite human industry, and man has not been negligent in profiting by the advantages of soil and climate and running waters. Every inch of the valley is cultivated, and the hills are on both sides covered with cornfields and vineyards. The country is as strong also in a military point of view as it is fertile ; out of the high road in the valley the way is continually interrupted by rivulets and deep ditches ; the hills on either side afford admirable flanks for the movements of an army, and there are heights from the river to the hills on either side for strong defensive positions. The French General was not a man to overlook this advantage, and the enemy were found on the 16th strongly posted with their left on the Arlanzon and their right on the mountains. Lord Wellington made arrangements to turn their position ; but they decamped during the night, and in the morning their whole army was seen retiring in five columns along the valley, and the hills on either side. They were estimated at about 18,000

*The allies
advance to
Burgos.*

CHAP. infantry and more than 2000 horse, and their line of baggage
 XLII. was longer and closer than men who had served in India had
 1812. ever seen with an Indian army; for they had pressed all the
 August. cattle in the country, and left nothing transportable for any marauders who might follow them. Clausel entered Burgos on the evening of the 17th; Marmont and Bonnet, who were still incapacitated by their wounds, had left that city a few days before. Caffarelli came thither from Vittoria to confer with him; a council of war was held that night; at two in the morning the French commenced their retreat, and by ten o'clock they had left the city and the suburbs.

Burgos. Fabling authors have ascribed the foundation of Burgos to an imaginary King Brygus, and mistaken antiquaries have endeavoured to identify its site with that of the one or other Augostobriga, both having been far distant. The earliest authentic accounts speak only of some scattered habitations in this well-watered part of the country, till, at the latter end of the ninth century, D. Diego Rodriguez, Count of Castille, better known in Spanish history as Diego Porcelos, erected a castle there by order of Alfonso III., and founded a frontier town under its protection, which from the old Burgundian word for a fortress, obtained the name of Burgos. The castle was built upon a hill which commands the rich plain watered by the rivers Arlanzon, Vena, and Cardenuela; in former times it was of great strength and beauty, cresting the summit of the hill, and towering above the houses, which in those times covered the slope; but when the succession to the throne of Castille was disputed by Affonso V. of Portugal, against Ferdinand and Isabella, in right of his wife Juana, the castle took part with that injured and most unfortunate princess, and firing upon the city, destroyed the best street, which was upon the descent: after this, the lower ground was built upon, and the castle was left standing alone upon the heights. During the sixteenth century, Burgos was the mart

through which the whole interior trade with the ports in the Bay of Biscay was carried on, and from whence the Segovian cloth was sent to all parts of Europe. Its population was then from 35,000 to 40,000, exclusive of foreigners, who were many in number; it had been reduced to 8000 or 9000, the place having declined after the seat of government was fixed at Madrid. Most of the Spanish cities may be traced to much higher antiquity; many exceed it in size; but there are few which are connected with so many of those historical recollections in which the Spaniards seem above all other nations to delight. It was the birth-place of Count Ferran Gonzalez, and of the Cid Campeador; the former used to knight his warriors in St. Lorenzo's church. A beautiful triumphal arch has been erected to his honour upon the site of the dwelling in which he was born; and his statue, with those of the two judges, Nuño Rasurez, and Layn Calvo, Diego Porcelos, the Cid, and the Emperor Charles V., adorns the gate of St. Maria, which opens upon one of the bridges.

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Our Edward I. was knighted by his brother-in-law, Alfonso the Wise, in S. Maria de las Huelgas, a nunnery founded by Alfonso V. and his English Queen Leonor, within sight of the city. Its church was preferred by the Castilian kings for the performance of any remarkable ceremony, the place for which was not prescribed; three kings therefore in succession were crowned there, and it was long a place of interment for the royal family. Except that at Fulda, no other nunnery ever possessed such privileges, or was so largely endowed. The cathedral, than which there is no more elaborate or more magnificent specimen of what may be called monastic architecture, was founded in 1221, by King St. Ferdinand and the Bishop Maurice, (who is said to have been an Englishman, either by birth or blood,) about 150 years after the see of Oca had been

CHAP. removed thither: among the relics which were shown there
 XLII. was a handkerchief of the Prophet Elijah, and a lock of Abra-
 1812. ham's hair, and one of St. Apollonia's innumerable teeth. Two
 August. short leagues from the city is the monastery of St. Pedro de
 Cardena, a far older foundation than the cathedral; where, from
 the time that two hundred of its monks were massacred by
 the Moors, the pavement used on the anniversary of their
 martyrdom to sweat blood, till that blood, which through so
 many centuries had cried for vengeance, was appeased by the
 final subjugation of the misbelievers. There the Cid lies and his
 wife Ximena: some of the French officers at the commence-
 ment of this treacherous invasion used to visit the church and
 spout passages from Corneille's tragedy over their tomb. There
 too lie his daughters, D. Elvira and D. Sol; and his father
 Diego Laynez; and his kinsman Alvar Fañez Minaya, and his
 nephew Martin Antolinez, and Martin Pelaez, the Asturian,
 names which will be held in remembrance as long as chivalrous
 history shall be preserved. And before the gate of the mo-
 nastery, the Cid's good horse Bavioca lies buried, and Gil Diaz
 his trusty servant, by the side of that good horse, which he had
 loved so well.

But of objects of antiquity or veneration, that on which the
 people of Burgos prided themselves most was a miraculous
 crucifix in the convent of St. Augustine, which a merchant of that
 city, on his homeward voyage from Flanders, found at sea, float-
 ing in a chest shaped like a coffin. The learned have concluded,
 upon a comparison of dates and circumstances, that it is the
 identical image which was carved by Nicodemus, and carried from
 Jerusalem to Berytus; where, being again nailed and pierced by
 unbelieving Jews in the 8th century, blood issued from its
 wounds, and miraculously healed both Jews and Christians of
 their diseases. When Berytus fell under the yoke of the

Saracens, the Christians, to save it from farther profanation, confined it thus carefully, and committed it in faith to the waves. Strong, however, as the circumstantial evidence for this identity was admitted to be, many persons piously preferred believing that it was no work of human hands, but had been sent from heaven, in order that there should be on earth one perfect resemblance of our crucified Saviour. They supported this opinion by the alleged and admitted fact, that no one has ever been able to ascertain of what material the image is made; the flesh, they say, is so elastic that it yields like that of a living body to the touch, and resumes its natural rotundity when the pressure is removed; the head moves to whatever side it may be inclined, and the arms, if they are unfastened, fall like those of a corpse; and the hair, and beard, and nails, seem not as if they were carved, or fixed there, but as if they grew. Volumes have been published filled with authenticated accounts of the miracles which this crucifix has performed. Kings, nobles, and prelates, have vied with each other in enriching the chapel wherein it is placed. So many lamps have been presented, that they are said literally to have hid the vault of the chapel, covering its whole extent; and of these the meanest were of massive silver. On each side of the altar stood thirty silver candlesticks, each taller than the tallest man, and heavier than many men could lift. The candlesticks upon the altar were of massive gold; between them were gold and silver crosses, set with precious stones; and crowns rich with pearls and sparkling with diamonds were suspended over the altar. Above the altar, the miraculous Crucifix is placed, behind three curtains embroidered with jewelry and pearls. It was shown only to persons of great distinction, and not to them till after many ceremonies, and till they had heard two masses: bells were then rung to give notice that all who were present must fall upon their knees, while the

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CHAP. sacred curtains were undrawn. The great captain Gonsalvo de
 XLII. Cordoba, when he would have ascended to inspect it closely,
 1812. was overcome with sudden awe, and withdrew, saying he
 would not tempt the Lord. And Isabella, the Catholic Queen,
 for whom one of the nails which fastened the image to the cross
 was taken out, that she might enshrine it among her relics,
 fainted when she saw the arm drop; and when she came to
 herself, repenting of her intention, as though such piety had par-
 taken of the sin of sacrilege, ordered the nail to be reverently re-
 placed. . . It is a relief for those whose thoughts have been long
 employed upon the wickedness and the sufferings of their
 fellow-creatures, if their attention can sometimes be drawn away
 by such examples of their weakness and their credulity.

*The allies
 enter Bur-
 gos.*

When the enemy withdrew from Burgos they were joined by
 9000 infantry of the army of the north under General Souham,
 who took the command, and retiring to Briviesca halted there
 in a strong position. On the morning of the 18th, the allies
 took possession of the heights to the north-west of the castle,
 and entered the city, where they were received with the usual
 acclamations. But this was no day of joy to the inhabitants:
 the garrison, who from their fort completely commanded both the
 city and the suburbs, opened a fire of musketry and grape into the
 principal streets, and burned the houses which were nearest them;
 and on the other hand the Guerrillas began to plunder, as if it were
 an enemy's town of which they had taken forcible possession.
 Alava, by threats, by blows, and by unremitting exertions,
 restored order at last; and his efforts were not a little assisted
 by a rumour which he caused to be spread among them, that
 the French were returning in great force: these marauders then
 took to their heels, and a Spanish battalion was posted in the
 city, and a battalion of *caçadores* in the suburbs.

On the following day the castle was invested. One division

remained on the left of the Arlanzon ; part of the army forded it, and marched round the heights of St. Miguel ; their advance drove the enemy from three detached *flèches* which they were constructing, to see into the hollows on the side of the hill, and took possession of such parts as were under cover. The remainder of the army was advanced on the high road in front of Monasterio to cover the attack. Upon reconnoitring the castle, it was found much stronger than had been expected ; it was a lofty building, built with the solidity of old times, flanked with small round towers, and its roof sufficiently strong to bear guns of large calibre which the French had placed upon it. The keep had been converted into a casemated battery ; the lower part of the hill had been surrounded by an uncovered scarp wall of difficult access, and between these defences two lines of field-works had been constructed, thickly planted with cannon, and encircling the hill. The garrison under General Du Breton consisted of nearly 3000 men, well provided with stores of all kinds. It was apparent that approaches against them must be carried on regularly ; the most sanguine entertained no hope of succeeding in less than seven or eight days ; nor would that hope have been entertained if the deficiency of means had been considered, unless an undue reliance had been placed upon military courage in circumstances where skill and science are of far more avail. The siege establishments of the army had been deficient in all the former sieges, in all which, therefore, success had been dearly purchased ; but here there was not even the skeleton of an establishment. There were five officers of engineers, but not a sapper or miner ; and only eight men of the royal military artificers, to whom 81 artificers of the line were added. The artillery consisted of three 18-pounders, and five 24-pounder iron howitzers, with 300 rounds of ammunition for each, and 15 barrels of powder. The engineers' stores were

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*The horn
work on S.
Miguel's
taken.*

scanty in proportion, but in a store which the enemy had left in the town a considerable number of entrenching tools were found. Lord Wellington had no other means within his reach when he moved from Madrid. He had no means of transporting more guns and ammunition from Madrid, or from Ciudad Rodrigo, to Burgos. The Intruder and the French armies had swept Castille of all the mules and horses upon which they could lay hands; and if some might still have been purchased at high prices, there was no money to pay for them in the military chest.

On the side toward the country the castle was commanded by the heights of S. Miguel, which are separated from it by a deep ravine. The summit is about the same level as the upper works of the castle, at a distance of 300 yards. On this height the enemy had nearly completed a large horn work; the branches were not perfect; the rear, on the advance of the allies, had been closed by an exceedingly strong palisade; and in front they had begun to throw up three flèches, from which they had now been driven. As a preliminary to any attack, it was necessary to win the horn work. The arrangements for this were, that two parties should march that night, one upon each salient angle of the demi-bastions, enter the ditch, the counter-scarp being unfinished, and escalade them, under protection of 150 men, who were to march direct on the front of the work, halt at the edge of the ditch, and keep up a continued fire on those who defended the parapet. . . . A third storming party under the Honourable Major Cocks was to march round the rear of the work, and endeavour to force in at the gorge. This plan was better arranged than executed. The covering party began to fire as soon as they were put in motion, and continued firing as they advanced, till they reached the ditch where they ought to have begun their fire: by that time so many of their men

had been killed and wounded, that the rest dispersed. The attack on both semi-bastions was not more fortunately conducted; the ladders were not long enough for the face of the work;... and the troops, remembering the murderous character of the former sieges which they had witnessed rather than their eventual success, hung back. Major Cocks lost in advancing nearly half his party by the fire of the castle, but he found that the garrison of the horn work neglected the gorge, being fully occupied with the attack in front. He therefore with little opposition got over the palisades and entered the body of the work with about 140 men; these he divided, posting one half on the ramparts to ensure the entry of the co-operating force in front, and with the other he formed opposite the gateway, in the hope of making the garrison prisoners: they were about 500 in number, under a *Chef de Batallon*, and had his support been brought up in time there was every probability of his capturing them; but the French running from their works, mere weight of numbers did for them as much as determined courage could have done; they literally ran over this little party and escaped into the castle. Their loss did not exceed 70 men, that of the assailants amounted to 420, including six officers killed and fifteen wounded.

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Col. Jones's
account of
the sieges,
p. 191.

Such a beginning, though successful, was not likely to give the troops confidence. And it was now found, .. which could not be understood by a ground-plan of the works, nor indeed be exactly ascertained till they were in possession of St. Miguel's hill, .. that although this hill commanded from its narrow side that on which the enemy's works were erected, it was itself commanded by the terrace of the castle. The breadth of St. Miguel's is parallel to the length of the castle hill, and consequently St. Miguel's is outflanked by the castle hill; and as the surrounding ground is so low as to be completely overlooked

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1812.

*September.**Failure in
assaulting
the first
line.*

and commanded by that hill, it was impossible to erect batteries on any spot except the narrow ridge, which was not only out-flanked by the opposite height but commanded by it. Trenches however were now opened to secure a communication with the horn work, and afford cover for the men; batteries were erected; and in order to save the troops from unnecessary fatigue, Lord Wellington resolved to assault the outer line, on the night of the 22nd, without waiting to form a breach in it. A party of Portuguese were to advance from some houses in the suburb close to the wall, cut down the palisades, and take the line in flank and rear, while a British party were to advance under a ridge of ground, and escalade the wall in front. The houses afforded cover to the one party, the ridge to the other, until the moment of attack. But no serious attack was made; the Portuguese were checked by a fire from a guard-house on the line, and could not be induced to enter the ditch: the British planted their ladders, and the officers mounted, but very few men followed them. Major Lawrie of the 79th, who commanded this party, was killed. Captain Fraser Mackenzie was struck down by a blow on the head; he recovered himself, mounted a second time, and was shot through the knee. The enemy, whose attention was not diverted by any other attack, mounted the parapet, and fired down upon the assailants, who stood crowded in the ditch unable now to advance, and still unwilling to retire. Lord Wellington was watching the attack from the hill of St. Miguel, under a fire of musketry, grape shot, and shells; and when he saw that the Portuguese did nothing, and that the party in front made no progress, he ordered the attempt to be relinquished, after the loss of about three hundred and thirty men. The wounded were brought in in the morning during an hour's truce.

The original plan was now resumed of working up to the

wall, and mining under it. The enemy placed two or three guns behind a projecting palisade which was so close as perfectly to secure them, and from thence they did great execution. As there were neither sappers, miners, nor pioneers, the engineer officers were obliged not only to direct every operation but to stand by, and instruct the working parties, and while thus employed, Captain Williams was killed. It seemed miraculous that any of these valuable officers escaped. The enemy could not now but have discovered that the besiegers were miserably provided with artillery, and that they had no ammunition to spare; nevertheless they began to prepare their second line for an obstinate defence. On the evening of the 29th, the miners hit upon the foundation of the wall, mined it, and charged the mine with twelve barrels of powder. At midnight it was sprung, and threw down the wall. Three hundred men were in readiness for storming; a serjeant and four men, the advance of a party of twenty who were to lead the way, mounted without opposition, for the enemy were panic-stricken; they remained some minutes on the top of the breach before the French, perceiving that they were not supported, took courage and drove them down. The officer in command of the first advance did not discover the breach, . . he returned into the parallel reporting that the mine had failed, and the storming party, in consequence of this error, was withdrawn. After this, Lord Wellington determined to have no more night attacks.

A supply of gunpowder having been obtained from Sir Home Popham's squadron, a second mine was completed; the first breach was rendered practicable, and the explosion which made the second was the signal for assaulting both. Immediately before the explosion, and while in the act of communicating that all was ready, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones of the engineers

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A second
assault
fails.

A third by
daylight
proves suc-
cessful.

Oct. 4.

CHAP. XLII. was severely wounded, an officer whose Journals of the Sieges, and whose general Account of the War have been the most useful as well as the most trust-worthy of the printed authorities from which the present history has been composed. About an hundred feet of the wall were thrown down by the explosion: the storming party, instead of being composed of detachments from different regiments, consisted of the 24th regiment, supported by the working and covering parties in the trenches, a reserve of 500 men having also been formed in the parallel. This assault was made in the face of day. The officer who led the left party was at the foot of the old breach before the smoke had cleared away, and he was the first man on the top of it; and the dust had scarcely subsided before the troops had gained the summit of both breaches, and driven the enemy into their covered way, and behind their new palisades. During the night the besiegers established themselves in both breaches, and along the wall to the left of them, and began an approach towards the second line of works. But the rains now began to set in heavily; and on the following afternoon 300 of the garrison made a sortie from their covered way, gained possession of the first breach, and retained it long enough to ruin the lodgement and carry off the tools. They did not get possession of the second breach, nor of the parallel along the parapet: but the advantage which they had gained was sufficient to encourage them, and to lessen the confidence of the besiegers, who could not but perceive that they were struggling against all advantages of situation, and with means the most inadequate. The enemy could not depress their guns so as to bear upon the new works, but they kept up a constant fire of musketry upon them, and from time to time rolled large shells down the steep glacis, and these either carried away the gabion where the men were breaking ground in the night, or lodging against it and

bursting, blew it to pieces. The rain was now so heavy that much time was daily expended in draining and keeping the communications up the steep banks and breaches practicable. The garrison meantime were never idle: they had now disabled two of the three 18-pounders; and making another sortie at two in the morning of the 8th, from the covered way with 400 men, they surprised the advanced covering party, drove the remainder from the parallel of the outer line, and once more levelled the work and carried off the tools. Major Cocks was killed in a charge to regain it: he was shot through the body when ascending the breach, by a French infantry man close to him: the ball entered on the right side between the fourth and the fifth rib, passed through the great artery immediately above the heart, and so out at the left side, breaking the left arm. Major Cocks was a young officer of the highest promise. He was the eldest son of Lord Somers, and by the demise of his maternal grandfather, in possession of a large landed estate; but preferring the military profession to the peaceful enjoyment of good fortune, and to the pursuits whereto his station in society invited him, he devoted himself to the study of that profession with an ardour, of which an ordinary observer would not, from his mild manners and habitual composure, have supposed him capable. Entering early into the service, and leaving his regiment in England, he joined the army at Lisbon in the spring of 1809, for the purpose of acquiring the Portuguese and Spanish languages. He was in the south of Spain when the French attempted to surprise Cadiz, and he it was who gave Alburquerque the first information of their movements, by which timely advice that magnanimous Spaniard was enabled to prevent their design and throw himself into the place. He read much, and let no opportunity pass unimproved of perfecting by practice the knowledge which he acquired from books: and

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Major
Cocks
killed.

CHAP. thus he had distinguished himself on so many occasions, that
XLII. the promotion which his rank and fortune might have com-
1812. manded was not more rapid than his conspicuous merit had
October. deserved. When the despatches relating the capture of the
horn work on St. Miguel's reached home, his commission as
Lieutenant-Colonel was immediately sent out; but before these
despatches arrived in England his career was closed. On the
day preceding his death he was field-officer of the trenches; the
day was very wet, and he went round to every sentry to see
that the orders were clearly understood, . . . a duty generally left
to the serjeant who posts them, and not often attended to by a
subaltern having only a picket of twenty men; but Major
Cocks never spared himself, and never left any thing which
depended upon him undone. The death of such a man (for
such men are rare) was justly regarded in the army as a
national loss. He was buried in the camp ground of his regi-
ment near Bellema, Lord Wellington, Sir Stapleton Cotton,
Generals Anson and Pack, with the whole of their staffs, attend-
ing his funeral, and the officers of the 79th (his own regiment)
and of the 16th light dragoons.

After this second successful sortie, no farther attempt was
made to push the works between the outer and second line: a third
breach was effected with the view of making a flank attack at the
moment of assaulting the second line in front; but when it was
made, it could not be stormed for want of musket ammunition.
The enemy attempted to repair it during the night, but were
several times driven in. A small supply of powder having now
been received from Santander, the howitzers were put in bat-
tery; but the 24-pound shot were nearly expended, and for the
18-pounders the 16-pound shot fired by the enemy were col-
lected and made to serve: when the embrasures were opened,
the guns could not be run in on account of the weather, and

one of the batteries was silenced in half an hour by the enemy's fire. By the 18th, a sufficient opening had been made in an exposed part of the second line; and the church of St. Roman, which was near the second line, had been mined. The assault was made by daylight, the works were immediately carried with very little loss, and some of the German legion escaladed the third line, but they were few, and were presently driven back, for the course of the siege had taken confidence from the besiegers and given it to the besieged; and when the guards gained the parapet the garrison rallied on the *terre plein* of the work and assembled in force, then advanced and drove the assailants back completely from the line. The mine under the church did little injury to it, but it so alarmed the enemy that they exploded their own mines, which destroyed the greater part; the troops lodged themselves in the ruins, and a communication was carried to this point during the night. A convoy of heavy artillery and ammunition was now on its way from Santander, and the castle might then have been reduced in a few days, without further loss; but it was now too late, and after this last failure all circumstances induced Lord Wellington to think only of retreat.

On the day of that failure, the enemy were joined at Bre-
viesca by the army of observation from Alava, and the remainder of the army of the north. This force considerably outnumbered that which Lord Wellington could bring against them, and in cavalry they were greatly superior. They made a show of coming on in front, and in consequence, the covering army moved up near Quintana-palla, and was joined by most of the besieging corps. On the 20th they advanced in force, drove in the pickets, and obtained possession of Quintana-palla, but Sir Edward Paget drove them back and recovered the place, and they then desisted from their offensive movements.

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1812.

October.

*The second
line assault-
ed with ill
success.*

*Movements
of the
French in
the north.*

CHAP.
XLII.

1812.

October,

*Ballasteros
refuses to
act under
the British
commander.*

Intelligence which Lord Wellington had reason to expect arrived on the following day, that the united forces of the enemy in the south were in motion. Ballasteros, who had hitherto, if with little success and no great skill, displayed the most indefatigable activity, had in a mood of sullen resentment at the appointment of Lord Wellington to the chief command, ceased to molest the enemy. He had hung upon the flanks of Soult's army, and harassed it as far as Granada, with more effect than in any of his former enterprises, because the enemy were dispirited and on their retreat; but upon receiving instructions to obey Lord Wellington's orders, he took no farther measures for annoying the French, refused to act in concert with Sir Rowland Hill, according to the plan which the British Commander had laid down, and remained obstinately inactive at the most critical time. At length he published a letter to the minister at war, saying, that from the time when the French treacherously seized the four fortresses, he had spared no efforts for raising the nation, and that no person had contributed more to the events of the second of May than himself, without which events, Spain would not have been in its present state. From that time he had never laid aside his arms, and had resisted all solicitations which the foreigners had made him to the prejudice of his country, . . . inexorable in being a Spaniard and nothing but a Spaniard, and that his countrymen should be so, like him; this having been his principle, without any regard to his own fortune, he had always found the nation ready to support it, in every sense. "And now he was surprised," he said, "to see that the English General, Lord Wellington, was by a resolution of the Cortes appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies; those armies, thousands upon thousands of whose companions in arms were in the grave, having fallen in defending the reputation of their country, were observing what

would be his conduct on this occasion ; and he should not consider himself worthy of being an Aragonese, if he did not represent to the government, that he could not condescend to a determination which disparaged the Spanish name." He spoke of the English as a nation to whom the Spaniards were bound by true friendship and fair dealing, but of whose fair promises and bad faith no one could give more information than the then president of the Regency, the Duque del Infantado. "Was Spain," he asked, "like the petty kingdom of Portugal, that the command of its armies should be intrusted to a foreigner? Had its revolution begun like that of Portugal? Had it not still resources of its own? Had it not generals, officers, and soldiers, who still supported the honour which they had inherited from their forefathers ; and who in the present war had made both English and French know that they were nothing inferior to them in discipline or in courage, and that they had chiefs of their own who knew how to lead them to victory? Finally, he required that the opinion of the soldiers and of the people should be taken upon this matter ; if they condescended to the appointment, he should renounce his employments, and retire to his own house, thus manifesting, that he had only the honour and the welfare of his country in view, not any ambitious or interested end.

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October.

Ballasteros was a rude, intrepid, enterprising and persevering soldier of fortune, handsome in person, strong in body, and of a hale constitution ; very useful as a partizan at the head of 4000 or 5000 men, but incapable of conducting any extensive operations with a regular army. Before the appointment of Lord Wellington took place he was in no good humour with the Government, and the Government on its part as little pleased with him. With some better parts of the national character, he partook in no slight degree of its boastfulness, and entertaining

*He is exiled
to Ceuta.*

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a most exaggerated notion of his own merits, made no scruple of saying that Ballasteros had done more for Spain than all her other chiefs put together, and that in spite of the Government, Ballasteros, unassisted and discouraged, would continue to do more than the favourites of the Regency, whose pockets were filled with doubloons by the English. But though he had a large party among the lower orders in Cadiz, and some of his regiments were much attached to him, he overrated his own importance as greatly as his own deserts; he was unpopular in the provinces and disliked by his officers; and when the Government put him under arrest for thus defying its authority, marched him under an escort to Malaga, and sent him from thence to Ceuta as an exile, not a hand, and scarcely a voice was raised in his defence. Some seditious writings indeed were published in his favour at Cadiz, but they produced no effect. The loss of an active partizan was regretted, and the error of an honest, though obstinate and wrong-headed man; but the army and the nation concurred in condemning him, and in approving the promptitude and decision with which the Government had acted.

Meantime, in consequence of this inactivity, in dereliction of all duty, on Ballasteros's part, and of the inefficiency of the Anglo-Sicilian army, Marshals Soult and Suchet were enabled, without any impediment, to concert their operations with the Intruder, and carry them into effect. General Maitland's health gave way under the anxieties of his situation, so that it became necessary for him to return to Sicily. Major-General William Clinton was sent from thence to take the command in his stead, and till his arrival, it devolved upon Major-General John Mackenzie. That general made an attempt to seize the castle of Denia by a *coup-de-main*: from its strength and its position on commanding ground close to the sea it might have easily

G. Maitland gives up the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army.

been maintained against the enemy, and would have afforded great opportunity for annoying him. Major-General Donkin, Quarter-Master-General of this army, was intrusted with the enterprise; it failed, but the men and guns which had been landed were re-embarked with little loss. Knowing that nothing was to be apprehended from this army in its present state, Marshals Jourdan, Soult, and Suchet, held a council in presence of the Intruder, at Fuente la Higuera. They had feared at one time that it might have been necessary to abandon Valencia: that apprehension was removed, and they now believed that, as the long and brave resistance which had been made by the garrison at Burgos had given the army of Portugal time to recover strength and to unite with the troops in the north, nothing more was required for restoring their affairs, than that the armies of the south and the centre should co-operate with it, for the double purpose of beating Lord Wellington, and re-establishing the Intrusive government at Madrid. It was not deemed necessary to take any part of Suchet's forces for this service; the state of Aragon and Catalonia on the one hand, and the presence of the Anglo-Sicilian expedition on the other, made it dangerous to weaken him.

At the point where the roads from Alicante and Valencia to Madrid join, stands the little castle of Chinchilla; it was in possession of the Spaniards, and while the Intruder was reconnoitring it one day with a telescope, a shot from an eight-pounder passed close by him. This place the French besieged; it was ably defended by the Governor D. Juan Antonio Cearra, who was a lieutenant-colonel of engineers: but the enemy were not scrupulous as to any means which could accelerate their success; and during a night's truce they erected a battery of eight guns, in the most advantageous situation; by this battery the works were much injured, and the garrison

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October.

Unsuccessful attempt upon Denia.

The French prepare to march from the south against Lord Wellington.

Castle of Chinchilla taken by the French.

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 1812.
 Oct. 9.
They begin their march.

considerably reduced in number; and of twenty artillerymen, there only remained eight to work the guns, when some of these men were struck dead by lightning, many more, and among them the governor, wounded by it, and the works so shaken, that it became necessary to surrender. The enemy's preparations were complete soon after this obstacle was removed; and on the 16th of October, the Intruder set out from Valencia towards the Tagus, with Marshals Jourdan and Soult at the head of 70,000 troops, 10,000 being cavalry. Lord Wellington received intelligence of this from Sir Rowland Hill on the 21st, and the same advices informed him that the Tagus was already fordable by individuals in many places, and was likely soon to be so for an army. As long as the Tagus remained unfordable, Sir Rowland's position was tolerably secure; but when the river fell, it became too hazardous for him to maintain an advanced position near Madrid in front of an enemy so greatly superior. It was necessary that Lord Wellington should move towards him, lest the corps under his own command should be insulated in consequence of the movements which Sir Rowland might find himself compelled to make. He determined therefore to fall back upon the Douro, so to afford Sir Rowland a point upon which to return, and by uniting their forces, to secure a retreat into Portugal.

Lord Wellington raises the siege of Burgos.

This resolution was executed as promptly as it was formed. He instantly raised the siege, and filed his whole army in the night of the 21st under the walls of the castle and over the bridge, which was closely enfiladed by its artillery; a bold and unprecedented manœuvre, which military men adduce as a proof that the march of troops cannot be stopped by the fire of artillery in the night. The allies moved in silence and good order; but a party of Guerrillas, regardless of discipline, then, as at all times, put their horses to their speed, and the clatter

which they made alarmed the garrison. A fire was consequently opened from the guns which were directed on the bridge, and the first discharge was most destructive; but the gunners then lost the range and direction, and their farther fire served only to quicken the speed of the carriages. Every thing was brought away in this retreat except the three disabled guns, and the eight pieces of the enemy which had been taken in the horn work. The loss of the allies during the siege amounted to 24 officers and 485 men killed; 68 officers and 1487 men wounded and missing. The enemy did not begin to follow till late on the ensuing day; 10,000 of their troops encamped that day on the south of Burgos, and on the morrow at noon, they came up in force with the retreating army. Sir Stapleton Cotton detained them for above three hours at the passage of the Hormaza, in front of Celada del Camino; they were twice charged there by Major-General Anson's brigade with great success, and the rear-guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the Guerrillas on their left were driven in and came flying upon them, four or five of the enemy's squadrons being mixed with them in pursuit. In the confusion which ensued, the French were mistaken for Spaniards, and favoured by that mistake, they fell upon the flank and rear of the allies. Some loss was sustained, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pell of the 16th dragoons was taken prisoner, having had his horse shot. A very superior body of cavalry, in which the enemy were strong, now came up, and the allied cavalry fell back hastily, lest they should be surrounded; but having crossed a wide and deep ditch by a narrow bridge, the brigades of Major-Generals Bock and Anson charged their pursuers when only part had filed over: in this they were repulsed, hardly pressed, and forced upon the infantry rear-guard of German light troops under Colonel Halkett: that officer formed his troops in four squares, and the men

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*October.**Retreat
from Bur-
gos.*

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October.

*The allies
cross the
Pisuerga.**Disorders
during the
retreat.*

behaving, as that legion ever did, admirably, repulsed the enemy in several charges, and checked the pursuit. The right of the army crossed the Pisuerga that afternoon at Torquemada, and the left at Cordovilla, where head-quarters were established that night.

The army continued its march on the 24th towards the Carrion. Throughout the north of Castille, which is a great wine country, the wine is stowed either in caves dug in the hill sides, or excavated in the earth, the soil from the excavation being formed into a mound over them, and the entrance appearing like the chimney of a subterraneous dwelling. These cellars were now filled with new wine; the soldiers broke into them during the night, and it was not without the greatest exertions that the officers in the morning could put their battalions in march. The enemy, however, after their yesterday's repulse were less pressing; and the whole army having that day marched twenty miles, took up its ground behind the Carrion with its right at Dueñas and its left at Villa Muriel; and here the brigade of guards which had disembarked at Coruña joined them. The retreating army did not exceed 20,000 men; the French displayed above thirty; they were confident also in the superiority of their cavalry, in that country the most efficient force; and as it is their national character to be easily elated, they might well be elated now, at having baffled Lord Wellington before so poor a fortress as the castle at Burgos, and compelled him who had driven Massena out of Portugal, and routed Marmont at Salamanca, to retreat before them. English soldiers are neither lightly elated, nor soon cast down; they keep their courage on a retreat, for that never gives way; but they become disdainful of control, when they have no opportunity of wreaking their wrathful feelings upon the enemy who is in pursuit, and insubordination is then the sin which most

easily besets them. This was already felt, though as yet they had suffered little, and though the retreat was so deliberately made, and with so firm a face toward the enemy, that the men lost none of their confidence in their Commander.

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The army halted on the 25th, and measures were taken for impeding the pursuit. A battalion of the royals was posted at Palencia to cover the operations for destroying the bridges over the Carrion at that old city; but the French assembled there in such force, that the commanding officer being attacked and overpowered, found it necessary to retire upon Villa Muriel, and the bridges were left uninjured for the pursuers to pass. Two other bridges over the same river at Villa Muriel and at Dueñas were mined, that they might be exploded on the enemy's approach, and one in like manner over the Pisuerga at Tariago. The two former were successfully exploded, that at Villa Muriel under a fire of grape-shot from the enemy; but they discovered a ford there, and passed over a considerable body both of horse and foot. A false report that the enemy had already crossed at Tariago, delayed the commencement of the work there; the French came up before it was completed; it was exploded prematurely, and consequently to no effect; their cavalry galloped over and made the party prisoners. This enabled them to push a corps on the right into contact with the posts on the Carrion; their passing at Palencia made it necessary for Lord Wellington to change the front of his army, and this second success rendered his farther retreat difficult, and even precarious. Major-Generals Pringle and Barnes were therefore ordered to attack those who had crossed the Pisuerga; the Spanish troops co-operated in this, and the enemy were driven across the river with considerable loss. Neither could they maintain themselves upon the Carrion after having forded at Villa Muriel; the Spaniards who were employed to dislodge

CHAP. XLII. 1812. *October.* them, faltered in the charge, and Alava, while leading them on and in the act of encouraging them, fell badly wounded; the fall of this gallant leader did not inspire them with more courage, but the Brunswickers were then ordered to advance; those brave men ran into the village without firing a shot; the Spaniards took heart and followed them, and the French withdrew; and the fifth division under General Oswald advancing against their main body, compelled it to recross.

*Oct. 26.
The allies
halt.* The next day the allies retreated sixteen miles without molestation, and crossed the Pisuerga at Cabezon del Campo; the bridge there was barricadoed and mined, and the army halted in its rear. The ruined bridges at Dueñas and Villa Muriel had impeded Souham's movements, so that he did not approach till evening; he then halted his whole army on the right bank of the Pisuerga. *Oct. 27.* The morning of the 27th was foggy, but when the mist cleared, their whole force was seen encamped at about three miles distance. They brought up two brigades of artillery and cannonaded the town, with little other harm than that of severely wounding Lieutenant-Colonel Robe of the artillery. Being opposed to a superior fire, they made no farther attempt in front, but made considerable detachments to their right, through Cigales, with a view of getting possession of the bridge at Valladolid, and thus interposing in the rear of the retreating army. Lord Wellington had an opportunity of seeing their whole force from a high ground, and saw that they were in very great strength. On the 28th, they extended their right still farther, and endeavoured in the morning to force the bridge over the Douro at Simancas, which was defended by Colonel Halkett, with his brigade of the 7th division, while the Earl of Dalhousie, with the remainder of the division, defended the bridge at Valladolid. Halkett being hard pressed, blew up the bridge, and disappointed them of their passage

there ; at the same time he sent the Brunswick Oels regiment to Tordesillas, whither the enemy detached troops in the evening, and where also the bridge over the Douro was destroyed in time. Lord Wellington sent orders to the Brunswickers to take post on its ruins, in such manner as to prevent them from repairing it ; and breaking up from the Pisuerga, he crossed the Douro on the 29th, by the bridges of Puente Douro, and Tudela, both which, and that at Quintanilla also, were blown up, and subsequently those at Toro and Zamora. The pursuers that evening displayed more enterprise than they had hitherto shown ; they passed a body of men in the night of the 29th, by swimming the Douro near Tordesillas, and these gallant fellows falling upon the guard who had been left in a tower on the south end of the bridge, and looked for no attack on that side, surprised and overpowered them, and immediately fell to work to restore the communication. Lord Wellington was apprised of this in time, or it would have frustrated all his former precautions ; he marched his army early on the morrow, and posted them on the heights, between Rueda and Tordesillas, immediately opposite and near the bridge : the bridge by this time had been nearly repaired, but the French had made no attempt to pass ; and in that position, which he strengthened with batteries, Lord Wellington remained from the 30th till the 6th of November, the enemy meantime extending along the river from Toro to Valladolid. He thus obtained the double object of resting the troops, and gaining time for Sir Rowland Hill's movements ; for, . . . though his first view had been in falling back upon the Douro to afford Sir Rowland a point upon which to retire when he should no longer be able to maintain an advanced position in front of Madrid, against the very superior force which would be brought against him, . . . having seen the strength of Souham's army, it had

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CHAP. XLII. become necessary to order Sir Rowland to break up from the Xarama, for the purpose of securing his own retreat.

1812. Sir Rowland was an officer upon whom Lord Wellington

October.

Sir Rowland Hill retreats from the Xarama.

might always rely with the most perfect confidence. He expected such orders, and receiving them on the 29th, intended to begin his march on the following morning; but the mine which should have destroyed the Puente Larga, on the Xarama, failed; and the enemy, who had collected a large body between that bridge and Aranjuez, immediately made an attack upon the allied post there. They were repulsed by Colonel Skerrett with considerable loss on their part, and that of some forty men on ours: this affair delayed the march of Sir Rowland's right till the evening, the enemy however made no subsequent attempt to molest him, farther than by picking up such stragglers as fell behind for the sake of plundering and drinking; and these were numerous. The army marched all night and reached Madrid on the following morning. That capital presented a melancholy scene: it was known that these allies could make no attempt to defend it, and that their retreat would be followed by the entrance of the enemy; and two days before, when the Military and Provisional Government were about to transfer their authority to the *Ayuntamiento*, that body dissolved itself, regardless of its duty. Upon this, the Regidor D. Pedro Baranda, who had been on the point of resigning his office, came bravely and honourably forward to take himself the charge from which they had shrunk, and summoning persons to his aid who had been in authority when the French withdrew, began to take measures for averting the evils which there was so much cause to apprehend. The letters in the post-office were sent off to Avila, lest they should be seized by the enemy, and many persons brought into danger by their contents. And to prevent the

State of Madrid.

excesses which must be expected, if on the entrance of the enemy the prisons should be thrown open, the alcaydes were called upon to deliver in a list of those persons who were imprisoned for disloyalty to the national cause, and they were set at liberty while there yet existed an authority which could restrain them from acts of immediate vengeance.

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November.

There were large depôts of provisions in the Retiro and in the convent of Monserrate, which the allied army had no means of carrying with them in their retreat, and orders were therefore given that they should be burnt. The municipality requested that they might rather be disposed of either by sale, or as a loan, for the inhabitants and the hospitals; it was not at the commissary's discretion to accede to this proposal; but instead of destroying the stores, the people in the immediate vicinity were invited to help themselves there. It seemed, indeed, in this retreat, that in the economy of an army the English had yet every thing to learn: the troops were at this time scantily provided with food, their line of supply had been along the valley of the Tagus, the arrangements for changing its direction failed, and before the men effected their junction with Lord Wellington's army, the sweet acorns which they found in the wood formed no slight part of their subsistence. The works at the Retiro were destroyed before the troops withdrew from Madrid, and the artillery there was rendered useless: their departure resembled that of the French in this respect, that they were accompanied by a considerable number of Spaniards, for whom it would have been dangerous to place themselves at the mercy of the Intrusive Government; but such persons were objects of commiseration and respect to their countrymen, not of contempt and execration.

*The allies
withdraw
from Ma-
drid.*

While the allies retired leisurely towards the pass of the Guadarrama, a French officer presented himself on the after-

*The French
enter.*

CHAP. noon of November 1, at the bridge of Toledo, announcing on
XLII. the part of General Drouet, that King Joseph would enter
1812. on the morrow with his army, and requiring that a deputation
November. should go out to meet and welcome him. On the morrow,
accordingly, the *Ayuntamiento* went forth accompanied by some
of the parish priests, of the titular nobility, and of those who
held office under the Intruder. Baranda briefly represented the
peaceable conduct of the inhabitants, and expressed to Joseph's
minister of the Interior, that his only wish was to retire to his
own house, where he might consult his own health and look
after his own affairs. This permission was easily obtained, as
the French presently re-established the former functionaries;
but on the 6th, the municipality were informed that circum-
stances rendered it necessary for the troops to leave the capital
for some days; and that, in the meantime, they must take upon
themselves the charge of preserving tranquillity. Baranda was
then summoned from his short retirement, and required again to
act as President of the *Ayuntamiento*. At two on the afternoon
of the 7th, the troops departed to reinforce Marshal Soult, who
had followed Sir Rowland's movements; and in less than two
hours after their departure, Lieutenant-Colonel Mondedeu, the
commandant of a Guerrilla party, entered; on the morrow, the
Medico arrived with part of his band, the Empecinado's divi-
sion on the following day, and on the 11th, the Camp Marshal
Bassecourt with some of his troops. Fewer disorders were com-
mitted than might have been expected under such circumstances,
and those chiefly by peasants and deserters, who thought to
take advantage of the sort of interregnum in which the capital
was left; but the officers caused these offenders to be arrested,
and exerted themselves to prevent excesses. But the inha-
bitants were told that, as the human means of effecting with God's
blessing their own deliverance, they must contribute towards

the support of the soldiers as much as their necessities could spare ; and it may be supposed that this contribution was exacted with less compunction on the one part, and submitted to with less unwillingness on the other, because both well knew that when the French returned the locust would devour what the palmer-worm had left.

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On the 6th Sir Rowland reached Arevalo, which is about 80 miles from Madrid ; the troops had suffered much from the weather, more from the gross ill management on the part of the commissariat and the staff, and not a little from their own irregularities, moral discipline having long been disregarded in modern armies. He was now in communication with Lord Wellington, and was instructed to continue his march by Fonteveros upon Alba de Tormes. By this time Lord Wellington's army had been recruited by rest, and the enemy had rendered the bridges passable at Toro and at Tordesillas : he broke up therefore from his position in front of the latter city before daylight, leaving the fires burning : that day he fell back to Torrecilla de la Orden, continued his march the following day, and on the 8th took up the position which he had twice before occupied in front of Salamanca. Sir Rowland crossed the Tormes the same day at Alba, occupied that town and castle with Major-General Howard's brigade, and stationed a Portuguese division on the left of the Tormes, under Major-General Hamilton, to support them. They were not followed during their retreat from the Douro ; the enemy halted to collect provisions and bring up their detachments, and the armies of Portugal and the north then formed their junction with those of the south, and of the centre under Soult and the Intruder : their united force amounted to not less than 80,000 foot and 12,000 horse, being the whole of their disposable force in Spain, and it was believed that they had with them not fewer than 200 pieces of cannon. The allies

*Junction of
the retreating
armies.*

*Junction of
the French
armies.*

CHAP. had 48,000 foot and 5000 horse. On the 9th the enemy drove
 XLII. in the piquets in front of Alba, and Major-General Long was
 1812. obliged to withdraw his brigade through that town on the follow-
 November. ing morning. The enemy then, who were directing their main
 efforts against the right of the allies, approached their position
 on the Tormes, and prepared to force a passage. They attacked
 the troops in Alba with twenty pieces of cannon, and bringing
 up 15 squadrons and a considerable force of infantry threatened
 an assault, their light troops advancing close to the walls which
 had been hastily thrown up. They continued their fire from
 two o'clock till darkness had closed; but they made no impres-
 sion on the brave troops who were opposed to them, and therefore
 they did not repeat the attempt. The intermediate time till the
 14th they employed in reconnoitring the fords, and the position
 which Lord Wellington occupied in front of Salamanca; and on
 the 14th they commenced the passage at three fords, about two
 leagues above Alba, near Lucinas.

*Lord Wel-
 lington re-
 treats from
 Salamanca.*

Lord Wellington immediately broke up from St. Christoval, ordered the troops to move toward Arapiles, and as soon as he had ascertained the direction of the enemy's march from the fords, moved with a division of infantry and all the cavalry he could collect to attack them; but they had already crossed in too great force. The wind at this time blew strong, and a thick rain rendered all objects indistinct at little distance; Lord Wellington, nevertheless, under cover of a cannonade, reconnoitred their position, and saw that they were too strongly posted at Mozarbes to be attacked. In the evening therefore he withdrew the troops from the neighbourhood of Alba, having destroyed the bridges, and leaving only a Spanish garrison of 300 men in the castle, into which the remains of an old palace had been converted. During the night, and in the course of the ensuing morning, he moved the greater part of the troops

through Salamanca, and placed Sir Edward Paget, with the first division of infantry on the right, at Aldea Tejada, to secure the passage there over the little river Zunguen, in case the movements of the French on his right flank should compel him to make choice either of giving up his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo or with Salamanca. The inhabitants of that city were some preparing for the worst, and others helplessly expecting it, yet with a lingering hope that another battle upon that ground which had proved so destructive to Marmont's army might once more deliver them. Lord Wellington himself had this possibility in mind, and did not order the commissariat and hospital stores to be removed from Salamanca till the movements of the French rendered it certain that, notwithstanding their great superiority in numbers, they would not venture to bring on a general action. They fortified their position at Mozarbes, and sent out bodies of horse and foot toward their left, to act upon the communications of the allies with Ciudad Rodrigo. This was a sure game; they were too strong and too strongly posted for Lord Wellington to think of attacking them; nothing therefore remained for him but to retreat upon his resources; and this was the more necessary because the men were nearly exhausted with the fatigues of so long and arduous a campaign; there was little regard to discipline among them, except when in the immediate presence of an enemy, and the horses were dying of exhaustion and for want of forage.

On the 15th the army was put in motion to retire, in three columns, observing, as well as the country would allow, parallel distances. Sir Rowland commanded the first, Sir Edward Paget the centre, the third consisted of the Spanish army. They crossed the Zunguen, passed the left flank of the enemy's position, and encamped that night in the olive-grounds, on the Vamusa, one of the smaller rivers which find their way into the

CHAP.
XLII.
1812.
November.

*Retreat to
the Agueda.*

CHAP. Tormes. The weather was most unfavourable, and the way
XLII. sometimes over stony and ploughed grounds, sometimes over
1812. swampy or inundated low lands. The troops arrived at their
November. halting places greatly fatigued. They were without shelter of
Sufferings any sort; it was impossible to kindle fires because of the heavy
of the army. and incessant rain; and they were still farther dispirited by finding
that the supplies had been forwarded to Ciudad Rodrigo. Bread
for three days in advance had been issued to them as usual, but
English soldiers are seldom provident, and when such demands
were made upon their strength, the natural means of supporting
and recruiting it could never be more needful. There was no
provender for the horses, the bark of trees and sprigs of wild
briar were the only and miserable substitutes that could be found.
The French never displayed less vigour than at this time; the
overweening contempt which they had once affected for the
British troops had been so thoroughly corrected, that they made
no attempt to overwhelm an enemy greatly inferior in number,
and retreating under circumstances of great difficulty and dis-
tress. They only sent a body of cavalry with light artillery
in pursuit; and these contented themselves with picking up
stragglers and such baggage as fell behind. The army bivou-
acked on the 16th in a wood about two leagues from Tamames;
the ground in many places was covered with water, but the rain
ceased, and some biscuit was issued. The day's march had been
most painful, over such heavy ground that at every step the
horses sunk to the fetlock, and the men to their ancles; but
while the men were filling their havresacks with sweet acorns,
which they rejoiced to meet with, in the want of other food, the
horses now and then picked up a little grass.

The 17th was another wet and misty day; the army left its
bivouac at six; an extensive wood lay before them: the enemy
now followed close upon their rear, and the light companies

were ordered to extend themselves through the wood for the purpose of protecting the flanks and the baggage. This service was not easily to be performed against so great a force of cavalry as was now harassing the movements of a disorderly army. Wherever the way was through the woods, officers as well as men carried on a successful warfare against the herds of swine which at that season are turned there to feed upon the acorns; the Spaniards, it is said, began; the wretched state of their commissariat was their excuse, and the allies had the same excuse for following the example; and so eagerly was it followed, that the continued firing of musquetry on all sides, often occasioned an apprehension that the piquets were warmly engaged, and even that the army was surrounded. This occurred so often that it produced incaution at last, and the enemy's fire was mistaken for pig-shooting. Owing to the badness of the roads, and the swollen state of the rivulets, there was an interval of about a mile between two of the infantry divisions. Sir Edward Paget, who commanded the centre column, rode to the rear, alone, for the purpose of discovering the cause of this interval: a body of the enemy's cavalry meantime had entered between these divisions; they had pursued a troop of Portuguese horse from the left flank: the firing had been ascribed to the pig-shooters, and Sir Edward falling in with the French was made prisoner, being without support: they might have done much hurt had they been more enterprising or more aware of their advantage. At this time the troops were descending upon the little village of S. Muñoz, in a valley between two hills; the Huebra which runs into the Douro has its course along this valley, a deep and rapid stream; both hills are covered with oaks, and the declivity on both sides is difficult and steep. The troops when they had forded were formed in open columns on the heights, and halted. A fog came on early in the afternoon,

CHAP.
XLII.

1812.

November.

*Sir Edward
Paget made
prisoner.*

CHAP. under cover of which the enemy got possession of a hill upon
 XLII. the right of the British line; they brought up some mountain-
 1812. guns, and commenced a fire upon the rear-guard, consisting of
 November. the light division, under Major-General Alten, while it was
 fording the river. Some loss was sustained by them. The guns
 of Major Macdonald's troop of horse-artillery returned their fire
 successfully, but during the cannonade he was severely wounded.
 The enemy's cavalry followed as soon as the division had crossed,
 and began to hem them in; and though the troops formed in
 squares, they succeeded in charging them in the low ground.

*Lord Wel-
 lington
 reaches Ciu-
 dad Ro-
 drigo.*

There was now some appearance that an action might be
 brought on; the men were sufficiently eager for this, they longed
 to revenge themselves upon the French for the privations and
 sufferings of their retreat; they made no doubt of beating them,
 and they anticipated with hungry eagerness the pleasure of
 taking their supplies. As Lord Wellington came to pass the
 column in review, the word, "here he comes," passed along, and
 carried with it sure confidence to every heart, . . . that confidence
 which before the works at Burgos could not be felt, being given
 in the field as fully as it was deserved. But the French also knew
 that the British commander and his troops might justly rely upon
 each other, and they would not hazard a battle. The cannonade
 was continued on both sides till evening closed. The men
 bivouacked as usual on the wet ground, their cloaks and blankets
 soaked with rain; but the rain had ceased, it was a moonlight
 night, and they had the satisfaction of knowing that another
 day's march would bring them to Ciudad Rodrigo, beyond which
 the enemy could not follow them, and where their privations
 would be at an end. Between three and four in the morning
 they moved from their bivouack; the enemy followed them that
 day only with their cavalry. Lord Wellington's head-quarters
 were in Ciudad Rodrigo that night, and on the 19th and 20th

the army entered the Portugueze frontier, crossing the Agueda. The loss during this retreat of about 240 miles amounted to 196 killed, 663 wounded, 421 missing, and 280 horses; many of the men who had been returned as missing afterwards came in; but others, among whom were some valuable officers, died in consequence of the fatigues and hardships which they had endured.

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November.

The enemy retired as soon as the allies had reached Ciudad Rodrigo, and they withdrew from the Tormes also as soon as the castle of Alba was surrendered. The Spanish Governor Don José de Miranda held out there with great gallantry, and made more than an hundred prisoners in some well-directed sallies. Some characteristic correspondence passed between him and the French; they required him to surrender and rely upon their generosity, otherwise he must expect to be treated with the utmost rigour; he in reply spoke of his duties as a soldier, and boasted of his brilliant garrison. The French allowed him an hour for returning a second answer, and bade him tremble if it were a refusal; in his reply he bade them do their duty as he should perform his, and told them that if the fortune of war should be in their favour, his numerous prisoners, who had been treated in the best manner, would be the victims. In this strain, but in letters which increased in length, and became more and more courteous, the correspondence was continued from the 14th of November till the 24th, on the night of which Miranda left the fortress in the hands of Lieutenant D. Nicolas Soler, with 20 men, the prisoners and the sick; and informing the French commander, in his last communication, that this officer was instructed to deliver up the place, he with the remainder of the garrison effected their escape, making their way through many dangers, but with little loss, to the Puerto del Pico.

*The French
retire to the
Tormes.*

*Castle of
Alba de
Tormes evacuated.*

CHAP.
XLII.

1812.

*November.**Lord Wellington's
circular letter to the
commanding officer.*

As soon as it was ascertained that the enemy had withdrawn from the Tormes, Lord Wellington distributed the troops in winter cantonments, the left being retired to Lamego, and the right thrown forward as far as Baños and Bejar, to hold the passes. He then addressed a circular letter to the commanding officers of battalions, for the purpose of drawing their attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. "The discipline of every army," he said, "after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the generals and other officers to bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service ; but I am concerned to have to observe, that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the last campaign, in a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster ; it has suffered no privations which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service ; nor has it suffered any hardships excepting those resulting from the inclemencies of the weather at a time when they were most severe. It must be obvious, however, to every officer that from the time the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred. Yet, the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such short marches ; none on which they made such long and repeated halts ; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed in the rear by the enemy. We must look therefore to some cause besides those

resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged. I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

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November.

“ I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the officers ; and I am quite certain that as their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention, to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict performance of their duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future fix their attention to these points. Unfortunately the inexperience of the officers has induced many to conceive that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which, of all others, every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldiers, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries and field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments, for the receipt and issue, and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his food and the forage for his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officer of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

“ These are the points then to which I most earnestly entreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the officers under your command, Portuguese as well as English, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant inspection

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November.

and superintendence of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments ; and they must endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a sense of their situation and authority ; and the non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty, by being constantly under the view and superintendence of the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the provost, and to punishments by the sentence of courts-martial will be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages of which there are too many complaints, when they know that their officers, and their non-commissioned officers, have their eyes and attention turned towards them. The commanding officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant, real inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article, and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view both should be inspected daily."

He proceeded to say that he had frequently observed during the late campaign with how much more ease and celerity the French soldiers cooked their food than the British. This disadvantage on our part, he said, must be ascribed to the same cause as the other evils which he lamented, "the want of attention in the officers to the orders of the army and to the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others to get the meat, &c. to be cooked : and it would soon be found if this practice were duly enforced, and a particular hour for serving the dinners, and for the men dining, named, as it ought to be, equally as for the parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it had lately been found to

take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the moment when the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy." He concluded by repeating that the great object of the general and field-officers must be to get the captains and subalterns of the regiments to understand, and to perform the duties required from them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army could be restored and maintained during the next campaign.

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1812.

November.

This letter excited no little surprise in the nation, mortifying and disgraceful as the faults were which were thus openly and manfully exposed. But it was not more severe than the occasion called for. No retreat had ever been conducted with greater military skill; and nothing but that skill, and the reputation which the British troops had established for themselves under its direction, could have saved the army from the consequences of the ignorance or neglect of duty in many of the officers, and the insubordination of the men, which was a consequence of such neglect or ignorance. The circumstances of that retreat justified the whole severity of Lord Wellington's remarks, and would more evidently have done so, if the sufferings of the army had been more broadly stated; for though the marches had indeed been short, and the halts long and frequent, no army which was not flying from an enemy, but retreating before it, in strength, ever suffered so much from exposure, and hunger, and exhaustion. Nothing could be more judicious than his orders during the whole retreat, and nothing more irregular than the way in which they were carried into effect; and this, though in part owing to casual and unavoidable obstructions on the way, arose in a far greater degree from negligence and incapacity. Sometimes divisions were moved too soon, more frequently too late, and kept standing on wet ground, in the rain, for two hours, perishing with cold, waiting the order to move. Their clothes

CHAP. were seldom dry for six hours together, and during the latter
XLII. part of the retreat continually wet; sometimes they were bivou-
1812. acked in a swamp, when better ground was near: they lay down
November. upon the wet ground, fell asleep from mere exhaustion, were
roused to receive their meat, and had then no means of dressing
it, . . the camp-kettles had been sent on, or by some error were
some miles in the rear, or the mules which carried them had
foundered on the way; and no fire could be kindled on wet
ground, with wet materials, and under a heavy rain. The sub-
alterns threw the blame upon their superiors, and these again
upon theirs, all complaining of incompetence in some of the
general officers, and carelessness or supercilious neglect in some
of the staff. But the intended effect was produced. That some-
thing was deficient in the equipments of the army was perceived,
and in part remedied. Alas! no one observed that there was an
utter want of that discipline by virtue of which Cromwell con-
quered, which rendered the Swedes invincible under their great
Gustavus, and to which the Prince of Parma owed little less than
to his own military genius, admirable as that was.

CHAPTER XLIII.

OPERATIONS DURING THE WINTER AND SPRING. BATTLE
OF VITTORIA.

LORD WELLINGTON'S failure at Burgos, and his consequent retreat to the Agueda, gave the Whigs a last opportunity of repeating their predictions, that the war in the Peninsula must prove unsuccessful, and they availed themselves of it with unabated confidence. The more rancorous radicals insulted the nation for the hopes which had been entertained, exulted in the reverses which they magnified, and reviled the ministers and the General, ..the ministers both for having continued the war, and for "starving" it; Lord Wellington both for inactivity and for rashness, for doing too little and too much, for wasting time at Madrid, and for attempting a siege with such inadequate means, that nothing but the most profuse expenditure of blood could afford even a forlorn hope of its succeeding. Even when the events of the Russian campaign made it evident that the formidable tyranny against which we had so long contended must soon be overthrown, the opposition, as well as the revolutionists, turned away their eyes from the prospect.

Parliament met at the latter end of November. In the Prince Regent's speech it was stated, that the southern pro-

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November.

Opinions of
the oppo-
sition.Marquis
Wellesley
calls for in-
quiry.

Nov. 30. On this occasion, Marquis Wellesley called upon the Peers, to inquire whether the system which had hitherto been pursued was founded upon just and extended principles; whether an able and efficient exertion of our resources had been made; whether such means as the country possessed had been fully employed, and whether the result had been such as the nation had a right to expect from the possession of those means, and the right application of them. He wished it were possible to fix in the minds of their lordships something like a definite and precise object, as the issue of the contest in the Peninsula. In his mind, the only legitimate object was, the expulsion of the French armies from Spain; and the war had been carried on in a way totally inadequate to the production of that result. The plan, which of all others all mankind must reprobate, was that of employing our resources with a view rather to what might be spared in expense, than to what might be effected by exertion: thus exposing the sinews of our strength to hourly danger, and bearing hard upon our finances, yet effecting neither economy nor success, but falling dead as it were between both. A vast expense of blood and treasure had been lavished, without accomplishing any one definite object. The best assistance we could afford to Russia was by carrying on the war in Spain upon a broad and extensive scale; it had not been so carried on, and he charged upon that system, therefore, a defection from the cause of Russia. He did not mean to dispute that the last campaign had been beneficial to Spain; but his objec-

tion was, that those benefits were imperfectly secured, and that they could not expect them to be permanent.

Lord Grenville repeated and persisted in his old opinion, that the deliverance of Spain was beyond the utmost means of this country to effect; and that it was cruel and base to embark the population of that country in so hopeless a cause, merely for the sake of a little temporary advantage. The ministers had not advanced one step in the accomplishment of this object; and this third advance into the interior of Spain had, by its failure, proved the correctness of the data on which his opinion was founded. Their boast of having delivered Andalusia was an empty boast: no one doubted that the deliverance was more than temporary, and that the French could not re-occupy the provinces whenever they pleased. It was the want of means, the failure of supplies and resources, which had led to the unproductive results of all their exertions. The blame did not lie with the Spaniards, but with those who encouraged the hopes which they had no right to entertain: the fault was with the English ministers, who in their ignorance over-rated the condition of Spain, and anticipated more from her than she could by possibility perform. He asked also, why ministers, with a revenue of one hundred and five millions, or more, by estimate, extorted by means the most grinding and oppressive from a suffering people, were yet unable to supply Lord Wellington's military chest? The difficulty arose from their incapacity, not from the deficient resources of the country, much as they had been drained. They might diminish by one half the income of every individual in this country, with as little effect or promise of ultimate success as had attended those plans which led them to circulate a vile and adulterated currency in paper coin throughout the nation. When such had been its effects, why not at this moment stop the contest in Spain?

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XLIH.

1812.

November.

Lord Grenville.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1812.

November.

*Mr. Pon-
sonby.*

*Mr. Fre-
emantle.*

In the House of Commons, Mr. Ponsonby said, it was useless to carry farther an unprofitable contest; it was useless to waste the blood and the treasures of England for an unattainable object; it had been proved that the power of England was not competent to drive the French out of the Peninsula.

Mr. Freemantle was decidedly of opinion, that by the battle of Salamanca we had gained nothing but glory; that the deliverance of Spain was no nearer its accomplishment than when Lord Wellington was posted at Torres Vedras, and that our prospects at the present moment were not nearly so bright as at the commencement of the last session, .. at which time his declared opinion had been, that we could entertain no rational prospect of making any impression upon the enemy in Spain.

*Mr. Whit-
bread.*

Mr. Whitbread's tone upon that subject was somewhat modified; he admitted that the situation in which we now stood in Spain was glorious beyond example, in so far as related to the achievements of our armies, though with respect to the expulsion of the French, we were not so near our object as some people supposed. There was this difference between an offensive and a defensive war; that an offensive war ought always to be a war of spirit. When vigorous efforts therefore were to be made in Spain, there ought to be no limit to that vigour. Let an application therefore be made to the Prince Regent, to know from him whether the greatest possible use had been made by ministers of the means with which they were intrusted for carrying on the war, before coming to a decision on the merits of ministers, or the probability of the war being in future carried on with success. He was far from wishing to refuse them the means necessary for carrying it to a successful issue; but feeling for the people who were groaning under accumulated burdens and threatened with the Chancellor of the Exchequer's financial abilities, he thought the last resources of the country ought not to be

granted without security for their being properly applied. Under all these circumstances, he was desirous of imploring the Prince Regent to take into consideration, whether or not it was at present possible to bring about a pacification. Buonaparte was on his retreat to his resources, his force not annihilated, though certainly in great danger, and this was what the House were to congratulate themselves on, and for which they were to go to the Prince Regent with an address on the prosperous state of the country! If the situation of affairs on the continent was good for any thing, it was this, that the Emperor of France having failed in his object, an opportunity was now offered when it would not be inglorious, and when it would certainly be highly useful to propose to the enemy some arrangement for peace. Buonaparte was at present in a perilous situation, and every exertion ought to be made, by taking advantage of it to procure a peace. But a feeling seemed to pervade the minds of certain persons, that peace should not be concluded with that man, . . . a feeling which he wished to eradicate from this country: for, in the probable course of events, we should be obliged to make peace with him. Let him therefore be sent to openly and manfully! The fate of the mission would be speedily known; and the issue would be a conviction on the mind of every one, whether a permanent and honourable peace could be procured or not.

When a motion for thanks to Lord Wellington and his army for the battle of Salamanca was brought forward, Sir Francis Burdett said, he was far from wishing invidiously to detract from the merits of men who had devoted their exertions to the service of their country, or to withhold from them any recompense that it was in the power of parliament to bestow: but when he heard the battle of Salamanca represented as having been equal in importance to the battle of Blenheim, and to

CHAP.
XLIII.

1812.

November.

*Motion of
thanks to
the armies.*

*Sir Francis
Burdett.*

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1812.

December.

other great battles which had completely changed the aspect of the whole affairs of Europe, he could not suffer such delusions to go forth uncontradicted, . . . delusions which were calculated to plunge the country, under the direction of the same persons, still more deeply in a destructive and ruinous war: for after their boasted and over-praised victories, we were still as far from our object as ever. What! were we to suffer the French troops to recover from the effect of their discomfiture and exhaustion, and to wait until the tide of good fortune which had attended us flowed back on its source? Were we to be satisfied with a retreat? Yet, where now was the Marquis of Wellington? In what direction were we to look for the glorious results of the campaign? In what manner was the diminution of the French power in Spain evinced? Nothing seemed to have resulted from all our advantages but calamity and distress; and it followed, therefore, that either Lord Wellington was not entitled to the praise which the House was called upon to bestow, or that the fault of our failure was attributable to the gross negligence and imbecility of the ministers. Lord Castlereagh, Sir Francis pursued, in the plenitude of his satisfaction, had not confined himself to Spain, but had travelled out of his course, and taken the House to Russia, where in the destruction of from 200,000 to 300,000 human beings, in the burning of Moscow, and in the devastation of an immense tract of Russian territory, he found new causes of congratulation, new sources of national pride and gratitude! Would he be equally inclined to consider it a matter of triumph, if Buonaparte (which in his opinion was more than probable) should extricate himself from his perils, and after having found good winter quarters, return to the contest with renovated ardour in the spring? Could he believe it possible that Russia could continue such a contest, and undergo a repetition of similar dreadful

experiments and sacrifices? Supposing he marched to Petersburg, which seemed to be his ultimate intention, would the same mode of defence as at Moscow be adopted? Would Russia burn Petersburg too? He for one could not greatly admire the magnanimity of burning that, the preservation of which ought to have been fought for; nor could he see the shining character of the Emperor Alexander, who was not, like the Emperor of the French, personally sharing in the dangers of the war. He could not subdue the conviction which arose in his mind on viewing all these things, of the utter impossibility of the Emperor of Russia's feeling any exultation whatever: on the contrary, he thought that unfortunate individual must be oppressed by a view of the irreparable calamities to which himself and his people had been, and were likely still further to be, exposed. Farther than this, when a grant was moved to the Marquis of Wellington, Sir Francis said, he did not wish to divide the House upon it, but he wished to move, that the consideration of the grant should be deferred till some inquiries had been made into the late extraordinary campaign. Lord Wellington's victories had none of the characteristics which distinguished those of Marlborough. It had been observed, and by military men too, that he had brought his army into difficulties, but that his men had fought him out of them again; and that in the capture of the fortresses which he had won, a waste of life was to be complained of. The cause of Spain appeared to him infinitely more hopeless than it was at the commencement of the campaign, . . . the case of the Peninsula more deplorable than ever.

Marquis Wellesley moved for a committee to inquire into the conduct of the war in the Peninsula. "My lords," said he, "what secret cause amidst the splendid scene that has been exhibited in the Peninsula, . . . what malign influence amidst the

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XLIII.

1812.

December.

Dec. 7.

M. Wellesley moves
for a committee of
inquiry.

March 12.

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rejoicings and acclamations of triumph, has counteracted the brilliant successes of our arms, and has converted the glad feelings of a just exultation into the bitterness of regret and disappointment? With an army in discipline and spirit superior to any that had ever been assembled, uniting in itself qualities so various, as never to have entered into the composition of any other such assemblage of force ; .. with a general, pronounced by the whole world to be unsurpassed in ancient or modern times ; the pride of his country, the refuge and hope of Europe ; .. with a cause in which justice vied with policy, combining all that was ardent in the one motive, with all that was sober in the other ; .. with the eyes of Europe fixed on our movements ; .. with the admiration of the world excited by our achievements : .. how is it that our hopes have been raised only to be frustrated? How is it that we have been allowed to indulge in expectation of an approaching completion of success, only to behold the utter disappointment of our wishes? Why has a system of advance suddenly and inevitably been converted into a system of retreat? When victory actually sprung from the bosom of retreat, why was the glorious victor compelled to relapse into his retrogression? Why has it happened that we have seen the great conqueror who chased the French armies from the plains of Salamanca, pursued in his turn, by those whom he had conquered, over those plains which had been the scene of his former triumphs? Why, in conclusion, has a system of offence shrunk into a system of defence, and what is the reason that our military operations in the Peninsula have ended where they began?

“ I should be lost to every feeling of honour, and to every sense of duty to the country, if I did not state that the effect of this campaign altogether has been not to approximate you towards your object, but to remove you from it ; and that this

calamity has arisen from the insufficiency of those means which, by a small addition, might have been rendered effective. I maintain, that the object we had in view, (the only honest object... the only great object... which we could pursue, or hope to obtain by our operations in Spain,) was the expulsion of the French, or, at least, a considerable diminution of their power, with a view to the freedom of the people, and the independence of the Spanish monarchy. This was, certainly, the main object which we ought to have contemplated; the ultimate object of the British nation was, certainly, by the deliverance of the peninsula of Spain, to lay a solid foundation for the establishment of a permanent and honourable peace.

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“What I have contended is, that the efforts we have made have not been equal to the resources of the country; that they have not been such as the magnitude, the infinite importance of the cause demanded, and as the favourableness of the opportunity particularly called for; that we have not made even a faint approximation to the object of the war, the expulsion of the French from the Peninsula; but that the French have been enabled, by our reverses, to consolidate their power in Spain, and to systematize the moral and military subjugation of the country. We ought to have called forth all our resources, . . . and we have made no extraordinary sacrifice; we ought to have strained every nerve at this momentous crisis, . . . and we have remained little better than idle spectators of the fate of Spain. We have been deterred by petty objections; by calculations of expense, which are but as dust in the balance.”

Earl Grey supported the motion for a committee, saying, that the great objects of the campaign had not been realized, but that, on the contrary, there had been a complete failure, . . . a great and lamentable failure; and that it was one of the most important duties of that House, in cases of ill success, to

Earl Grey.

CHAP. vindicate the interests of the country, by visiting with its
 XLIII. severest censure the causers of the misfortune. Aware as the
 1813. ministers were, he said, of the state of Europe, and knowing,
 March. as they must have known, the effect that at such a crisis would
 have been produced by a vigorous and decisive effort in the
 Peninsula, it was their bounden duty to have provided Lord
 Wellington with ample means for carrying through his enter-
 prising projects, and crowning them with brilliant and unqua-
 lified success. Nothing had happened which induced him to
 repent of his opinion, that the efforts of the Spanish people
 could alone enable them to withstand the overwhelming power
 of France. This sentiment he had uttered under the supposi-
 tion that no other power would stand up against the French
 Emperor, and that that Emperor would not depart from the
 unity of council and of action, by which his greatest successes
 had been achieved. And, indeed, if with such a commander
 and such an army as ours, and at a time when the army of
 France in the north had met with disasters, greater than which
 never fell upon a host assembled for the purposes of injustice
 and ambition, . . . if under these circumstances we had achieved
 so little in Spain, what would have been the issue, if one tenth
 only of the forces employed against Russia had been turned
 against us? The time had called for exertion, and the exertions
 had failed, . . . failed almost entirely as to their great object: the
 French were left in possession of the best parts of Spain; and
 we had not advanced in any degree, considering the effects of
 the last campaign upon the minds of the Spaniards, to the
 accomplishment of our object. Such was the case, and it called
 loudly for inquiry.

*The Earl of
 Liverpool.*

To these assertions the Earl of Liverpool replied, that the
 campaign which had been thus represented as a failure and a
 defeat, was, in fact, the most brilliant that had been achieved by

British arms in any period of our history. They had been seeking as a great object, that the whole force of Spain should be placed under the command of Lord Wellington, and that object had at length been accomplished. Every exertion that could be made, had been made, for sending out troops to the Peninsula and for supplying them there, and the success of the war was indisputable. Portugal had been rescued from the enemy, and placed in a state of security, and now one-third of Spain was relieved from their presence. Spain and Portugal had set the example which Russia had followed, with the great advantage of having a government in full activity to direct all its strength. The example thus set and thus followed would have an effect among the other nations of Europe, would rouse their spirit, animate their exertions, and teach them in what manner to resist oppression, . . . teach them that an united nation, determined to resist an invader, could not be conquered! . . . Earl Bathurst argued to the same purpose, saying, that something had been effected, if the views of England were what Marquis Wellesley had powerfully described them to be at the beginning of the war in Spain, . . . first, to create a diversion in favour of our allies ; secondly, to encourage resistance in other countries, by showing its effects in Spain ; and thirdly, to prevent the commercial and military means of that country from falling into the hands of our enemy. Those had been the views of England, those were the views of the present Government, and those views had been forwarded by the last campaign. And Lord Wellington was satisfied with the conduct of the administration during that campaign, . . . a declaration which had not been sought for by the ministers, but which he had voluntarily made.

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Earl Bathurst.

In these debates, the Whigs manifested the same disposition to magnify our reverses and depreciate our success, and the

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Lord Hol-
land.

Lord Wel-
lington
goes to
Cadiz.

same propensity for predicting discomfiture and disgrace which had characterized their conduct during the whole struggle. The feeling with which they continued to regard Buonaparte, notwithstanding his inordinate ambition and his remorseless tyranny, was farther exhibited by Lord Holland, when, upon presenting some petitions for peace, he expressed his trust that ministers entertained no chimerical notions of wresting from France what she had acquired during the last twenty years, nor of humiliating the great prince who now ruled that country; and his willingness to believe that they had not neglected the opportunity which the successes of Russia afforded for opening a negotiation! But they better understood their duty to their allies, and to Europe, and to their country; and being instructed by experience as well as encouraged by sure hope, they spared no efforts now for enabling Lord Wellington to open the ensuing campaign with means which should render success certain. Lord Wellington went to Cadiz at the close of the year, to make arrangements with the Spanish ministers for the co-operation of the Spanish armies. A deputation from the Cortes was sent to compliment him on his arrival; he paid his respects, in consequence, to that assembly; expressed his thanks in a brief and modest speech, for the different marks of honour and confidence which he had received from it; and said, that not the Spaniards alone looked to it with hope, but the whole world was concerned in the happy issue of their vigorous endeavours to save Spain from general destruction, and to establish in that monarchy a system founded upon just principles, which should promote and secure the prosperity of all the citizens, and the greatness of the Spanish nation. In reply, the president complimented him upon his victories, which had been celebrated, he said, like those of the Genius of Good over the Genius of Evil. The Cortes did not now hope or trust

for new triumphs from the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, they looked upon them as certain; and looked, not only that the Spanish and allied armies under such a leader would drive the French beyond the Pyrenees, but that, if it should be needful, they would pitch their victorious tents upon the banks of the Seine; it would not be the first time that the Spanish lions had trampled on its banks upon the old fleur-de-lys of France.

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It was arranged that 50,000 Spanish troops should be placed at his disposal. The army under Castaños formed part of these; it consisted of what had formerly been called the 5th, 6th, and 7th armies, now comprehended under the name of the fourth: Castaños was to hold also the captaincies-general of the province of Extremadura, Old Castille and Leon, Galicia and Asturias. There was to be an army of reserve in Andalusia under the Conde de Abisbal, and an army of reserve in Galicia. The other armies were that of Catalonia, which was the first; of this Copons held the command: he was also captain-general of that province, and of that part of Aragon which was on the right of the Ebro; the second, which Elio, captain-general of Valencia, Murcia, and New Castille, commanded; and the third (formerly the fourth) under the Duque del Parque, who was also charged with the captaincies-general of Jaen and Granada.

Arrangements for the co-operation of the Spanish armies.

From Cadiz, Lord Wellington repaired to Lisbon. Triumphant arches were erected in all the towns through which he passed, from Elvas to the Tagus. The ships, the troops, and the people of Lisbon, received him with such honours as he deserved; greater could be paid to no man; and there was a general and voluntary illumination during three successive nights. A drama was composed to celebrate his victories, and represented in his presence at the royal theatre of San Carlos, where

Lord Wellington goes to Lisbon.

CHAP. all the boxes were decorated with Angels bearing crowns and
 XLIII. shields, on which the initials of Lord Wellington were inscribed;
 1813. *O Nome*, "the Name," was the title of the piece, and it was preluded
 April. by a hymn in honour of the Prince of Brazil, and the exhibition
 of his portrait under a canopy. The scene then represented the
 Elysian fields, where, in the pitiable style of operatic invention,
 Glory, and Posterity, and Camoens, and the Great Constable,
 Nuno Alvares Pereira, with sundry other Lusitanian worthies,
 recitativèd in praise of Lord Wellington, Lord Beresford, and
 the Portuguese and British armies; and down came Angels and
 Genii presenting illuminated scrolls, inscribed with the names of
 his victories.

*Relaxed
 discipline of
 the Portu-
 guese army.*

The Portuguese army was, at this time, reproved by Lord Beresford for its want of discipline during the late retreat, in terms not less severe than those of Lord Wellington's letter. Certain officers were suspended for scandalous neglect and total disregard of their duties: and it was stated, that, in every instance, complaints had been made by the commandants of corps or brigades, of inactivity and want of zeal in the officers of all those corps which had suffered extraordinary loss during the retreat. That such losses were occasioned by the negligence of the officers was proved, by the fact, that other corps in the same marches, and under the same circumstances, difficulties, and privations, had none of their men missing; the officers of those corps were named with due praise. Marshal Beresford added, he deemed it important to remind the army, that with all the reasons which he had (and he was happy to say that he had every reason) for praising the conduct of the Portuguese officers, when they were in presence of an enemy, and exposed to fire, valour, nevertheless, was not the only thing needful; firmness and constancy were equally so for supporting the reverses, and fatigues, and privations, to which a military life is subject; and

if the officers did not yield under such circumstances, the soldiers certainly would not; for no soldier, and especially no Portuguese soldier, ever would be backward in any thing when his officer set him an example; nor would ever commit any fault or manifest any discontent, so long as he saw his officer doing his duty under the same circumstances, and setting him an example of courage, firmness, and constancy. One of the army surgeons had been brought before a court martial for neglecting the sick and wounded under his care, while they were in the hospital at Madrid. He was sentenced to a month's imprisonment, and the loss of a month's pay. Marshal Beresford, in confirming the sentence, expressed his disapprobation of it; a punishment so little in proportion to the crime, he said, was not likely to impress persons who had neither the proper feelings of men, or of Christians; for what could be more horrible, than to see men who had been wounded in the service of their Prince and of their country, or whose health had been broken in that service, neglected by one who had received rank, honour, and pay, for the express intent of making him more attentive in his treatment of them? What could be worse than that such a person should be found preferring his own ease, or interest, or temporary convenience, to his duty towards his God, and his Prince, and his fellow-creatures, and leaving them either to perish through his neglect, or to fall into the hands of the enemy?

The consequences of the retreat were severely felt; in January, more than a third of the British army were on the sick list, fever being the principal disease, which want of clothing had, with fatigue, contributed to produce, and want of cleanliness to propagate. In personal appearance and in clothing, the British troops were at this time much worse than the Portuguese. But supplies of every kind, as well as large reinforcements, were received during the winter, no time being lost, and no care

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neglected. The infantry had suffered so much from want of cover, that they were now provided with tents, three for each company, and these were borne by the animals which used before to carry the camp kettles, tin kettles being substituted for iron ones, . . . one to six men, and light enough for the men to carry it by turns on their knapsacks. Tents were not thought necessary for the cavalry, because, not being either heated or exhausted so much in their marches, they were better able to stand the cold at night.

*Buonaparte
withdraws
troops from
Spain.*

While the British force in the Peninsula was increased, and the Spanish rendered more available than it had been in any former campaign, that of the French was weakened; the enormous loss which Buonaparte had suffered in Russia, and the obstinate ambition with which he kept large garrisons in the north of Germany, rendering it necessary for him to withdraw troops from Spain. From 10 to 20,000 repassed the Pyrenees; not fewer than 140,000 were still left, . . . good troops, well-officered, and under commanders of high reputation and approved skill. But both officers and men had had their confidence abated; the generals felt that even the resources of the conscription were exhaustible; and as little hope, when they considered the present state of their Emperor's fortunes, could be entertained of subjugating the Spaniards, the object upon which all seemed to be most intent was that of enriching themselves by plunder, while

*Exactions of
the French.*

it was still in their power to do so. M. Suchet left scarcely one picture of any value in Valencia, either in the convents, churches, or private houses; and that city was thus deprived of the finest works of Juanes, . . . works, which, precious as they are, were there enhanced in value by the local and religious feeling with which his fellow-citizens regarded the productions of their saintly painter. There and every where contributions were imposed and exacted in a manner which made it apparent that

the Intrusive government treated them now not as subjects who were to be taxed, but as enemies from whom all that could be extorted was to be taken. Their operations on the side of New Castille and Leon were at this time confined to periodical circuits for the purpose of enforcing the payment of contributions. On the side of the Tagus they fortified the right bank of the river, repaired the Puente del Arzobispo, and occupied Almaraz, though they did not restore the bridge there.

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Meantime the Spaniards were not idle. Longa surprized General Fromant in the valley of Sedano, when returning to Burgos with the requisitions which he had collected, and with sixty respectable householders whom he was taking away as hostages for the contribution: the hostages were rescued, Fromant with about 700 of his men killed, and nearly 500 taken prisoners. A party of the enemy had entered Bilbao, these also he surprized, and they suffered the loss of 200 men; then making for Salinas de Anaña, which was the strongest hold of the French in that district, he besieged it with 2500 men and five pieces of artillery, and after three days, the remainder of the garrison, consisting of 250, surrendered at discretion. This so dismayed the enemy that they abandoned Nauclares and Armiñon, which he was proceeding to attack, and both fortresses were demolished by his orders. His next object was the Fuerte del Cubo de Pancorbo, a post of importance for its situation, and for the care with which it had been strengthened; here too the garrison were made prisoners and the fort demolished. Caffarelli meantime was vainly besieging Castro, where he suffered some loss, and found it necessary to give up the attempt, that he might check Longa in his career of success. That active partizan was now threatening Breviesca; he eluded Caffarelli and Palombini when they moved against him, and retreating to Zovalina, there to refresh his troops, ordered his retreat so well

*Longa acts
successfully
against the
enemy.*

Nov. 28.

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*Mina's
movements.*

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that they were uncertain what direction he had taken ; Caffarelli therefore reinforced his garrisons, and repairing to Vittoria himself, left Palombini at Poza with 3000 foot and 300 horse to protect the high road, and be ready to act against Longa. But while a third of that force was detached to levy contributions, Longa surprized the remainder at daybreak : their collected plunder and some 300 prisoners fell into his hands, and they suffered a farther loss of between two and three hundred in killed and wounded. The approach of their detachment, and of a large body on its way from Burgos to Vittoria, then rendered it necessary for him to retire.

While Longa thus harassed the enemy in the north of Spain, Mina was assailing them with his wonted activity in Navarre and Aragon. The English landed two 12-pounders for him in the Deva, together with clothing, ammunition, and other things of which he was in need ; 600 of his men were ready to receive and escort these. The French endeavoured to intercept them, and were repulsed in the attempt ; and Mina was no sooner possessed of the guns than he attacked the enemy in Tafalla, where they had a garrison of 400 men. General Abbé moved to relieve it with all the disposable force from Pamplona ; but he was beaten back by a part of Mina's force which had been left to observe that city, and on the fifth day of the siege the garrison surrendered as prisoners at war. The wounded he sent under an escort to Pamplona ; destroyed the fort at Tafalla, and the works, . . also a Franciscan Convent, and an old palace in which the French might have established a garrison ; and he demolished in like manner two other such edifices at Olite, that the road might be clear between Pamplona and Tudela. From Tafalla he proceeded to Sos in Upper Aragon, a fort which the enemy had occupied more than three years, and fortified sufficiently as long as the Spaniards could bring no guns against it. They

were on the point of surrendering after a four days' siege, when General Paris arrived from Zaragoza and carried off the garrison, leaving the fort half ruined: Mina completed its demolition, and by this enterprize laid open the road between Pamplona and Jaca. Shortly after, Fermin de Leguia, who was under his orders, ventured, without instructions, upon an adventure which was executed as boldly as it was designed. With only fifteen men, being the whole of his party, he approached the castle of Fuenterrabia in the night, scaled the wall with one man by the help of spikes and ropes which supplied the place of a ladder, surprized the sentinel, got possession of the keys, opened the gates for his men, and took eight artillerymen prisoners, while the remainder of the garrison, who dreamt of no danger, were sleeping in the town. He then spiked the guns, threw into the sea all the ammunition which he could not carry away, set fire to the castle, and though pursued by the enemy retreated without loss. Mina was heard of next at Lodosa, where he attacked a detachment of 1000 French, few of whom escaped, 635 being made prisoners. Caffarelli had at this time been called to France, giving up the command in the north to Clausel; that able general hoped to signalize himself by destroying an indefatigable enemy who had baffled the efforts of all his predecessors; and this was the first proof which he made of that enemy's ability. Mina next attempted to intercept a convoy which was going from Tolosa to Pamplona; the convoy was alarmed in time, but the attempt led to an affair with Abbé's force, in which the French retired with the loss of full 300 men.

Clausel had left a considerable garrison in Puente la Reyna, well fortified for the sort of war which they might have to sustain; and an advanced post of 50 men at Mendigorria, in an old church of S. Maria, which they had fortified. While he was in pursuit of Mina from Estella, and Abbé from Pamplona,

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February.

Feb. 20.

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*Caffarelli
recalled
from Spain.**Clausel en-
deavours to
hunt Mina
down.*

CHAP. XLIII. their skilful antagonist led them to suppose that he was in the valley of Berrueza, .. then making a rapid counter-march with one of his regiments, appeared in Mendigorria. The garrison at Puente outnumbered him both in horse and foot, but they did not venture to interrupt him in his operations ; and he set fire to the church. The French had no other resource than to ascend the tower, and fire upon him from thence. He sent a trumpet to offer terms, but they would not allow him to approach, either in the confident expectation of being succoured from Puente, or because they were confounded by the situation in which they found themselves ; for the smoke and the flames distressed them so dreadfully, that in the course of half an hour, they prepared to let themselves down by ropes ; but Mina ordered ladders to the roof of the church, from whence they descended, and were made prisoners. The Guerrilla chief, now Camp-Marshal in the regular service, took credit to himself for sparing their lives when by the laws of war they had placed them at his mercy : by this time indeed both the invaders and the Spaniards in Navarre had found it their interest to revert to the humanities of civilized warfare. His own hospital was in the valley of Roncal, and from the combined movements of Clausel and Abbé he inferred that it was their intention to deprive him of that retreat, the only one which there was for his wounded and invalids. Not being strong enough to resist the force which was now brought against him, he removed all who were in a condition to bear removal, and left the others to the enemy's mercy, calling to mind no doubt with satisfaction his own recent conduct at Tafalla and Mendigorria : as he had hoped, the men were humanely treated by General Abbé, though the hospital effects were destroyed, and Isaba which had been deserted by its inhabitants was set on fire, and 150 houses burnt. Clausel employed the months of April and May in endeavouring

to hunt this formidable enemy down, of whom in an intercepted letter to the Intruder, he said, that he would be Lord of Navarre unless it were occupied by a corps of from 20 to 25,000 men; because when he was weak he always avoided an action, and fell upon detachments when he was sure of victory. In the course of this attempt the loss which his own men sustained from fatigue far exceeded any that he inflicted upon Mina's hardy troops, who were intimately acquainted with the country, and accustomed to the hair-breadth scapes of such campaigns. At no time, however, was so much apprehension entertained for Mina's safety, though he himself relied with his wonted confidence upon his resources and his fortune, now too not without certain knowledge that his pursuers would soon be called off to a contest, which for them would be of a far more serious kind.

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On the side of Biscay the enemy were more successful; they surprized and captured Renovales, with six of his officers, at Carvajales de Zamora; and Castro, from which Caffarelli had been repulsed, was taken by General Foy, after a siege of eighteen days. The Governor Don Pedro Pablo Alvares discharged his duty to the utmost, and the Lyra, Royalist, and Sparrow sloops of war, and the Alpheia schooner, under Captain Bloye, assisted in the defence. Foy brought all the force which he could collect against it, and proceeded as if he hoped to strike the province as well as the garrison with terror, .. for he offered no terms, and seemed determined to take the place by storm, let it cost what it would. When he had made a breach wide enough to admit twenty men abreast, he turned his guns on the town and castle, and threw shells incessantly at the bridge that connected the castle with the landing-place, hoping thus to cut off the retreat of the garrison, which at the commencement of the siege consisted of 1200 men. At noon the enemy entered in great numbers through the breach and by escalade in various

*Renovales
made pri-
soner.*

*Castro de
Urdiales
taken by
G. Foy.*

May 11.

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1813.

April.

*Enormities
committed
there by the
French.*

parts; the garrison when they could no longer defend the town retreated into the castle, the ships' boats were in readiness to receive them, and they were embarked by companies under a tremendous fire of musquetry, two companies remaining to defend the castle, till the last gun was thrown into the sea. Every soldier was brought off, and many of the inhabitants, and landed at Bermeo on the following day. The town was burnt. Foy indeed acted in the spirit of his Portuguese campaign; as he had offered no terms he showed no mercy, but when the town was entered put the defenders to the bayonet without distinction. It had been well if the wickedness of the enemy had ended there; but in one of their unsuccessful attacks many of their men had been pushed down a ravine by their fellows while pressing forward to the charge, the bridge by which they expected to cross having been destroyed by the English; and because the inhabitants had not informed them of the destruction of this bridge, they butchered men and women, sparing none, and inflicting upon them cruelties which nothing but a devilish nature could devise.

Little attempt was made on the enemy's part to annoy the allies during the winter and spring. Foy, with 1500 infantry and 100 horse, had endeavoured, in February, to surprize the post at Bejar, but was promptly repulsed; and the French in the same month advanced from Orbigo and Castro Gondoles as far as Astorga and Manzanal in one direction, and to the Puebla de Sanabria and Mombuey in another, the Galician army retreating before them, and then resuming their former position when the enemy in their turn had retired. Much greater activity was shown in plundering the inhabitants; and this kind of war, wherein there could be no resistance, was carried on so shamelessly, that the Intruder, it was said, deemed it necessary to call one of the generals to account.

Clausel was of opinion that an error had been committed in not concentrating their forces more upon the Ebro, which might have been done, he said, without abandoning Castille, and this error, he feared, they should find cause to repent. But the Intruder's council had determined upon taking the Douro for their line of defence; and with this view they threw up works on the right bank at every assailable point, relying, as Soult had formerly done at Porto, upon the security which that deep and rapid river might afford them. Marshal Soult had been called away in March to take part in the campaign in Germany. The head-quarters of what had been his army were removed from Toledo to Madrid early in April, and Toledo was abandoned; but troops were kept at Illescas, and reconnoissances made by the cavalry towards Escalona, the Alberche, and Añobes del Tajo, apprehending some movement of Sir Rowland's army in this direction. The Intruder leaving that capital to which he was never to return, removed his court, or rather his head-quarters, to Valladolid, where the Palace Gardens were put in order for his recreation, and some defensive works constructed. On the 11th of April, General Hugo, who had been left with the command in Madrid, informed the *Ayuntamiento* that the troops were about to depart, and that they must take measures for preserving tranquillity and guarding the public buildings, civil and military. The most precious articles in the cabinet of natural history were sent off, with whatever else could be removed from the other public establishments, and all arrears of contribution were exacted with the utmost rigour. Beasts enough were not left in Madrid for the scavengers' use, so that the inhabitants were ordered to collect the sweepings of the streets into the squares, and there burn what used to be carried into the country for manure. The people of that poor capital had always clung to the hope of deliverance with a strength of belief which

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*M. Soult
called from
Spain.**The In-
truder goes
to Valla-
dolid.*

CHAP. characterizes the nation, and in the movements of their oppres-
 XLIII. sors they now saw reasonable ground for expecting that it could
 1813. not be long delayed.

April.

Anglo-Sici-
 lian army.

The pride of the French too had been at this time abated on the eastern coast, where Suchet had hitherto boasted of success in all his undertakings. Major-General William Clinton arrived at Alicante in November to take the command from which his health had compelled General Maitland to retire; and notwithstanding the difficulties which were opposed by a false point of honour, by a jealousy as ill-founded as it was ill-timed, and perhaps by treasonable intentions, he succeeded in obtaining consent to garrison the castle with British troops. In December a reinforcement of 4000 men, British and foreign, arrived from Palermo, under Major-General James Campbell, who by seniority superseded General Clinton in the command, which he was to hold till the then hourly expected arrival of Lord William Bentinck from Sicily. But Lord William was detained by political circumstances in that island, where the hopeless attempt had been undertaken of improving a government before any improvement has been effected either in those who are to govern or be governed; and, as no end could be seen to this delay, Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray was sent out from England to command the allied forces in that part of Spain. Feeble as that allied force was, and inert as its feebleness had compelled it to be, it had yet employed Suchet's attention during the autumn and winter.

Sir John
 Murray
 takes the
 command

That general had his head-quarters for the most part at San Felipe, between Alicante and Valencia, and about three leagues from the Xucar. Some trivial affairs were all that occurred, till Sir John Murray soon after his arrival took the army out of its cantonments, apparently with the view of making the French marshal fall back and concentrate his forces on that river. After

an unsuccessful attempt at surprising an enemy's detachment in the populous village of Alcoy, he moved forward and took up a position near the town of Castalla, where in the preceding summer Don Joseph O'Donnell had sustained a severe defeat. While Sir John made this movement on the right, General Elio with a separate Spanish corps of 12,000 men moved on the left to Yecla, Villena, and the flat country in that direction. There was an old castle in Villena, and Elio garrisoned it with 800 of his best troops. Suchet was not a man to lose any opportunity which was presented him : he saw that one of Elio's divisions had taken post at Yecla, within reach of Fuente-la-Higuera, where his own advance was placed, and too far from that of the allies which was at Villena, 25 miles distant. During the night he collected the flower of his army at Fuente-la-Higuera, and marched with one division, the cavalry and the reserve, upon Villena, while, with the other part of his force, General Harispe proceeded rapidly to Yecla, unseen by the Spaniards. At break of day he came in sight of them ; they retreated from one position to another, but were out-manœuvred and beaten, and after losing some four or five hundred men, 1200 laid down their arms.

On the afternoon of the same day, Suchet was seen advancing within a few miles of Villena, which is about two leagues to the westward of Castalla. Sir John Murray immediately withdrew the Majorcan division from Alcoy, and concentrating his force, occupied the strong position of Castalla. His left, consisting of that division, was placed on the rocky and almost inaccessible hills south of the town, . . the range terminating there. Major-General Mackenzie's division, and the 58th regiment from Lieutenant-General Clinton's occupied the town, and the ground to the right ; here and in front of the castle some redoubts and batteries had been constructed. The re-

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*April.**Defeat of
Elio's corps.**April 12.**Suchet
marches
against the
Anglo-Sici-
lian army.*

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 April. mainder of the position was covered by a strong ravine which rendered it almost inaccessible on that side; and there Lieutenant-General Clinton was stationed, supported by three battalions of General Roche's division as a column of reserve. The position was well taken. The second battalion of the 27th foot, the 1st Italian regiment, and the Calabrian free corps, had on the first alarm been pushed forward beyond Villena, under Colonel Adam, and with them a detachment of cavalry commanded by Colonel Lord Frederick Bentinck. The object of this movement was to observe the enemy's motions: it brought on a cannonade, and the French endeavoured to break in upon our troops, and enter Villena pell-mell with them; but Colonel Adam, following his instructions, fell back upon Biar without loss. Sir John, being now assured that Suchet meditated a serious movement, urged General Elio to withdraw his 800 men from Villena, where the castle, in its imperfect state of defence, was not tenable against such an enemy; but the Spanish general was not to be persuaded. The French entered Villena that evening, pushing their light troops beyond it towards Biar; and on the morrow, the commandant surrendered at the first summons, and he and his battalion were made prisoners of war.

April 12.

In the afternoon, Suchet advanced in force towards Biar; which village is situated at the entrance of a strong pass, in a range of hills running nearly parallel with the position of the allies. About four o'clock he commenced a serious attack upon Colonel Adam's detachment. That officer's orders were to fall back upon Castalla, but to dispute the pass; and this he did for five hours against a very superior force, with the utmost gallantry and skill; till being overpowered by numbers, and having both flanks turned, he retreated then to the pass, and took the place which had been allotted to him in the position,

on the high ground to the left of Castalla, having in this unequal conflict both inflicted and sustained very considerable loss. Two mountain guns fell into the enemy's hands; they could not be brought off, because they were disabled; Colonel Adam therefore directed Captain Arabin to fight them to the last, and then abandon them. Before day closed, the French were seen in great force on the road to Biar, and on the hills opposite the position; but darkness prevented any further operations for the night. At daybreak they were perceived in great numbers along the defile of Biar, and in the plain ground which separates it from the hills near Castalla; and in the course of the morning they posted several large masses of infantry, as if in preparation for a decided attack. Their success against Elio's corps had increased their confidence; and they had accustomed themselves to speak of this army as composed of the rabble of the allied nations, and to talk of driving them into the sea.

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April.

*Battle of
Castalla.*
April 13.

About one, they pushed forward a large column of cavalry to the village of Onil, about two miles in front of Castalla, and this movement was continued parallel to the front of the allies, until nearly opposite the right of the position. Sir John Murray had foreseen this; the ground was unfavourable for cavalry, and no notice was taken of the movement. Three masses of infantry at the same time moved rapidly from their right, crossed the plain ground in front of the pass, and with a gallantry, which, in the words of the British general, entitled them to the highest praise, commenced an attack on the centre and the left. The left had been weakened; for about an hour before the attack, General Whittingham had been ordered, with the three regiments which he had in position there, to make a reconnoissance upon the enemy's right flank; but this was the key of the position; and the consequence of thus weakening it might have been dis-

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astrous, if Colonel D. Julian Romero had not opportunely arrived there with two regiments from Alcoy. Upon this point, from whence more than half its force had been withdrawn, the main attack was made; and notwithstanding the difficult approach to it, the assailants gained ground. The Spaniards, who had expended all their cartridges, were observed to be retiring, and the enemy moving in considerable force to the left of our centre. The moment was critical. Just as the assailants had gained the summit, Colonel Adam, whom they were proceeding to attack in front, prevented them; and giving them no time to recover breath after the exertion of such an ascent, charged and overthrew their column, killing, wounding, or taking prisoner, during the pursuit, almost every man opposed to his brigade. The Spaniards resumed their ground. Whittingham too had no sooner apprehended the intention of the enemy, than he returned with all speed, and arrived in time to take part in the action, in which, and in the pursuit, the Spaniards distinguished themselves. The total failure of the enemy here seemed to be felt along their whole line of attack; they retreated every where. The cavalry, which had now advanced toward the front of the allies, fell rapidly back on perceiving this unexpected reverse, and entered the defile in such confusion, that had the advantage been vigorously pursued, a signal victory might, in all likelihood, have been obtained. Suchet, having united his broken battalions with those which he kept in reserve, took up a hasty position at the entrance of the defile. Sir John Murray, still retaining the height, moved a considerable part of his army into the plain, and formed it in front of the enemy, within cannon-shot, his right flank covered with the cavalry, his left resting on the hills. In this state, Marshal Suchet thought that the English did not choose to make an attack, and Sir John Murray, that the French did not choose to wait for one;... for the line of the allies

was scarcely formed when the enemy began their retreat, and continued it through the night, the action terminating at dusk with a distant cannonade.

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The French had 18,000 infantry in the field, and 1600 cavalry: the allies were not much inferior in infantry, but greatly so in horse. The loss of the allies was 670 killed, wounded, and missing, the greater number of the killed being Spaniards. 800 of the enemy were left dead in front of the line which they had attacked: no prisoners were taken except such as were wounded; but Suchet sent 2000 of Elio's soldiers prisoners to Tortosa on their way to France, and represented that his success on the one part of the operations balanced his failure on the other. If this had been the case numerically, which it was not, it was far otherwise in reputation. He had suffered a mortifying defeat; but what must most have tended to console him for it was, his satisfaction at perceiving that there was no intention on the part of the allies to pursue their victory. He retreated that night to Villena through Biar, where he left many dead and dying. Sir John, on the following day, marched his army in two columns to Alcoy, hoping (though with little confidence in that hope) that he might force the strong pass of Albayda, and reach the intrenched position of the enemy at S. Felipe before they could; this he thought better than a direct pursuit, because the road which the French had taken was favourable for cavalry, and he was greatly inferior in that arm. In the vicinity of Alcoy, he remained till the 17th, and then advanced with the whole army into the open country, to the foot of the Albayda pass, about a league in front of Alcoy. But this being a lateral movement, made after the enemy had so far the start as to have passed all that was perilous for him, and got into a strong country, with his forces collected and re-

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stored to order, was an unimportant demonstration which had no effect: and he returned after it to his position at Castalla.

Marshal Suchet had not been more successful in machinations of another kind. Before the battle of Castalla, an Italian regiment in the Anglo-Sicilian army had been corrupted, and would have betrayed its post in an attack concerted with that view, if a timely discovery had not been made. A scheme also had been formed for delivering Alicante into his hands, but this also was detected, and three of his emissaries suffered death for it at Alcoy. Frey Assensio Nebot, known as a Guerrilla chief, by the name of *El Frayle*, the Friar, had more than any other partizan annoyed the French in Valencia. His party was well organized, and provided with a regularity which was seldom to be found in the regular Spanish armies: so rigorous were the measures employed against him, that women were put to death for supplying him with means and intelligence; and at length it was affirmed, that three criminals who had been condemned to capital punishment obtained their lives, and the promise of a good reward, on condition of presenting themselves to the Friar as volunteers, and taking an opportunity to assassinate him. Mr. Tupper, who had been the British consul at Valencia, and whose zealous services were never wanting to the common cause, obtained information of this villany, and the Friar was thus put upon his guard.

Lord Wel-
lington
opens the
campaign.

Lord Wellington was now prepared to open the campaign, and, for the first time, with such means as enabled him to act in full confidence of success. If the Anglo-Sicilian army should not achieve any signal service, he was yet assured that it would give sufficient employment to Suchet, so that the Intruder could look for no support from that side. The British force under his command consisted of 48,000 effective men; the Portuguese of

about 28,000; the Galician of 18,000. The enemy were not inferior in number, and could more surely rely upon the whole of their troops; but the change in their Emperor's fortune and in their own had been such, that they looked only to a defensive campaign, and trusted to their strong position on the Douro. In the middle of May, Lord Wellington put his troops in motion. The cavalry which had wintered in the neighbourhood of Coimbra began their movement at the end of April: they went by the way of Porto to Braga, where they rested some days, and proceeding to Braganza, reached that place which was the point of union for the left of the army, on the 22d of May. The left of the army under Sir Thomas Graham crossed the Douro in Portugal, between Lamego and the frontier. The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo in the preceding year could not have been undertaken, unless that river had been rendered navigable far above the point to which the Portuguese barks formerly ascended; it had now been opened as high as to the mouth of the Agueda; and boats had been quietly collected at different points, without exciting any suspicion that they were designed for the passage of the troops. Five divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry were thus placed upon the right bank of the Douro, while the enemy supposed that they had only to guard against an attempt from the left. The difficulties of the march were indeed very great; most of the roads are so narrow, that carriages could barely pass between the thick walls which bounded them; and the mountain streams had their course in ravines, from whence the ascent is so laborious, that sixty men could not without great exertion enable the horses to drag the artillery up. Nevertheless, hope and ardour overcame all difficulties; and the advantage which the troops derived from being provided with shelter were sensibly felt: out of a division of 6000 men, there were but 120 sick after a march of 250

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*May.**The left of
the army
crosses the
Douro.*

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May.

miles, through such a country. When these were far on their way, Lord Wellington, with two divisions of British infantry, a Portuguese one under the Conde de Amarante, a Spanish one under Morillo, and some corps of cavalry, advanced from Ciudad Rodrigo by the direct road to Salamanca; the remainder of the army under Sir Rowland Hill moved upon the same point by Alba de Tormes.

*May 26.
Affair near
Salamanca.*

The line of their retreat in November was still too evidently marked by the skeletons of the poor animals who had been worked to death in that cruel service. A division of infantry under General Villatte had been left in Salamanca, with some artillery, and three squadrons of horse. They evacuated the city upon the approach of the allies, but they lingered too long upon the high ground in its vicinity. When Lord Wellington was within half a league of Salamanca, he and his staff got upon a rocky height which commanded a full view of the city and adjacent country. Below him were his own videttes, and beyond them those of the enemy, each supported by piquets. To the right were the Arapiles, a name known only in topography before, but which had now a place in military history; and in the same direction, but more behind him, the heads of two columns, forming Sir Rowland's division, were seen on two nearly parallel roads. Through a glass, the enemy were observed drawn up; two battalions and a squadron to the right of the city, near a ruined convent; two squadrons on the Tormes, near the bridge; half a squadron guarding the ford, about a mile above the city, near S. Martha; . . . and behind the city a battalion in reserve. Villatte having barricaded the bridge and the principal communications throughout the town, seemed to have thought himself sure of an easy retreat. The 1st German hussars, favoured by ground which concealed them from the enemy, inclined toward the ford, while the 14th light

dragoons, keeping beyond the reach of fire, edged along the left bank of the river. The enemy appeared in some confusion, but remained stationary, as if waiting for something; and beyond the city, in the direction of Miranda de Duero and Zamora, their piquets were withdrawing, and mules and baggage joining them from all sides. It was now nearly ten in the forenoon, and the day very hot. The head of Sir Rowland's right column, which consisted of cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, under General Fane, were within two miles of S. Martha, marching for the ford: the enemy now began to move, first in the direction of Toro, but presently, as if wavering, bending to their right, they kept close to the Tormes, in the direction of Arevalo; and retired rapidly, but in good order, when Fane with his six squadrons had crossed the river. It was well for them that this cavalry was already jaded by a long march; but the horse-artillery, as soon as, owing to the ravines and the intricacies of the ground, it could be brought into use, opened upon them with great effect, every shot going through their crowded ranks. They retired with extreme rapidity, but in excellent order, and the artillery pursued as quickly as a very deep country, occasionally intersected with hollow roads, would allow. When the enemy came to Aldea Lengua, there was an opportunity of attacking them with every probability of forcing them to lay down their arms; but strict orders had been given not to pass a ravine just by that village; and the moment (never to be regained in war) went by. When orders came to proceed, it was just too late; the pursuit however was continued, and some three miles beyond the village a charge was attempted by two squadrons, but feebly, for the horses were now far spent; the enemy formed into squares, and repulsed them by a volley, though with little loss. The pursuit was continued about three miles farther. Some of the French

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May.

CHAP. were taken, being unable to march farther from fatigue; and
 XLIII. many threw away their knapsacks, and sacks full of biscuit, and
 1813. of corn, but no troops under such circumstances could have
 May. behaved better; . . and some proofs were given of what better
 deserves to be called ferocious intrepidity than courage. One
 of their men who was severely wounded attempted to destroy
 himself; and another obstinately refusing to surrender when it
 was not possible for him to escape, compelled those who would
 fain have saved his life to cut him down. The affair ended in
 front of Aldea Rubia; a corps of infantry and cavalry retiring
 from Alba, when threatened by Major-General Long and by
 Morillo's division, joined the enemy here; and Lord Wellington,
 as his infantry had not come up, recalled the troops from the
 pursuit. Above fourscore of the French lay dead on the road,
 and many fell among the standing corn: some 200 were made
 prisoners; and some baggage, ammunition, and provisions, with
 Villatte's coach, were taken.

*Passage of
the Ezla.*

During the two following days, Lord Wellington established
 the troops which had marched from the Agueda and Extre-
 madura Alta between the Tormes and the Lower Douro. On
 the 29th he left Salamanca, and reached Miranda de Duero.
 The enemy had destroyed all the bridges upon the river except
 that at Zamora. Opposite Miranda there is a ferry, where this
 deep and rapid stream is from 80 to 100 yards wide, and the
 rocks on either side from 400 to 500 feet high. When it is so
 swoln that the ferry is impracticable, the only way by which
 travellers can cross is after the old Peruvian manner, in a sort of
 hammock or cradle, fastened to a rope, which is secured upon two
 projecting points of rock, about thirty feet above the ordinary
 level of the water. Here Lord Wellington crossed, and on the
 following day joined Sir Thomas Graham's corps at Carvajales
 on the Ezla. This river, which upon good grounds is believed

*Florez Esp.
Sagrada,
t. 16, p. 3.*

to have been the Astura of the ancients, and in Leon is called the Rio Grande, descends from the Puertos de Asturias, passes by Mansilla to Benevente, near which town it receives the Cea from the east, and the larger river Orbigo from the west, and enters the Douro below Zamora. At daybreak on the 31st, the troops began to ford; the enemy so little apprehended danger on that side, that they had only a piquet there, and thus no opposition was offered to a very difficult and perilous passage. The ford was intricate; the water nearly chin deep; the bottom rough and stony; and the stones large and loose. The hussar brigade began the passage, entering in a body; and as it was supposed that a village on the opposite hill was occupied by the enemy, and as it was necessary that some infantry should cross to support the advance of the hussars, each dragoon had a soldier holding by his stirrup. But this impeded the horses: alarmed both by the stream, and the unsafe footing, they became unmanageable and plunged forward: the men who before could scarcely keep their feet against the force and weight of the stream, lost at once their footing and their hold; they were plunged into the water, their knapsacks overweighed them and kept them on their backs, and in this manner they struggled at the mercy of the current. There were, fortunately, three or four small islands just at this part; and by these most of the officers and men were stopped, but several valuable lives were lost. The hussars exerted themselves with exemplary humanity to assist the infantry, and one of their corporals lost his own life in the performance of this generous duty. In this way the 51st and the Brunswick Oel's corps, as well as the cavalry, passed. Their orders were to ascend the hill and take the village; the enemy's piquet were made prisoners. A pontoon bridge was then thrown across, and the remainder of the corps passed over.

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May.

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June.

The French seem now for the first time to have comprehended Lord Wellington's plan, and found themselves out-manœuvred by an enemy to whom they had hitherto allowed no credit for any thing except courage, and that only because they had been so often beaten by them that it was no longer for their own credit to deny it. No sooner were they menaced by the advance of the columns than they destroyed the bridge at Zamora, and retired from that city and from Toro. Both cities were entered by the allies; and at daybreak on the first of June, the hussar brigade under Colonel Grant came up near Toro with the enemy's rear-guard, who retired rapidly to the village of Morales, in the direction of Tordesillas. After having been cannonaded by two guns, which were all that could be brought up in time through the deep sandy roads, the French formed behind the village. The hussars passed on both sides of the village, and instantly charged them; upon which they made off with all speed for a little bridge across a marshy bottom, faced about there, being supported by some guns belonging to their infantry, and stood a charge. They were worsted in it, but passed the bridge; part of the 10th hussars pursued, and Captain Lloyd advancing with great spirit, but few followers, was taken; they were again pressed, and retired hastily on the infantry, losing more than 200 prisoners in these affairs, and so many in killed and wounded, that the 16th regiment of dragoons was almost destroyed. Captain Lloyd was ill-treated by his captors, they beat him and rifled him, but left him in their retreat. Though the fighting was almost in the street of Morales, the Spaniards were now so accustomed to sights of war, that within ten minutes after the firing had ceased, the women were spinning at their doors, and the little children at play as if nothing had happened.

Lord Wellington halted at Toro, that the light division and

the troops under Sir Rowland might cross the Douro by the bridge there, that his rear-guard might come up, and that the Galician army should unite itself with his left. The whole of the allied force was now on the right side of the Douro: leaving then half the reserve-ammunition near Zamora to spare the horses (which were already suffering), he proceeded: the French, whose force was distributed between Valladolid, Tordesillas, and Medina, retiring as he advanced, their rear crossing at the Puente de Duero, on the same day that the allies accomplished their first object in the campaign, by uniting on the right side of that river. The enemy now concentrated their force behind the Pisuerga; there also there was strong ground for defence; but abandoning that also when Lord Wellington manœuvred on their right, they withdrew behind the Carrion. The Intruder quitted Palencia on the 6th, and the greater part of his troops early on the following morning, after a night passed in the fear of close pursuit. When Lord Wellington entered that city, flowers were thrown upon him from the windows, and a shower of roses from the upper gratings of a nunnery. The enemy had not left a morsel of bread, nor a drop of wine in that city: and when they hastily retired from a bivouac near Tordesillas, leaving it to be occupied by a part of Sir Rowland's corps, the fuel which the troops found collected there consisted of doors, window-frames, tables, and drawers, from the houses in the neighbourhood.

From the Ezla to Palencia, the troops had marched through one continued track of corn, where villages were so thinly scattered, that it seemed unaccountable where the cultivators were to be found. The land was generally in wheat, with a fair proportion of barley, and here and there a crop of vetches and clover. They moved generally by two roads, and on each side of each at least twenty yards were trampled down. The

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1813.

June.

Sir Row-
land Hill
crosses the
Douro.

June 3.

CHAP. horses were fed on green barley nearly the whole march. The
 XLIII. intention of the British Government was to pay the inhabitants
 1813. for whatever the army must of necessity take from them ; and on
 June. the part of the Government, the full payment was in fact made :
 but little of that payment reached the poor people to whom it
 was due. For want of specie, the commissaries could pay upon
 the spot only in bills ; to the peasantry these were worth no
 more than what the land-sharks who follow in the wake of an
 army chose to offer for them ; and in this iniquitous manner
 large fortunes were amassed, . . a species of roguery which many
 of the Portugeze (though as a people the Portugeze are emi-
 nent for probity) were not slow in learning.

*The French
 abandon
 Burgos.*

The army crossed the Carrion on the 7th, following an
 enemy who seemed undetermined where to make a stand. On
 the 12th, Lord Wellington found it necessary after such rapid
 movements to halt his left, while the right under Sir Rowland
 advanced to reconnoitre the strength of the French, and the
 position which they had taken up near Burgos, where great
 pains had been taken to strengthen the fortifications of the
 castle. They were posted in considerable force on the heights
 to the left of the Hormaza, with their right above the village
 of that name, and their left in front of Estapar. Part of
 the allied force flanked them on their right, another marched
 against the heights of Hormaza, the remainder threatened those
 of Estapar ; without waiting to be attacked they were dislodged,
 and retreated hastily for Burgos, suffering considerable loss
 from the horse artillery, and losing a gun and some prisoners,
 but retreating in the best order. More presence of mind in-
 deed was shown by them hitherto in presence of the enemy, and
 in action, than in their counsels. They posted themselves on
 the left of the Arlanzon and of the Urbel, which were then
 greatly swoln with rains : but in the night they retreated into

the city, and hurrying from it, blew up the castle early in the morning, about an hour after the Intruder had left it. They seemed to have been aware that there was no longer any hope of recovering their ascendancy, and to have intended to bring upon the city a destruction which should prevent the inhabitants from rejoicing in their deliverance. But the hurry, and fear, and confusion, with which their preparations were made defeated this malignant purpose. Several mines failed; some which were primed did not explode; others were so ill managed that they blew the earth inwards: and as the explosion took place some hours sooner than was intended, the destruction which was intended for their enemies fell in part upon themselves. Many of their men who were lingering to plunder perished as they were loading their horses with booty in the streets and squares, and three or four hundred were blown up in the fort. Above 1000 shells had been placed in the mines: the explosion was distinctly heard at the distance of fifty miles; and the pavement of the cathedral was covered with the dust into which its windows had been shivered by the shock. The town escaped destruction owing to the failure of so many of the mines, but the castle was totally destroyed, . . . gates, beams, masses of masonry, guns, carriages, and arms lying in one heap of ruins; . . . some of the mines had laid open the breaches, and exposed the remains of those who had fallen during the siege.

The object of the enemy now was to occupy a position behind the Ebro, blocking up the great road by placing a garrison in the castle of Pancorbo, and calling to their assistance the corps from Biscay, Navarre, and Arragon. But Lord Wellington, repeating the manœuvre which had before so perfectly succeeded, had already sent his left column to effect its passage in a quarter from whence they apprehended no danger. The Ebro rises in the mountains of Santillana, its principal source

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XLIII.
1813.
June.

CHAP. XLIII. being at the northern extremity of Old Castille, towards the
 1813. Asturian frontier, near a town which from that cause is called
 Fontibre. The Sierra de Oca prevents it from trending westward,
 like the other great rivers of Spain; and at Miranda de Ebro, the
 point at which the Intruder had instructed the different divisions
 of his army to make for with all speed, it appears nearly as large
 a stream as at Tortosa, though in the course of the intervening
 sixty leagues it receives many and large rivers, one of them
 the Aragon, of such magnitude, that it is called the husband
 (*el varou*) of the Ebro. While the remainder of the army were
 pushing the enemy back upon Burgos, the left column had been
 detached to effect its passage above Frias by the bridges of
 S. Martin and Rocamunde: the road thither had been deemed
 impracticable for carriages, and on that supposed impractica-
 bility the enemy relied; but the confidence of the British General
 was partaken by his army, and well seconded by them in all
 ways; exertions which nothing but zeal and eager hope could
 have accomplished were made; and the artillery was lowered
 down the steep banks of the river where there were none to offer
 any resistance. The French had calculated not without reason
 on the line of the Ebro, if they had had foresight or been allowed
 leisure to occupy it. The road begins to descend the mountains
 about three miles from the right bank, and for more than half
 that way winds down a continued defile, which admits only eight
 or ten men abreast, and being withal tremendously steep, is so
 paved that horses can scarcely keep their feet there. Another
 such defile, and of greater length, is to be passed on the opposite
 side. A few ditches cut across the route, a few trees placed as
 barricadoes, a rock blown up to block the pass, a hundred or two
 of men to defend it, and to roll stones from the crags and pre-
 cipices above, might have stopped any force that attempted the
 passage. The left column crossed on the 14th, the remainder

*Passage of
 the Ebro by
 the allies.*

of the army on the 15th, at the same points and by the Puente de Arenas, and on the following day they moved to the right, in the direction of Vittoria.

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1813.

June.

*The French
fall back
upon Vit-
toria.*

They knew at this time little of the enemy, not even who commanded their united force, whether Marshal Jourdan or General Gazan, the Intruder's command being of course merely nominal; it was thought that their intention was to have given battle upon the main road, near Briviesca; but this alone was certain, that their plans had been disconcerted by Lord Wellington's movements and sudden advance, and that they were in that state of irresolution which prepares even the best soldiers for defeat. On the 16th and 17th they assembled a considerable force near Espejo, composed of troops which had been employed against Longa and Mina, and of others detached from the main body of their army. They had also a division of infantry, with some cavalry, at Frias, to observe the movements of the allies after the passage of the Ebro. These detachments, in all about 16,000 men, moved on the 18th, those from Frias upon S. Millan, and those from Espejo upon Osma. The light division, under Major-General Alten, drove them from S. Millan, and cut off the brigade of their rear-guard, of whom it killed and wounded many, took 300 prisoners, with a considerable quantity of baggage, and dispersed the rest among the mountains, .. from thence to be brought in by the peasants and the guerrillas. Sir Thomas Graham arrived at Osma at the same time with the enemy's corps; they were considerably superior in numbers, nevertheless they retired as soon as an intention was shown of attacking them; presently they returned briskly as if to become assailants in their turn, but their reception was not such as to encourage them, and they once more retired towards Espejo, and being followed thither withdrew to the heights. The enemy's head-quarters were that day at Pancorvo. During the

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*June.**June 19.**Vittoria.**Garchay,
L. 24. cap.
13. p. 187
—8.**Position of
the French
army.*

night they moved from thence towards Vittoria; and on the following day their rear-guard was found strongly posted, having its right covered by the village of Subijana, and its left upon the heights in front of Pobes. The light division attacked them in flank on the right, Sir Lowry Cole with the 4th in front, and they were driven back upon their main force, of which a view was then obtained, but no correct judgement could be formed of its numbers, because they were in part concealed by the mountains, and a thick rain was falling during the whole day. On that night they took up a position in front of Vittoria.

This city, which is now the capital of the province of Alava, and stands in a valley, bounded on one side by a part of the Pyrenees, and on the other by a range of bold though inferior mountains, was founded in 1181 by Sancho VII. of Navarre, a king distinguished by the appellations of the Wise and the Valiant. There had been a village called Gasteiz on the site; Sancho thinking it a good situation for a fortress which might check the incursions of his Castillian neighbours on that side, rebuilt, peopled and fortified it, and gave his new town the name of Vittoria, in memorial of some now forgotten victory obtained in that vicinity over them. Juan II. of Castille made it a city. It is now divided into the old and new towns, the latter being the larger and better part of what in peaceful times was a populous, industrious, and prosperous place, containing more than a thousand houses, and twice that number in the suburbs.

In front of this city the enemy had taken their position, under the nominal command of the Intruder, but actually commanded by Marshal Jourdan, as the Major-General of the army. Their left rested upon the heights which terminated at the Puebla de Arlanza; and they had a reserve in rear of their left, at the village of Gomecha: their centre extended along a range of strong heights on the left bank of the Zadorra, its right resting

on a circular hill that commands the valley to which that river gives name; this hill they had covered with infantry, flanked and defended with several brigades of guns: their right was in advance of the river, above the village of Abechuco, to defend the passage. This position, extending about eight miles, covered the three great roads which from Bilbao, Logroño, and Madrid, converge upon Vittoria; it crossed also the main road to Bayonne, upon which immense convoys were seen, moving towards France with the last harvest and the last gleanings of their plunder. The city was filled with others awaiting their turn for departure. It is remarkable that, within sight of this ground, the battle of Najara was fought, in which Edward the Black Prince, acting as the ally of a bad man, defeated the best troops of France under their most distinguished leader Bertram du Guesclin, who was come in support of a worse. It is also remarkable that the Prince of Brazil, before the battle of Vittoria was fought, should have conferred the title of Duque da Victoria upon Lord Wellington.

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Lord Wellington halted his columns on the 20th, in order to close them up, for since reaching the Ebro they had necessarily been extended, because of the nature of the country: only the 6th division was left at Medina de Pomal to cover the march of supplies from the rear. That day he made a close reconnoissance of the enemy's position in every part, with the determination of attacking them on the following morning, if they should continue there. There was little disparity of numbers between the two armies, each having from 70 to 75,000 men. Lord Wellington instantly perceived that the position, though in most respects well chosen, was too confined, that it showed an inconsiderable front, and was liable to be taken in flank.

At daybreak on the 21st of June the allied army was put in motion. The right under Sir Rowland, consisting of the second

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Vittoria.*

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British division, the Conde de Amarante's Portuguese division, and Morillo's Spanish corps, was to commence the action by attacking the heights of La Puebla, upon which the enemy's left rested. Sir Thomas Graham with the left, composed of the 1st and 5th divisions, Generals Pack and Bradford's brigades of infantry, Generals Bock and Anson's brigades of horse, and Longa's Spanish division, was directed to turn their right by a wide movement, and, crossing the Zadorra, to cut off their retreat by the road to Bayonne. As soon as either of these corps should be in a situation to manœuvre on the other side the river, the centre, consisting of the 3d, 4th, 7th, and light divisions, in two columns, was to advance, and the whole then push forward on the city, and attack it simultaneously in front and in flank, ..whereby the French would be compelled either to abandon it and their precious convoys, or risk a battle in the hope of preserving them. The Spaniards, under Morillo, began the action, and attacked the heights with great gallantry; their leader was wounded, but remained in the field; the enemy stood firm, and made great efforts to retain their ground, perceiving when too late that they had neglected to occupy it in sufficient strength. Strong reinforcements were sent from their centre to its support, so that Sir Rowland found it necessary to detach thither, first, the 71st regiment, and the light infantry battalions of Major-General Walker's brigade, and successively other troops; the contest was very severe, and the loss considerable. Here the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Cadogan was mortally wounded, an officer, in Lord Wellington's words, "of great zeal and tried gallantry, who had acquired the respect and regard of the whole profession, and of whom it might have been expected, that if he had lived, he would have rendered the most important services to his country." At length the enemy were driven at the point of the bayonet from these heights; and under the cover which the pos-

session of this ground afforded, Sir Rowland crossed the Zadorra at La Puebla, passed the difficult defile, two miles in length, which is formed by the heights and the river, and then attacked and won the village of Sabijana de Alva, which covered the left of the enemy's lines. They on their part made repeated attempts to regain this important point, and with that hope drew from their centre a considerable force: again and again they endeavoured to recover the village, but their efforts, though bravely and perseveringly made, were unsuccessful.

The difficult nature of the country delayed the communication between the different columns, and it was late before Lord Wellington knew that the 3d and 7th divisions, under the Earl of Dalhousie, had arrived at their appointed station. The 4th and the light divisions, however, crossed the Zadorra immediately after Sir Rowland had gained possession of Sabijana, the former at the bridge of Nanclares, the latter at the Tres Puentes; almost at the same time the Earl of Dalhousie's column arrived at Mendonza, and the 3d division, under Sir Thomas Picton, charged and took the bridge higher up, and crossed and was followed by the 7th. These bridges the enemy ought to have destroyed, but from the beginning of the campaign a want of foresight had been manifested in all their operations, though when in action their generals displayed the habitual promptitude of experienced commanders. The four divisions which had now crossed and which formed the centre of the allied army, were destined to attack the heights on which the right of the enemy's centre was placed, while Sir Rowland should move forward from Sabijana to attack the left. The French had lined those heights with artillery, which opened on the allies as soon as they attempted to advance from the river, and with so destructive a fire, that it became necessary for them to halt and bring two brigades of guns to oppose it. Meantime the contest was maintained at

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Sabijana with great obstinacy; the enemy feeding their attacks from a wood, in which their troops were assembled in great force. But when a brigade which Sir Rowland had detached along a range of mountains to turn their flank appeared, and at the same time Sir Thomas Picton approached their front, they gave over their attempts to recover the village, and began to think rather of retreat than of a successful resistance. And when Sir Thomas pushed on to take the large circular hill in flank, while the fourth division moved simultaneously upon the village in the centre, their whole force prepared to fall back upon the town, retreating before the allies could close, but keeping up a hot fire from their artillery. The third division first came in contact with their columns, and by a gallant attack captured 28 of their guns which they had not time to draw into the road. The other divisions pressed them in front. At this moment both the winning and the losing game were played with equal skill, "the allies advancing by echelons of battalions, in two or three lines, according to the nature of the ground; and the French retiring before them in the most orderly manner, and taking advantage of every favourable opportunity to make a stand." And here it happened, that General Colville's brigade, which was on the left of the centre, and most in advance, became, by an accident of the ground, separated from its support; the enemy, who lost no opportunity in action, attacked it with a far superior force, but the brigade stood firm, though out of 1800 men it lost 550.

Colonel
Jones's
Account,
2. 158.

While the right and the centre, following up their success, were pushing the enemy back upon Vittoria, the left was advancing upon that town by the high road from Bilbao. Sir Thomas Graham with that column had been moved on the preceding evening to Margina, and had then so considerable a round to make, that it was ten o'clock before he began to de-

scend into the plain. General Giron with the Spanish army had been detached to the left under a different view of the state of affairs ; but having been recalled and reached Orduña on the yesterday, he marched from thence in the morning so as to be in readiness to support Sir Thomas Graham, if his support should be required. The enemy had a division of infantry and some cavalry advanced upon the Bilbao road, resting their right on some strong heights covering the village of Gamarra Mayor, and both that village and Abechuco were strongly occupied as *têtes-du-pont* to the bridges over the Zadorra at those places. The heights were attacked both in front and flank by Brigadier-General Pack's Portugueze brigade, and Longa's Spanish division, supported by Major-General Anson's brigade of light dragoons, and the 5th division of infantry, all under the command of Major-General Oswald ; and they were carried, both Spaniards and Portugueze behaving admirably. Longa then with little resistance got possession of Gamarra Menor, and the larger village of the same name was stormed and taken by Brigadier-General Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, which advanced under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry without firing a shot: the enemy suffered severely there, and lost three pieces of cannon. Sir Thomas Graham then proceeded to attack the village of Abechuco with the 1st division ; they formed a strong battery against it, under cover of which Colonel Halkett's brigade advanced to the attack, supported by General Bradford's brigade of Portugueze infantry. Three guns and a howitzer were taken on the bridge here, and the village was carried. While the contest at Abechuco continued, the enemy seeing their communication with Bayonne threatened, marched a strong body to their right in the hope of recovering Gamarra Mayor: they were driven back in confusion ; made a second attempt, and were again repulsed, for Sir Thomas had loop-

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CHAP. holed the houses in front of the bridge, placed artillery to flank
XLIII. the approach, and stationed several battalions concealed along
1813. the walls, and their fire repelled the enemy upon a third advance.

June. But the French had two divisions of infantry in reserve upon the heights on the left of the Zadorra; Sir Thomas, therefore, could not cross the river with such a corps in front, till the troops which had moved upon the centre and the left of the French should have driven them through Vittoria. About six in the evening this was done, and the corps which held him in check retreated then lest it should be taken in rear. The left then crossed the Zadorra, took possession of the high road to Bayonne, and forced the right as well as the left centre of the enemy back into the Pamplona road; and now they were unable to hold any position long enough for drawing off their artillery and baggage. In the expressive language of an officer who bore his part in the victory, "they were beaten before the town, and in the town, and through the town, and out of the town, and behind the town, and all round about the town." Every where they had been attacked, every where beaten, and now every where were put to utter rout. They themselves had in many actions made greater slaughter of a Spanish army, but never in any instance had they reduced an army, even of raw volunteers, to such a state of total wreck. Stores, baggage, artillery, every thing was abandoned; one gun and one howitzer only were they able to carry off, and the gun was taken before it could reach Pamplona. 151 pieces of brass ordnance on travelling carriages were taken; more than 400 caissons, more than 14,000 round of ammunition, and nearly two millions of musket-ball cartridges. The loss on the part of the allies consisted of 501 British killed, 2808 wounded: 150 Portugeze and 89 Spaniards killed, 899 and 466 wounded, . . the total loss not amounting to 5000. The French acknowledged a loss of 8000.. unquestionably it was

greater; not more than a thousand prisoners were taken; for so soon as they found themselves irretrievably defeated, they ran, and never did brave soldiers when beaten display more alacrity in flight. Having abandoned all their ammunition waggon, they had not powder to blow up the bridges; had this been done, the pursuit would have been greatly impeded; attempts were made to break them up with pick-axes, and in this they partly succeeded in several places. But the country was too much intersected with ditches for cavalry to act with effect in a pursuit; and infantry who moved in military order could not at their utmost speed keep up with a rout of fugitives. Yet, precipitate as their flight was, they took great pains to bear off their wounded, and dismounted a regiment of cavalry to carry them on. And they carefully endeavoured to conceal their dead, stopping occasionally to collect them and throw them into ditches, where they covered them with bushes. Many such receptacles were found containing from ten to twenty bodies.

The Intruder, who now appears for the last time upon the stage of his everlasting infamy, narrowly escaped. The tenth hussars entered Vittoria at the moment that he was hastening out of it in his carriage. Captain Wyndham with one squadron pursued, and fired into the carriage, and Joseph had barely time to throw himself on his horse and gallop off under the protection of an escort of dragoons. The carriage was taken, and in it the most splendid of his trinkets, and the most precious articles of his royal plunder. Marshal Jourdan's staff was among the trophies of the field; it was rather more than a foot long, and covered with blue velvet, on which the imperial eagles were embroidered; and it had been tipped with gold; but the first finder secured the gold for himself. The case was of red morocco with silver clasps, and with eagles on it, and at

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either end the Marshal's name imprinted in gold letters. Lord Wellington sent it to the Prince Regent, and was gracefully presented in return with the staff of a Field Marshal of Great Britain. The spoils resembled those of an Oriental rather than of an European army; for the Intruder, who in his miserable situation had abandoned himself to every kind of sensuality, had with him all his luxuries. His plunder, his wardrobe, his sideboard, his larder, and his cellar, fell into the conqueror's hands. The French officers, who carried the pestilential manners of their nation wherever they went, followed his example as far as their means allowed, and thus the finest wines and the choicest delicacies were found in profusion. The wives and mistresses of the officers had gathered together in one house, where they were safe, and from whence they were sent in their own carriages with a flag of truce to Pamplona. Poodles, parrots, and monkies, were among the prisoners. Seldom has such a scene of confusion been witnessed as that which the roads leading from the field of battle presented; . . broken down waggons stocked with claret and champagne, others laden with eatables dressed and undressed, casks of brandy, apparel of every kind, barrels of money, books, papers, sheep, cattle, horses, and mules, abandoned in the flight. The baggage was presently rifled, and the followers of the camp attired themselves in the gala dresses of the flying enemy. Portuguese boys figured about in the dress coats of French general officers; and they who happened to draw a woman's wardrobe in the lottery, converted silks, satins, and embroidered muslins, into scarfs and sashes for their masquerade triumph. Some of the more fortunate soldiers got possession of the army chest, and loaded themselves with money: "Let them," said Lord Wellington, when he was informed of it; "they deserve all they can find, were it ten times more." The camp of every division was like a

fair; benches were laid from waggon to waggon, and there the soldiers held an auction through the night, and disposed of such plunder as had fallen to their share to any who would purchase it. Even dollars became an article of sale, for they were too heavy to be carried in any great numbers; eight were offered for a guinea . . . guineas which had been struck for the payment of the troops in Portugal, and made current there by a decree of the Regency, being the gold currency. The people of Vittoria had their share in the spoils, and some of them indemnified themselves thus for what they had suffered in their property by the enemy's exactions.

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The city sustained no injury, though the French were driven through it, and though great part of the battle might be seen from every window. Nothing could be more mournful than its appearance that night, . . . a lantern at every door, and no one in the streets. It was the first place where the allies had found that the inhabitants were French in feeling. Two days of heavy rain impeded the pursuit; but that rain saved many houses from the flames, for the French wreaked their vengeance upon every thing which they could destroy in their flight. Every house at which the pursuers arrived had been gutted by the fugitives, every village set on fire, and the few inhabitants who had not taken flight in time had met with no mercy; at every step the allies found havoc, and flames, and misery, the dying and the dead. Such was the panic among the fugitives, that, finding the gates of Pamplona closed, they attempted to force their way over the walls, and did not desist till they were opposed by a serious fire of cannon and musketry. A council of war was held there, in which it was resolved to blow up the works and abandon the place; with this intent they destroyed ammunition and tore down palisades from the outworks. But the Intruder knew that the possession of so strong a fortress

CHAP. XLIII. would in some degree cover his flight; and the last act of his
 1813. usurped authority was to order that every article of food and
 fuel should be taken from the Spaniards who were within reach.

June.

By the rigorous execution of this order, the quantity in the town was more than doubled; and having left a garrison there, the flying force continued their way to the Pyrenees. Their rear was still in sight of Pamplona, when the right and centre of the allies were checked in their pursuit by a fire from the walls.

Sir T. Graham proceeds against G. Foy.

Sir Thomas Graham with the left of the army was ordered to march by Puerto S. Andrian upon Villa Franca, in the hope of intercepting General Foy, who occupied Bilbao after the atrocities which he had committed in Castro. The orders were not received till the 23rd, when the weather and the ways in consequence were so bad, that only a small part of the column could pass the mountain that day; and it was not till the 24th that Sir Thomas, with Major General Anson's brigade of light dragoons, the light battalions of the German legion, and two Portugueze brigades could march from Segura, the rest of the troops not having come up. The roads were so slippery with the rain, and in many places so steep, that horses could scarcely keep their feet, or the infantry make any progress. This allowed Foy time to withdraw the troops from some of the military stations there, and with his collected force he began his retreat into France. The allies came to the junction of the roads from Bilbao and from Vittoria to Bayonne just as the enemy's rear had passed it. The French occupied in force some strong ground on the right of the Oria, in front of the village of Olaverria, about a mile and a half from Villa Franca; they were dislodged from thence, and allowed the pursuers to take possession of the town, meaning to make their stand at Tolosa. During the night, Longa's corps joined Sir

June 24.

Thomas, and the advance of General Giron's. On the following morning the enemy evacuated Celequiz, and took up a very strong position between that place and Tolosa, covering the road to Pamplona. Longa was then directed to march by Alzo upon Lizara in order to flank his left, while General Mendizabal was requested to dispatch some battalions from Aspeytia to flank his right, which rested upon a mountain with an inaccessible ravine in front. The French were driven from the summit of a hill lying between the Pamplona and Vittoria roads, on the right of the allies, by a very skilful attack of Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, and the possession of this important point enabled the assailants to act on the Pamplona road. In the course of the afternoon the Spaniards arrived at their destination, and between six and seven a general attack was made, one column advancing upon the Vittoria road, another on the left; General Bradford driving the enemy in on their front by the Pamplona road, and Longa still more on the right from the side of the mountains, turning, and forcing from very strong positions, all their posted bodies on the right of the town. Still they held the town; and it was found much more capable of defence than had been represented; this was generally the case with their fortified posts, so prone were the Spaniards to report things always according to their hopes; the walls had been loop-holed, and new towers erected to flank it. The Vittoria gate was barricadoed and the Pamplona one on the bridge; both were flanked by convents and other large buildings which the enemy occupied; the place was nowhere open, and a strong wood block-house had been constructed in the Plaza, of so much importance had it been deemed. A nine-pounder was brought up close to the Vittoria gate, under cover of the light battalions' fire; the gate was burst open: at the same time, the walls were attacked and gained under a considerable fire, and

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*June.**The French
driven from
Tolosa.*

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about half an hour after night closed, the enemy forsook the place, flying from every point, and the troops entered amidst the *vivas* of the inhabitants, who had fully expected to have been plundered that night by the retreating enemy. The British officer who first entered thought they were in some danger from their deliverers, considering the mixed composition of the troops, and how likely it was that some parties away from their regiments might take advantage of the darkness and the confusion. He advised them therefore to shut their doors, and, to the credit of the troops, it must be added, that no outrage or excess was committed. Longa and the German legion passed on, and formed immediately beyond the town. The loss of the allies on this and the preceding day amounted to about 400; Sir Thomas Graham was struck during the attack by a musket ball; the hurt was not serious, and he attempted to conceal it, but could not, and was obliged to dismount.

June 26.

Foy retreats
into France.

On the morrow one brigade was placed on the Pamplona road, and another on the Bayonne, each about a league from Tolosa; a third occupied Alegria, and Sir Thomas then halted two days to ascertain the advance of Lord Wellington on his right. Foy had retreated to Anduain, where he destroyed the bridge; but he now knew himself to be no longer safe within the Spanish territory, and lost no time in making his way into France. A brigade of the Galician army attacked his rear-guard on the Bidassoa at Irun, and drove them over the bridge. They still maintained a strong stone block-house there, which served as a head to the bridge, and some loop-holed houses on the Spanish side of the river. General Giron sent for some Spanish artillery to dislodge them; an English brigade of nine pounders was sent from Oyarzun to act with it; the French then found it necessary to abandon their post, and they blew up the block-house and burnt the bridge. In all these affairs no troops could have

June 30.

behaved better than the Spanish; and General Giron, with a natural and becoming feeling, had been very desirous that this last exploit should fall to their part. The garrison at Passages, 150 in number, surrendered on the same day to Longa, and on the following the garrison of Guetaria, being blockaded by land, evacuated the town and fort, and went by sea to St. Sebastian's. Castro de Urdiales, the scene of General Foy's atrocities, had been abandoned the day after the battle of Vittoria, the British squadron having cut off the garrison from all supplies by sea, and the Spaniards by land. A British vessel heaving opportunely in sight, the commandant withdrew precipitately, without destroying his artillery and powder, or injuring the castle. A few old women were the only survivors in the town, and their tale of the barbarities which the French and Italian troops had committed there is too dreadful for recital; there is, however, a satisfaction in recording that fourteen of the perpetrators were among the prisoners taken at Bilbao, and were deservedly put to death. The garrison got by sea to Santona, that and St. Sebastian's being the only points which the enemy now occupied upon that coast. The French had left 700 men in Pancorbo, a post commanding a ravine through which the high road from Burgos to Vittoria passes. The Andalusian army of reserve, under the Conde de Abisbal, was on its way to join the main force. Lord Wellington requested him to make himself master of the town and lower works, and blockade, as closely as he could, the castle, which is situated on a high rock. Abisbal assaulted and took the town and the fort of Santa Marta on the 28th; and cutting off the garrison in the castle from the spring which supplied them with water, compelled them to surrender two days afterwards, when in all other respects they were well provided for a regular defence.

General Clausel's corps, consisting of part of the army of the north, and one division of the army of Portugal, 14,000 in all,

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*Passages is
surren-
dered.*

*Castro
abandoned
by the
enemy.*

*Pancorbo
taken.*

*Clausel re-
tires to Za-
ragosa.*

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had been recalled from its operations against Mina to join the collected force of the Intruder. Coming in a direction which none of the fugitives had taken, he approached Vittoria the day after the battle, and finding that city in possession of Major-General Pakenham's division, which had just arrived there, and having no means of communicating with the routed army, he retired immediately towards Logroño. There he halted, hoping to obtain information whereby to direct his movements; and Lord Wellington thinking there was some prospect of intercepting his retreat, moved three divisions towards Tudela, and the 5th and 6th from Vittoria and Salvatierra towards Logroño. Clausel, who was at this time harassed by the indefatigable Mina, and by Don Julian Sanchez with his regiment of cavalry, left Logroño on the 24th, taking with him the garrison of that place, and marching on the left bank of the Ebro, crossed it by the bridge at Lodosa, and reached Calahorra on the following day. On the next he arrived at Tudela; but the Alcalde of that city informed him that the allies were on the road to meet him, upon which he marched toward Zaragoza, taking with him this garrison also.

*Prepara-
tions for the
siege of
Pamplona.*

Sir Rowland meantime following the main body of the defeated army on their retreat over the Pyrenees, dislodged them from every point which they attempted to hold, and obtained possession of the passes of S. Esteban, Donna Maria, Maya, and Roncesvalles. It was now Lord Wellington's intention to besiege Pamplona; with this intent the heavy guns and stores for the siege were brought from Santander to Deba, a little town to the westward of S. Sebastian's; there they were landed, and cows and bullocks had been collected for transporting them to the trenches: but the intelligence which Lord Wellington received from the Anglo-Sicilian army rendered it necessary to give up this intention, and every thing therefore was reshipped.

CHAPTER XLIV.

OPERATIONS OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY. RECOVERY OF
ZARAGOZA. SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN'S. BATTLES OF THE
PYRENEES.

It was part of Lord Wellington's plan that Marshal Suchet should be engaged on the eastern coast by the Anglo-Sicilian army, and thus prevented from sending assistance to the French in Aragon and on the upper Ebro. His position upon the line of the Xucar was too strong to be attacked in front by the force under Sir John Murray's command, or acting in concert with him; and a movement by Requena and Utiel upon their right flank, and by Tortosa and Lerida towards the rear, seemed as hazardous as it would have been circuitous and difficult. A naval expedition remained for consideration: and if a vigorous attack were made either upon Tarragona or Rosas, Suchet's attention must necessarily be drawn thither, so that he could give no aid to the armies in the north, and must leave the open part of the kingdom of Valencia to the Spaniards. Tarragona was preferred as the point of attack, and Sir John was instructed to embark with that view. If he should succeed in his attempt against that place, an establishment would be secured on the coast north of the Ebro, so as to open a communication with the Spanish army in Catalonia; but this was a question of time and means, and if

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*Expedition
from Ali-
cante.*

April 14.

CHAP. Suchet should be strong enough in Catalonia to frustrate the
 XLIV. attempt, Sir John was directed in that case to return immedi-
 1813. ately, and land as far north in the kingdom of Valencia as he
 June. could, and there join with the right of the Spanish armies, to
 assist them in profiting by the opportunity which Suchet's absence
 and the withdrawal of a considerable part of his force from the
 Xucar might be expected to afford.

The expedition was to have been kept secret; but the preparations which were made at Alicante for the embarkation of a considerable corps could not be concealed, and Suchet was speedily informed of them. Already he had apprehended, by a movement of the Spaniards from La Mancha upon Cuenca, and of Villacampa from the frontiers of Aragon upon the upper Guadalaviar, that it was intended by a combined operation to compel him to evacuate Valencia; but as at that time Clausel's activity relieved him from any inquietude with regard to Mina, he was enabled to withdraw a division from Aragon, and to place Pannetier's brigade between Tortosa and Valencia, that he might direct it upon whatever point should be threatened, without leaving the line of the Xucar exposed.

*Col de Balaguertaken
 by the Anglo-Sicilian
 army.*

By the end of May the expedition, consisting of 700 cavalry, and 14,600 infantry, including Whittingham's division of 5000, and above 4000 Italians, had embarked, and on the last day of that month the fleet, commanded by Rear-Admiral Hallowell, sailed from Alicante. It was seen from Valencia; and the French troops from the side of Tortosa were instructed to be ready for moving whithersoever the debarkation might call them. After a very favourable passage, the fleet anchored on the evening of the 2d in the port of Salon, within sight of Tarragona. The soldiers who had been ordered to hold themselves in readiness to land were put into the boats, but the surf ran so high that Admiral Hallowell pronounced the attempt too dangerous,

and therefore they returned to the ships. But before the fleet came to anchor, a brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost, was judiciously detached to get possession of the fort at Col de Balaguer, that point commanding the only road by which artillery could be brought to the relief of Tarragona. General Copons, who had been apprized of the expedition, occupied Reus at that time, and sent two battalions, at first, to co-operate in the attack upon this fort, and afterwards two more in consequence of some movements from Tortosa. The attack was vigorously pressed. On the 5th the place was battered in breach; on the 7th a magazine exploded; the garrison, consisting of 80 men, were intimidated by this, and the commandant capitulated. On this side, therefore, no succours could now reach Tarragona, which is about six leagues from Col de Balaguer, except by a circuitous march of three days, through a very difficult country: there was a pass indeed by which the place might be approached, but it was not practicable for artillery.

Meantime the debarkation had been effected on the 3d, in broad day, and with an order, a precision, and a rapidity, peculiar to the English in their naval operations. Having reconnoitred the fortress, Sir John Murray determined upon attacking it on the western side, which was the weakest, and that on which stores might most conveniently be brought up to the batteries. General Bertolotti, who commanded in Tarragona, did not confine himself within the walls; he occupied the Fuerte Real, and the ruins of the bastion of St. Carlos, which, though, like all the external works, it had been demolished, presented still an imposing appearance; and great exertions were made for repairing it. These works were between 350 and 400 yards from the body of the place, to the southward, and nearer the sea, the approach being exceedingly difficult, and covered by

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*The expedi-
tion lands
near Tar-
ragona.*

*M. Suchet's
Mem. 2,
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the fire of the town. But they were thought to be the key of the place, and that if the besiegers could establish themselves there, Tarragona must fall in three days. Accordingly two batteries were begun on the evening of the 4th, and on the morning of the 6th they opened their fire with good effect; another was erected during the night, and on the morning of the 8th, the commanding engineer reported that a practicable breach in the Fuerte Real had been made; but he requested that it might not be stormed, because its immediate possession could be turned to no account, and to retain it would cost the lives of many men. The fire therefore was continued only to prevent its re-establishment. Meantime, when the weather would permit, the artillery and engineer horses, and the cavalry and artillery stores, were landed, and the operations of the engineers were so far advanced that two heavy batteries were constructed to enfilade the place. The city was then summoned to surrender; but as none of the batteries were as yet within 500 yards of the place, and the fire of the besieged had been very superior to that of the besiegers, General Bertoletti would not listen to the summons. On the 11th, the commanding officer of engineers reported that he was perfectly prepared to push the siege with vigour; and according to Sir John Murray's order, Major-General Sir William Clinton, who had that day been left in temporary command of the siege, resolved to storm the Fuerte Real at nine that night. Accordingly a disposition for the assault was made, and arrangements for distracting the enemy's attention by a simultaneous show of attack along the whole of his front, aided from the side of the sea by the bomb-vessels and gun-boats.

*Suchet's
movement
for the re-
lief of Tar-
ragona.*

Marshal Suchet meantime, leaving General Harispe with the command on the Xucar, had made for Tortosa by forced marches with one division, his reserve, and a brigade of cavalry: and before

his arrival he had dispatched orders for the garrison of that place to secure the Col de Balaguer; but the fort there was taken before any attempt to succour it could be made, and he could therefore bring with him no artillery in his attempt to raise the siege of Tarragona. He had directed also Generals Decaen and Maurice Mathieu to march for the relief of the place. On the side of Tortosa all due precautions had been taken, by getting possession of the fort which absolutely commanded that singular pass. On the other side, Sir John Murray had ordered General Whittingham to see if the road could by any means be broken up or impeded, . . but in an open country this was found impracticable in any part, except at a point near the sea, and within two miles of Tarragona. When Whittingham was at Torre de Embarra upon this investigation, Manso, who had 2000 men at Vendrell, came there to inform him that Decaen, from Hostalric and the country beyond it, would arrive that night at Barcelona, where there would then be a force of 12,000 foot and 400 horse, disposable for the relief of Tarragona. This information General Whittingham communicated to Sir John Murray on the 9th, observing that the enemy might advance to succour that place, in two columns, one by the road along the coast, the other by the heights, upon the left of the besieging army; the Spanish division, which formed the left, would thus be exposed in flank to a superior force, and in a position that was commanded by the heights, and had the fortified city in its rear. And he suggested to Sir John, that he should leave General Copons with the Catalan army to cover the siege, while he, with the British troops and the Majorcan division, marched immediately upon Villa Franca to attack Decaen; that general would have advanced beyond Villa Franca; victory, considering the number and the quality of the allied troops, would

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CHAP. not be doubtful, and it would decide the contest in Catalonia ;
 XLIV. and after driving him from Molins de Rey, and destroying the
 1813. stone bridge over the Llobregat, by which bridge alone artillery
 Juné. could be brought across that river, there would be time to return
 and encounter Marshal Suchet.

*Sir John
 Murray
 raises the
 siege.*

To this suggestion Sir John paid no regard ; but late in the evening of the 11th, when every thing was ready for an immediate assault upon the Fuerte Real, he received intelligence that Suchet was advancing with 12,000 men from the side of Tortosa, and Decaen with 8000 from Barcelona ; upon which he determined immediately to raise the siege, and with such haste, as to abandon all the heavy artillery, ammunition, and stores that had been landed. He thought it would have been an useless waste of the lives of British soldiers to assault a work, which, if carried, must in his opinion have been abandoned the next day ; he placed no reliance upon the Spaniards under Copons, who had not more than 8500 disposable men, and those without pay, discipline, artillery, or means of subsisting, and whom he considered totally incapable of acting in the field. He distrusted his own foreign troops, who worked slowly at the siege, with great unwillingness, and with so little steadiness, that it had required an additional party of 200 British soldiers to carry to the batteries the ammunition which one of their parties threw away when they came under fire. The French too, he thought, had all advantages ; they had fortresses in every direction to furnish them supplies, to retire upon if they wished to avoid an action till they could bring together more troops, or to cover them if they were defeated ; whereas he was in the open field, without any point of support, or of retreat, except to the ships : and how serious an operation would it be to embark an army in an open bay, and on a beach where he had

learned by experience that it was impossible to disembark in any but the lightest boats! Three days at least would be required to complete this re-embarkation. He decided, therefore, upon beginning it without delay.

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Admiral Hallowell strongly remonstrated against abandoning the artillery, and engaged to bring off every thing, if Sir John would only give him the night from the 12th to the 13th; but that commander gave ear to less hopeful counsels, most unfortunately for himself. For public opinion loudly condemned his conduct; it became the subject of a court martial; and though the sentence acquitted him upon all other charges, it pronounced that he had committed an error of judgement in abandoning his artillery, when it might have been brought off. The embarkation was commenced at daybreak. At first some of the valuable stores were sent off, but orders were given to abandon them. Great part of the infantry were put on board during the day in full view of the besieged, who crowded on the ramparts to behold what they were unable to understand. Sir John himself embarked early in the evening; but it was not till near midnight that the 1st division, under Sir William Clinton, who was left in command of the troops on shore, moved to the beach; and so completely were the enemy deceived as to its movements, by the piquets of this division having been kept at their advanced stations till darkness had closed, that not a man ventured without the walls, and not a shot was fired during the night, except from the ramparts, nor did any enemy show himself to molest the embarkation. The cavalry of the Majorcan division were embarked on the morning of the 13th, by means of a mole constructed for the purpose, about two leagues from the town; but the other cavalry and a great part of the field artillery were ordered by land to the Col de Balaguer, whither Sir John

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*Suchet approaches
Col de Balaguer, and
retires again.*

Murray repaired in the Bristol early on the 13th, and where the whole armament was directed to assemble.

While the allies were thus re-embarking with discreditable precipitance, two other armies thought it necessary in consequence of this movement to retreat also, in equal haste, . . . General Copons from the vicinity of Reus to the mountains, lest he should be exposed to a combined attack from Decaen and the garrison of Tarragona; and Decaen himself to Barcelona, apprehending that the allies had raised the siege for the purpose of bringing him to action. On the evening of the 13th an enemy's detachment was seen advancing by the piquets in front of the fort at Col de Balaguer, and judging that this might be the advance of Suchet's force, Sir John ordered part of the infantry to be relanded as it arrived from Tarragona, in order to cover the embarkation of the cavalry and field-artillery, which had reached that point in the course of the day. He was not mistaken in this judgement, . . . Marshal Suchet having found the way by the mountains impracticable, thought to force his way by the Col, expecting to reduce the fort with as little difficulty as the allies had done; and on the 14th he presented himself there on the road from Tortosa with the main body of his army. He found a battalion in position covering the fort, but to his astonishment he also discovered the British fleet at anchor between the Col and Hospitalet. His light troops and skirmishers extended themselves along the hills, and approached within cannon-shot of the fort. But he found it impossible to advance, so completely was the road on that side commanded by the fort and by the judicious station taken by the ships of war, which could anchor there close to the shore; and it was equally impossible for an army to remain there many hours, there being no water within many miles. He found it necessary, therefore, to

retire the same evening to the village of Perillo, not knowing what had occurred at Tarragona, alarmed as well as surprized at what he had seen, and holding himself prepared to follow the movements of the fleet.

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On the following morning he made a second movement on Valdellos, as if intending to attempt the mountain road. As soon as Sir John Murray was informed of this, he apprehended that it was Suchet's intention to turn the position which the allies occupied, and enter the plain of Tarragona in their rear; upon which the farther embarkation of the cavalry was suspended, and nearly the whole of the infantry were put on shore. He also sent a strong division, and all the cavalry, under Major-General Mackenzie, to observe the enemy's motions, and attack them if they should attempt to press farther forward. They remained on the 16th nearly in the same position; but intelligence came that a column was in march from the side of Tarragona, and as this would have rendered General Mackenzie's situation extremely critical, he was ordered to retire to Hospitalet, and accordingly retreated thither in the course of the night. Sir John now determined to take up a position in the plain, between the high ground of the Col and the sea, and this was done on the 17th. The left rested on the hills, which are almost inaccessible on that side; the ground in front, though level, was impracticable for cavalry, because it is intersected from the hills to the sea with gullies and deep ravines caused by the winter rains. The right extended to the shore, and was greatly protected by the gun-boats and the fire of the shipping. In this strong position he had resolved to wait the enemy's attack, but in the forenoon it was ascertained that they had retired on both sides, Suchet toward Tortosa, and Decaen toward Barcelona, after throwing supplies into Tarragona. Sir John then assembled a council of war, in which it was concluded that as nothing farther in the

June 15.

*Sir John
relands
the troops.*

CHAP. way of offensive operations could be attempted by the army in
 XLIV. its then state, and as no advantage could be expected from
 1813. remaining where they were, and acting defensively, the most
 June. advisable measure was to re-embark and return to Alicante,
 there to re-equip the army.

*Lord W.
 Bentinck
 takes the
 command.*

*Fort at Col
 de Balaguer
 demolished.*

*Unsuccess-
 ful move-
 ments of the
 Spaniards
 in Valencia.*

In the afternoon of this busy day Lord William Bentinck, who had long been looked for, arrived from Sicily to take the command. The Mediterranean fleet, under Sir Edward Pellew, came with him, having quitted its station off Toulon in the hope of assisting the operations against Tarragona, either by its presence there, or by making a show of landing at and attacking Rosas. Lord William on assuming the command confirmed the opinion of the council of war, and ordered the troops to be immediately re-embarked. The weather being such as to raise a high surf, rendered this very difficult; nevertheless by great exertions on the part of the navy, every thing was got on board by the midnight of the 19th. At the same time the fort at Col de Balaguer, having been dismantled and ruined, was blown up; and on the ensuing day, Admiral Hallowell and the Anglo-Sicilian army made sail for Alicante from their bootless expedition, and Sir Edward Pellew returned with the Mediterranean fleet to his wonted station.

The explosion of the fort announced to the French that the English had abandoned all thought of any further operations in lower Catalonia, . . much to Marshal Suchet's relief, who while they remained there deemed it necessary to observe their movements, and yet felt that he was wanted upon the Xucar. General Elio's army, joined by that which Ballesteros had formerly commanded, but was now under the Duque del Parque, had endeavoured to take advantage of his absence with so large a part of his force. On the 11th they had attacked General Harispe's rear-guard, under General Mesclop, when on the road from

S. Philippe to its position on the Xucar, but were repulsed at the village of Rogla with some loss, and Elio himself was for a little while in the enemy's hands, but he had the good fortune to escape without being recognized. The French then pursued their march without farther molestation to the bridge over the Xucar. On the 13th the Spaniards presented themselves in force there, and while a cannonade was kept up on that side, the Duque del Parque attacked Alcira by the two roads of Carcagente and of Gandia. General Habert let their principal column approach the suburb, then charged it at the moment when it began to deploy, threw it into confusion, routed it with the loss of 400 killed and more than 600 prisoners; and this in time for repairing to support his left on the Gandia road, and there also to defeat the assailants. Notwithstanding this success, General Harispe was far from feeling secure in his position. He informed Marshal Suchet that there were in his front not less than 28,000 of the least bad Spanish infantry, and from 2 to 3000 cavalry in a good state; this, he said, the prisoners agreed in affirming, and the intelligence was not of a kind to make them feel more secure than they ought to be. The departure of the expedition from Balaguer Roads after the total failure of its object enabled the Marshal to hasten back toward the Xucar, and he did this with the more speed, because there was a report that its intention was to intercept him on his way to Valencia, by landing either at Puerto de los Alfaques, or at Castellon de la Plana. But the fleet had no other object in view than that of returning to Alicante, and in this it suffered much from storms. Eighteen transports were driven on the Alfaques; the troops were taken out, and fifteen of the vessels were got off, but the others were lost.

On landing at Alicante, Lord William received intelligence of the battle of Vittoria. Suchet had apprehended no such

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*The fleet
suffers on
its return to
Alicante.*

*Suchet's
measures
after the
battle of
Vittoria.*

CHAP. tidings. Buonaparte seems to have entertained till the last a
 XLIV. blind persuasion that his schemes of ambition in Spain and
 1813. every where else must finally be successful, and the instructions
 June. which he had sent to the Marshal were that he should endeavour to
 gain time, and lose no ground, till the affairs of the north should be
 finished, when, if it were then necessary, dispositions would be
 made in favour of the armies in Spain. The Marshal, however,
 knew that he must lose no time in retiring from Valencia; that
 province therefore was delivered by the battle of Vittoria, as
 Andalusia had been by the battle of Salamanca. He thought
 to retain upon it a hold which would enable him at any time to
 return by leaving a garrison of 1200 men in Murviedro, stored
 for twelve months, the place having been materially strength-
 ened during the eighteen months which had elapsed since the
 French obtained possession of it: 500 men were also left in
 Peñiscola, 120 in Denia, and as many in Morella, that little
 fort commanding a mountain-road, by which a corps of infantry
 without cannon could at any time re-enter Valencia from
 Aragon. Looking forward therefore to the probable resumption
 of their conquests, with the hopefulness which characterizes the
 French character, and with the confidence which he might
 justly feel in his own ability of improving all circumstances to
 the best advantage, he commenced his retreat with the less
 reluctance because Clausel apprized him that he had arrived at
 Zaragoza with 14,000 men, and would establish himself upon
 the Gallego, in readiness either to co-operate with the army of
 Aragon, or with the Intruder, if the army on that side should
 resume the offensive.

*Suchet's
Memoires,
2, 310—
324.*

*Lord Wel-
lington un-
dertakes the
siege of S.
Sebastian.*

A junction between Clausel and Suchet was what Lord Wellington apprehended as soon as he heard that the expedition against Tarragona had failed, and that consideration made him at once give up his intention of laying siege to Pamplona.

Unwelcome as the tidings were, this change of purpose may have compensated for the failure, . . . Pamplona being so much stronger than it was at that time supposed to be by the allies, and the British army still so defective in its engineer's department, that the siege might probably have proved unsuccessful. Resorting therefore to the surer method of blockading a city, which there was reason to believe was not provided for a long siege, he intrusted that service to the Spaniards, and ordered works to be thrown up on every side, to prevent the escape of the garrison, and to cut them off from all supplies; and he determined to besiege St. Sebastian's, where farther means of attack could be obtained by sea. The service was intrusted to Sir Thomas Graham with 10,000 men.

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But the failure in Catalonia was soon compensated by the events which took place in Aragon. Clausel, not waiting for Marshal Suchet's movements, nor to consult with him, left his artillery at Zaragoza, and made for France by way of Jaca. The Spaniards supposed that his chief motive was the desire of securing the riches which he had amassed. Mina was marching upon the same point with a far inferior force, in the hope of intercepting some of this booty, when he received orders which suspended his progress. Duran at the same time, as commandant in Lower Aragon, was instructed to take such opportunity as might offer for acting against the enemy in Zaragoza. This veteran, who was then at Ricla, sent Colonel Tabuenca to inform Mina of Clausel's retreat, and to confer with him upon a plan of speedy operations for the recovery of that capital, where there were no other troops remaining than a not numerous garrison, and against which he should immediately move. Tabuenca was then with his regiment at Borja; Mina was supposed to be at Gallud: not finding him there, Tabuenca hastened to Pedrola; but there he found D. Julian San-

Clausel retreats into France by way of Jaca.

Duran invites Mina to act with him for the deliverance of Zaragoza.

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chez, who directed him to look for Mina at Alagon; and from Alagon Cruchaga directed him to Las Casetas, and there at one in the morning Tabuenca arrived and found him. Upon delivering his dispatches, he stated, that General Duran had selected him to be the bearer, because, being a native of Zaragoza, and having been present during both sieges, he could give him the fullest local information, upon which their combined operations might be concerted. Mina replied, that their forces were not sufficient for such an enterprize. He had approached the city, he said, upon an assurance that the enemy had evacuated it; but an intercepted letter had just been brought him, in which the governor, General Paris, ordered the garrisons on the left of the Ebro to maintain their posts, because succours were on the way to them from Marshal Suchet.

Tabuenca had not expected such a reply. He represented, that the united force of the two divisions amounted to from 10,000 to 12,000 infantry, and 1500 horse; that the garrison did not at the utmost exceed 5000, including invalids; that when with that number so wide a circuit was to be covered, various false attacks might distract their attention, and an entrance be effected where they least apprehended it: and that when once the Spaniards should have set foot upon the walls, they might count upon as many brave soldiers as there were men of Zaragoza. The reinforcements which the governor looked for were, he said, far off, and could not, if time were made good use of, arrive till they would be useless. There was more reason to fear that Clausel might march back; but even in that case they could maintain themselves in Zaragoza. Paris could not defend the city, if he were vigorously assailed: and though he might bring off the garrison by the bridge over the Ebro, the French could not carry off their booty. Mina replied, that he had only three regiments of infantry on the right of the

Ebro, and cavalry was of little use; but in the morning he expected information from the place, and would then determine whether to remain or to retire. Tabuenca observed, that the regiments on the left bank would not be useless if they were made to approach, and that the cavalry might be dismounted; and he requested him at least to bring down the regiments which he had at Alagon and Pedrola, that the enemy's attention might thus be drawn toward Las Casetas, when Duran came with his division, as he would do, to Maria or Cadrete. To this Mina consented.

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Early in the morning, Tabuenca's regiment, which had followed him, arrived at the Puente de la Claveria, where he joined it, and proceeded on the right of the canal of Tauste toward the Puente de la Muela, meaning to give the men some rest there, while he went in search of Duran. They had scarcely been an hour upon the way, when a fire of musketry was heard on the left toward Las Casetas, and an orderly of Mina's came in all haste to recall them, because the enemy had attacked him. Tabuenca, confiding in his own knowledge of the ground, represented to Mina, that instead of obeying this order, it would be better that he should occupy the Puente de la Muela, whereby he should divert the enemy's attention, if, as might be expected, more troops should issue out, and at the same time secure that point in case Duran should make for it. Mina approved of this suggestion. The alarm had been occasioned by a body of horse, some 150 in number, who had been sent on an exploring party; they were charged by Mina's cavalry, and compelled to retreat with all speed; but other bodies presently sallied to their support, and one of about 1000 foot and 100 horse made for the Puente de la Muela. Tabuenca, who had with him about 1400 men, quickened his pace and anticipated them; and seeing this they halted, hesitated, and then fell back. Their

*July 8.
Affair be-
fore Zara-
goza.*

CHAP. XLIV. main force advanced against Mina upon the road to Las Casetas; troops also came to his support, and his men behaved with their wonted gallantry. The enemy were superior both in horse and foot, and when the body which had been disappointed in their intention of occupying the bridge of La Muela joined them, the Navarrese could with difficulty keep their ground; but Tabuenca hastening with part of his men, approached the enemy on their left flank, under cover of some olive yards, and opened upon them a fire as opportune as it was unexpected; taking advantage of the movement which this occasioned among them, Mina charged with such effect, that they retreated hastily till they were under the fire of their works. Mina then encamped his troops between the Casetas and the heights of La Bernardona, . . he had now with him 4000 foot and 1500 horse; and Tabuenca regarding this affair as a preliminary to the recovery of Zaragoza, ordered his regiment to march immediately upon the Casa Blanca and the Torrero, while he took the same course with the detachment which had been engaged. These posts, which had been so obstinately disputed in the former sieges, were abandoned by the French at their approach; and the Spaniards entered them, rejoicing in their success, and in being enabled to rest, after a march of four and twenty hours, during which they had had no other refreshment than a hasty meal at Gisen.

*Second
sally of the
French.*

Between four and five in the afternoon the French sallied a second time and in greater force. They attacked Mina's division, which was supported by D. Julian Sanchez with his Castilian lancers; but while thus engaged, Tabuenca, leaving just troops enough in the works which he had taken to cover his retreat should that be necessary, attacked the enemy on their left and in the rear, and the result was that they were driven into the city, leaving some two hundred killed. Mina's loss in

killed and wounded amounted in the course of the day to 115; Tabuenca's to 28. Duran arrived after the affair, just as evening was closing; that morning, as he was about to march from Muel for Cadrete, he was informed that a French detachment had gone from Zaragoza to bring off the garrison of Almunia which a party of his troops were blockading; and he was preparing to intercept them when a dispatch from Tabuenca made him hasten with all speed to the more important scene of action. Early on the morrow, Mina and Julian Sanchez came to confer with him in the Casa Blanca, and Duran proposed that they should assault the city on the following night: the wall, he said, might be escaladed at many points; the enemy's attention might be distracted by false attacks, and they were sure of assistance from within. This veteran had frequently distinguished himself by assaulting towns that were imperfectly fortified; Mina was less accustomed to such service, and more disposed to watch for and profit by any opportunity that might be offered him in the field: he was of opinion that they ought to remain before the city and collect thither the remainder of their forces; and in that opinion he persisted when Duran on the following evening renewed the proposal: for he judged rightly, that by a little delay success would be rendered more certain, and obtained at less cost of life.

D. Julian Sanchez removed with his lancers that evening to the Casa Blanca. The enemy allowed no one to go out of the gates: they had suffered too much in the two sallies of the preceding day to venture upon a third; and their vigilance was such, that eager as the inhabitants were to communicate with those through whom they expected now to obtain the deliverance for which they so long offered up their prayers, they could convey no intelligence: neither, indeed, was it easy for them to determine what were the intentions of the French; for

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Duran arrives before the city.

The French withdraw from Zaragoza.

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though they had their plunder packed up for removal and the carriages laden with it, and though they mined the stone bridge over the Ebro, they made at the same time other demonstrations, which were intended to show that it was not their purpose to abandon the city. A little before eight in the evening two guns were fired, which were the signal for a general movement, ... coaches, carts, and sumpter beasts were collected about the Puerta del Angel, and the troops began to file over the stone bridge. This movement was succeeded by stillness, and just before midnight the bridge was blown up. Duran was presently informed by his outposts where the explosion had been, and that the French had abandoned the city; immediately he sent D. Julian Sanchez and Tabuenca to ascertain what damage had been done to the bridge, and whether it were possible to pursue the enemy: he charged them also to give immediate directions for rendering it passable, and not to enter the city unless it should be absolutely necessary, nor suffer any soldier to enter it, that there might be no opportunity for any of those excesses which on such occasions were so likely to be committed; for the same purpose he posted guards at all the gates. The *Ayuntamiento* however deemed it best, that Sanchez should enter with his lancers, and with a patrol of the citizens maintain order: the principal streets were presently illuminated, the people waiting for no orders or concert, but acting with one common feeling; and the Coso was crowded to see the entrance of the deliverers.

Duran had lost no time in apprizing Mina of what had occurred, and requesting to see him that they might arrange their joint entrance. The *Ayuntamiento*, between one and two in the morning, came to the Casa Blanca, bringing the keys to Duran, and informing him that the enemy had left about 700 men in the Aljaferia, whose presence, they added, could not

prevent him from entering Zaragoza and giving the inhabitants a day of jubilee. Duran replied, that he waited for General Mina to enter with him; but Mina neither appeared, nor any messenger from him, till about seven in the morning, when, passing by the Casa Blanca, without alighting, or turning aside to the building in which the *Ayuntamiento* and Duran were awaiting him, he sent a chaplain to inform the old general that he was going on to the Torrero. Not a little surprised at this, they all went out in hope of speaking with him, but it was too late; and when one of the *Ayuntamiento* was deputed to seek him at the Torrero, and let him know that they were waiting for him, he was not found there. The forenoon was far advanced before he, with some of his chief officers, approached the Puerta Quemada, where Duran with his division and the *Ayuntamiento* were expecting them; his cavalry was at that time fording the Ebro; and merely saying to Duran that he was about to pursue the enemy with them, he rode away. Even noble minds are not always free from infirmity, and this conduct was ascribed to a jealous desire of engrossing to himself the glory of having delivered Zaragoza; for which reason he did not choose to enter with Duran, who was an older camp marshal, and as such, and also as commandant-general of Lower Aragon, must have entered at the head of the troops. But if this unworthy feeling existed, there were fairer motives that mingled with it; he thought it better that his infantry should remain encamped than that they should be quartered in the city; and the pursuit of General Paris was certainly an object of no trifling importance. Two of Mina's regiments thinking that they were following Paris toward Leciñena, fell in with him unexpectedly, and were attacked by him in the rear, and found it necessary to take up a position, first upon a height near that place, and then near the Ermita de Magallon. The French, whose business should then

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have been rather to secure themselves by a rapid retreat, than to seek for trivial advantages, lost some time in vainly endeavouring to dislodge them. Giving up the attempt, at last they took the road to Alcubierre; the Spaniards then pursued, harassed their rear, and compelled them to abandon, at the foot of the mountain there, the greater part of the coaches, *calesas*, and carts, laden with spoil which they had brought from Zaragoza. Paris meantime accelerated his retreat, and effected it, but not without losing the greater part of his convoy, all his artillery, and considerable numbers in killed and wounded, and some fifty prisoners, of whom about twenty were Spanish traitors. Mina arrived with his cavalry after the spoil had been taken, and when it was too late to continue the pursuit.

*Suchet
draws off
the remain-
ing garri-
sons in
Aragon.*

Paris's orders had been to make for Mequinenza if he were compelled to leave Zaragoza; this he found impossible, and was glad to effect his escape by Huesca and Jaca. Marshal Suchet, after leaving a garrison of 4500 men in Tortosa, under Baron Robert, moved toward the frontier of Aragon, with the double view of saving Paris, and of enabling a detachment to rejoin him which he had sent to destroy the castles at Teruel and Alcañiz, and bring off the garrisons. The detachment having arrived at Caspe, Suchet pushed his columns to Fabera, and had now his army on the right bank of the Ebro... having its right at Caspe, its centre at Gandessa, and its left at Tortosa. Here he received intelligence that Paris was driven upon Jaca; that Clausel, who had moved down from Jaca with a view of securing Zaragoza, finding it too late, had again retreated, and retiring still further, had taken a position with his corps upon the frontier of France; and that the whole of Aragon was lost. Nothing remained for him but to draw off the garrisons of Zuera, Gurrea, Anzanigo, Ayerbe, Huesca, Belchite, Fuentes, Pina,

Bujaraloz and Caspe, and to think only of combining his operations with General Decaen for maintaining Catalonia. He crossed the Ebro therefore at Mequinenza, Mora, and Tortosa; and in passing between Hospitalet and Cambrils, was cannonaded by the English fleet. To maintain the line of the lower Ebro after the deliverance of Aragon was impossible; it was equally so to feed his army in the sterile environs of Tortosa, where he was also in danger of having the defiles in his rear occupied by the enemy, who might come by sea, and interpose between him and the strong places in Catalonia; he determined therefore upon moving on Reus, Valls, and Tarragona.

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1813.

July 15.
*Suchet's
Memoires,*
2, 329—
331.

Meantime Duran, manifesting no displeasure at the discourtesy which had been shown towards him, made his entrance into Zaragoza. His first business was to march through the rejoicing streets to the church of Our Lady of the Pillar, and there offer up thanksgiving; his second was to lay siege to the castle. The heavy artillery of his division was sent for, and approaches regularly made; and the Zaragozans, after having so often seen the Spaniards who had been made prisoners in Aragon or Valencia, marched through their streets, had now the satisfaction of seeing a French garrison brought prisoners thither in their turn from La Almunia, where they had surrendered to a detachment of the Sorian division. During the first days of the siege, Mina, finding it in vain to pursue General Paris, returned, and took up his quarters with his troops in the suburb; and this was supposed to be a farther indication of jealousy towards Duran, because by remaining on that side of the Ebro which appertained to his own district of Upper Aragon, he was not under his command; it was deemed more strange that he took no part whatever at this time in the operations of the siege, but left it wholly to be carried on by the Sorian division; in fact he was daily expecting to be appointed to the command of the whole province. Before that

Duran enters Zaragoza.

July 10

CHAP. appointment arrived, intelligence came that Suchet had advanced
 XLIV. to Fabara and Caspe; upon which he crossed the bridge, began
 1813. his retreat to Las Casetas and to Alagon, and sent orders to
 July. Tabuenca to follow him with his regiment: Tabuenca replied
 that he was under General Duran's command, and could not
 leave Zaragoza without his orders. And Duran, as soon as he
 was informed of this, sent to Mina, saying he could not allow
 the regiment of Rioja to accompany him in his retreat (a retreat
 of which he was no otherwise informed than by the orders which
 had been sent to its colonel), because being determined to
 defend the city, he required its presence, and indeed he requested
 the support of some of his troops also: for if the enemy should
 advance to Zaragoza, which he did not expect, the retreat of the
 Spanish troops would have a most prejudicial effect upon the
 public mind; the two divisions were strong enough to meet the
 French and give them battle, and this they ought to do; but for
 himself, with his single division, he could defend the city. This
 indeed Duran at that juncture could well have done; but if the
 alternative had been to meet Suchet in the field, or to retreat,
 the course which Mina followed, in pursuance of his usual
 system, would have been unquestionably the most judicious.

*Mina takes
 the com-
 mand.*

It was soon ascertained that Suchet had retreated, upon
 which Mina returned to Zaragoza; he then took up his quarters
 in the city, and the siege of the Aljaferia was carried on jointly
 by the two divisions; and on the fourth day after his return, the
 commission which he had looked for arrived, appointing him
 Commandant General of all Aragon. The same day brought
 orders for Duran to join the army of Catalonia, leaving, how-
 ever, such regiments as Mina might think proper to detain.
 Mina took two out of four regiments, and one of three squadrons
 of cavalry; with the remainder Duran departed for Catalonia,
 leaving to Mina the reputation of effecting the deliverance of

Zaragoza, which certainly was not due to him, and was not needed for one who had rendered more signal services to his country, when its fortunes were at the lowest ebb, than any other individual. Duran was remarkable among all the partizans who distinguished themselves in this war for the discipline which, as an old officer, he introduced among his troops, and which he maintained by means that made him equally respected and beloved. Father, or grandfather, were the appellations by which they called him, and which he deserved by the care which he manifested on all occasions for them. On the second day after his departure a redoubt was blown up, in which the commanding officer of the artillery, and 28 men who were in garrison there, perished. This was said to have been his own act; and it was said also that another artillery officer intended to set fire to the powder-magazine, but was prevented by the soldiers, who with their besiegers must otherwise have been destroyed, and with them no small part of the city. The motive assigned for this insane desperation was resentment against the commandant of the place for determining to capitulate, though the works had sustained little injury, and were abundantly provided for a long defence. Immediately after this the garrison surrendered.

Thus after four years of captivity, Zaragoza was delivered from its detested enemies. During the greater part of that time no tidings but those of ill fortune had reached the Zaragozans, .. the defeat of their armies, the capture of one strong hold after another, some having yielded through famine, others to the strength and skill of the besiegers, and more having been basely or traitorously given up. And though they well knew that the journals of the Intrusive Government, like those in France, were conducted upon a system of falsehood, suppressing every thing which could not be made appear favourable to Buonaparte's views, they could not doubt the substance of these

CHAP.
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*Recon-
quista de
Zaragoza,
pp. 23—84.*

*The Alja-
feria sur-
rendered.*

*Conduct of
the Zarago-
zans during
their cap-
tivity.*

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1813.

July.

tidings, nor, in some of the worst cases, the extent of the national loss. The prisoners who were taken in Blake's defeat before Murviedro, and the still greater number who surrendered with him at Valencia, had been marched through the streets of Zaragoza, in the depth of winter, and in a condition which would have moved any soldiers to compassion, except those of Buonaparte and of the generals whom he employed in Spain: without shoes and stockings, foot-sore, half naked, half famished, they were driven and outraged and insulted by an enemy who seemed, together with the observances of civilized war, to have renounced the feelings of humanity. At such times the Zaragozans, without distinction of rank or sex, crowded about their unfortunate countrymen to administer what consolation they could, to weep over them, and to share with them their own scanty supplies of clothing and of food. On such occasions too, all the respectable families, as if by one consent, kept days of mourning and humiliation*, each in their houses: and more earnest prayers were never offered up than they breathed in bitterness of soul for the deliverance of their injured country, and for vengeance upon their merciless and insolent oppressors.

At the time of the deliverance, and long after, the city and its environs bore miserable vestiges of the two sieges. Ruined houses were to be seen far and near on every side, and the

* These affecting circumstances are stated in a letter written from Zaragoza, 22d of January, 1812, to D. Mariano de Lope, a priest who distinguished himself by his heroic conduct during both sieges. A copy of this letter I had the honour of receiving from the Countess de Bureta, who transmitted it to me at the time, that I might see what were the feelings and the conduct of her fellow-citizens during their captivity.

broken walls of what once had been fertile inclosures. Some streets were merely ruins ; in others, the walls of the houses were literally covered with the marks of musket balls, and in some places large holes had been made in them by the numbers which had struck there. Most of the churches and convents were nothing but heaps of ruins ; the Capuchin's convent had been so totally demolished, that only a solitary cross remained to mark the spot where it had stood. Nothing had been repaired except the Aljaferia and such of the fortifications as the French re-fortified for their own security. Much of this material destruction was reparable ; but precious monuments of antiquity had been destroyed, . . precious libraries and precious manuscripts, which never could be replaced ; and upon most of the inhabitants irreparable ruin had been brought. The loss of life which had been sustained there may be summed up : broken fortunes and broken hearts are not taken into the account ; but the sufferers had the proud and righteous satisfaction of knowing that they had not suffered in vain. The two sieges of Zaragoza, that in which it was overcome, not less than that which it successfully resisted, contributed more than any other event to keep up the national spirit of the Spaniards, to exalt the character of the nation, and to excite the sympathy and the admiration of other countries. And the good will not pass away with the generation upon whom the evil fell. There is no more illustrious example of public virtue in ancient or modern history than this of Zaragoza. Such examples are not lost upon posterity ; and such virtue, as it affords full proof that the Spanish character retains its primitive strength, affords also the best ground for hope, not only that Spain may resume its rank in Christendom as a great and powerful kingdom, but also that the Spaniards may become, religiously and politically, a free and enlightened nation ; not by the remote consequences

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1813.

July.

CHAP. of a sudden and violent revolution, which always brings with it
 XLIV. more evils than it sweeps away, but by the progress of wisdom
 1813. and truth, working their sure though slow effect in God's good
 time, among a patient, thoughtful, and devout people.

July.

St. Sebastian's.

Aragon having now been wholly delivered from the enemy, no attempt could be made from that side to relieve Pamplona; the blockade of that city was safely intrusted to the Spaniards, who were now becoming an efficient part of the allied armies; and meantime the siege of St. Sebastian's was made Lord Wellington's immediate object. St. Sebastian's, which is the most important town in Guipuzcoa, stands at the mouth of the little river Urumea, on a peninsula between two arms of the sea, and at the foot of a high hill. A bay forms its port, which has been widened and deepened, but is still small and shallow, and so insecure in certain winds, that ships have been driven from their anchors there; yet to this port the town owes its origin, and its fortifications, which were first erected to protect the shipping. Close at hand, on the side toward France, is the capacious harbour of Passages, surrounded by mountains, with an entrance between the rocks so strait, that only a single ship can pass, and that only by towing; formerly it served for ships of the line, but under the mal-administration of later years it had been neglected, and was now so far filled up, that none but small craft and vessels of 200 or 300 tons came in: for this reason, probably, the Caraccas Company, whose port it had been, removed to St. Sebastian's. There also the entrance is very narrow, being confined between two moles. The town contained from 600 to 700 houses, in twenty streets, all which are paved with large smooth stones, and several of them long, broad, and straight: the suburbs were more extensive, and the whole population was estimated at 13,000.

Few places present a more formidable appearance; the only land approach is over a low sandy isthmus, occupied by one front

of fortification, and this narrow road is commanded by the castle; but on the left flank there are considerable sand hills some 600 or 700 yards distant, which completely enfilade and take in reverse the front defences. Those which cross the isthmus are a double line of works, with the usual counterscarp, covered way, and glacis; but those which run lengthways consist only of a single line, and trusting to the waters in their front to render them inaccessible, are built without any cover. The northern line is from top to bottom quite exposed to the sand hills; the Urumea, which washes the town on that side, is fordable for some hours before and after low water, and the tide recedes so much that during that time there is a considerable space left dry by which troops can march to the foot of the wall. Yet the wall had been left uncovered, though Marshal Berwick had availed himself of this defect when he attacked the place in 1719, and by effecting a breach there had made the garrison retire into the castle. In the revolutionary war, S. Sebastian's was taken by the French without resistance; for though the troops would have done their duty in defending it, the inhabitants, rather than endure the horrors of a siege, allowed the magistrates, some of whom were timid and others traitorous, to surrender.

After the battle of Vittoria, Jourdan had thrown a garrison of between 3000 and 4000 men into the place. The conduct of the siege was intrusted to Sir Thomas Graham, and the fifth division, under Major-General Oswald, consisting of Major-Generals Hay and Robinson's British brigades, and Major-General Spry's Portuguese, were employed in carrying it on. The first division, under Major-General Howard, consisting of the 1st and 2d brigades of guards under Colonel Maitland and Major-General Stopford, with the brigades of the German legion, and Lord Aylmer's, were in position covering the great road between Irun and Oyarzun, and supporting Don Manuel Freyre's Spanish

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1813.

*July.**Distribu-
tion of the
allied army.*

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July.

corps which crowned the heights of S. Marzial and guarded the line of the Bidassoa from the Crown Mountain to the sea. Giron and Longa kept up the communication with the left of the centre at Vera : this consisted of the 7th and light divisions, under the Earl of Dalhousie and Baron Alten . . the former posted in the pass of Etchalar, the latter on the mountain of S. Barbara, and in the town of Vera. The right of the centre, commanded by Sir Rowland, occupied the valley of Bastan, and with Major-Generals Pringle and Walker's brigades of the 2d division, under Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir William Stewart, guarded the passes of Maya. The Conde de Amarante, with Colonel Ashworth and Brigadier-General Da Costa's Portuguese brigades, held the minor passes of Col d'Ariette and Col d'Espegas on the right, leading also into the valley of Bastan. Another Portuguese brigade of this division, under Brigadier-General Campbell, occupied a strong position between the valleys of Aldudes and Hayra, keeping communication on its left through the Port de Berdaritz with the valley of Bastan, and through the Port d'Alalosti on its right, with the right wing of the army, in the pass of Roncesvalles. The 6th division, under Major-General Pack, occupied S. Estevan, and formed the reserve of the centre, ready to support the troops at Maya or at Etchalar. The right wing covered the direct approaches to Pamplona from St. Jean de Pied-de-Port: in its front Major-General Byng's brigade of the 2d division guarded the passes of Roncesvalles and Orbaicete; Morillo, with a division of Spanish infantry supporting the latter post; Sir Lowry Cole, with the 4th division, was in second line, at Biscarret, in rear of the pass of Roncesvalles. The 3d division formed the reserve under Sir Thomas Picton, and was stationed at Olaque. This was the distribution of the allied army, guarding the passes of the Western Pyrenees, and covering the blockade of Pamplona and

the siege of S. Sebastian's. As the best means of saving time and labour in that siege, it was determined to follow Marshal Berwick's mode of attack, breach the exposed wall from the sand hills, and storm it as soon as the breach should be made practicable, trusting by quick movement to pass through the fire of the front line of works.

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July.

When the troops appointed for the siege arrived in sight of the place, the whole of the works and of the castellated hill appeared to be in motion, so busily were the enemy every where employed in strengthening their defences. The Spaniards, who were previously blockading the place, could offer little interruption to them, because they had no artillery; but serious operations were now to commence, and the French, though they neither distrusted their own skill, nor that every possible exertion would be made for their relief, knew that all that skill and all those exertions would be called for. As a preliminary measure, it was necessary for the besiegers to drive the garrison from a post which they occupied, about 700 or 800 yards in advance of the town, formed by the convent of S. Bartolomé, and an unfinished redoubt, adjoining it, on the extremity of the steep hill towards the river, and from a small circular work which they made with casks on the causeway. Approaches were made, and batteries erected in the course of the night, between the 13th and 14th of July, with a celerity that surprized the French; and in the morning the guns opened upon the side of the convent. It was soon beaten down, . . the chapel, with its organ and costly adornments, was laid open, and demolished, and the roof fell in; but the French were not driven from the ruins. A false attack was made to ascertain whether they intended to maintain an obstinate resistance there; the troops carried it farther than their orders directed, and were fain to return with some loss. It was then attempted to drive the garrison out by means of red-hot shot;

*Siege of S.
Sebastian's.*

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1813.

July.

*Convent of
S. Bartolo-
mé taken.*

July 17.

the Portuguese were less expert at this service than they had shown themselves in the field, they fired shot which had not been half heated, and frequently missed the whole building. Beams and whatever else was combustible from the neighbouring houses were used for heating the furnace; and at length the convent was set on fire in several places, but the garrison succeeded in extinguishing the flames as often as they broke out. The enemy, meantime, kept up from the town an incessant fire of shot and shells upon the batteries. After 2500 eighteen-pound shot and 450 shells had been fired at the convent, it was found that the French were not to be dislodged by any other means than by the bayonet. Accordingly two columns were formed, one under the direction of Major-General Hay, on the right, to cross the ravine near the river, and attack the redoubt; the left, under Major-General Bradford, to attack the convent. Major-General Oswald commanded. The attack was begun about ten in the forenoon; the enemy in the convent were not aware of it till it was made; but the movement was perceived from the town and castle; troops were sent to reinforce the garrison, and a heavy fire was opened upon the assailants; . . it was soon discontinued, because they came to close quarters, and it must then have proved equally destructive to both parties. The reinforcement was not of more advantage, for thinking to take one body of the assailants in the rear, they were encountered and charged by another, and driven upon the convent, where the garrison had already been overpowered, and those who escaped were driven with the fugitives from the works down the hill, through the village of S. Martin's, immediately below, which the enemy had burnt. The impetuosity of the pursuers could not be restrained; their directions not to pass the village were disregarded; they followed the French to the foot of the glacis, and suffered on their return. The garrison behaved gallantly, and lost 250 men; the loss of the allies

amounted to 70. A fire from the town was kept up upon this post for twenty-four hours; and most of the dead with which the ground between it and the town was strewn, remained unburied there during the remainder of the siege, so great was the danger in collecting them, each party being jealous of the approach of an enemy to their works, even upon such an office.

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Two batteries were thrown up during the night in a situation to enfilade and take in reverse the defences of the town. This in the loose sand was a most difficult work, and the fire of the enemy was directed with great precision to interrupt it; four sentinels were killed in succession through one loop-hole. The only eminence from whence artillery could be brought to bear directly on the town, though still about an hundred feet below it, was above the convent, and almost adjoining its walls. Here a battery was erected; the covered way to it passed through the convent, and the battery itself was constructed in a thickly peopled burial-ground. A more ghastly circumstance can seldom have occurred in war;... for coffins and corpses in all stages of decay were exposed when the soil was thrown up to form a defence against the fire from the town, and were used indeed in the defences; and when a shell burst there, it brought down the living and the dead together. An officer was giving his orders, when a shot struck the edge of the trenches above him; two coffins slipped down upon him with the sand, the coffins broke in their fall, the bodies rolled with him for some distance, and when he recovered he saw that they had been women of some rank, for they were richly attired in black velvet, and their long hair hung about their shoulders and their livid faces. The soldiers, in the scarcity of firewood, being nothing nice, broke up coffins for fuel with which to dress their food, leaving the bodies exposed; and till the hot sun had dried up these poor insulted remains of humanity, the stench was as dreadful as the sight.

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July.

*The bat-
teries open.*

The village of S. Martin, or rather its ruins, were now occupied, and approaches were struck out there to the right and left. On the 20th the batteries opened, and early in the evening the enemy abandoned the circular redoubt. The next day a flag of truce was sent with a summons to the governor, but not received. Meantime a parallel across the isthmus had been begun; in cutting it, the men came upon a channel level with the ground, in which a pipe was laid for conveying water into the town. The aqueduct was four feet high, and three feet wide. Lieutenant Reid of the engineers ventured to explore it, and at the end of 230 yards, he found it closed by a door in the counterscarp, opposite to the face of the right demi-bastion of the horn-work. It was thought that if a mine were formed at this point, the explosion would throw up earth enough against the escarpe, which was only twenty-four feet high, to form a way over it; and accordingly sand-bags and barrels of powder were lodged there.

The service of the breaching battery was severe; the enemy of course directed every disposable gun against it, and their shells repeatedly blew up every platform there, and dismounted the guns. The seamen who assisted them did their duty nobly, as they always did; but with characteristic hardihood disregarded all injunctions tending to their own preservation, till many of them had suffered. Three of their officers and sixteen of their men were killed and wounded there in the course of three days.

*Unsuccess-
ful assault.*

By mid-day of the 22d, a breach had been made about 600 feet long, and, as it seemed, perfectly practicable, the wall being entirely levelled. It was strongly advised that this should be stormed on the following morning, as early as the light and the tide would admit; instead of this, orders were given to make another breach to the left in a more oblique part of the wall; one sure disadvantage of delay being that the time employed in making the second breach would be well used

by the enemy in intrenching the first. After battering this second point for some hours, information was received from a civil engineer who was well acquainted with the place, that the wall to the right of the breach was a toise thinner than elsewhere; thither therefore the guns were directed, and before the night of the 23d, a practicable breach was made there also. Great part of the town had already been ruined by the fire; it was at this time in flames, and the frequent crashing of houses was heard amid the roaring of the artillery. Before day-break the trenches were filled with troops for storming and for supporting the assault, which was ordered for four o'clock; the batteries were to continue their fire upon the second breach till the moment of attack, and then all available guns were to be directed so as to restrain the enemy's flanking fire from two towers, . . which, though much injured, were still occupied, . . or otherwise to assist as occasion might be perceived. All was in readiness, when about an hour after daybreak the order was countermanded, upon a misconception that because the houses at the back of the breach were on fire, the troops would not be able to advance after they should have gained the summit. The remainder of the day was spent in widening the second breach; time at this juncture was of such value that it was hoped the delay might only be for twelve hours, and the assault made at four in the evening; but it was thought a more important consideration that there would then be but few hours of daylight, and therefore the following morning was appointed.

Major-General Hay's brigade formed the column of attack; Major-General Spry's Portuguese brigade, Major-General Robinson's, and the 4th *Caçadores* of Brigadier-General Wilson's, were in reserve in the trenches, the whole under the direction of Major-General Oswald. The attack was made an hour before, instead of after daylight, because the tide was returning, and was

CHAP.
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1813.

July 24.

CHAP. already two feet deep under the wall where the ground is dry
XLIV. at low water. But some confusion was probably occasioned by
1813. the darkness; and the chance of success would have been
July. greater if the arrangements had been made known to more of
those officers who were to take part in executing them. The
distance of the uncovered approach from the trenches to the
breach was about 300 yards, over rocks covered with sea-weed,
and intermediate pools of water, and in the face of an extensive
front of works; the breach was flanked by two towers: the fire
of the place was yet entire, and when the troops rushed from
the trenches, it was presently seen that the French were not unap-
prized of the intended attempt, and that they had lost no time in
making their preparations for defence; every gun which looked that
way from the castle, and from the hill, was brought to bear upon
the assailants, and from all around the breach they were flanked
and enfiladed with a most destructive fire of grape and mus-
ketry. Blazing planks and beams were thrown transversely
across the walls and on the breach; and stones, shot, shells,
and hand grenades, were showered upon the allies with dreadful
effect.

At this time the mine was sprung, and with as much effect
as had been intended. It brought down a considerable length
of the counterscarp and glacis, and astonished the enemy so
greatly, that they abandoned for a while that part of the works.
When the Portuguese who were to take advantage of this
hastened to the spot, there were no scaling ladders, . . an officer
ran to the foot of the breach, in hope the engineers there might
be provided with them; . . if he had but one ladder, he said, he
could post his whole party in the town: . . but ladders had not
been needed here, and not thought of for the point where they
might be required. The enemy had thus time to recover from
their surprise; and the Portuguese, standing their ground with

soldier-like fidelity, were miserably sacrificed, nearly the whole of this party being killed before the order for recalling them arrived.

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Meantime Lieutenant Jones of the engineers, with an officer and nine men of the first royals, gained the top of the great breach; and men were rushing up to follow them, when the enemy sprung a mine in one place, and in another drew the supports from under a false bridge, thus blowing up some of the assailants, and precipitating others upon the spikes which had been fixed below. The men who were at the foot of the breach were then panic-stricken; they, as well as the French, remembered that in such situations the victory is not to the brave or the strong, if superior skill is opposed to courage and strength: they ran back... it was impossible to rally them, and they suffered much. The intention was, that another column should pass in the rear of the first, between it and the sea to the second breach, and storm it; but the discomfiture of the first party prevented this, and none of these reached their destination. The whole was over before morning had fairly opened, and in the course of an hour 45 officers and above 800 men were killed, wounded, or missing.

The river prevented any immediate communication, so that at the batteries it was thought that hardly any thing more than a false alarm had taken place, till, as day dawned, they discovered through their glasses the bodies of officers and men in the breach, and under the demi-bastion and retaining wall. Presently one or two of the enemy appeared on the breach, and a serjeant came down among the wounded, raising some, and speaking to others. The firing which had been continued occasionally on the breach was then stopped; more of the French appeared; a kind of parley took place between them and the men at the head of the trenches; and half an hour's truce was agreed on for the purpose of removing the wounded and the

CHAP. dead ; but so jealous were the French that they would not allow
 XLIV. the dead who were nearest them to be approached ; some of the
 1813. wounded they carried into the town, and others were borne by
 July. their soldiers into the British lines. While the troops were yet
 under arms, not knowing whether another attack might be
 ordered, a British officer saw one of his Portuguese soldiers start
 off, and reproved him for so doing, when after a while the man
 returned ; but the Portuguese replied, scarcely able to command
 his voice or restrain his tears as he spake, that he had only been
 burying his comrade, . . . and in fact it appeared that with no
 other implement than his bayonet and his hands, he had given
 his poor friend and countryman a soldier's burial in the sand.
 The officers who fell in this attack were buried together, each
 in a shell, in one grave, in a garden near the encampment.

*The siege
 suspended.*

Lord Wellington came over from Lesaca on the same day
 about noon, and determined upon renewing the attack ; the
 second breach was to be completed, the demi-bastion thrown
 down, and fresh troops appointed for another assault. But the
 ammunition was now running low ; and upon his return that
 night he received intelligence of movements on the enemy's part
 in the Pyrenees, which made him forthwith dispatch orders for
 withdrawing the guns from the batteries and converting the
 siege into a blockade.

*Soult ap-
 pointed
 Command-
 er-in-chief.*

Marshal Soult had been sent back from Germany as Lieute-
 nant of the Emperor, and Commander-in-chief of the French
 armies in Spain. Of all the French generals employed in the
 Peninsula, he had obtained the highest reputation ; and undoubt-
 edly no one could be better entitled to the praise of those authors
 who write history, with a mere military feeling, reckless of all
 higher considerations. That *impassibility* which he considered as
 one of the first essentials for a general in such a war, and of
 which proof had been given in his proclamations and his acts,

recommended him to Buonaparte not less than his great ability. The remains of the armies of Portugal, of the centre and of the north, were united; their ranks, which had so often been thinned, were filled by a new conscription; and the whole being re-formed into nine divisions of infantry, was called the army of Spain; the right, centre, and left, were under Generals Reille, Drouet, Comte d'Erlon, and Clausel; the reserve, under General Villatte: there were two divisions of dragoons under Generals Treillard and Tilly, and a light division under General Pierre Soult. In the expectation of success every exertion had been used to increase the strength of their cavalry, though of little use in the Pyrenees, that the war might be once more carried beyond the Ebro; and with the same view a large proportion of artillery was provided. The decree which appointed Marshal Soult bore date on the first of July; he took the command on the 13th, and his preparations were forwarded with the ability, activity, and hopefulness by which the French are characterized in such things. He issued an address to his troops, containing more truth than was usually admitted into a French state paper, because the truth in that place could not possibly be concealed; but it was sufficiently coloured with artful misrepresentations and with falsehood. "The armies of France," it said, "guided by the powerful and commanding genius of the Emperor Napoleon, had achieved in Germany a succession of victories as brilliant as any that adorned their annals. The presumptuous hopes of the enemy had thus been confounded; and the Emperor, who was always inclined to consult the welfare of his subjects, by following moderate counsels, had listened to the pacific overtures which the enemy made to him after their defeat. But in the interim, the English, who, under the pretence of succouring the inhabitants of the Peninsula, were in reality devoting them to ruin, had taken advantage of the opportunity afforded them. A

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*July.**His address
to the troops.*

CHAP. skilful leader," said Marshal Soult, "might have discomfited
XLIV. their motley levies; and who could doubt what would have been
1813. the result of the day at Vittoria if the general had been worthy
July. of his troops? Let us not however," he continued, "defraud
the enemy of the praise which is their due. The dispositions
and arrangements of their general have been prompt, skilful,
and consecutive; and the valour and steadiness of his troops
have been praiseworthy. Yet do not forget that it is to the
benefit of your example they owe their present military character;
and that whenever the relative duties of a French general and
his troops have been ably fulfilled, their enemies have commonly
had no other resource than in flight." In one part of this address
Marshal Soult rendered justice to Lord Wellington; but this
latter assertion strikingly exemplifies the character of the vain-
glorious people whom he was addressing. He himself had been
repulsed by a far inferior British force at Coruña; had been
driven from Porto, and defeated in the bloody field of Albuhera.
He was addressing men who had been beaten at Vimeiro, beaten
at Talavera, beaten at Busaco, beaten at Fuentes d'Onoro,
routed at Salamanca, and scattered like sheep at Vittoria.
They had been driven from Lisbon into France; and yet the
general who had so often been baffled addressed this language
to the very troops who had been so often and so signally defeated!
"The present situation of the army," he pursued, "is imputable
to others: let the merit of repairing it be yours. I have borne
testimony to the Emperor of your bravery and your zeal. His
instructions are to drive the enemy from those heights which
enable them arrogantly to survey our fertile valleys, and to chase
them across the Ebro. It is on the Spanish soil that your tents
must next be pitched, and your resources drawn. Let the
account of our successes be dated from Vittoria, and the birth-
day of the Emperor be celebrated in that city."

Lord Wellington's situation had not during the whole war been so critical as at this time. He had two blockades to maintain, and two points to cover, sixty miles distant from each other, in a mountainous country, where the heights were so impassable that there could be no lateral communication between his divisions. His force was necessarily divided in order that none of the passes might be left undefended, but the enemy could choose their point of attack, and bring their main force to bear upon it; thus they would have the advantage of numbers; and they had the farther advantage, that a considerable proportion of their troops, all who had belonged to the army of the north, had been accustomed to mountain-warfare, in which the British and Portuguese had had no experience.

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Critical situation of the allied army.

Soult's first object was to relieve Pamplona, which could only be relieved by some such great effort as he intended; whereas S. Sebastian's, as long as the garrison could maintain themselves there, had always the possibility of receiving supplies along the coast. With this view he collected a convoy of provisions and stores at S. Jean de Pied-de-Port. Meantime the hostile forces, though each within their own frontier, were encamped in some places upon opposite heights, within half cannon-shot; and their sentries within 150 yards of each other. Hitherto with the Spaniards and Portuguese it had been, in the ever-memorable phrase of Palafox, war at the knife's edge; but that national contest, in which the aggressors had treated courtesy and humanity with as much contempt as justice, was at an end; it was a military contest now, and the two armies offered no molestation to each other in the intervals of the game of war. The French, gay and alert as usual, were drumming and trumpeting all day long; the more thoughtful English enjoying the season and the country, looking down with delight upon the sea and the enemy's territory, and Bayonne in the distance, and sketch-

Soult's movements for the relief of Pamplona.

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ing in the leisure which their duties might allow the beautiful scenery of the Pyrenees. The right of the allied army was at Roncesvalles, the sacred ground of romance, where in the seventeenth century a spot was shown as still reddened with the blood of the Paladins; and where Our Lady, under some one of her thousand and one appellations, may perhaps still continue to work miracles in the chapel wherein they were interred. From that pass, and from the pass of Maya, the roads converge on Pamplona; and Soult made his arrangements for attacking both on the same day in force, . . . for doing which he had the great advantage that Lord Wellington was at the opposite extremity of the line, near S. Sebastian's.

*Battles of
the Py-
renees.*

Accordingly, on the 24th, he assembled the right and left wings of his army, with one division of his centre, and two divisions of cavalry, at S. Jean de Pied-de-Port; and on the 25th (the same day that the unsuccessful assault upon S. Sebastian's was made) he began his operations, and in person, with about 35,000 men, attacked General Byng's post at Roncesvalles. Sir Lowry Cole moved up to his support with the 4th division; and they maintained their ground obstinately, against very superior numbers, though with considerable loss. But in the afternoon the enemy turned their position; and Sir Lowry deemed it necessary to withdraw in the night, and marched accordingly to Lizoain, in the neighbourhood of Zubiri. General Drouet, with 13,000 men, was to force the position of Maya: early in the morning he manœuvred against each of the four passes, and against the Conde de Amarante's division, which was posted on the right. Under cover of these demonstrations, he collected his main strength behind a hill immediately in front of the pass of Aretesque, and from thence about noon made a sudden and rapid advance, favoured by a most unexpected chance. Two advanced videttes, who had been posted on some high ground

to give timely notice of an enemy's approach, had fallen asleep during the heat of the day; the French were thus enabled to advance unseen, and the piquet had scarcely time to give the alarm before the enemy were upon them. The light infantry companies of the second brigade sustained the attack with great steadiness; when they were overpowered, the 34th and 50th regiments came up, and afterward the right wing of the 92d; for as the other passes were not to be left unguarded, troops could only be brought from them by successive battalions, as the need became more urgent. Opposed as they thus were to very superior forces, the 32d lost more than a third of its numbers, and the 92d battalion was almost destroyed. The allies retired slowly, defending every point, as succours enabled them to make a stand, but still over-matched; till, about six in the evening, Major-General Barnes's brigade of the 7th division came to their support; then they recovered that part of their post which was the key of the position, and might have re-assumed their ground; but Sir Rowland, having been apprized that Sir Lowry Cole must retire, deemed it necessary to withdraw them during the night to Irurita. They had been engaged seven hours, and lost four guns and more than sixteen hundred men.

During the whole of the following day, the enemy remained inactive beyond the Puerto de Maya. On that day Sir Thomas Picton, who, as soon as he was informed of Soult's movements, had crossed to Zubiri with his division, moved forward to support the troops at Lizoain, and assumed the command there as senior officer. The enemy's whole force advanced against them early in the afternoon, and they retired skirmishing to some strong ground, which they maintained, in order of battle, till night closed. Generals Picton and Cole concurred then in opinion that the post of Zubiri would not be tenable for so long

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a time, as it would be necessary for them to wait there. Early on the 27th, therefore, they began to retreat still farther, and took up a position to cover the blockade of Pamplona. The garrison of that fortress had been informed by some deserters from the Walloon guards that Soult, with a powerful army, was advancing victoriously to their relief, and that relief was certain. Their hopes were raised to the highest pitch; the firing was only five miles distant. The state of things appeared so critical to Abisbal, that he prepared to raise the blockade, and spiked some of his guns; and the enemy sallied, got possession of several batteries, and took fourteen pieces of cannon, before Don Carlos d'España could repulse them. The position which the retreating troops took to cover the blockade had its right in front of the village of Huarte, extending to the hills beyond Olaz, and its left on the heights in front of the village of Villalba, the right of this wing resting on a height which covered the road from Zubiri and Roncesvalles, and the left at a chapel behind Sorauren, on the road from Ostiz. Morillo's division of Spanish infantry was in reserve, with that part of Abisbal's corps which was not engaged in the blockade; and from the latter two regiments were detached to occupy part of the hill by which the road from Zubiri was defended. The British cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton were placed on the right, near Huarte, being the only ground on which cavalry could act. The river Lanz runs in the valley which was on the left of the allies, and on the right of the French, in the road to Ostiz. Beyond this river is a range of mountains connected with Ligasso and Marcalain, by which places it was now necessary to communicate with the rest of the army.

Lord Wellington arrived as these divisions were taking up their ground; and shortly afterwards Soult formed his army on a mountain between the Ostiz and the Zubiri roads, the front

of the mountain extending from one road to the other. One division he placed on a bold height to the left of the Zubiri road, and in some villages in front of the third division, where he had also a large body of cavalry. The same evening he pushed forward a corps to take possession of a steep hill on the right of General Cole's division: it was occupied by a Portuguese battalion and a Spanish regiment; these troops defended their post with the bayonet, and drove the enemy back. Seeing the importance of this point, Lord Wellington reinforced it with the 40th and with another Spanish regiment, so that the further efforts of the French there were as unsuccessful as the first; but they took possession of Sorauren, on the Ostiz road, whereby they acquired the communication by that road; and they kept up a fire of musketry along the line till it was dark.

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In the morning, General Pack's division arrived. Lord Wellington then directed that the heights on the left of the valley of the Lanz should be occupied, and that this division should form across the valley in rear of the left of General Cole's, resting its right on Oricain, and its left upon the heights. They had scarcely taken the position in the valley, when they were attacked in great force from Sorauren: the enemy advanced steadily to the attack; but the front was defended from the heights on their left by their own light troops, and from the height on the right, and on the rear, by the 4th division and a Portuguese brigade; and the French were soon driven back, with great loss, by the fire in their front, both flanks, and rear. This was a false move from which Soult never recovered: with a view of extricating his troops from the situation in which they were now placed, he attacked the height on which the left of the 4th division stood, and where the 7th *Caçadores* were posted, at an *ermida* or chapel behind Sorauren. Momentary possession was obtained of it; but the *Caçadores* returned to

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their ground, supported by Major-General Ross at the head of his brigade, and the enemy were driven down. The battle now became general along the whole of these heights, but only in one point to the advantage of the French, which was where a battalion of Major-General Campbell's Portugueze regiment was posted; that battalion was overpowered, it gave way immediately on the right of Ross's brigade: the French then established themselves on the line of the allies, and Ross was obliged to withdraw from his post. Upon this, Lord Wellington ordered the 27th and 48th to charge first that body of the enemy which had established itself there, and then those on the left. Both charges succeeded; the enemy were driven back: the 6th division at the same time moved forward nearer to the left of the 4th; the attack upon this front then ceased entirely, and was but faintly continued on other points of the line. Every regiment in the 4th division charged with the bayonet that day, and the 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23d, four different times. Their officers set them the example, and Major-General Ross had two horses shot under him. The events of that day abated Marshal Soult's confidence, and made him feel how little he could expect to succeed against such troops and such a commander. He no longer thought of dating his report of the operations from Vittoria, and celebrating the Emperor Napoleon's birthday in that city; and he sent back his guns, his wounded, and great part of his baggage, to S. Jean de Pied-de-Port, while they could be sent in safety.

On the 29th both armies remained quiet in their positions, each expecting the result of its combinations. Sir Rowland had been ordered to march upon Lizasso by Lanz, and the Earl of Dalhousie from San Esteban upon the same place; both arrived there on the 28th, and Lord Dalhousie's division came to Marcalain, thus assuring Sir Rowland's communication

with the main body. Marshal Soult's manœuvres were now baffled, for the allies were become one army; but he saw one chance for victory still remaining, and he was not a man to let any opportunity escape him. Drouet's corps, before which Sir Rowland had retired, followed his march, and arrived at Ostiz on the 29th. Thus the French force also became one army. The Marshal thought his position between the Arga and Lanz was by nature so exceedingly strong, and so little liable to attack, that he might without apprehension withdraw from it the bulk of his troops. Occupying, therefore, still the same points, but drawing on to his left the troops which were on the heights opposite the third division, he reinforced Drouet with one division, and during the night of the 29th occupied in strength the crest of the mountain opposite to the 6th and 7th divisions, thus connecting his right in its position with the force which had been detached to attack Sir Rowland, his object being thus to open the Tolosa road, turn the left of the allies, and relieve St. Sebastian's, now that he had failed in the attempt for the relief of Pamplona.

On the morning of the 30th his troops were observed to move in great numbers toward the mountains on the right of the Lanz, with what intent Lord Wellington at once perceived, and determined to attack the French position in front. He ordered Lord Dalhousie to possess himself of the top of the mountain opposite him and turn their right, and Sir Thomas Picton to cross the heights from which the French division had been withdrawn, and from the Roncesvalles road turn their left, and he made his arrangements for attacking them in front, as soon as the effect of these movements on both flanks should appear. In every point these intentions were effected. Lord Dalhousie with General Inglis's brigade drove them from the mountains: Major-General Pakenham who had the command of the 6th division, Major-General Pack having been wounded, then

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CHAP. turned the village of Sorauren, and Major-General Byng's
XLIV. brigade attacked and carried the village of Ostiz. Sir Lowry
1813. Cole attacked their front, when their confidence in themselves
as well as in their ground had thus been shaken, and the
July. French were then compelled to abandon a position which Lord Wellington declared to be one of the strongest and most difficult of access that he had ever seen occupied by troops.

While these operations were going on, and in proportion as they succeeded, troops were detached to support Sir Rowland. Late in the morning the enemy appeared in his front, and made many vigorous attacks, while Drouet manœuvred upon his left: every attack was repulsed, and the allies maintained their ground, till Drouet by a more distant movement ascended the ridge, and came absolutely round their left flank; Sir Rowland then leisurely retired about a mile to a range of heights near Eguarras, and repelled every attempt to dislodge him from that strong ground. Lord Wellington meantime pursued the enemy after he had driven them from their position on the mountain, and at sunset he was at Olaque, immediately in the rear of their attack upon Sir Rowland. Their last hope had failed, and, withdrawing from Sir Rowland's front during the night, they retreated with great ability through the pass of Doña Maria, and left two divisions there in a strong position to cover their rear in the pass. Sir Rowland and Lord Dalhousie were ordered to attack the pass; they moved by parallel roads; and the enemy, closely pressed by the 7th division, were ascending the hill in great haste, when Sir Rowland arrived at the foot of the pass, not in time to cut off any part of their rear. Both divisions ascended the hill, each by its own road; and the French took up a strong position at the top of the pass, with a cloud of skirmishers in front. On the left, which was Sir Rowland's side, the attack was led

by Lieutenant-General Stewart with Major-General Walker's brigade; they forced the skirmishers back to the summit of the hill, but coming there upon the main body, found it so numerous and so strongly posted, that they deemed it necessary to withdraw till the 7th division should come into closer co-operation. They had not long to wait for this: General Stewart was wounded, and the command devolved upon Major-General Pringle; he renewed the attack on that side, while Lord Dalhousie pressed the enemy on the other; both divisions gained the height about the same time, and the enemy, after sustaining a very considerable loss, retired; they were pursued for some way down, but a thick fog favoured them, and prevented the allies from profiting further by the advantage they had gained. Lord Wellington meantime moved with Major-General Byng's brigade and Sir Lowry Cole's division through the pass of Velate upon Irurita, thus turning their position on Doña Maria. A large convoy of provisions and stores was taken by Major-General Byng at Elizondo. The pursuit was continued during the following day in the vale of the Bidassoa. Byng possessed himself of the valley of Bastan and the position on the Puerto de Maya; and at the close of the day the different divisions were re-established nearly on the same ground which they had occupied when their operations commenced, eight days before. The enemy had now two divisions posted on the Puerto de Echalar, and nearly their whole army behind that pass; and Lord Wellington resolved to dislodge them by a combined attack and movement of the 4th, 7th, and light divisions, which had advanced by the vale of the Bidassoa toward the frontier. The 7th, taking a shorter line across the mountains from Sumbilla, arrived before the 4th. Major-General Barnes's brigade was formed for the attack, advanced before the others could co-operate, and with a regularity and gallantry which, Lord Wellington says, he had seldom seen

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equalled, drove the two French divisions from the formidable heights which they vainly endeavoured to maintain. Major-General Kempt's brigade of the light division likewise drove a very considerable force from the rock which forms the left of the pass; and thus no enemy was left in the field, within this part of the Spanish frontier. During these operations the loss of the allies amounted to 6000 in killed, wounded, and missing; that of the French exceeded 8000. On both sides great ability had been manifested; seldom indeed has the art of war been displayed with such skill, and upon such difficult ground. To guard against the repetition of so formidable an effort on the enemy's part, the positions which the allies occupied were strengthened by redoubts and intrenchments. While the main scene of action lay in the neighbourhood of Pamplona, that portion of the enemy's force which had been left to observe the allies on the great road from Irun, attacked Longa, who occupied that part of the Bidassoa and the town of Vera with his division. He repulsed them with great loss; and it was not the least of the discouraging reflections, which could not but occur to the enemy after the failure of all these well planned and well attempted endeavours, that the Spanish troops had now become as efficient as the Portuguese.

*Siege of St.
Sebastian's
resumed.*

During these eventful days the guns had been withdrawn from the batteries before St. Sebastian's, and, with all the stores, embarked at Passages, and the transports had been sent to sea; but a blockade was kept up, and the guard continued to hold the trenches. The vigilant enemy made a sortie on the morning of the 27th, and carried off between 200 and 300 Portuguese and English from the trenches prisoners into the town. Want of foresight on the part of the besiegers allowed them this opportunity, for some of the guns of the left embrasures had, in apprehension of such an attempt, been ar-

ranged so as to take the enemy in flank ; and those guns were withdrawn with the others. On the 3rd the French surprized a patrol in the parallel and made them prisoners : but Soult's defeat was known now ; the stores were re-landed at Passages, and Sir Thomas Graham waited only for the arrival of more artillery and ammunition from England to re-commence the siege. The infantry meantime rested on its arms ; and the cavalry, who longed to eat the green maize (which was prohibited), kept their horses in good exercise in looking for straw. The 17th was Buonaparte's birthday ; three salutes were fired from the Castle of St. Sebastian's on the eve preceding, as many at four in the morning, and again at noon ; and at night the words "*Vive Napoleon le Grand*" were displayed in letters of light upon the castle : .. it was the last of his birthdays that was commemorated by any public celebration. The expected artillery arrived at Passages on the 18th. That little town had never in the days of its prosperity, when it was the port of the Caraccas company, presented a scene so busy, nor while it lasted so gainful to the inhabitants and the peasantry of the surrounding country. The market for the army was held here, which they supplied with necessaries, the produce of the land ; and which at this time wanted nothing wherewith England could supply it, so frequent now and so easy was the intercourse. Here the reinforcements were landed, which, now that the British government had caught the spirit of its victorious general, were no longer limited by parsimonious impolicy. When the horses were to be landed they were lowered from the transports into the sea, and guided by a rope as they swam to shore ; but this sudden transition from the extreme heat of the hold to the cold water proved fatal to several of them.

The garrison of St. Sebastian's employed the time which the blockade afforded them so well, in strengthening their defences

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and adding new ones, that when the allies had to re-commence the siege, the place was stronger than before. The plan now determined on was to lay open the two round towers on each end of the first breach, and connect it with the second breach, which was to the right, add to it another on the left, and demolish a demi-bastion to the left of the whole, by which the approach was flanked. A mortar battery was also erected for the purpose of annoying the castle across the bay. Sailors were employed in this, and never did men more thoroughly enjoy their occupation. They had double allowance of grog, as their work required; and at their own cost they had a fiddler; they who had worked their spell in the battery went to relieve their comrades in the dance, and at every shot which fell upon the castle they gave three cheers. Little effect was produced by this battery, because of its distance. Between it and the town is the island of St. Clara, high and rocky, about half a mile in circumference, which the French occupied; it was deemed expedient to dislodge them and take possession of it, because the season was approaching when ships might be obliged to leave the coast, and this spot facilitated the enemy's communication with their own country. The only landing-place was under a flight of steps, commanded by a small intrenchment on the west point of the island, and exposed to the whole range of works on the west side of the rock and of the walls; the garrison, consisting of an officer and twenty-four men, were thus enabled to make such a resistance, that nineteen of the assailants were killed and wounded. The island however was taken, and the garrison made prisoners.

The actual siege re-commenced on the 24th; and at the following midnight the enemy made a sortie, entered the of the advanced part trenches and carried confusion into the parallel; but when they attempted to sweep along its right, a

part of the guard checked them, and they retired into the town, taking with them about twelve prisoners. The batteries opened on the morning of the 26th. On the night of the 27th another sortie was tried; but experience had made the besiegers more vigilant, and it was repulsed before the slightest mischief could be done. Nothing that skill and ingenuity could devise was omitted by the garrison; they repaired by night as far as possible the injury which had been done in the day; cleared away the rubbish; and at the points at which the batteries were directed, let down large solid beams to break the force of the shot. But in this branch of the art of war, the means of attack are hitherto more efficient than those of defence; and in the course of the 29th the enemy's fire was nearly subdued. They lost many men by our spherical case shot; and they attempted to imitate what they had found so destructive, by filling common shells with small balls, and bursting them over the heads of the besiegers; but these were without effect. On the night of the 29th there was a false attack made with the hope of inducing the enemy to spring the mines, which it was not doubted that they had prepared; they fired most of their guns, but the end was not answered, for no mine was exploded.

Men were now invited to volunteer for the assault, such men, it was said, "as knew how to show other troops the way to mount a breach." When this was communicated to the 4th division, which was to furnish 400 men, the whole division moved forward. The column of attack was formed of the 2d brigade of the 5th division, commanded by Major-General Robinson, with an immediate support of 150 volunteers from the light division, 400 from the first, and two from the 4th; and with the remainder of the 5th division in reserve, the whole under the direction of Sir James Leith. Sir James had been severely wounded in the battle of Salamanca, and his constitution still felt the effects of the Walcheren fever; but leaving England as

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Preparations for assaulting the town.

CHAP. soon as he was sufficiently recovered to discharge his duties, he
 XLIV. arrived at St. Sebastian's on the 29th, and resumed the command
 1813. of his division in the trenches, Major-General Oswald, who
 August. had held it during his absence, resigning it and acting as a
 volunteer. As the breaches now appeared to be practicable,
 the assault was ordered for eleven o'clock on the forenoon of
 the 31st, being the time of low water; and to prepare de-
 bouches for the troops, three shafts were sunk at the advanced
 sap on the right, for the purpose of breaking through the sea
 wall, which was of masonry, four feet thick and ten feet above
 the high water mark; they were sunk eight feet below the
 surface, and each loaded with 540 pounds of powder.

*Soult moves
 for its re-
 lief.*

*Assault of
 St. Sebas-
 tian's.*

Marshal Soult, meantime, as soon as he knew that the siege
 had been re-commenced, leaving one division in front of the
 British light division, and another in front of the 7th, moved
 the rest of his army to the camp at Urogne, with the obvious
 intention of making an attempt to relieve the place. Under
 that expectation all the troops of horse artillery were ordered
 to march, and the artillery not employed in the siege was sent
 to the front. The eve of the assault was therefore a time of
 more than usual anxiety; for if either the assault should fail,
 or Soult should succeed, the situation of the allies would be
 rendered critical. In the course of the day the wood and
 rubbish of the right breach took fire, and a mine near it ex-
 ploded; and in the afternoon five small mines within the town
 were blown up by the falling of a shell. The evening closed
 in with a storm of thunder and lightning and heavy rain. Two
 hours after midnight the three mines were sprung, and com-
 pletely effected the purpose of blowing down the sea wall; the
 etonnoirs were immediately connected; a good passage out
 for the troops was thus formed, and the farther object was
 attained of securing all the works in their rear from any
 galleries which the enemy might have run out in that direction.

In the morning there was such a fog, and the smoke in consequence hung so, that nothing could be seen; but about nine o'clock a gentle sea-breeze began to clear the mist, and the sun soon shone forth. Sir Thomas Graham, having completed the arrangements with Sir James Leith, left him to command the assault, and crossed the Urumea to the batteries of the right attack, from whence all might be distinctly seen, and orders for the fire of the batteries immediately given, according to circumstances. Sir James held it as an article of his military belief that British troops could not fail in any thing which they undertook. He now took the opinion of the chief engineer, Sir Richard Fletcher, as to the spot from whence he could best overlook and direct the desperate service of the day; the place they fixed on was upon the beach, about thirty yards in advance of the debouche from the trenches; and there, without any cover or protection whatever, they both took their stand; for it was a maxim with him that however brave the troops, and however devoted the officers, the example of those in command was, beyond every thing, essential.

About eleven o'clock the advanced parties moved out of the trenches, and the enemy almost immediately exploded two mines, for the purpose of blowing down the wall to the left of the beach, along which the troops were advancing to the breach; the passage between the wall and the water was narrow, and they expected, by the fragments of masonry which would be thrown down, to obstruct the line of march. This intent failed; but about twenty men were crushed by the ruins of the wall. The garrison, as on the former assault, were perfectly prepared; and from the Mirador battery, and the battery del Principe, on the castle hill, they opened a fire of grape and shells upon the columns. The forlorn hope, consisting of an officer and thirty men, fell to a man; the front of the columns which followed were cut off, as by one shot; and the breach,

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CHAP. when the assailants reached it, was presently covered with their
XLIV. bodies ; many of those who were ascending it were thrown down
1813. by the bodies of those above them, the living, the wounded,
August. and the dead, rolling together down the ruins. From the
Mirador and Prince batteries, from the keep of the castle,
from the high curtain to the left of the breach, and from some
ruined houses in front, about forty yards distant, which were
loop-holed and lined with infantry, a concentrated fire was kept
up ; a line of intrenchment had been carried along the nearest
parallel walls ; this was strongly occupied, and it entirely swept the
summit of the breach ; and, in addition to all this, the horn-work
flanked and commanded the ascent. The tower of Amezquita,
on the left of the breach, was the only available point of
defence which had not been manned ; overlooked it could not
have been by such engineers as those who conducted the defence :
undoubtedly they considered the means which they had provided
to be more than sufficient, and that no courage, however
desperate, could in the face of them carry a breach which,
upon all rules of art, was actually impracticable. That every
art of defence which science and experience could devise would
be practised was expected ; it was known, also, that the garrison
were as little deficient in confidence as in numbers, and that
they had stores in abundance ; but if there had been even a
suspicion that the ground at the point of attack was what it
was now found to be, it is certain that the assault, under such
circumstances, would never have been ordered.

Nothing, in fact, could have been more fallacious than the
external appearance of the breach. Up the end of the curtain
it was as accessible, quite to the terre-plein, as it seemed to
be ; but there the enemy's situation was commanding, and the
ascent itself was exposed to the horn-work : but this was the
only point where it was passable, and there only by single files.
Except on this point, there was a perpendicular fall from

fifteen to twenty-five feet in depth, along the back of the whole breach, extensive as it was. Houses had been built against the interior of the wall; these were now in ruins; and there was no way of descending, except here and there by an end wall which remained standing; but the very few who could by this means get into the streets were exposed to an incessant fire from the opposite houses. During the suspension of the siege, every possible preparation had been made by the enemy, with the advantage of knowing the point which would be attacked; so that they had a great number of men covered by intrenchments and traverses in the horn-work, on the ramparts of the curtain, and in the town itself opposite the breach. The most determined courage was displayed by the troops, who were brought forward in succession from the trenches to this place of slaughter. Military duty was never discharged with more entire devotion than it was at this time both by officers and men. No man outlived the attempt to gain the ridge. The slope of the breach afforded shelter from musketry; but the nature of the stone rubbish rendered it impossible for the working parties to form a lodgement there, notwithstanding their utmost exertions, and the troops were exposed to the shells and grape from the batteries of the castle; and on the way to the breach so severe and continuous a fire was kept up, that Sir James Leith was obliged to send directions for removing the dead and the dying from the debouches, which were so choked up as to prevent the passage of the troops.

A plunging shot struck the ground near the spot where Sir James was standing, rebounded, struck him on the chest, and laid him prostrate and senseless. The officers near thought certainly that he was killed; but he recovered breath, and then recollection, and resisting all entreaties to quit the field, continued to issue his orders. Sir Thomas Graham meantime accepted the offer of a part of Major-General Bradford's

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Sir James
Leith
wounded.

CHAP. Portugueze brigade to ford the river and assist in the assault.
 XLIV. The advance of a battalion under Major Snodgrass, and of a
 1813. detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel M'Bean, was made rapidly
 August. and firmly, under a very heavy fire of grape, along the beach
 and over a creek knee-deep. They got over, but not without great
 loss, and bore their part in what Sir Thomas Graham began now
 to think was an all but desperate attempt: and desperate it must
 have proved, if, upon consulting with Colonel Dickson, who com-
 manded the artillery, he had not ventured to direct that the
 guns should be turned against the curtain. A heavy fire was
 immediately directed there, passing only a few feet above the
 heads of our own troops, and it was kept up with a precision
 of practice beyond all example. The troops who were employed
 in the assault were astonished at hearing the roar of cannon
 from behind them; they saw the enemy swept from the curtain;
 a few of their own men were brought down also by the first
 discharge: the second made the intent fully intelligible; its
 effect upon the enemy was visible, and a great effort was then
 ordered to gain the high ridge at all hazards.

*Sir Richard
 Fletcher
 slain.*

At this time a shell burst near Sir James Leith, tore off the
 flesh of his left hand, and broke the arm in two places; still he
 continued to give directions, till, fainting from loss of blood, he
 was carried from the field. Major-General Hay succeeded to
 the command. Almost immediately afterwards, and nearly on
 the same spot, Sir Richard Fletcher, talking to General Oswald,
 was killed by a musket-ball, which struck him in the spine of
 the neck. This was a great loss to his friends and his country:
 he was of such amiable qualities, as well as of such sterling
 worth, that no man was ever more respected and loved; and
 that his professional talents were of the highest order had been
 shown by the lines of Torres Vedras.

*The city
 taken.*

As Sir James Leith was carried through the trenches to the
 rear, he met the remaining part of his division pressing forward

to execute his orders; and the men of the 9th regiment, recognizing their general, promised him not to desist from their exertions until the place should be taken. Just as they arrived at the breach, a quantity of cartridges exploded behind one of the traverses of the curtain; the fire of the artillery had occasioned this; and it caused some confusion among the enemy, who already apprehended that the tide of fortune was turning against them. The narrow pass was now gained and maintained; hats were waved from the *terre-plein* of the curtain; the troops rushed forward, and drove the enemy down the steep flight of steps near the great gate leading from the works into the town. The troops on the right of the breach about the same time forced the barricadoes on the top of the narrow line wall, and found their way into the houses that joined it. In many places it was necessary to apply scaling-ladders before the men could get down. At the centre of the main breach, there was an excavation below the descent, and a barricado at some feet farther back; here, therefore, any who should have descended would have been inclosed as a mark for the enemy, till the way was cleared for them by a flanking fire from a round tower on the right, which took the French in reverse. The French themselves were inclosed in a barricado between that tower and the right breach, and their dead lay there heaped upon each other. The contest was still maintained from barricadoes in the streets, and by firing from the houses; till between four and five in the afternoon, the enemy were driven from their last defence in the town, except the Convent of S. Teresa, and retired into the castle. By that time the town was on fire in many places; and, to add to the horrors of a place taken by assault, the vindictive enemy fired upon it from their upper defences, and rolled their shells into it.

About three in the afternoon, the day, which had been

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sultry, became unusually cold; the sky was overcast, and between the blackness of the sky, the rain, and the smoke, it was as dark as a dusky evening; but when darkness would in its natural course have closed, the town was in flames. A dreadful night of thunder, and rain, and wind, succeeded; and it was made far more dreadful by man than by the elements. It is no easy task for officers, after the heat of an assault, to restrain successful troops who are under no moral restraint; and on this day so many officers had perished that the men fancied themselves exempt from all control. They sacked the place, and gave way to such excesses, that if the French could have suspected the state of drunkenness to which men so excellently brave in action had reduced themselves, they might very probably have retaken part of the town, if not the whole. The loss of the assailants amounted to nearly 1600 British and 800 Portuguese killed and wounded; 700 of the garrison were made prisoners.

*The French
defeated in
their at-
tempt to re-
lieve it.*

On the morning of the assault the French made a second effort for the relief of S. Sebastian's. Three divisions of Spaniards, under General Freyre, occupied the heights of S. Marcial on the left of the Bidassoa, and the town of Irun, thus covering the road to the besieged fortress. The position was exceedingly strong, the front and the left being covered by the river, and their right resting on the Sierra de Haya. They were supported by the first division of British infantry, under Major-General Howard, and by Lord Aylmer's brigade on the left, and in the rear of Irun; and by Longa's division near the Sierra in rear of their right. Still farther to secure them, Lord Wellington, knowing that during the 29th and 30th the enemy were assembling a large force at Vera, moved two brigades of the 4th division to the left of the Sierra, and occupied the heights on the right of that mountain, between the convent of S. Antonio and Vera; and Lezaca with a Portuguese brigade, to prevent it from being turned in

that direction. On the 30th also he moved Major-General Inglis's brigade to the bridge of Lezaca, and gave orders for the troops in the Puertos of Etchalar, Zugarramundi, and Maya, to attack the enemy's weakened post in front of their positions.

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Before daylight on the 31st the enemy crossed the Bidassoa with a very large force, two divisions by a ford in front of the left of the Spaniards, while a third, under protection of batteries which they had thrown up during the night, were constructing a bridge over the river, about three quarters of a mile above the high road. The two divisions immediately attacked the Spaniards along the whole front of their position on the heights of S. Marcial. The attack was made with that confidence which the French had always felt when the Spaniards were opposed to them in regular action; but the boldness with which they commenced it was ill maintained; for the Spaniards waited firmly till the assailants had nearly reached the summit of the steep ascent, then charged them with the bayonet whilst in column, and instantly broke them. As often as the French repeated the attack, so often were they driven back, some of them even across the river, where many in their haste lost the direction of the ford and perished. The division which had been pushed across the Bidassoa to protect the construction of the bridge, made a subsequent attempt on the right of the Spaniards, with no better success. But as the course of the river was immediately under the heights on the French side, and a considerable bend in that part of the stream was flanked by their batteries, the Spaniards could not prevent the pontoons from completing their work; and in the afternoon the enemy marched over a considerable body, which, with the divisions who had crossed at the fords, made another desperate attack upon the Spanish position. Lord Wellington, who pronounced the conduct of the Spaniards on this day to have been equal to that of any troops whom he had ever

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seen engaged, appeared in front of their line, at the moment when the French advanced to this last attack. He was received with loud and repeated shouts, and the men, proud of supporting in his sight the character which they felt that they had this day deserved, again beat back the assailants. They showed themselves indeed so capable of defending their post without assistance, that the two British divisions were not brought into action, the nature of the ground being such that they could not be employed on the flanks of the enemy's corps. When the French were at length convinced that all their efforts were in vain, they took advantage of a violent storm and the darkness which came on with it, to retire hastily from this front. Many took to the river in their fear, to sink or swim if they should miss the fords; and in this attempt so many were seen to perish, the river being swoln by the storm, that latterly the fugitives crowded to the bridge, and at last pressed upon it in such numbers, that it sunk beneath their weight, and most of those who were passing at the moment were lost.

About the same time that the enemy commenced their operations on this side, a very strong body of their infantry crossed the Bidassoa, in two columns, by the fords below Salon, in front of the position occupied by the 9th Portuguese brigade. Major-General Inglis moved with his brigade to their support, and finding he could not maintain the heights between Lezaca and the river, withdrew to those in front of the convent, protecting there the right of the Spanish army, and at the same time the approach by Oyarzun to S. Sebastian's. Major-General Kempt meantime moved a brigade of the light division to Lezaca, by which he kept the enemy in check; and the Earl of Dalhousie was directed likewise to support Major-General Inglis, but being engaged at the Puerto de Zugarramundi, he could not begin his march till late in the afternoon, nor arrive before the ensuing

morning, when the operations were at an end. For the enemy, when they found that Major-General Inglis was in a position from which they could not dislodge him, and knew that they had completely failed at the heights of San Marcial, felt that their situation on the Spanish side of the Bidassoa was becoming every moment more critical, and retired during the night. But the river had then so risen, and was still rising so fast, that the rear of their column was obliged to cross by the bridge at Vera: and to effect this, they attacked the posts of the light division about three in the morning. If a sufficient force could have been spared for guarding this point, a very considerable part of Soult's army might have been taken. The bridge was not wide enough for more than three or four to pass abreast, and a continual fire was poured upon it from the walls of a neighbouring convent, so that they were believed to have lost not less than a thousand men in passing. The loss of the allies on this day amounted to 400 killed, about 2060 wounded, and 150 missing, nearly 1600 of these being Spaniards. The brunt of the action had fallen upon them; and in this respect it was a day of great importance, because it made the French feel their own growing inferiority, and apprehend that St. Marcial would teach the Spaniards the same confidence in themselves which the Portuguese had learned at Busaco. Among the British officers who fell was Captain Douglas of the 51st; he is thus mentioned in a work wherein so many crimes have been recorded, because his brother officers bore this testimony to him, that he was the only man they knew of whom they could truly say there was nothing in him in the slightest degree approaching to a vice. The men of his company carried him off the field, made his grave carefully, and gave him a soldier's burial with all the marks of respect which they could bestow.

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*August.**Siege of the
castle of St.
Sebastian's.*

The effort on Soult's part had been great, and was deemed so by Lord Wellington, for a Portuguese brigade was withdrawn from the besieging corps during the assault. As soon as the town had been carried, preparations were made for reducing the castle. The enemy still held the convent of S. Teresa, the garden of which, inclosed as usual in such establishments with a high wall, reached a good way up the hill, toward their upper defences; and from thence they marked any who approached within reach of fire, so that when a man fell, there was no other means of bringing him off than by sending the French prisoners upon this service of humanity. The town presented a dreadful spectacle both of the work of war and of the wickedness which in war is let loose. It had caught fire during the assault, owing to the quantity of combustibles of all kinds which were scattered about; the French rolled their shells into it from the castle; and while it was in flames, the troops were plundering, and the people of the surrounding country flocking to profit by the spoils of their countrymen. The few inhabitants who were to be seen seemed stupified with horror; they had suffered so much that they looked with apathy at all around them, and when the crash of a falling house made the captors run, they scarcely moved. Heaps of dead were lying every where, English, Portuguese, and French, one upon another, with such determination had the one side attacked and the other maintained its ground. Very many of the assailants lay dead on the roofs of the houses which adjoined the breach. The bodies were thrown into the mines and other excavations; and there covered over so as to be out of sight, but so hastily and slightly that the air far and near was tainted; and fires were kindled in the breaches to consume those which could not be otherwise disposed of. The hospital presented a more dreadful scene . . for it was a scene of human suffering; friend and enemy

had been indiscriminately carried thither, and were there alike neglected;... on the third day after the assault many of them had received neither surgical assistance, nor food of any kind; and it became necessary to remove them on the fifth, when the flames approached the building: much of this neglect would have been unavoidable, even if that humane and conscientious diligence, which can be hoped for from so few, had been found in every individual belonging to the medical department, the number of the wounded being so great; and little help could be received from the other part of the army, because it had been engaged in action on the same day. The hideous circumstances of war were indeed at this time to be seen in S. Sebastian's, divested of its pomp: and to a thoughtful mind its actual horrors were less painful than the brutal insensibility with which they were regarded by men whose nature, originally bad, had been worsened by their way of life. Great exertions were made to stop the excesses which at such times are to be expected; but the utmost exertions can do little among troops who believe themselves privileged by the occasion to break loose from the restraints of military discipline, and who are not more fearless of death than they are, while in health and strength, of judgement. The town was sacked: had it been an enemy's town, it could not have suffered more from its captors. Sentries were placed at all the outlets to make the plunderers lay down their booty, but all that could be secreted about the person was carried off; and the Spaniards of Passages and other places were ready, as at a fair, to purchase the spoils of their countrymen. A reproach was brought upon the British name. The French seized the opportunity of endeavouring to fix upon their enemies the same odious imputation which they themselves were conscious of having deserved; they accused the British of setting fire to the town, indiscriminately murdering friend

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*August.**Excesses
committed
in the city.*

CHAP. and foe, and pillaging the place under the eyes of their officers,
 XLIV. who made no attempt to restrain them. These charges were
 1813. brought forward by that party in Spain who, without inclining
 September. in the slightest degree toward the French, manifested on all
 occasions their jealousy and their envious dislike of England;
 and they added the farther calumny, that the captors had
 plundered the churches, and, by giving way to excess of every
 kind, lost the favourable time for following up their success and
 taking the castle. All was false, except that great excesses had
 been committed: the difference between the conduct of the British
 at St. Sebastian's, and that of the French at Porto, Tarragona,
 and other places, being this, that the crimes which the former
 perpetrated were checked as soon as they could be by the
 officers, acknowledged by the generals as evils which they had
 not been able to prevent, severely condemned by them, and
 punished: those of the French had been systematic and pre-
 determined; the men were neither checked nor reproved by
 their generals; and so far were the generals from receiving any
 mark of disapprobation from their government, that the acts
 themselves were ostentatiously proclaimed in bulletins and
 official reports, in the hope of intimidating the Portuguese
 and Spaniards, and without any sense of shame.

*The gar-
 rison sur-
 render.*

Preparations were immediately made for reducing the castle,
 the plan being to erect batteries on the works of the town, and
 breach the Queen batteries, the Mirador, and the keep. On
 the 3d, some discussion concerning a surrender was entered
 into with General Rey, which he broke off when it was required
 that the garrison should lay down their arms and become
 prisoners of war. These terms the general knew he could obtain
 at the last moment, and possibly he still entertained some hope
 of holding out till another effort could be made for his relief;
 as, even after he had retired into the castle, some artillery and

ammunition reached him there from France, it being impossible, upon such a coast, and when the ports were so near, entirely to cut off the communication. The Convent of S. Teresa was taken on the 5th; by this time the flames, which continued still to spread, had driven the troops from their more advanced stations, and made them retire to the ramparts. By the evening of the 7th, the roofs of such houses and steeples as remained unburnt were prepared for musketry; and on the following morning nearly sixty pieces of ordnance opened on the castle. With great exertions, directed by Captain Smith, of the navy, guns were got up the steep scarp of the islet of S. Clara, and there mounted on a battery, which the sailors manned. The wall of the Mirador was so hard, that the balls at first split upon striking it; nevertheless, it was peeled by the continual fire, and was beginning to come down, when the white flag was hung out. All the enemy's batteries were at that time utterly demolished, those on the sea line alone excepted; the guns dismounted, the carriages knocked to pieces, and the castle in ruins. There were no barracks, nor any covering for the troops except holes, which had been excavated in every nook and corner, to serve for them as splinter-proofs; and of these many were filled with water, much rain having fallen during the preceding week: but for the prisoners, who were in the hands of the garrison, there was no shelter, and many of them were killed by the fire of their friends. The French general might have obtained credit for an act of generous humanity, and of policy as well, if he had released these prisoners, sending a trumpet with them to declare his reasons for so doing, and to express his reliance upon British honour that an exchange should be allowed for them; for this no doubt would have been agreed to, though the advantage was so manifestly to the enemy.

General Rey, on displaying the white flag, said he would

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send officers to confer on the terms of surrender. Sir Thomas Graham replied, no others would be offered than what had already been stated; the garrison must lay down their arms, and be made prisoners of war. During the whole siege they had lost about 2400 men, and they had now eaten all their horses. Yielding of necessity now, they were especially anxious that they should be under British protection, be embarked at Passages as the nearest port, and conveyed directly to England; and this was promised. One article requested that the *Commissaire de Guerre*, having with him the widow and the two daughters of his brother, who had died at Pamplona, might be allowed to return with them to France, he being their chief support. General Rey was indignant that an article about women should appear in the capitulation of such a garrison, and after such a defence; and this he expressed coarsely, as if a soldier disparaged his character by showing any consideration for humanity!

Sept. 10.

On the 10th, the Portuguese were formed in the streets of the ruined city; the British on the ramparts. The day was fine, after a night of heavy rain. About noon the garrison marched out at the Mirador gate. The bands of two or three Portuguese regiments played occasionally; but altogether it was a dismal scene, amid ruins and vestiges of fire and slaughter: a few inhabitants were present, and only a few. Many of the French soldiers wept bitterly, there was a marked sadness in the countenances of all, and they laid down their arms in silence. Colonel S. Ouary, the commandant of the place, had been uniformly attentive to the officers who had been prisoners. When this kindness was now acknowledged, he said that he had been twice a prisoner in England; that he had been fifty years in the service, and on the 15th of the passing month he should have received his dismissal: he was now sixty-six, he said,

an old man, and should never serve again; and if he might be permitted to retire into France, instead of being sent to England, he should be the happiest of men. Sir Thomas Graham wrote to Lord Wellington in favour of the kind-hearted old man, and it may be believed that the application was not made in vain. Captain Sougeon was recognized at this time, who, on the day of the first assault, had descended the breach to assist our wounded: "There," said he, pointing to his men, "are the remains of the brave 22d; we were 250 the other day, now not more than 50 are left." Lord Wellington, upon being informed of his conduct, sent him to France. Eighty officers and 1756 men were all the remains of the garrison, and of these 25 officers and 512 men were in the hospital.

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CHAPTER XLV.

OPERATIONS OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY. THE ALLIES ENTER FRANCE. PASSAGE OF THE BIDASSOA, THE NIVELLE, AND THE NIVE. TREATY BETWEEN BUONAPARTE AND FERDINAND, AND CONSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.

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The remains of Romana's army return from the North.

Lord W. Bentinck invests Tarragona.

DURING the siege of St. Sebastian's, some few hundred men, the remains of Romana's army, who had not been able to effect their escape from the North, when their magnanimous general and their comrades went to take part in their country's struggle, and most of them to perish in it, returned to Spain. The resistance to Buonaparte's tyranny, which the Spaniards and Portuguese had begun, had prepared the way for the deliverance of the continent, and thus eventually restored them to their native land.

The Anglo-Sicilian army had no sooner returned to Alicante from its ill-conducted expedition against Tarragona, than every exertion was used for enabling it to take the field, and profit by the retreat of the enemy from Valencia. Lord William Bentinck entered that capital on the 9th of July, and leaving General Elio to observe Murviedro, proceeded with his own troops, and such of the Spaniards as he could find means of providing with subsistence, for in this essential point there was the greatest

difficulty. Having arrived at Vinaroz, he detached a corps under Lieutenant-General Sir William Clinton by sea to Tarragona, in the hope of preventing the enemy from dismantling that fortress, if such should be their intention. When the fleet arrived off Tarragona, a French force was discovered in its vicinity; but there were no indications of any such purpose. The detachment, therefore, landed at the Col de Balaguer; and there, Lord William, having crossed the Ebro at Amposta on flying bridges, joined him with the advance of the army, some cavalry, and artillery; the whole then moved forward to the village of Cambrils, and on the first of August they invested Tarragona; that operation was well performed, and cover was obtained three hundred yards nearer than the most advanced point which had been occupied during the previous attack. Preparations were now observable in the place for its destruction; but it was evident that the garrison could not effect this in the presence of the allied army, unless Marshal Suchet came in force to cover the operation. That general was at Barcelona; his troops were at Villafranca and at Villanova de Sitges, being thus divided to lessen the difficulty of subsisting them; and his advance was at Arbos and at Vendrell: sometimes he seemed to be menacing a movement against the allies, and sometimes preparing for a farther retreat. Lord William, with such an enemy in such force so near, would not expose himself to a failure like that of Sir John Murray; and he deferred beginning the siege and landing his heavy artillery, till the Duque del Parque's army should come up, and Sarsfield with his Catalan troops. The Duque joined on the third; the Catalans were actively employed upon the right flank of Suchet's divisions, cutting off his supplies; and on the 7th they surprized a battalion who were guarding the mills at St. Saturni, and occasioned them a loss of 200 men. Sarsfield

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*August.**Col. Jones's
account,
V. 2. 201.*

CHAP. joined on the 11th. But as the appearance of the allies before
 XLV. Tarragona prevented the garrison from demolishing the works,
 1813. so on the other hand it gave Marshal Suchet time for bringing
 August. together as large a force as he thought the occasion required.
 The British general, like Generals Maitland and Murray before
 him, felt all the difficulties of his situation; he was conscious
 that his ill-composed army was far from being efficient in pro-
 portion to its numerical strength; he had no means of feeding
 the Spanish part of that army if the enemy should manœuvre
 upon his flank, so as to cut off the supplies which they obtained
 from the country; he had found it impracticable to throw a
 bridge over the Ebro; and should he be compelled in his present
 situation to retreat, the ships could not take off more than a
 third of his forces. But while the prudence of remaining in
 that situation became a serious question, preparations for
 breaking ground were carried on.

*Suchet
 raises the
 siege.*

Suchet meantime acting as if he were opposed to a much
 greater force, had waited till Generals Decaen, Maurice Ma-
 thieu, and Maximien Lamarque could join him with 8000 men
 belonging to the army of Catalonia; with this accession his
 numbers were estimated at from 27,000 to 30,000. They
 effected their junction at Villafranca on the 14th. The first
 attempt was by the coast road; but Admiral Hallowell effectually
 checked this movement, by stationing his troops as close as
 possible to the low sandy shore in front of the Torre del Barra.
 On the ensuing morning Lord William was informed that a
 large body of the French were advancing through the inland
 country by the Col de Santa Christina; and in the evening a
 sharp skirmish took place between the advance of hussars and
 the cavalry under Colonel Lord Frederick Bentinck, which he
 sent forward to observe their motions: in this the Brunswick
 hussars distinguished themselves, repulsing the enemy and

making several prisoners. Suchet advanced rapidly beyond the Gaya that day, while Decaen advanced upon Valls and the Francoli. Lord William did not deem it prudent to risk a general action before Tarragona; at nightfall, therefore, he commenced his retreat, and when day broke the whole army was out of sight of the city; the British, Germans, and Sicilians, covering the road towards Tortosa, took up a position near Cambrils. Sarsfield occupied Reus; and the Duque del Parque was directed to proceed to the Col de Balaguer, where, if Suchet should push the retreating army so as to make a general action necessary, it was intended to await his attack. But the French commander had no such purpose; his present object was to bring off the garrison from Tarragona, and to demolish its fortifications, so that they might afford no support to the allies. On the night of the 18th the works were blown up; and Marshal Suchet then withdrew for ever from a place where, by the premeditated atrocities which were committed at its capture, he has fixed upon his memory an indelible stain. The demolition was effectual: the artillery consisted of about 200 pieces of brass ordnance and 46 iron mortars; 50 of the former were left uninjured; and he did not tarry long enough to destroy the quantity of warlike stores which he had not the means of removing. Sarsfield on the following day took possession of the city.

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*The French
abandon
Tarragona.*

Suchet soon fell back upon the line of the Llobregat, having drained the plain of Villafranca of its resources. In a country thus exhausted, General Copons declared it was not possible to provide for the whole Spanish force under Lord William's command; and in consequence of this, and upon erroneous information that part of the French troops had been detached to aid Marshal Soult, the British general, conformably to an arrangement made with Lord Wellington, sent the Duque del

*Plans pro-
posed to
Suchet by
Marshal
Soult.*

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Parque, with the 4th Spanish army, to Zaragoza; and he reinforced the corps, then employed under Elio, in the blockade of Tortosa. Early in September he concentrated the greater part of his remaining force at Villafranca. At this time Marshal Soult had proposed to Suchet that he should cross the Pyrenees with the whole disposable force of the armies of Aragon and Catalonia, and unite with him at Tarbes and at Pau, for the purpose of re-entering Spain together by Oleron and Jaca, and making another effort for the relief of Pamplona. A different project was offered to his consideration by the minister at war, . . . that he should as much as possible occupy the enemy upon the Ebro: in either case a reinforcement of conscripts was to be counted on. The difficulties in the way of the first plan were soon perceived by Soult himself to be insurmountable; and Suchet represented the danger of drawing after him the Anglo-Sicilian army into the southern departments of France, which were defenceless. But as a practicable though a perilous operation, he offered to advance between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, with 70 pieces of field and 30 of mountain artillery, to meet Soult, who might debouche from Jaca with his infantry and cavalry, but without cannon. But for this two things were necessary, . . . that he should have conscripts to place in the garrisons, and that before he marched from Catalonia he should defeat the Anglo-Sicilians.

Lord William's numbers were not equal to those which could be brought against him, the want both of provisions and means of transport having obliged him to leave Whittingham's division at Reus and Valls; but he had no suspicion that Suchet would advance against him. His army was posted at Villafranca and in the villages in its front, as far as the mountains on the Llobregat; the advance, under Colonel Adams, consisting of the 27th British regiment, one Calabrian and three Spanish

battalions, with four mountain guns, occupied the pass of Ordal, on the main road, about ten miles in their front, and the same distance from the enemy's posts on the Llobregat. The pass was so strong, that Lord William was without any apprehension of its being forced, especially as he thought the probable point of attack would be by turning his left at Martorell and San Sadurni, where Copons was posted. Nor, indeed, was it likely Suchet would have confined himself to the front attack of a position which was strong there, but open on both flanks, unless, because such an attack was improbable, he thought the enemy might be taken there by surprise, before they had strengthened the post.

Accordingly, having concerted his plans with General Decaen, he collected the divisions of Harispe and Habert, with his cavalry at the bridge of Molins del Rey, and at eight o'clock on the night of the 12th moved for the pass. The allies were reposing in position, when about midnight their piquets were rapidly driven in, and they were presently attacked in force. An old work which commanded the main road was well defended by the Calabrians, till they were driven from it by the repeated attacks of superior numbers; they rallied then about sixty paces in rear of it, behind some old ruins, and there, in conjunction with the Spaniards, who were close on their left, stood their ground some time longer. But in a night attack the assailants, acting upon ground with which they were well acquainted, and on a concerted plan, had greatly the advantage over a very inferior force who were taken by surprise. Colonel Adam and the two officers next in succession to him were badly wounded, and obliged to quit the field; owing to the changes this occasioned, the regular directions were interrupted, and the ground in consequence was disputed much longer than it ought to have been against a force so greatly superior, both

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*September.
Suchet
surprizes
the allies at
the pass of
Ordal.*

CHAP. British and Spaniards maintaining it so resolutely, that the
 XLV. right and the centre were nearly destroyed in their position.
 1813. The Calabrian corps on the left fell back along the hills, and
 endeavoured to reach San Sadurni, which Manso occupied
 with his brigade. Their hope was to rejoin the army by the road
 leading from thence to Villafranca; but after crossing the river
 Noya, in front of San Sadurni, they were attacked by a con-
 siderable column, and forced back toward the Barcelona road:
 they succeeded, however, in making their way to Sitges, and
 there effected their embarkation on the following night. The
 guns were taken by the enemy, but most of the fugitives joined
 Manso.

*The Anglo-
 Sicilians
 retreat.*

As soon as the attack was known at head-quarters, Lord
 William put the army in motion to sustain his advance; but
 before any reinforcements could reach the spot, the French had
 carried every point, and it remained for him then either to retreat
 without loss of time, or give battle to an enemy superior in num-
 bers and flushed with success, upon ground which afforded no
 advantage of position. He determined therefore upon retiring;
 Major-General Mackenzie, with the 2d division, covered the
 retreat during the most difficult part of its execution, to the vil-
 lage of Monjoz; Sarsfield moved to the left of Villafranca, by
 the hilly and woody country on that side; and the British, Ger-
 mans, and Sicilians, took the main road by the villages of
 Monjoz and Arbos. Marshal Suchet expected that Decaen
 would arrive before Villafranca in time to co-operate with him,
 and force the allies to an action; but that general had to cross
 the Llobregat and the Noya, and was delayed also in the defiles
 by Manso, and by the Calabrese, with whom he fell in when
 they were making for S. Sadurni. His own cuirassiers and dra-
 goons, under General Meyer, pressed with very superior num-
 bers, near Monjoz, upon the cavalry under Lord Frederic

Bentinck, who covered the retreat, and some sabre strokes were exchanged between the two leaders. At length a most timely and vigorous charge was made simultaneously by Lord Frederic with the 20th dragoons, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hawker, and the Sicilians, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Schrader with the German hussars, by which the enemy were driven back, and so completely checked, that they made no farther attempt upon the retreating army; so it reached Vendrells that evening, without any loss. During the night it retired to Altafulla, and on the evening following took up its ground in front of Tarragona, as the nearest protecting situation; the Spaniards, under Sarsfield, moving upon Reus. The ruins of Tarragona could have afforded little support, if the allies had not been better protected by their own strength, and by the opinion which Suchet had learned to entertain of them. He advanced no further than Villafranca in pursuit; and after exacting a contribution from the distressed inhabitants, returned to Barcelona.

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At this time the uneasy state of affairs in Sicily, and the ill success of political changes there as premature as they were well-intended, rendered it necessary for Lord William Bentinck to repair thither, and the command of the army devolved upon Lieutenant-General Sir William Clinton. That general was left with an inadequate force, and under discouraging circumstances, to attend to objects which were of no inconsiderable importance to the common cause. He had to provide against the likelihood of Suchet's availing himself of his late success to relieve or to withdraw his garrisons in Valencia or on the Ebro; and he had to occupy the attention of that able commander so as to prevent him from sending any considerable detachment to take part in Soult's operations against Lord Wellington. It was found impracticable to construct a bridge upon the Ebro as low down as Amposta; and if it had not been so, he could not have spared

The command devolves upon Sir William Clinton.

CHAP. troops enough from other more important services, to protect it
XLV. against the sallies of the strong garrison in Tortosa. The best
1813. course therefore which he could pursue seemed to be that of
September. repairing the defences of Tarragona, as far as time and means
permitted, so as to render it a point of support. Well was it
for the Anglo-Sicilian army that, notwithstanding the credit it
had lost by Sir John Murray's precipitate retreat, and the recent
loss which it had sustained at Ordal, it had yet impressed Mar-
shal Suchet with a most respectable opinion of its ability in the
field; skilful as he was, nothing but that opinion withheld him
from acting vigorously against it when he had it so greatly at
advantage. His disposable force at this time was not short of
25,000 men, with a large body of cavalry; better troops he could
not desire; and their supplies were protected by the possession
of several important fortresses, all which were garrisoned well.
The Anglo-Sicilian army amounted barely to 12,000 effective
men, including a small body of cavalry; about half of these were
British and Germans, the remainder Italians and Sicilians in
British pay, on whom, though they were not ill-disciplined, the
same confidence could not be placed in the presence of an
enemy. There were about 11,000 Spanish troops whose services
General Clinton might have commanded, if there had been
means for rendering them available, but they were in a state
almost of destitution; without pay, ill-clothed, and worse fed;
and he had no control (as his predecessors had had) over the
first Spanish army, which army also was prevented by its wants
from taking the field, except occasionally, and then from keeping
it, except for a very short time. With the commander of that
army, General Copons, and with the other leaders, the best
understanding prevailed; nor indeed were there among all the
Spaniards better men or more distinguished officers than some
of them, . . the names of Manso and Eroles will be held in honour

as long as the Catalans retain any of that national spirit by which they are so honourably distinguished. They might be expected to check any movement of the enemy on the side of Lerida, or towards Tarragona; and to interrupt their communication with France along the inland road, by which their supplies were principally brought; but direct co-operation was not to be looked for where there was no unity of command, and . . . on the one part . . . all but a total want of means. Even the troops in British pay suffered great privations, their communication with the depots at Malta and Gibraltar being interrupted because of the plague. But the tide of the enemy's fortunes had now turned; and all difficulties were met cheerfully by the allies, in the sure hope that their perseverance would soon be crowned with success. As soon as arrangements were made for restoring the works at Tarragona, and for supplying as far as possible the Spaniards who were attached to the Anglo-Sicilian army, head-quarters were established at Villafranca; the troops which had been cantoned at Reus, Valls, and other places in the environs of Tarragona, were ordered to occupy an advanced line of cantonments: a force, consisting of cavalry, with some field-artillery, and Sarsfield's Spanish division of about 5000 infantry, were stationed at Villafranca; the enemy's movements on the Llobregat were narrowly observed; and the remainder of the allied troops (with the exception of those who carried on the works at Tarragona) were so distributed, that, upon any emergency, they could be assembled at Villafranca in four and twenty hours.

Meantime, on the opposite side of the peninsula, an interval of seeming inactivity had followed the capture of S. Sebastian's; but the time, though marked by no military movements, was busily employed in preparing for them, by closing up the troops, replacing the ammunition, and re-organizing those divisions which had suffered most. The opposing armies were in sight of

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*Position of
the armies
on the Py-
renean fron-
tier.*

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each other. There was something mournful as well as impressive to a thoughtful mind in the contrast between the stupendous scenery of the Pyrenees, and the diminutive appearance of field works, and large armies upon such a theatre: "the little huts, and the less beings who inhabited them," might have been overlooked as mere specks in the prospect, had it not been for the more mournful knowledge that these tens of thousands were collected there for life or for death; one party having been sent thither by the wicked will of an individual drunk with ambition, and the other brought there by the duty and necessity of resisting his lust of power. The troops who covered the blockade of Pamplona suffered severely from wet and cold, and were unavoidably subject to privations from which their more fortunate comrades near the coast were exempt. When the clouds opened, they could see the fertile country of the enemy beneath them, in sunshine. During the weeks of hard, irksome duty, passed thus in a situation where exertion and enterprize were not required, but in their stead continual vigilance and patience, desertions became frequent; they were most numerous, as might be expected, among the Spaniards, because they were in their own country; and least, in a remarkable degree, among* the Portugeze.

Levy ordered in France for Soult's army.

Speech of M. Regnaud.

It was now no longer in Buonaparte's power to allot conscripts by the hundred thousand for the consumption of his war in the Peninsula. A levy of 30,000 was all that could be ordered to reinforce Soult's army; "the armies in Spain, it was admitted, having been compelled to yield before superior numbers, and the advantages which the enemy drew from their maritime com-

* The weekly average of desertions I find thus curiously stated: 25 Spaniards, 15 Irish, 12 English, 6 Scotch, and half a Portugeze.

munications, needed reinforcement: for England, while in the north of Europe it lavished its intrigues and its promises, was not less lavish in the south of its resources and sacrifices. The proposed levy, however, raised in the departments adjacent to the Pyrenees would suffice to stop the successes upon which the enemy were congratulating themselves too soon; it would suffice for resuming the attitude which became France, and for preparing, the moment when England should no longer dispose of the treasures of Mexico, for the devastation of both the Spains!" This was the language of M. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely in an official speech; and the senator, M. le Comte de Beurnonville, making a report in the name of a special commission, spake in the same strain, . . . a strain that becomes doubly curious when compared with the events which were so soon to follow. "England," said he, "who intrigues much and hazards little, has not dared to compromise her land forces by sending them to combat in the north of Germany, and uniting them with the Russian and Prussian phalanxes; she feared reverses which she could not but foresee, and which for her would be irreparable. In this thorny conjuncture, and that it might have the air of doing something for the powers whom it had set to play, the cabinet of London had preferred mingling the English troops with the Spanish and Portuguese *bands*, being sure that it could withdraw them without inconvenience, according to its interest. Hence that sudden augmentation of its force, which had determined our armies to a retrograde movement; and these *bands*, encouraged by some ephemeral successes, have carried their audacity so far as to invest the places of St. Sebastian's and Pamplona." . . . Buonaparte's ministers never thought proper to inform the senate that these *bands* soon carried their audacity a little farther, and took them both. "The proposed levy," it was added, "would enable

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CHAP. the French armies of the Peninsula to resume their ancient
 XLV. attitude."

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*Lord Wel-
 lington's
 orders upon
 entering
 France.*

The orator, and the special commission for whom he spake, were mistaken: it was England who resumed her ancient attitude, . . . who re-asserted and resumed her military superiority upon that ground where her Plantagenets had displayed it. Her victorious armies were at this time preparing to plant their banners in France, leading thus the way to the general invasion of what the French in the pride of their military strength had called the sacred territory. As soon, indeed, as the enemy had been driven beyond the Pyrenees, the army had looked forward to this with all the pride of the military spirit, and of excited national feeling: the Spaniards and Portugeze talked of retribution and revenge; and among the British the question was discussed whether or not they were to be freebooters. That question was answered by Lord Wellington in the general order which he issued as soon as the troops encamped among the Pyrenees. "The commander of the forces," said he, "is anxious to draw the attention of the officers of the army to the difference of the situation in which they have been hitherto, among the people of Portugal and Spain, and that in which they may hereafter find themselves, among those of the frontiers of France." After observing that every military endeavour must thenceforth be used for obtaining intelligence, and preventing surprize, he proceeded to say that, notwithstanding the utmost precautions were absolutely necessary, as the country in front of the army was the enemy's, he was particularly desirous that the inhabitants should be well treated, and private property respected, as it had been till that time. The officers and soldiers of the army, said he, must recollect, that their nations are at war with France solely because the Ruler of the French nation will not

allow them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke; and they must not forget that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal have been occasioned by the irregularities of the soldiers and their cruelties, authorized and encouraged by their chiefs, towards the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country. To revenge this conduct on the peaceable inhabitants of France would be unmanly and unworthy of the nations to whom the commander of the forces now addresses himself; and at all events would be the occasion of similar and worse evils to the army at large, than those which the enemy's army have suffered in the Peninsula, and would eventually prove highly injurious to the public interests.

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General orders, July 9, 1813.

Though it was not possible to act on the offensive upon a great scale, till Pamplona should have surrendered, Lord Wellington determined with the left wing of his army to cross the Bidassoa, and dislodge the enemy from some strong ground which they occupied on the right of that river as an advanced position; the key to it being the high steep mountain called La Rhune, which fronts the passes of Vera and Etchalar. Mount La Rhune is a remarkable spot; and its possession had been obstinately contested in the campaign of 1794, because its summit served as a watch-tower from whence the whole country between Bayonne and the Pyrenees might be observed. The mountain itself is within the French territory, but there is a chapel, or, in Romish language, a hermitage, on its summit, which used to be supported at the joint expense of the villages of Vera in Spain, and of Sarré, Ascain, and Urogne, in France; people of different nations, and hostile feelings, being there drawn together by the bond of their common faith... The right of the army being at Roncesvalles and Maya, could at any time descend from its commanding situation into France.

Passage of the Bidassoa.

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The Bidassoa.

The Bidassoa, a river not otherwise remarkable than as forming the boundary of two great kingdoms, rises on Mount Belat, flows down the valley of Bastan, and, spreading into a broad stream after it has passed Irun, enters the Bay of Biscay between the Point of Figueras (a rocky promontory in which Mount Jaysquibel terminates) and the heights on the French side. Mount Jaysquibel, which extends along the coast from Passages to this point (its highest elevation being about 1700 feet) is separated from the chain of the Pyrenees by a broad valley, along which the Vittoria road passes; at its foot stands the old and melancholy town of Fontarabia, . . . a name which Milton has made familiar to English ears; the river rising sixteen feet there, and forming a tide harbour, washes the ruins of its walls, which were blown up in the war of 1794; but when the tide is out there is a considerable extent of sand on both sides of the stream. The little town of Andaye, famed for its brandy, is on the French shore opposite. The bridge which the enemy had destroyed in their retreat is about a mile from Irun, and a little below it is the Isle of Pheasants, better known by its later name from the Conference held there in 1660, which brought in its consequences so many evils, not upon Spain alone, but upon the greater part of Europe. Between this island and the mouth of the river three fords had been discovered: Spanish fishermen had been employed in this service, and they performed it so well, as if pursuing the while their ordinary occupation, that the French sentries on the opposite bank never suspected their intent.

Attack of the French position.

A stronger position as to all natural advantages can hardly be imagined than that which the allies were to attack, after they should have crossed the Bidassoa; the French had strengthened it by redoubts, by *abattis*, and intrenchments at every knoll; the paths were hardly practicable; it was laborious work even

for an unarmed man to reach points which were now to be assailed in the face of an enemy perfectly prepared. But it was necessary to advance from a country where the nature of the ground rendered it difficult to support the troops; and where supplies for many of the corps were carried to the mountain encampments on the heads of men and women, long strings of whom were to be seen toiling up the steep and slippery ascents. Preparations for the attack were made on the 6th, and the troops were under arms and in motion soon after midnight. The tents were left standing, that the enemy might discover no signs when dawn appeared of the intended movement. It was a stormy night, with thunder and lightning, and some rain, . . . the rain not enough in any way to impede or increase the difficulties of the attempt, and the storm in other respects favouring it; for it moved in the same direction as the troops, and prevented the enemy from hearing the noise of the artillery and pontoon train. The storm was succeeded by an extraordinary sultry heat, what little wind there was feeling like the breath of an oven. The 1st and 5th divisions, with Wilson's Portuguese brigade, were to cross the river in three columns below, and one above, the bridge, and carry the French intrenchments about and above Andaye; and General Freyre, with the Spaniards, was to cross in three columns at the higher ford, and turn the enemy's left by carrying their intrenchments on the Montagne Verte, and on the heights of Mandale. The troops arrived at their appointed stations without having been noticed; and every thing thus far had been so fortunately performed, that the enemy did not begin to fire till the heads of the columns were nearly half over, when a rocket was discharged from the steeple at Fontarabia, as the signal for the simultaneous advance of the troops above.

Every thing succeeded perfectly. The 5th division was the

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first that set foot on the French soil; they advanced under a brisk fire from the enemy's piquets, against the line which was hastily forming on the nearest range of hills. The first came presently up, and the enemy were driven from the works. Freyre was equally successful on his side; the Spaniards rushed down the mountain, forded the river, and carried the Montagne Verte. The affair began at 8, and at 9 it was seen that the huts of the mountain post had been set on fire and abandoned. Meantime Baron Alten, with the light division, and with Longa's, attacked and forced the intrenchments on the Puerto de Vera; and Giron, still farther on the right, attacked their position on Mount La Rhune. The light division drove them from redoubts, and intrenchments, and abattis, such, in the words of a distinguished officer then present, "as men ought to have defended for ever;" and the Spaniards, in like manner, carried every thing before them, till they reached the foot of the rock on which the hermitage stands, which on that side presents a craggy cliff, though on the other it is accessible by a gentle slope. Even that post the Spaniards made several attempts to carry by storm, which failed only because it was impossible to ascend there; the enemy, therefore, remained in possession of the hermitage that night, and of a rock on the same range of mountains with the right of the Spanish troops. In all other parts the firing had ceased early in the afternoon, here it was kept up till late at night; and the conical outline of the mountain was seen far and wide by the light of this awful illumination. Some time elapsed on the following morning before the fog cleared away sufficiently for Lord Wellington to reconnoitre Mount La Rhune, the prominent mountain there, towering above its neighbours; he perceived that it was least difficult of access on its right, and that the attack might advantageously be connected with that on the enemy's works

*Batty's
Campaign
in the
Western
Pyrenees,
p. 28.*

in front of the camp of Sarré. Accordingly, he ordered the army of reserve to concentrate to their right: Giron at the same time attacked the post on the rock, and won it most gallantly; his troops followed up their success, and carried an intrenchment upon a hill which protected the right of the camp: the enemy immediately evacuated all their works in order to defend the approaches to their camp, and these posts were occupied by detachments which Lord Dalhousie sent from the 7th division through the Puerto de Etchalar for this purpose. Giron then established a battalion on the enemy's left upon Mount La Rhune. Night, opportunely for the enemy, prevented farther operations; they retired under cover of the darkness both from the hermitage and the camp, and the allied armies pitched their tents in France. The British loss in these two days was 579 killed, wounded, and missing; that of the Portuguese 233; that of the Spaniards 750. Sir Thomas Graham, having thus established within the French territory the troops who had so often been distinguished under his direction, resigned the command to Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope, who had arrived from Ireland the preceding day, and departed himself to take a command in the Low Countries. As soon as the left of the allied army had made this important movement, the enemy moved General Paris's division from Oleron to the neighbourhood of St. Jean de Pied-de-Port, and on the night of the 12th they surprized and carried a redoubt in front of the camp of Sarré, taking prisoners a piquet of forty Spaniards, and one hundred pioneers. The redoubt was farther from the line, and from the ground from whence it could be supported, than Lord Wellington had supposed when he gave orders for occupying it; he left it, therefore, now in their possession. On the following morning they made an attack upon the advanced posts of the Andalusian army, hoping to regain the works

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CHAP. which they had constructed in front of the camp ; but they were
XLV. repulsed with little difficulty.

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The country which was now occupied by the contending armies had been well disputed in the years 1793 and 1794, during the heat of the French revolution, and men whose names afterwards became conspicuous served at that time in both armies: Mendizabal and the high-minded Romana among the Spaniards ; among the French, Latour d'Auvergne ; Moncey, one of the few French marshals who brought no reproach upon himself by rapacity or cruelty ; and Laborde, who will be remembered in Portugal for both, and for having been the first French General whom Lord Wellington defeated. In that war the Spaniards fought with the manifold disadvantage of having a wretched administration, an ill-disciplined and worse provided army, and a revolutionary spirit showing itself in some of their own countrymen ; yet they made a longer and sturdier resistance in the Pyrenees than the French displayed when it was now their turn to defend the passes and protect their own country from invasion. But, honourable as it was for the armies of England, Portugal, and Spain thus to have driven the enemy from Lisbon and Cadiz to the Pyrenees, and pursued him into his own territories, the spirit in which that invasion was undertaken was not less honourable to the allied nations than the success of their arms. The French, indeed, as soon as they apprehended that their own country must soon become the seat of war, spoke with horror of what might be expected from the Portugeze and Spaniards, remembering then with uneasiness, if not with shame and remorse, the atrocities which they themselves had committed. Their hope was that the peasantry would rise, and carry on that kind of war which within the Peninsula had been found so destructive to the invaders ; and no endeavour was omitted for exciting them to such a course. But a circumstance

had happened to check this spirit upon its first manifestation, a few days before the passage of the Bidassoa. The Portuguese, when they surprized and took a French piquet on the side of Roncesvalles, were fired at by the peasantry: they took fourteen of them, and these men were immediately marched to Passages, there to be embarked for England as prisoners of war. This treatment had the effect of intimidating the people, while it awakened no spirit of vengeance, because it was perceived to be nothing more than what was strictly just. That spirit might have been roused if Lord Wellington had not by timely severity effectually checked the license which the troops were but too ready to have taken, and from which it had not been possible to protect the Spaniards in the Pyrenean valleys. The French peasantry did not forsake their houses when the allies crossed the Bidassoa. The inhabitants of the large village of Urogne did not leave it till the battle approached, and then they collected in an adjoining field; but they dispersed as soon as flames broke out among their dwellings; for the troops who entered it began to plunder. . . they set several houses on fire, and drank to such excess that, had the enemy been on the alert, he might easily have captured or destroyed them. Some of the officers were more culpable than the troops, for they used no exertions to prevent the outrages which they saw. Lord Wellington, as soon as he was informed of this misconduct, republished his former orders, and accompanied them with a severe reprimand, declaring his determination not to command officers who would not obey his orders, and of sending some of them who had been thus grossly unmindful of their duty to England, that their names might be brought under the notice of the Prince Regent. It was now seen how much the moral conduct and character of an army depends upon its general. Lord Melville once made the

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*Conduct of
the French
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monstrous assertion in Parliament that the worst men were the fittest for soldiers. His strong understanding should have taught him better, if his heart had failed to do so ; and he was properly rebuked for it by the Duke of Gloucester, who observed, that the men who had the strictest sense of their personal duties were those who served their country with most patience and most fidelity in war. But Mr. Windham's hope of recruiting our armies with men of a better description than those who used to be forced or inveigled into it, or driven by desperation to enlist, had not been realized, and the want of moral and religious training was still left to be supplied by military discipline. . . as far as that could supply it. Lord Wellington enforced that means ; and it is not the least of his many and eminent merits, that he made such means effectual, without bringing upon himself any reproach for undue severity. After the excesses at Urogne, not an inhabitant was to be seen in the French territory ; they had withdrawn more because of these outrages, than in obedience to the injunctions of their own government. But a proclamation was issued in French and Basque, assuring them that their persons and property should be respected. Some necessary examples of justice upon those who ventured to violate orders so emphatically repeated convinced the inhabitants that they might trust to the word of the British general ; and, after those examples had been made, never, perhaps, since the days of the great Gustavus, was such excellent discipline observed in an enemy's country. Even the Portugueze and Spaniards, whom it might have been thought almost impossible to restrain from giving way to that desire of vengeance which had been so wantonly, cruelly, and insolently provoked, obeyed the injunction of the great commander who had beaten their invaders out of Portugal and Spain, and

demeaned themselves with such good order and humanity, that the French often said their own armies were the foes whom they dreaded.

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Two pontoon bridges, and one bridge of boats, were laid over the Bidassoa immediately after the passage had been effected; and works were thrown up to strengthen the position, in which Lord Wellington now waited for the surrender of Pamplona, that he might advance with his whole strength. That city, the modern capital of Navarre (Olite, now a miserably decayed place, was the ancient one), was the great bulwark against the French on that side. Lord Wellington trusted to a sure blockade for reducing it. Its wells supply it abundantly with water; and it was provided with a corn-mill, the largest in existence of its kind, to be worked by hand or by horses, and setting in motion four or five grindstones of such dimensions, that four-and-twenty loads of wheat could be ground by each in a day. When corn began to fail for this well-constructed mill, and there was little prospect of relief after the failure of Soult's great effort in the Pyrenees, the governor made a bold attempt to obtain subsistence from the very force which blockaded him: he sent to Don Carlos d'España, requiring him to furnish 7000 rations daily for the inhabitants of the city, whom, he said, he could no longer afford to feed. Don Carlos, who knew that the French general had, with characteristic effrontery, included his troops in this estimate, replied, that, unless the inhabitants were fed as well as the garrison, while any food lasted, he should hold the governor responsible for their treatment, and would strictly inquire into this when the place should be surrendered, as it must. When the stores were nearly exhausted, it was reported and believed that the enemy intended, as they had done at Almeida, to blow up the works, and endeavour to effect their escape: the

October.
Pamplona
is surren-
dered.

CHAP. attempt would have been far more hazardous ; but it is said
 XLV. to have been prevented by an intimation from Don Carlos, that
 1813. if the place were thus injured, he would put the governor and all
 the officers to death, and decimate the men. Towards the end
 of October, they proposed to surrender, on condition of being
 allowed to march into France with six pieces of cannon ; their
 second proposal was, that they should march thither under an
 engagement of not serving against the allies for a year and a
 day. Don Carlos replied, that he had orders not to grant them
 a capitulation on any terms excepting that they should be
 prisoners of war ; and to this they declared they would never
 submit. Upon these terms, nevertheless, on the last day of
 October, they surrendered, being 4000 in number ; and the
 Spanish general, setting an example of proper determination on
 such an occasion, refused to grant these, till he had ascertained
 that none of the inhabitants had perished during the blockade
 either through ill-treatment or for want.

*Marshal
 Soult's po-
 sition on the
 Nivelle.*

Marshal Soult, meantime, was receiving a considerable
 reinforcement of conscripts. Papers in all the languages of the
 allies were thrown into the outposts, and distributed wherever it
 was likely they might be found, inviting deserters, and denouncing
 vengeance if France should be invaded : the whole French
 nation, it was said, was in arms, and if the English and Spanish
 and Portuguese should set foot upon their territory, they should
 meet with nothing but death and destruction. Some expectation
 the French commander placed upon the hardships to which the
 troops must be exposed, at that season, in the Pyrenees, upon
 the weather, and in consequence the increased difficulty of
 supplying the allied armies. Forage, indeed, had become so
 scarce, that some of the cavalry were reduced to graze their
 horses, which of course could not long have been kept in
 condition without better food. The cattle brought for the

consumption of the troops through a great part of Spain arrived in a jaded and lean condition, . . . those which lived to reach the place of slaughter, . . . for the roads along which they had been driven might easily be traced by their numerous carcasses, lying half-buried or unburied by the way-side, . . . sad proofs of the wasteful inhumanity of war! The weather had been more stormy than was usual even on that coast and at that season. The transports at Passages were moored stem and stern in rows, and strongly confined by their moorings; yet they were considered in danger even in that land-locked harbour: some were driven forward by the rising of the swell, while others, close alongside, were forced backward by its fall, so that the bowsprits of some were entangled in the mizen-chains of others. The cold on the mountains was so intense, that several men perished. A piquet in the neighbourhood of Roncesvalles was snowed up: the parties who were sent to rescue it drove bullocks before them as some precaution against the danger of falling into chasms, and the men were brought off; but the guns could not be removed, and were buried under the snow in the ditch of the redoubt. Soult, since his failure in the Pyrenees three months before, had been fortifying a formidable line of works in them. The right rested upon the sea in front of S. Jean de Luz, and on the left of the Nivelle; the centre on La Petite Rhune, and the heights behind the village of Sarré; the left, consisting of two divisions of infantry, under General Drouet, was on the right of the river, on a strong height behind the village of Ainhoue, and on the mountain of Mondarin, which protected the approach to that village. Two divisions, under Generals Foy and Paris, were at S. Jean de Pied-de-Port. This position described a half circle through Irogne, Ascain, Sarré, Ainhoue, Espelette, and Cambo, the centre projecting very much at Sarré. La Petite Rhune, though overtopped by the greater hill of

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CHAP. XLV. the same name, from which it is separated by a narrow valley,
 1813. is a very high ridge: from the sea to its foot the enemy's front
 November. was covered by a range of works; the ridge itself was strongly
 fortified; and a range of high steep hills, extending from thence
 to Ainhoue, was defended by a chain of redoubts near enough
 to protect each other. The enemy's centre was in great force
 upon this range; and there was a strong corps in the village of
 Sarré, which was protected by a regular closed work with ditch
 and palisades. Their left was thrown back, at nearly an acute
 angle, upon Espelette.

*Passage of
the Nivelle.*

The first intention was to turn this position, by advancing
 Sir Rowland's corps from Roncesvalles through S. Jean de
 Pied-de-Port; this movement would turn the sources of the
 Nive, threaten Soult's rear, and compel him, it was thought,
 to abandon his works, and retire beyond Bayonne; but this
 plan was given up upon full consideration, Soult's line being so
 short, and the road behind it so good, that he might have it in
 his power to fall upon Sir Rowland with a superior force, or to
 attack Sir John Hope when it would be difficult to reinforce
 either; or he might retire untouched, and keep his army in a
 condition to continue active and harass the allies in their winter
 quarters. Lord Wellington resolved, therefore, to strike at the
 centre of his position, strong as it was, and at the same time to
 attack the heights of Ainhoue, which were its immediate support,
 on the left. With this view Sir Rowland had been ordered,
 as soon as Pamplona should fall, to move leftward, into the
 valley of Bastan, and the cavalry to close up in his rear in
 readiness for supporting the right of Beresford's corps at Maya.

The enemy, fully expecting an attack, were always under
 arms at daybreak, and remained in their redoubts till nightfall;
 and they improved every day's delay, which the state of the
 weather afforded them, in strengthening their works, strong as

the labour of three months had already made them. The rain, indeed, continued so many days, and so heavy, that many persons began to fear it would be impossible for them to move; and Lord Wellington, with all his just confidence in himself and in the troops which he commanded, could not but feel how easily human strength and military skill might be baffled by the elements. The weather cleared on the 4th; and on the 7th he met Sir Rowland, Marshal Beresford, and all the chiefs of the right and centre at Urdache, from whence he reconnoitred Ainhoue closely, and pointed out the mode by which that part of the position was to be attacked. The object was to force their centre, and establish the army in rear of their right; and the attack was to be made by columns of divisions, each led by the general officers commanding it, and each forming its own reserve. Sir Rowland directed the movements of the right, consisting of the 2d and 6th divisions, under Sir William Stewart and Sir Henry Clinton, Sir John Hamilton's Portuguese, and Morillo's Spanish division, Colonel Grant's brigade of cavalry, a brigade of Portuguese artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh, and three mountain guns under Lieutenant Robe. Marshal Beresford directed the right of the centre, with the 3d, 7th, and 4th divisions, under Major-General Colville, Camp-Marshal Le Cor, and Sir Lowry Cole. Giron was to act on his immediate left with the Andalusian army of reserve. Baron Alten's light division, with three mountain guns, and Longa's corps was to attack La Petite Rhune; Sir Stapleton Cotton to follow the movement of the centre, with General Alten's brigade of cavalry, and three brigades of British artillery. Freyre, with the Galician army, was to move from the heights of Mandale toward Ascain, prevent the enemy from detaching troops from thence to the support of others, and take advantage of any movement which they might make from their

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CHAP. right toward their centre ; and Sir John Hope was to act along
XLV. the remainder of their line to the sea.

1813. The 8th was the day intended for the attack, but the state
November. of the roads prevented the artillery and some of Sir Rowland's
brigades from coming up ; it was postponed therefore till the 10th.
This opened with so clear and beautiful a moonlight morning,
that it was scarcely perceptible when daylight began to predominate ; and men who had served in India were reminded of an Indian sky. Lord Wellington was on horseback at five, and reached the point of attack at six ; he found Sir Lowry Cole's division at its post, with 18 pieces of cannon at the head of the column : it was on a sloping ridge, which ends in a high point above the village of Sarré ; and on that point was the redoubt which he was to attack, and which had been made with the greatest care, having a deep ditch, an *abattis* in front, and *trous de loup*, so named from their resemblance to the pit-falls in which wolves are taken. Giron was close on his left, and Le Cor on the right, both in valleys. Lord Wellington, Beresford, Sir Lowry, General Colville, and their staffs, were in a little grove, which covered them, about 600 yards from the redoubt, walking about till it was light enough to commence the attack. Sir Lowry then drove in the enemy's piquets, and the horse artillery were enabled to gain the ridge, and open in front of the grove within 400 yards of the redoubt ; their fire in return rattled through the branches ; Colonel Ross dashed forward and opened six guns within 300 yards, which riddled the curtain : the French, however, stood firm, till after about an hour's firing they saw the Spaniards moving to their rear, and the infantry advancing with ladders to escalade them ; they then leaped over the parapet and ran ; . . . they were about 300, of whom some twenty were taken in the ditch, and not more than eight or ten killed. The artillery was then rapidly ad-

vanced against the next redoubt on the right, and that cost only about a quarter of an hour, for it was abandoned with discreditable precipitation.

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By this time the troops were advancing with great celerity over most difficult ground; Lord Wellington moved on to the first redoubt, from whence he could direct the movements of the Spaniards, and of the 3d, 7th, and 4th divisions; one of those bursts of cheering which electrify the hearers indicated his presence. Beresford advanced with the 3d and 7th, while the Spaniards attacked the village of Sarré by its right, and Sir Lowry turned its left. Downie commanded the battalion of Spaniards to whom this service was assigned, while Giron remained in the valley with a brigade which was to support the light division; and as in that situation it might not be seen when the village was carried, Downie as a signal said he would send his aide-de-camp to toll the church bell. He made the attack with great spirit; the enemy in front of the village made a show of more determination than they kept up, and they rushed from their second line as if ashamed of having too hastily given up the first; but after some skirmishing they retired to the second, and thence from the redoubts and heights cannonaded the assailants. Downie carried the village most gallantly, and the bell tolled: Sir Lowry meantime attacked and carried the works on the low hills in the rear of Sarré, and there halted for orders.

Baron Alten, meanwhile, was equally successful in his operations. He had formed the light division before daylight, in a ravine separating the great and little La Rhune, and within 300 yards of the intrenchments with which the face of La Petite Rhune was covered. Rushing from thence as soon as the day opened, the troops forced line after line; the enemy did not wait in their redoubts to be assaulted; and the assailants having carried all the works, and formed without farther opposition on

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the summit of the hill, were crossing the valley to attack the right of the high range behind Sarré when Lord Wellington reached the point which Sir Lowry had gained. The preliminary attacks having thus succeeded, the whole moved forward against the intrenched range of heights which formed the strongest part of the enemy's position. The Spaniards on Giron's left were not sufficiently alert to support the light division; it was not for some time that the guns could be got up over most difficult ground; part of the 95th, who had gained the first high point, were attacked and obliged to retire; and the enemy had the advantage till the Spaniards, quickened by messages from Lord Wellington, came up; the French then gave way, and the lower ridge, in the centre of the position opposite to our two central columns, was immediately occupied. The Prince of Orange, who was with Lord Wellington that day, was then sent to Marshal Beresford, desiring him to attack that part of the high range in his front, while Sir Lowry should at the same time assail it on his side.

It was now about ten o'clock, and before this simultaneous effort could be made there was time to look at the position which was about to be attacked. The mountain extends about twelve miles from Ascain to Mondarin; only one valley intersects it, which is that through which the Nivelle flows, but there are several dips in the range; every higher point had its redoubt, and in the intervals the enemy were formed in great strength, some in lines, some in columns, with sharp-shooters half way down the hills. A friend of Lord Wellington's said at the time to Sir George Murray, that he should expect a very difficult task here, if he had not seen the amazing superiority of our troops in the attack on Sarré: Sir George replied, it is impossible to say how that position may be defended; it is very formidable, but we probably shall get it very easily; when the

French see the red coats they know we are determined to carry our point, and they never dispute it long." The troops justified this brave confidence; six columns began to ascend, with a chain of sharp-shooters in their front; and never could greater intrepidity be displayed than that with which the British and Portuguese advanced against strong works, or solid columns at the top of steep ascents, where they were frequently obliged to use their hands as well as feet in climbing. When they approached a redoubt, they halted a few minutes to take breath; a party was sent to turn it: the sharp-shooters went close up, and another party went straight at it in front, with as much confidence as if to charge a regiment on a plain: when they got within twenty or thirty paces, the enemy uniformly fled, and the assailants being out of breath could overtake but few of them. Most of these redoubts had a glacis, with an *abattis* in front, which gave them time to get off. From one large one, which was attacked by the 21st Portuguese regiment, the garrison continued to fire till the assailants jumped into the ditch; then the French hastened out at the rear with all alacrity.

Lord Wellington ascended in the interval between the 7th and 4th divisions. Just as he reached the summit of the range at one of its dips, Beresford and Colville, with the 3d division, had carried a very high hill, crowned with a strong stockaded redoubt, which was, in fact, the key of the position, and looked down upon the whole range on both sides. The 40th suffered here from having pushed on too fast. The allies were now gaining the upper ridge on all sides, and the artillery attempted to follow: Ross's troop was the only one which succeeded, and that by two hours of the utmost exertion, and by partly making a road. Sir Lowry, with the 4th division, reached the top at a lower part: two brigades of the enemy were formed upon a

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height on his left; and beyond them, on a very high point above Ascaín, was a large and strong redoubt, manned by a battalion of infantry. The light division was toiling up the hill to the right of this work, and the Spaniards to the left. Sir Lowry attacked the brigades; there were two generals at their heads; but when the assailants came near, the French fired five or six rounds in rather an unsoldier-like hurry, and then moved hastily off, leaving the redoubt to its fate. Downie, seizing a colour, and waving it as he advanced on horseback at the head of his battalion, led on his men; they went against it gallantly, in spite of their officers, who behaved ill; the light division commenced an attack upon it, in which Colonel Barnard was wounded; and the 52d lost a good many men here, before Lord Wellington's orders for desisting and summoning the garrison could arrive. While this attack continued, the troops under Beresford got so far in the rear of the redoubt, that it was impossible for the garrison to retreat. They proved to be the first battalion of the 88th regiment, nearly 600 strong: their colonel had been promoted for his defence of St. Christoval's, at the first siege of Badajoz: he hesitated, parleyed, and requested to confer with his officers, and subsequently with the non-commissioned officers; but it was in vain to resist, and there was no way to escape; so they surrendered, and laid down their arms on the glacis. Some of the men expressed their indignation in coarse and indecent language at finding themselves prisoners; and one serjeant, in particular, who wore the cross of the Legion of Honour, cursed his fortune, that after being present in the battles of Austerlitz and Wagram, he should now be captured in a redoubt!

While these operations were going on in the centre, Sir Henry Clinton, with the 6th division, having driven in the enemy's piquets on both banks of the Nivelle, crossed that river, covered

the passage of Sir John Hamilton's Portuguese division, and ascended the hill in line, scarcely firing a shot. The enemy were formed on the top of the hill, as on a fine parade, in front of their huts, and with strong redoubts on both flanks. The first party in its eagerness pushed on too fast, and was driven back; but as the support came near they dashed forward again; and the enemy, having thrown away their fire, went off in great confusion, abandoning redoubts, camp, and all. Sir William Stewart's division carried a work on a parallel ridge in the rear. Morillo, by attacking the enemy's posts on the slopes of Mondarin, and following them towards Itzatce, covered the advance of the whole to the heights behind Ainhoue. Sir Rowland then forced the enemy to retire from those heights towards the bridge of Cambo on the Nivelle; and Sir William Stewart drove a division from Mondarin into the mountains toward Baygorri. By two o'clock the allies had gained possession of the whole of the position behind Sarré and Ainhoue.

The enemy, who had been in front of our centre, were now retiring along the road to St. Pé, a village on the Nivelle, between three and four miles distant. The nature of the country rendered it impossible to cut them off; and Lord Wellington was obliged to wait an hour, that the troops might take breath, and to see that the operations on the right had succeeded; and that the 6th division, after carrying the works in its front, had inclined to the left, and closed upon the third. This having been ascertained, about three o'clock, he directed the 7th and 3d divisions (being the right of the centre) to move by the left of the river upon St. Pé, and the 6th by the right upon the same place; while the 4th and light divisions, with Giron's reserve, held the heights above Ascain, covering the movement on that side, and Sir Rowland covered it on the

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CHAP. other. The Nivelle is from twenty to thirty yards wide, rapid
XLV. like a mountain stream, and not fordable; there is a stone bridge
1813. at St. Pé, a wooden one half a mile lower down, and a stone
November. one about the same distance still lower, at the village of Ayan.
The first of these bridges was eagerly contested; but, after some severe skirmishing, the allies effected the passage of all three. Lord Wellington halted upon the heights above St. Pé; and, having occupied the bridges and the villages, waited there for reports from the right and left. During the whole day he could distinctly hear, and generally see, the firing on the right, Sir Rowland's quarter; but the projecting base of La Rhune entirely prevented him from seeing what passed on Sir John Hope's side; and a steady breeze, setting toward the sea, prevented any sound from reaching him in that direction. But on that side there could be no anxiety, for it was not intended to be the scene of serious action; and what service was to be performed there, was performed well. The French had constructed a redoubt round the ruins of a small chapel on a hill, and connected it with the defence of Urogne by intrenchments, and a strong *abattis*. From this work, which formed a sort of advanced post to their right wing, Sir John Hope drove them, and from Urogne, and pushed forward the 5th division to the inundation which covered the intrenchments in front of Ciboure, and those protecting the heights in advance of Fort Socoa. The enemy were kept in expectation here that this position would be assaulted; and they were menaced in their intrenchments, which covered the heights behind Urogne, and extended along the hills in the direction of Ascain: that village they abandoned in the afternoon, and Freyre took possession of it. As soon as Lord Wellington had received the reports, he gave orders for attacking the heights behind St. Pé; they were of difficult access, through vineyards, and were crowned with woods; and

the enemy had a considerable force there: during the intervals of severer action, the sharp-shooters had been warmly engaged in the village, and along the river; and shrapnells had been thrown at the heights with visible effect from Ross's brigade. The 3d division now crossed near the village, the 6th advanced upon its right, and the 7th attacked the left of the heights; the brunt of the action on this side was borne by this division. The 51st and 68th regiments, light troops, scoured a wood in full cry, like a pack of hounds, and drove out a large body of sharp-shooters, whom they drove up the hills, but with so much eagerness as to leave their support behind. Instantly upon this advantage being presented, a strong column moved from behind the hill and attacked them; the enemy were led by a general officer on horseback, and behaved with more spirit than they had shown in any other part of the engagement. The two regiments, if they had not been two of the best, must have been cut to pieces; but though they were very weak in numbers, and were driven back, they formed in close order, and in the most gallant manner retook the hill. This was the last business of the day; the three divisions took post on the heights beyond St. Pé, thus establishing themselves in the rear of the enemy's right; and the remainder of the army rested on the ground which they occupied, the evening being so far advanced that no farther movement could be made.

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Lord Wellington was on the heights above St. Pé before daylight; the morning was hazy, and it was noon before he received the reports which enabled him to put the troops in motion. During the night the enemy had abandoned all their works and positions in front of S. Jean de Luz, and, knowing no time was to be lost, lest the divisions at S. Pé should interpose between them and Bayonne, retired upon Bidart,

Nov. 11.

CHAP. XLV. destroying all the bridges on the lower Nivelle. Sir John Hope followed with the left, as soon as he could cross the river; but it was mid-day before he could repair the bridge which connects Ciboure with S. Jean de Luz, and construct a flying bridge to expedite the passage of the troops. The 5th division passed here, part with the artillery by the bridge, part by fords close above the town; the first, with Wilson's Portuguese brigade by a ford about a mile higher up, and broad enough for the men to cross by platoons. It rained most heavily; the water was deep, the opposite bank muddy, and the shore swampy ground: but no opposition was offered, and the men, elated by the signal success of yesterday, were in high spirits. The centre moved forward about a league, and the right made a corresponding move, which was as far as the state of the roads, after so violent a fall of rain, would allow. Soult showed about 16,000 men at Bidart all day. The army bivouacked a second night. On the following morning Lord Wellington was again in front of the centre at daybreak, but a thick fog enveloped every thing; it was noon before it cleared, and he then learned that the enemy had retired during the night into an intrenched camp, in front of Bayonne.

By these operations, in which the allies lost little more than 500 killed, and less than 2400 wounded, the French were driven from positions strong in themselves, and which they had been fortifying with great skill and great labour for six months. 51 pieces of cannon, 1500 prisoners, and 400 wounded, were taken. Soult had full 70,000 men; but though there was no flight, nor any thing like a rout, no determined spirit of resistance was manifested; they fought like brave men, but dispirited ones, and in several instances their officers used every endeavour to bring them on in vain. They had relied upon the difficulty of the ground, not dreaming that artillery could be brought to

act against them over rivers and rocks and mountains; and, indeed, the allies were beholden for their success, in no slight degree, to the extraordinary skill and activity with which this part of the service was directed by Colonel Dickson. Mountain-pieces on swivel carriages, harnessed on the backs of mules which had been trained for the purpose, were conveyed to the ridges of the mountains, and brought to bear on the French from positions which they had considered inaccessible for guns... The foot and horse-artillery were alike active and expert; and the artillery-men dragged their cannon with ropes up steep precipices, or lowered them down, wherever they could be employed with most effect. Generals Byng and Kempt were wounded: Colonel Lloyd of the 94th, an officer of great promise, and who had frequently distinguished himself, was killed.

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The weather, which continued wet, without intermission, from the 11th to the 18th, rendered the cross-roads so bad, and the streams so formidable, that Lord Wellington could not follow up his success as he would otherwise have done. He placed the army, therefore, in cantonments between the Nivelle and the sea; but as the enemy were concentrated in great numbers round Bayonne, two miles only in their immediate front, a defensive line was formed against any sudden advance. It commenced at the sea on the left, in rear of Biarits, passed over the main ridge of heights, and crossed the high road, near a country house belonging to the mayor of that little town. The front of this part of the line was protected by the two small lakes of Chuhigue and Rousta; the high road passes across a valley between them, and here was the most advanced line of sentinels guarding the left wing; from thence it followed the right bank of the valley, in front of Arcangues, and coming there upon the Nive, near a chateau belonging to Garat (one

*The allies
cantonned be-
tween the
Nivelle and
the sea.*

CHAP. XLV. of the contemporary historians of the French revolution, and himself an actor in it), it was thrown back along the left of that river by Arrauntz, Ustaritz, Larressore, and Cambo; from which latter place the enemy, who occupied a tête-de-pont there, withdrew their posts on the 18th, and blew up the bridge. Head-quarters were at S. Jean de Luz, a town which dates its decay from the peace of 1763, when France was deprived of its possessions in North America. The Nivelle divides it from Ciboure (a smaller town), spreading just above both into a beautiful bay, and forming an island where it spreads, which is connected by bridges with both. The bay terminates on the north-east by a rocky point of land, on which a battery called Fort St. Barbe was erected, and on the opposite side is the harbour of Socoa, defended by a martello tower. Between these points the bay is nearly a mile in width, and on both sides a pier had been begun, which it was intended to have carried so nearly across, as only to have left a sufficient entrance, and thus to have afforded safe anchorage on this stormy coast, where it is grievously needed. When the Spanish fleet was wrecked here in 1627, the dead who were cast up on the immediate shores filled ninety-six carts. On that occasion the inhabitants of S. Jean de Luz behaved with exemplary kindness to the survivors; and it was proposed in the Spanish council that, as a becoming acknowledgment, its ships and merchants should enjoy a perpetual exemption from all duties in Portugal, whither they traded largely for salt: I wish it could be added, that such a proof of national gratitude had been given. During the action of the 10th, a naval demonstration was made opposite Fort Socoa, by four of Sir George Collier's squadrons; the swell would not admit of a close approach, but they came near enough for one of them to be struck by some shot from the sea-batteries.

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S. Jean de
Luz.

D. Fran-
cesco Ma-
noel.
Epanapho-
ras, p. 256.

The inhabitants of S. Jean de Luz had mostly remained in their own houses, shutting themselves up there to abide their fate, in dread of invaders whom they had been taught to consider as being equally rapacious and merciless. There was still a disposition in the allied troops to take that license which brutal spirits promise themselves in war; but, during the action of the 10th, two offenders had been hanged, each upon the nearest tree to the spot where his crime was committed, with a paper upon his breast declaring for what offence this summary justice had been executed. Such severity was equally politic and just; and the allies soon acquired as good a character for their conduct toward the inhabitants as for their behaviour in the field. The people were the more sensible of this, because it was strikingly contrasted with the predatory habits in which their own troops had long been licensed, and which those troops had not laid aside when they were driven within the French frontier. Marshal Soult would gladly now have withheld them from courses which he had so long permitted or encouraged; and just at this time an instance occurred in which he endeavoured to strike terror by a wholesome example. When they were quitting S. Jean de Luz, a woman complained to an officer whose company was quartered there, that the men, expecting to depart, were beginning to plunder her house: he gave no ear to her entreaties that he would restrain them, and the woman at length, in her emotion at seeing her goods thus given up to spoil, exclaimed, that "if those who ought to be their defenders would not protect them, the English might as well be there at once." "Oh!" said the officer, "if you are a friend to the English, you shall see how I will protect you!" and immediately he set fire to her house himself. A *gendarme* who was present took the woman's part; and declared that though he could not take the officer into custody, nor prevent him by force, he would report the circumstance to the

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Discipline
observed by
the allies.*

CHAP. Marshal: he did so; and the officer, who was a captain of
 XLV. infantry and a member of the Legion of Honour, was brought
 1813. to a court-martial, condemned, and shot.

November.

*The inha-
 bitants re-
 turn to their
 homes.*

But it was too late for Marshal Soult to correct the inveterate habits of men who, during all their campaigns in the Peninsula, had been supported by a predatory system; and though most of the people, and especially the villagers, forsook their houses at the approach of the allies, yet, when proclamations were issued in French and in Basque (which is the language of these parts), assuring them that their persons and property should be respected, and when they understood that British discipline would afford them a security which it was in vain to hope for amid their own armies, they returned. The French authorities endeavoured in vain to dissuade them; the general wish was expressed so strongly, that at length no farther impediment was opposed to it than that of forbidding them to carry back any thing with them. Above 3000 persons came back to S. Jean de Luz and the neighbouring places before the end of November, and as many more passed through the line of the allied out-posts, in one day early in December, on their return;... among them were several young men, escaping in women's clothes from the conscription.

The weather had prevented Lord Wellington from passing the Nive, as he intended to have done, immediately after having forced the French position, and the army in consequence occupied only the confined space on the left of that river; while the enemy profited by all the resources of the country on its right, and had a free communication between Bayonne and S. Jean de Pied-de-Port. They occupied an intrenched camp in front of Bayonne, about twelve miles from S. Jean de Luz, and this position they had been fortifying with provident care from the time of their defeat at Vittoria. Bayonne obtained its

Bayonne.

present name in the twelfth century, till when it was called Lapurdum, as when the cohort of Novempopulania had its headquarters there. This ancient city, which during three centuries belonged to our Plantagenet kings, is memorable in military history for the invention of the bayonet, a weapon that in its name indicates the place of its origin, and that, in British hands, has proved more destructive than any other to the nation by which it was invented. In the war of the French revolution this city would not have been tenable against a single division of an enemy's army: the war of the intrusion made it immediately a place of great importance, as a depôt for the French; and therefore it was well fortified, to secure it against a sudden attack from the English, before the possibility of any more serious danger had been contemplated. It stands at the junction of the Nive with the Adour; the latter a great river, and the former not fordable for several miles up: the city is on the left of the Adour, the citadel on the other side. The position which Marshal Soult occupied was under the fire of the fortress; the right resting on the Adour, and covered in front by a morass, formed by a rivulet which falls into that river. The right of the centre rested upon the same morass, and its left upon the Nive; the left was between the Nive and the Adour, resting on the latter river and defending the former, and communicating with a division of the army of Catalonia, under General Paris, at St. Jean de Pied-de-Port. The roads from that place, and from S. Jean de Luz to Paris, pass through Bayonne; and these are the only paved roads, all the others are so bad as to be impracticable in winter. The enemy had their advanced posts, from their right, in front of Anglet, and toward Biarritz; and they had a considerable corps cantoned in Ville-Franche and Monguerre.

As soon as the weather and the state of the roads allowed, preparations were made for crossing the Nive. On the 8th of

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*Passage of
the Nive.*

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December, Lord Wellington moved the troops out of their cantonments. The preceding day had brought intelligence that Hanover was delivered from the French... and that the Dutch also had risen against their oppressors, and asserted their independence. With this news to encourage them, at which even the French people appeared to rejoice, because it gave them a hope of peace, which could only be obtained by the total defeat of Buonaparte's ambitious schemes, the allies recommenced their operations on the morrow. Sir Rowland, with the right of the army, was to cross at Cambo, and Beresford to support him by passing Sir Henry Clinton's division at Ustaritz: the bridges at both places had been destroyed. The river, dividing into two branches, forms an island of considerable extent opposite Ustaritz; our piquets had previously occupied this, and here a pontoon-bridge was thrown across during the night. The bridge at Cambo had been hastily and insufficiently repaired, so that very few succeeded in getting over its broken slope. There were fords above and below; the lower was good enough for cavalry, but ten men were drowned in attempting it; the upper one, therefore, was chiefly used by the infantry, ... and it was no easy passage, the left bank being steep, and the water rising at the time, in consequence of renewed rain. At both places, however, it was effected with little opposition, and the enemy were immediately driven from the right bank. The troops, advancing then through swampy meadow-land and very deep roads, soon found themselves on the high road from St. Jean de Pied-de-Port; and the French retired skirmishing, being followed and pressed; those opposite Cambo were nearly intercepted by Sir Henry Clinton. The enemy now assembled in considerable force upon a range of heights running parallel with the Adour, keeping Ville-Franche upon their right; and they kindled fires, as if intending to remain there. A galling

fire was kept up from the detached houses of this village; but houses, village, and heights were carried by the 8th Portuguese regiment, the 9th Caçadores, and the light battalions of the 6th division; and the French, after one or two hasty volleys, retired. The advance of the allies had been so much impeded by the condition of the ground, that by this time evening had closed; and Lord Wellington contented himself therefore with the possession of the ground that he occupied.

This had been a day of great fatigue for the left wing of the army. At one in the morning the drums had beat to arms; and, after a most toilsome march through heavy rain, the first division, under Major-General Howard, was assembled by day-break at the Plateau of Barouillet, in advance of Bidart. At dawn the rain ceased; and the 5th division, under Major-General Hay, supported by the 12th light dragoons, was seen crossing the valley which separates the hilly ground of Biaritz from that of Bidart; its right in communication with the first, and its left extending to the sea-coast. At eight o'clock the whole line of light troops commenced their fire; those of the enemy contested every hedge and bank which afforded them shelter, and from whence they could take deliberate aim; but a fire of shells from the artillery, who posted themselves on the eminences along the whole line, assisted greatly in dislodging them. The whole line gradually advanced, and the enemy retreated before them to Anglet, not venturing to await their approach. About one the first division gained the heights on the right of the chaussée, opposite to Anglet, the light infantry driving the enemy down the slopes to their intrenched camp. The 5th division made equal progress, sweeping the country between Anglet and the sea as far as the banks of the Adour; and occupying with its light infantry the Bois de Bayonne, a large pine wood which covers the whole space on

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the left of that river, between the intrenched camp and the sea. General Alten, meantime, made a corresponding advance with the light division, between the left wing and the Nive; they drove the enemy from behind the deep morass which covered their advanced posts in front of Bassussarry, and compelled them to retreat to their intrenched camp near the Chateau de Marrac, . . . that castle to which, in the first act of this great drama, Ferdinand had been decoyed by Buonaparte.

As the movements on this side were intended only to favour the operations on the right, Sir John Hope's instructions were to return to his cantonments, and to commence retiring thither at six in the evening, unless a countermand should arrive. It began again to rain heavily in the afternoon; and the troops, supposing they were to remain on the ground which they had gained, lighted, not without difficulty, their bivouac fires; but the weather was far too bad for them to remain in such exposed situations; and at the appointed time they began their march back toward their several cantonments, the 5th division forming the rear guard. By this time it was quite dark; even the main road had been completely broken up by the passage of artillery, and of so many troops; the hollow ways were knee-deep in mud: one little drummer stuck fast in it, and was obliged to be lifted out, and carried for some distance by two soldiers; many of the men were so completely exhausted, that they sunk down by the way-side; and before they reached the place of rest, they had been little less than four and twenty hours on foot, and during the greater part of that time in a heavy winter's rain.

On the morning of the 10th, Sir Rowland found that the enemy on his side had retired into their intrenched camp, on the right of the Nive. He established himself, therefore, in the position intended for him, with his right on the Adour, his left on the heights of Ville-Franche, above the Nive, and his

centre across the chaussée at the village of St. Pierre. Marshal Beresford's troops were again drawn to the left of the Nive; and Sir Rowland communicated with the centre of the army, by a bridge which had been laid over that river. Morillo's division was placed at Urcuray, and Colonel Vivian's brigade of light dragoons at Hasparren, to watch Paris's movements, who, upon the passage of the Nive, had retired toward St. Palais.

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Thus the allied army formed a sort of crescent, which was intersected by a river, and along which the communications were exceedingly bad. On any part of this bending line Marshal Soult could direct an attack with his main force; and, if he should be repulsed, there was a secure retreat for him within his intrenched camp. Supposing, therefore, that the allies would have their principal strength on the right of the Nive to support Sir Rowland, he left just troops enough to occupy the works opposite to that General's position, and with the rest of his army moved at daybreak against Sir John Hope, expecting to overpower the left wing by numbers. The 5th division occupied the Plateau of Barouillet, having General Campbell's Portuguese brigade in its front, on the high road. Baron Alten, with the light division, was posted at Arcangues, about two miles to the right. Both were on strong ground; but there was no defensive connexion between them, except along a range of hills, which projected too much to be occupied otherwise than by small posts; and between Barouillet and Arcangues there is a broad valley, which was left almost without defence, because it was thought that Marshal Soult would not attempt to advance in this direction, with posts of such strength upon either flank.

The enemy advanced in two strong columns; one by the great road attacked the posts of the 5th division, and drove them back upon their support on the Plateau of Barouillet.

CHAP. XLV. The other, coming forward by the Plateau of Bassussarry, threw out a strong line of *tirailleurs*, supported by battalions, against the light division at Arcangues; but the main body pushed on a little way beyond the left flank of the light division, and sent forward columns to attack the right of the 5th, denoting thus an intention of penetrating between, and in rear of the two divisions. Soult knew not at how great advantage he had taken the allies: the 5th division had been separated during the last night's dismal march, the ammunition mules were not forthcoming, and when the piquets were driven in, there was hardly a round left. There was nothing to be done but to hold their ground as well as they could, till more troops and ammunition should arrive. Not more than eight or ten guns could be brought into action, because of the nature of the ground, . . . there being a low thick wood to the right, and close to the road; and on the left a rugged heath, intersected with gullies and ravines. The French brought more pieces into play, and served them with more than usual vivacity; for they knew their own great superiority of numbers, and were elated with the hope of getting to S. Jean de Luz, which was the great dépôt of the allies. Sir John Hope, who was, with his staff, in the thickest of the fight, encouraging the troops by his example, received a severe contusion on his shoulder, and a hurt on his leg; and a ball went through his hat: . . . it was believed that, at one moment, nothing but his extreme gallantry saved the troops from utter confusion. Major-General Robinson, who commanded the second brigade of this division, was severely wounded, and carried off the field. The contest still continued, ebbing and flowing, till the enemy pushed through the wood in front of Barouillet, and through a large field and orchard on its right, in such force, as to drive back Campbell's Portuguese brigade, and Robinson's, which supported it; and,

penetrating thus beyond the front of the position, they were rapidly following up their success, when a Portuguese battalion on the left flank boldly moved forward on the road, and wheeled into the rear of the wood; at the same time, the 9th British regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, which was on the extreme right, faced about, and, uniting with the Portuguese, charged the French columns in their rear, . . . a movement as unexpected as it was bold and well-timed. It gave the enemy a severe check at this point, and some hundred prisoners were taken. This was between two and three in the afternoon. By this time a considerable number of troops had arrived in detail; the brigade of guards, who had been ordered from S. Jean de Luz to support the 5th division, arrived just after the enemy had been thus checked; and Lord Wellington, hastening from the right wing where all was quiet, came to the scene of action. He was very much exposed this day, and unavoidably so, for there was no eminence from whence the whole field could be seen; the wood intercepted the sight, and it was necessary for him to ride from point to point. The enemy, checked though they had been, persisted in the action, and it continued till night-fall; the firing gradually ceasing as the evening closed, and the troops, after very severe loss on both sides, remaining on the ground which they had occupied in the morning. The remainder of the left wing having been brought up from its cantonments, the first division relieved the fatigued troops; and the 7th took post in rear of the position, to support either of the defensive corps.

Meantime the attack upon the light division at Arcangues had been maintained with great animation and perseverance. The enemy were repulsed in all their efforts to dislodge these troops from their defences of the churchyard and the chateau; but they retained at night the Plateau of Bassussarry, in the im-

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CHAP. mediate front of Arcangues, which joins that of Barouillet,
 XLV. before the mayor's house. The issue of the day had greatly
 1813. disappointed Marshal Soult, whose utmost efforts had been
 completely defeated by a comparatively small part of the
 allied forces, and with great loss. He suffered a farther loss
 during the night. There were with him the two German
 regiments of Frankfort and Nassau Usingen; every possible
 means had been taken for concealing from their officers the
 state of affairs in Germany; nevertheless, they discovered that
 Germany had thrown off the yoke. The French government
 had been apprehensive of this, and, in consequence, had
 recently altered its conduct towards them; instead of being
 treated with disrespect, as men who had no government which
 could protect them, they now found themselves the objects of
 marked attention; and were newly clothed, and received pay
 up to the last six months, when a year and half's was due to
 the greater part of the French army. Marshal Soult, however,
 under various pretences, had long kept them in the rear. But
 in the action of this day they were in advance, in Villatte's
 division; and that General being severely wounded, the di-
 vision was for a while without any special commander: the
 officer in command of the Nassau regiment was a Bavarian,
 but had been educated in Hanover, and for some years in the
 Hanoverian guards. Not only had the news from Germany
 reached him, but means had also been found for conveying
 to him the orders of his sovereign; he now took advantage of
 the first opportunity which had offered, and proposed to the
 Colonel of a French regiment, that his corps, with the two
 Nassau battalions, and one of the Frankfort, should occupy a
 height a little in advance of where they then were. The advice,
 though proposed with a view of going over to the allies, offered
 some feasible advantage, and was agreed to without sus-

December.

Two Ger-
 man regi-
 ments escape
 from the
 French ar-
 my.

picion. As it was growing dark, and the roads were intricate, it was farther proposed, that the battalions should file to their ground by different routes. The German officers were apprized of the intention, except those of the second Frankfort battalion, to which no communication could be made, its commander being badly wounded in the action. A Frankfort officer now made his way to the outposts of our 4th division, in the centre of the allies, and announced the intended defection, requiring a General officer's word of honour that they should be well received, and sent to Germany: no General being on the spot, Colonel Bradford gave his word; means were immediately taken to apprize the three battalions, and they came over in a body, 1300 men; the French not discovering their intention till just when it was too late to frustrate it. On the morrow the Colonel wrote to General Villatte, thanking him for the attentions which he had received whilst under his command; but stating that in obedience to their King's orders, his troops had quitted the service of France to return to that of their own country. Their women and their sick, who were left behind, he commended to the General's humanity; and said that his brother officers and himself freely gave up their personal baggage in performing an act prescribed by their duty. This officer seems to have united a just moral feeling to a proper sense of military honour; and he rejoiced that he had been able to bring off these battalions, without being compelled to fire on the French, in company with whom they had served so long.

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In the morning the 5th division was brought a little forward, beyond the wood, and the advanced skirmishers were soon within forty or fifty yards of each other; the light troops drove in the enemy's piquets, and the most advanced sentries were again pushed forward to their own line. On this side, and also at

Dec. 11.

CHAP. XLV. Arcangues, there was some skirmishing during the forenoon, but with little advantage on either side: about noon the firing was suspended, the weather brightened, unarmed parties were sent out to cut wood for cooking, and the men received their rations. But about two there was a stir in the enemy's lines; they were seen cutting gaps in the fences for the passage of artillery; presently they attacked in great force, along the Bayonne road, driving in the piquets, and the hill in front of Barouillet again became the scene of contest. The soldiers who had gone in front to cut fuel ran hastily back when they heard the cry of "to arms," that they might get themselves armed and accoutred; and the French, seeing them run toward the rear, thought they had taken panic, and set up loud cheers, as if they had now only to pursue their favourable fortune. But the whole left wing was promptly formed in perfect order. A feint attack was made upon Arcangues, to cover a serious one upon the Plateau of Bassussarry. Lord Wellington's orders were, that the piquets, in case of any serious effort, should be withdrawn from the hill in front, but that the position in front of Barouillet should be maintained; great efforts were made, and the enemy every where were repulsed, Sir John Hope, as on the yesterday, encouraging his men wherever there was most danger: during these two days he was struck three times; and all his staff had either themselves or their horses wounded: Lord Wellington is said to have requested that he would consider of what consequence he was to the army, and not expose himself so much. When darkness closed, the two armies were in the same position which they had occupied on the preceding night.

The fifth division, which, after one day's severe exertion in the worst weather, had borne the heat of the action in the two following ones, was relieved by the first, as soon as it became

so dark that the enemy could not perceive and take advantage of any change in their position. The night was again rainy, and in posting the sentries at some parts, it was not easy, because of the darkness, to avoid interfering with the French piquets. The weather cleared toward morning; drums and trumpets were heard at intervals along the enemy's line; and at sunrise their staff officers were seen riding in all directions. Soult showed three or four divisions; and at ten some severe skirmishing began, which continued till three, being chiefly confined to the wood and the immediate ground about the house of Barouillet. The loss was not great, but it fell chiefly on the guards: Captain Watson, the adjutant of the 3d guards, observed in the morning that "plenty of laurel grew round that house to deck the graves of those who should fall"...and he was one of the first. Lord Wellington, foreseeing Soult's intention, moved the 4th and 7th divisions to the rear of the light division and of the first, where they might afford support to either. But Marshal Soult, when he found how fully the allies were prepared, did not deem it prudent to make any farther effort on this side, where he had tried his fortune skilfully, bravely, and perseveringly, but without success. The skirmishing therefore ceased in the afternoon, and the enemy retired entirely within their intrenched camp that night.

The last four days had been most harassing to the troops, exposed as they had been, and continually under arms; but the fifth day of these multiplied actions proved more murderous than any of the foregoing. During the night Soult passed a large force through Bayonne, with the intention of making a most formidable attack upon the right wing of the allies. Sir Rowland was aware of his movements, and prepared accordingly. His position was about a league from Bayonne, in the form of a crescent, extending about four miles from the Adour

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Dec. 12.

CHAP. XLV. to the Nive. Major-General Pringle's brigade, consisting of the 28th, 34th, and 39th regiments, formed the left, stationed on a ridge of hilly ground extending from Ville-Franche toward Bayonne, and bounded on one side by the Nive, and on the other by large mill-dams in a deep hollow, which separates it from the heights of Monguerre. Major-General Byng's brigade, consisting of the 31st, 57th, and 68th, formed the right, posted also on a long ridge, in front of the village of Vieux Monguerre, which had the Adour on its right, and mill-dams in like manner on its left, separating it from the heights in the centre. Brigadier-General Ashworth's Portuguese brigade occupied the centre ridge opposite the village of S. Pierre. The ground was favourable, because it admitted of only one or two points of attack, one of which was by the main road.

It was a clear frosty morning, but the ground so wet, and the road so heavy in that deep and rich soil, that the horses were knee-deep in stiff mud and clay. Soon after eight o'clock, the allied out-posts on the great road were attacked by *tirailleurs* in great numbers, and the French columns advanced close in the rear. Soult showed that day about four divisions; and these, drawn up in two lines and supporting columns, appeared, from the confined ground on which they acted, more numerous than they were. They advanced up the long slope in front of the centre position, their column extending a good way on either side of the road; at the same time a large body moved against the left of the centre, up the hollow way, its right resting upon the mill-dams. Sir Rowland, as soon as the enemy's intention of piercing the centre was manifest, brought Major-General Barnes's brigade forward from the heights of Petit Monguerre, and stationed it on the right of Ashworth's Portuguese. He moved also the whole of Byng's brigade, except one regiment, and the light companies of the others, to

support the right of the centre, and Brigadier-General Buchan's Portuguese brigade from behind Ville-Franche, to support its left. These troops arrived just at the time when they were most needed; four guns of Lieutenant-Colonel Ross's troop, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tullock's brigade of Portuguese artillery, were also moved up in aid of the centre, and kept up a steady but cautious fire, all possible exertions being used meantime for bringing them a supply of ammunition. The light companies which had gone forward in support of the piquets were borne back by weight of numbers upon the main line, and the French established themselves upon a height close to the position; and here the heat of the contest lay, this post being repeatedly won and lost, till Barnes's brigade, with the 92d Highlanders, and Ashworth's Portuguese, made a final charge, and drove the enemy down. The artillery fired this day with dreadful effect, and the main road was in many places literally running with blood.

On the right a feint only was made, before which the battalion that had been left there retired from Vieux Monguerre to the heights in its rear; but, ascertaining from thence that the enemy on this side were not in force, they re-entered the village, and made some prisoners there. But on the left centre the columns which had advanced up the hollow way made a powerful attack; and though the 71st and part of the 92d were sent to aid the Portuguese there, the enemy, by dint of superior force, won an important part of the position in front of Ville-Franche. Two Portuguese regiments opportunely arrived: Sir William Stewart directed the one to turn the right flank of the attacking columns, while the other attacked the enemy in front, charging them with the bayonet; and this was decisive in that quarter. A hot fire of *tirailleurs* was kept up meantime upon Major-General Pringle's brigade, with a view of preventing it

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CHAP. from aiding the centre ; but that General, occupying a line at
XLV. right angles to theirs, caused them considerable loss by a well-
1813. directed flanking fire.

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Foreseeing such an attack on Sir Rowland, Lord Wellington had provided against it by requesting Marshal Beresford to reinforce him with the 6th division, which had crossed the Nive accordingly at daylight that morning ; and he sent also for the fourth and two brigades of the third, and formed them in reserve. The expected coming of the 6th division gave Sir Rowland great facility in making his movements ; but before its arrival he had completely repulsed the enemy, the troops under his immediate command being about 13,000 men, and the force by which they were attacked little, if at all, short of twice that number. The allies kept their ground, . . . their purpose, therefore, was effected ; Soult's troops, when beaten back, had the city and the intrenched camp in their immediate rear, and retired under cover of their guns placed in position. They remained in great force in front of that camp, and kept up a warm cannonade upon the centre ; but the officers could not induce their men again to renew attacks which they had found so destructive. Sir William Stewart then directed Major-General Byng to unite his brigade and attack the enemy upon the opposite bank of the mill-stream, in front of the height of Vieux Monguerre. Byng did this in the most gallant style, carrying the colours of the 66th himself, and planting them, under a hot fire of musketry and artillery, in their position. The third regiment crossed the mill-stream to co-operate in the attack ; the brigade then drove the enemy down, and Buchan's Portuguese arrived to aid in finally repulsing them. About four o'clock the action terminated in a continued skirmishing : at night the enemy retired within their camp.

The loss of the allies during these five days, in killed,

wounded, and missing, amounted to 5029, of whom 302 were officers: nearly half the loss fell upon the Portuguese, upon whom, indeed, as much reliance was now placed as upon the British themselves. The last day was the most destructive: Generals Barnes, Le Cor, and Ashworth, and nearly the whole of the staff and aides-de-camp of Sir William Stewart, and of Generals Barnes and Byng, were wounded. The French return made their loss 1314 killed and 4600 wounded. They fought well in this long series of actions, far better than they had done in defending their position upon the Nivelle; and this can only be explained by the different feeling with which men, and especially men of the French temperament, are animated when standing on their defence, from that which excites them when they are themselves the assailants. Marshal Soult, who was never wanting in ability, never displayed more than on this occasion. The often repeated effort cost him his best troops, and forced upon him the mortifying conviction that, brave as they were, and admirably disciplined, they were nevertheless inferior to their opponents: for all circumstances here had been in his favour; the points of attack were at his own choice, and wherever he attacked he brought into the field a greatly superior force; yet every where he had been defeated. Not venturing, therefore, again to repeat a trial in which he had so often failed, though he had at this time 50,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, he cantoned his army in a defensive position, having its right on the camp round Bayonne, its centre spread along the right of the Adour to Port de Laune, and its left along the right of the Bidouse, from its confluence to S. Palais, posting two divisions of cavalry on the left of that place, and a weak division, under Harispe, at S. Jean de Pied-de-Port. That General had been withdrawn from Suchet's army for this service, because, being a native of the valley of Baigorry, and

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*Soult takes
a defensive
position.*

CHAP. XLV. having distinguished himself as a partizan in the Pyrenees, in the years 1794 and 1795, it was supposed that he might raise some irregular corps of his countrymen, and turn against the allies that system of guerrilla warfare which had proved so destructive to the invaders in Spain. Marshal Soult apprehended that Bayonne would be invested; and therefore he made Port de Lanne, which is on the Adour, eighteen miles above that city, his principal dépôt, laying down a bridge there, and protecting it by strong works; and he lined the right of the river with redoubts armed with heavy cannon. He intrenched Hastingues, and covered Peyrehorade with a *tête-de-pont*, for the defence of the Gave de Pau; and in like manner secured the passages over the Bidouse at Guiche, Bedache, and Came. He also strengthened the fortifications of S. Jean de Pied-de-Port and Navarreins, and intrenched Dax as an entrepôt for stores and reinforcements from the interior; thus omitting no measure of precaution which a just estimate of his enemy's strength seemed to require.

The allies wait in their cantonments for better weather.

The weather, by impeding for awhile any advance on the part of the allies, allowed him time for this. Lord Wellington waited till it should become more favourable, having obtained possession of a large tract of country, and being in a situation from whence to resume his operations with advantage as soon as the season might permit. Upon first entering France he had circulated among the inhabitants those general orders in which he enjoined his troops to respect their persons and property, accompanying them with a brief proclamation to the people. He had given, he said, and would enforce these positive orders for preventing those evils that might otherwise be looked for as the ordinary consequences of an invasion which they knew was the result of their own government's invasion of Spain, and of the victories of the allied armies. He

requested them to apprehend and bring before him any person who, disobeying these instructions, might offer them any injury; and, on their side, he required them to remain in their houses, and take no part in the war of which their country was now to be the scene. Great injury must inevitably be endured by the inhabitants of any country upon which that visitation falls; but none was suffered now which could be prevented by vigilant discipline founded upon just views of policy and a strict sense of justice. On the morning after the line of the Nivelle had been forced, a peasant was brought before Lord Wellington, having been taken near the British outposts: the man's simple account of himself was, that he was going to drive his sheep to Bayonne; upon which he was told that he might go where he pleased, and take his sheep where he pleased too. When the French saw that the peasantry were thus treated, . . . that the very few who were taken in arms were shipped off, like other prisoners, for England, . . . and that marauders were brought to summary punishment, they perceived that their invaders were as equitable as they were brave, and that the word of a British general was sacred.

The guerrilla troops, whom it would have been more difficult to restrain, were kept upon their own frontier. The discipline of the Portuguese was as good as that of the English. Marshal Beresford, when he commended them in one of his orders for their excellent conduct at the line of the Nivelle, expressed his particular satisfaction with their behaviour in their quarters and towards the inhabitants in general. They had proved, he said, their superiority over the French troops in the field of battle; and they had shown, also, to the French people that they were not less superior to those troops in humanity and in their whole deportment, whereby, as well as by their discipline and courage, they did honour to their country. The Portuguese were not less gratified by another order which Marshal Beres-

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ford issued after the passage of the Nive. He had deemed it necessary, in the spring of the preceding year, to deprive certain militia regiments of their colours, till they should have redeemed their character in the presence of the enemy; this, he said, they had had no opportunity of doing, the war having happily been removed far from their own country: but regiments raised in the same parts of Portugal, composed of their brethren and other near kinsmen, and in which, in fact, many of the very men who, in the said militias, had incurred this disgrace were now serving, had, in the late series of victories, demeaned themselves so gallantly, that they had re-established the character of their respective provinces; wherefore in justice he ordered that their colours should be restored. Their misconduct, he added, had proceeded not from want of courage, but from insubordination, . . . and that, too, not the effect of wilful disobedience, but arising from habits of undue familiarity between the officers and the men, owing to which, the latter were not prepared to render prompt obedience when it was indispensable. He reminded the officers, therefore, how necessary it was that they should obtain the respect of their soldiers by treatment at the same time just, impartial, gentle, and firm; and observed that the provincial governors would see the necessity henceforth of recommending, for commissions in the militia, persons who were qualified by their means and by their local respectability. *Correio Braziliense, t. 12, p. 306.* Marshal Beresford understood the national character. The Portuguese were in no slight degree gratified by this: they were proud of the military reputation which they had now established, and not less deservedly of that national feeling which they had manifested under every circumstance of good or evil fortune. *Conduct of Spanish and Portuguese soldiers at Dantzic.* A signal example of this feeling was given shortly afterwards by a battalion of Portuguese and Spaniards, composed of men who had been entrapped into the enemy's service

before the commencement of the struggle in their own country. They formed part of the garrison of Dantzic when the allies besieged it; and, knowing that the besiegers were in alliance with Spain and Portugal, no threats or inducements could prevail upon them to bear arms in defence of the city: in consequence of this firm refusal, the French commander compelled them to work upon the fortifications; but they had their reward; and when the place surrendered, they were maintained at the expense of the Russian government, till they could be transported to England on their way home.

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The Spanish government had shown no want of gratitude to Lord Wellington in conferring upon him honours and rewards. They gave him the title of Duque del Vittoria after the victory which drove the Intruder out of Spain; but while in such things they conformed to the national sentiment, their conduct sometimes manifested a want of that frank and generous confidence which ought to have been given in as full measure as it was deserved. In direct breach of the engagement made with him when he accepted the command of the Spanish armies, they had superseded Castaños, and made other changes, not only without his advice and concurrence, but contrary to his wishes, and in disregard of his remonstrances: and this might have produced the most injurious effect, if the war had not speedily been transferred to the enemy's country. Libels were circulated imputing sinister views to England, because some of its troops still remained at Cadiz and at Carthagená; and the government allowed these libels to circulate without taking any means for counteracting the impression which the calumny was intended to produce. Lord Wellington withdrew the troops as soon (after their presence had ceased to be necessary there) as he could obtain the Prince Regent's orders; and, in notifying this to the British ambassador, he stated the circumstances under which those fortresses had

*Ill conduct
of the Spa-
nish govern-
ment toward
Lord Well-
ington.*

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*Change of
the Re-
gency.*

been garrisoned at the request of the Spanish government itself; expressed his surprize that the existing government, knowing these facts, should yet have allowed such calumnies to pass uncontradicted, and requested that his letter might be published. The Regency was, indeed, at this time the mere instrument of the Cortes, which had displaced the late regents by a summary vote, for demurring to enforce an impolitic decree that the clergy scrupled to obey. Cardinal Bourbon, Don Pedro Agar, and Don Gabriel Ciscar were appointed in their stead to a station which opssessed only a nominal authority, the Cortes, under the dictation of a party more ardent than wise, having now arrogated to itself the whole actual power.

A whimsical proof had recently occurred of the readiness with which certain Spaniards accredited any imputation, however absurd, upon the intentions of the British government. A foolish paragraph had appeared in some Irish newspaper, saying, that Lord Wellington deserved to be made King of Spain; and that some of the grandees had offered to raise him to the throne! This found its way to Spain; and the Duques of Ossuna and Frias, the Visconde de Gante, and the Marques de Villena, published forthwith a letter to inform the world, that they neither did, nor would, acknowledge any other King than Ferdinand VII.;...that they detested and abhorred the very idea of any usurper ruling over the Spaniards;...and that they were persuaded that the other grandees, as soon as this statement should come to their knowledge, would hasten, in like manner, to give a public testimony of their principles and their fidelity!

*Proceed-
ings in Par-
liament.*

Parliament met early in November, under more auspicious circumstances than at any time since the baneful commencement of the French revolution. England, which had stood alone in the contest against the most formidable military

power that had ever existed in the civilized world, was now in alliance, not with the Spaniards and Portuguese alone, but with Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, Bavaria, and Holland. Buonaparte had been driven back over the Rhine; and a British army, after beating the French from the lines of Torres Vedras to the Pyrenees, had passed that boundary and entered France. Upon this occasion, some of those statesmen who had been most decided in their opposition to government, acknowledged the wisdom, and rejoiced in the success, of that policy which they had formerly condemned. "Upon this grand question," said Lord Grenville, "all party conflicts must be swallowed up and lost; it is the cause of no party, of no set of individuals, but of the whole nation joined in sentiment and in action to effect a great and glorious purpose. Internal tranquillity," he said, "might be considered as the first, and external peace as the second, blessing that any power under Heaven could confer upon a people; but what we desired and expected was the real blessing of peace, not the empty name; not the shadow but the substance. Too long did deluded Europe, by temporary and partial truces, by concession following concession, purchase from the insatiable enemy a precarious quiet, a troubled sleep; furnishing to her foe the very means of his aggression, and of her own subjugation. The time, my lords, is now arrived (and I rejoice that I have lived to see the hour) when the walls of a British parliament may again re-echo a sound formerly held sacred in this country, and upon the observance of which, I will venture to assert, depends the hope of the restoration of peace to Europe;..I allude to the old-fashioned tenet, now almost forgotten, of a balance of power in Europe; and I offer up my thanks, with humble gratitude, to the Supreme Disposer of Events, that after so long a period he has permitted me to behold my native land

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Lord Gren-
ville.

Nov. 4.

CHAP. XLV. in such a commanding situation, as to be able again to pursue
1813. that which ought to be the only legitimate object of foreign
November. policy, I mean the establishment and preservation of a balance of
power in Europe. Now, then, let Great Britain resume her
ancient policy; let her once more perceive that the only mode
by which the independence of the great commonwealth of
Europe can be secured, is not by perpetual peace (for that is
the visionary dream of visionary men), but by the maintenance
of this balance, by which, even in war itself, the weak will
find refuge from oppression. Whatever plans may be sug-
gested, having this in view, I shall meet with the most earnest
wish to find that they are compatible with the interests of the
country. I cannot be ignorant of the difficulties that may be
opposed: I do, however, fervently hope, nay, I believe, that
they may be surmounted. Do me not the injustice of believing
that these opinions are the result merely of the exultation felt in
consequence of recent and unexpected events. Undoubtedly
such events are calculated to warm the heart of every individual
who feels not only for the natural rights of man, but for the
independence of nations; but those with whom I have been in
the habit of confidential communication know my deliberate
opinion, that the existence of such a confederation as has now been
formed, of itself irresistibly calls upon Great Britain to employ
all her energies, and devote all her exertions to the success of
a common and a glorious cause. I was prepared to add an
exhortation, that as the chances of war must necessarily be
precarious, you would prepare yourselves to meet with firmness
those disasters which human foresight could not predict, and
which human wisdom could not prevent. Even now, under
circumstances that might seem almost to justify the confidence
of certainty, I offer that exhortation. If in the course of human
events (although I see little cause to fear) any unforeseen

calamity should unfortunately occur, remember the glorious cause in which you are engaged ; it may for an instant damp your hopes, but let it not damp your ardour, or shake your resolution. Be assured, my lords, of this, . . (I hope you are already assured of it), that there is for this country no separate safety, no separate peace ! There is neither safety nor peace for England, but with the safety and peace of Europe ; . . as for continental Europe, it is equally true, that an indissoluble union, a firm confederation with this country can alone secure for all liberty, tranquillity, and happiness, . . can alone obtain peace, now almost beyond the memory of living man. The plain duty of this country, placing its trust in Providence, is to improve by every possible exertion the bright prospect that lies before us. With the energies of Great Britain duly applied, ultimate success may be confidently anticipated ; we may now look forward to the speedy accomplishment of that great purpose for which we have already sacrificed, performed, and endured so much, . . and for which we are still ready to sacrifice, perform, and endure."

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In the same spirit, Marquis Wellesley declared, that the satisfaction he felt in the events which had now changed the destinies of Europe was with him a principle and not a sentiment. "It was not so much," he said, "because those events had raised the military reputation of this country and of our allies, that they had the highest value in his eyes, but because they were the natural result of wise and cautious measures, executed with the greatest degree of vigour ; and displaying a wisdom of combination and prudence of plan which could not fail ultimately to be rewarded with the success by which they were attended. He would not dwell on former errors ; but he would not hesitate to say that the glorious successes which had lately crowned our arms in Spain, and the arms of our allies in the

*Marquis
Wellesley.*

CHAP. north of Europe, were to be traced to the long train of per-
 XLV. severing councils persisted in by the government of this country.

1813. Though those councils had not always immediately produced the
 November. results that were expected, they were not the less the cause of what
 had ultimately taken place. While we were exerting ourselves
 in a struggle apparently hopeless, at that moment the public
 councils of this country were of the utmost importance to
 European liberty; for opportunity was thus given to the rest
 of Europe to re-consider their former errors, and to learn that
 great lesson which the example of Britain afforded them.
 Nothing could be more true than the last words which that
 great statesman, Mr. Pitt, ever delivered in public, that Eng-
 land had saved herself by her firmness, and other nations by
 her example. What a satisfactory and consoling reflection was
 it for us, that from this fountain the sacred waters of gladness
 and glory had flowed;...that to the persevering spirit of this
 country it was owing that other nations were at last animated to
 deeds worthy of the cause in which they were engaged, and of
 the example which was set them!"

Lord Liver-
 pool.

Lord Liverpool rejoiced that on this great occasion a spirit of
 unanimity prevailed in the British parliament. "We had seen,"
 he said, "during the preceding twenty years, coalitions whose
 size promised strength, crushed by the power of the enemy: what
 was it then which had given this irresistible impulse to the
 present? The feeling of national independence, that feeling
 which first arose in the Peninsula, gave the war a new character,
 and afforded grounds to hope not only for the deliverance of
 that country, but of the rest of Europe. There had before been
 wars of governments, but none like this between nations; and all
 our principles of policy and prudence must have been belied, if
 the issue of the present confederacy had not been very different
 from that of any of the former ones. They had before them

examples of perseverance unexampled in any other cause than that of liberty; they had seen the least military nations of Europe become formidable, and successfully resist the best disciplined troops of France. Small as Portugal was, the establishment of the Portuguese army had been of the greatest consequence, as the foundation of the success of the allied armies in the Peninsula; and as it gave, in addition to the general national feeling, a military tone, under the influence of which the Portuguese troops have been raised to an equality with the British. He was advancing no paradox, but a truth which was felt and admitted on the continent, when he said that the success of the peninsular cause gave new life to the suffering nations of Europe."

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This theme was pursued in the House of Commons with great eloquence by Mr. Charles Grant. "If," said he, "we had shown a dastardly spirit at the commencement of these troubles, where now would have been the deliverance of Europe? There will be no prouder page in history than that which tells of this struggle and its victorious result, . . . which tells that at a time when the foundations of the world seemed to be shaken, when all former constitutions were swept away, rather as if by a sudden whirlwind than by any of the ordinary means of destruction, . . . there was yet one nation, which, reposing under the shade of a happy constitution, proud of its ancient liberties and worthy to defend them, dared to measure its strength at one time against the unnatural energies of a frantic democracy, at another time against the gigantic resources of the most tremendous despotism that ever scourged the world. If, after this narration, history were obliged to add that in this struggle at last we fell, but that we fell gloriously, with our arms in our hands and our faces to the foe, even this would have been no mean praise: but, thank God, history will be called, not to

Mr. C.
Grant.

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lament the fall of British greatness, but to celebrate its renewed exploits and its living triumphs. . . It is to the theatre of these triumphs, it is to that soil which but lately seemed incapable of producing a single effort, that the moralist of after-ages will resort for examples when he denounces the fall of unhallowed greatness. There too will the patriot look for lessons of enthusiasm and disinterested virtue ; and this is the glorious feature of the present war. I have heard it observed of America, that her conduct has dispelled those classical associations which we have been accustomed to indulge of republican virtue and republican excellence. The remark was not more eloquently than justly made. But if we are obliged to give up that class of associations, I perceive with exultation that there is another which we may now cherish with additional fondness ; I mean those associations which enforce the belief of instinctive patriotism, of unbidden enthusiasm in the cause of virtue, of the grandeur of self-devotion, of the magnanimity of great sacrifices for great objects, for honour, for independence. We must all recollect with what delight we imbibed these sentiments at the fountains of classical learning, and followed them out into action in the history of great men and illustrious states. But of late there seems to have crept into this nation a sort of spurious and barren philosophy, of which it was the object to decry these associations, to represent them as the illusions of ignorance, or frenzy, or falsehood, to curb the original play of nature, to inculcate coldness and selfishness upon system, and to substitute in the place of all that formed the delight of a higher philosophy, a spirit of lazy deliberation, conducted by apathy, and ending therefore in meanness and dishonour. It was this philosophy which taught that it is not only more prudent, but more conformable to the laws of our being, for every man in time of danger to reason before he followed the

promptings of true courage ; to make it a matter of calculation whether his country be worth saving before he draws the sword in her defence ; to reduce it to a question of algebra, or a problem in geometry, whether he should resist the efforts of tyranny, or bow before the yoke ! The sleep which seemed to have spread over Europe gave too much countenance to these pernicious maxims ; but the hour has at length come which has exposed their fallacy, and rescued human nature from such calumnies. The experience of the few last years has confuted that heartless and bloodless system, the miserable abortion of a cold head and depraved imagination, which never awakened one noble thought, nor inspired one generous action. The experience of the few last years has proved that those high sentiments which we were taught to respect are not false and visionary ; but that they are founded upon whatever is deepest and purest in the human character. It has proved that true reason is never at war with just feeling ; that man is now what he was in those distant ages, . . . a creature born indeed to act upon principle, but born also to act upon strong passions ; and that he never acts more nobly, more wisely, more worthily of himself, than when he acts upon the prompt persuasion of grand passions, sublimed and directed by lofty principles."

Even Mr. Whitbread felt it necessary to say, that the proud exultation which then was manifested throughout the nation was hailed by no one, in the House or in the country, with more enthusiastic feelings than by himself ; and that he gave credit to the ministry, and to him who was at the head of it, till cut off by the dreadful deed which every one deplored, " for the great and steady confidence which they had placed in the talents and genius of our great commander, " . . . that confidence for which Mr. Whitbread and the party with whom he acted had so often, so confidently, and so contemptuously reproached them ! He insisted

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bread.

CHAP. XLV. however, that the deliverance of Europe had not been brought
1813. about by following Mr. Pitt's policy ; and that if the counsels
November. of Mr. Fox had been listened to, the carnage of the present
campaign would not have been necessary. " And," said he,
" I am particularly glad to observe the explicit terms of the
Prince Regent's speech, in which it is distinctly avowed that
no disposition is entertained to require from France sacrifices
of any description inconsistent with her honour or just pre-
tensions as a nation. I sincerely hope this feeling pervades the
whole alliance ; an alliance with which I am not inclined to
quarrel, as I have been with former ones, for it is promoted
and cemented by a feeling of common danger and necessity,
and not purchased and raised up to oppress France. It has
arisen from the keen and indignant sentiment which the grinding
oppression of France herself has excited ; and it holds out
a memorable lesson to the governments of Europe. France,
in the course of her career since the revolution, disturbed
and overthrew the ancient monarchies, upon the pretext of
their tyranny and despotism ; but when those states passed
under the power of France, who was to liberate them, they
found themselves subjected to a despotism still more odious, to
a thralldom still more insupportable. The Emperor of that
country is now in a condition to which, I firmly believe, nothing
but his own restless and gigantic ambition could have reduced
him : I hope the alliance will profit from this. I do not pretend
to know what were the terms proposed to France before the
termination of the armistice ; but I sincerely hope that now, in
the moment of success, the same terms will still be offered." . .
At this there was a general murmur through the House. . . " I am
not surprized," he continued, " at hearing this murmur : perhaps
I am misunderstood. What I mean to say is, and that I will
maintain, that whatever terms may have been proposed to

France at that time, as a basis upon which negotiations for peace might take place, I hope the same basis will now be offered, . . or else I see no conclusion to which the war can come."

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Mr. Canning was not present during this debate, but he took the first opportunity that presented itself for delivering his sentiments. "If," said he, "in the present state of this country and of the world, those who, during the course of the tremendous and protracted struggle, on various occasions, called upon parliament to pause, to retard its too rapid and too rash advance, and to draw back from the task it had unwisely undertaken to perform, . . if those persons have manfully and honourably stepped forward to join their congratulations to the joyful acclamations of the nation, and to admit the present to be the period favourable for a mighty and decided effort, how much more grateful must it be to those who, at no time during the struggle, have lifted up their voices in this place, excepting to recommend and to urge new exertions, . . to those who, when the prospects were most dreary and melancholy, insisted that there was but one course becoming the character and honour of Great Britain, . . a persevering and undaunted resistance to the overwhelming power of France! To an individual who, under the most discouraging circumstances, still maintained that the deliverance of Europe (often a derided term) was an object not only worthy of our arms, but possible to be achieved, it must be doubly welcome to come forward and vindicate his share in the national exultation. If, too, on the other hand, there have been those who, having recommended pacification when the opportunity was less favourable, are now warranted, as undoubtedly they are, in uttering the same sentiments, in the confidence that the country will sympathize with them, it is natural for those who, under other circumstances, have discouraged the expectation of peace, and have warned the nation

November.

Mr. Can-
ning.

Nov. 17.

CHAP. XLV. against precipitate overtures, now to be anxious to embrace
 1813. this occasion of stating their sincere conviction and their joy
 November. (as strongly felt by them as by others) that, by the happy course
 of events during the last year, and by the wise policy we shall now
 pursue, peace may not, perhaps, be within our grasp, but is at
 least within our view. It is impossible to look back upon those
 times when the enemy vaunted, and we perhaps feared, that we
 should have been compelled to sue for peace, without, amid all
 the ebullition of joy, returning thanks to that Providence which
 gave us courage and heart still to bear up against accumulating
 calamity. Peace is safe now, because it is not dictated; peace
 is safe now, for it is the fruit of exertion, the child of victory;
 peace is safe now, because it will not be purchased at the
 expense of the interest and of the honour of the empire: it is
 not the ransom to buy off danger, but the fruit of the mighty
 means which we have employed to drive danger from our shores.
 I must, with heartfelt delight, congratulate my country, that,
 groaning as she has done at former periods under the heavy
 pressure of adverse war, still 'peace was despaired of, for who
 could think of submission?' Her strength, her endurance have
 been tried and proved by every mode of assault that the most
 refined system of hostility could invent, not only by open
 military attacks, but by low attempts to destroy her commercial
 prosperity: the experiment has been made, the experiment has
 failed; and we are now triumphantly, but not arrogantly, to
 consider what measures of security should be adopted, or on
 what terms a peace should be concluded.

"But has this country gained nothing by the glorious contest,
 even supposing peace should be far distant? Is it nothing to
 Great Britain, even purchased at so large a price, that her mili-
 tary character has been exalted? Is it no satisfaction...no
 compensation to her...to reflect that the splendid scenes displayed

on the continent are owing to her efforts? that the victories of Germany are to be attributed to our victories in the Peninsula? That spark, often feeble, and sometimes so nearly extinguished as to excite despair in all hearts that were not above it, . . . that spark which was lighted in Portugal, which was fed and nourished there, has at length burst into a flame that has dazzled and illuminated Europe. At the commencement of this war, our empire rested upon one majestic column, our naval power. In the prosecution of the war, a hero has raised another stupendous pillar of strength to support our monarchy, . . . our military pre-eminence. It is now that we may boast not only of superiority at sea, but on shore; the same energy and heroism exist in both the arms of Great Britain: they are rivals in strength, but inseparable in glory. Out of the calamities of war has arisen a principle of safety, that, superior to all attacks, shall survive through ages, and to which our posterity shall look forward. Compare the situation of England with her condition at the renewal of the war! Were we not then threatened by the aggressions of an enemy even upon our own shores, . . . were we not then trembling for the safety and sanctity even of our homes? Now contemplate Wellington encamped on the Bidassoa! I know that a sickly sensibility leads some to doubt whether the advance of Lord Wellington was not rash and precipitate. I cannot enter into that refinement which induces those who affect to know much to hesitate upon this subject: I cannot look with regret upon a British army encamped upon the fertile plains of France: I cannot believe that any new grounds for apprehension are raised by an additional excitement being afforded to the irritability of the French people: I foresee no disadvantage from entering the territories of our enemy not as the conquered but the conquerors! I cannot regret that the Portuguese are now looking upon the walls of Bayonne 'that circle in those wolves'

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CHAP. XLV. which would have devastated their capital, . . . that the Portuguese
 1813. now behold planted on the towers of Bayonne the standard
 November. which their enemy would have made to float upon the walls of
 Lisbon! I cannot think it a matter of regret that the Spaniards
 are now recovering from the grasp of an enemy on his own
 shores, that diadem which was stripped from the brow of the
 Bourbons to be pocketed by a usurper! I cannot think it a
 matter of regret that England formerly threatened with invasion
 is now the invader, . . . that France instead of England is the scene
 of conflict! I cannot think all this matter of regret; and of
 those who believe that the nation or myself are blinded by our
 successes, I entreat that they will leave me to my delusion, and
 keep their philosophy to themselves.

“Our enemy,” the accomplished orator pursued, “who enslaved
 the press and made it contribute so importantly to his own pur-
 poses of ambition, endeavoured to impress upon other nations a
 belief that Great Britain fought only to secure her own interests,
 and that her views were completely selfish. That illusion is
 now destroyed, and the designs of this country are vindicated.
 We call on all the powers with whom we have been or are at
 war to do us justice in this respect: above all we claim it of
 America! I ask her to review her own and the policy of this
 country! Now she can behold Buonaparte in his naked deformity,
 stripped of the false glory which success cast around him; the
 spell of his invincibility is now dissolved; she can now look at
 him without that awe which an uninterrupted series of victo-
 ries had created. Were she now to survey him as he is, what
 would be the result? She would trace him by the desolation of
 empires, and the dismemberment of states. She would see him
 pursuing his course over the ruins of men and of things: slavery
 to the people and destruction to commerce, hostility to literature,
 to light, and life, were the principles upon which he acted. His

object was to extinguish patriotism, and to confound allegiance ; to darken as well as to enslave ; to roll back the tide of civilization ; to barbarize as well as to desolate mankind. Then let America turn from these scenes of bloodshed and horror, and compare with them the effect of British interference ! She will see that wherever this country has exerted herself, it has been to raise the fallen and to support the falling ; to raise, not to degrade the national character ; to rouse the sentiments of patriotism which tyranny had silenced ; to enlighten, to reanimate, to liberate. Great Britain has resuscitated Spain, and re-created Portugal ; Germany is now a nation as well as a name ; and all these glorious effects have been produced by the efforts and by the example of our country. If to be the deliverers of Europe ; if to have raised our own national character, not upon the ruins of other kingdoms ; if to meet dangers without shrinking, and to possess courage rising with difficulties, be admirable, surely we may not unreasonably hope for the applause of the world. If we have founded our strength upon a rock, and possess the implicit confidence of those allies whom we have succoured when they seemed beyond relief, then I say that our exertions during the last year, and all our efforts during the war, are cheaply purchased ; if we have burdened ourselves, we have relieved others ; and we have the inward, the soul-felt, the proud satisfaction of knowing that a selfish charge is that which, with the faintest shadow of justice, cannot be brought against us."

This speech was wormwood to Mr. Whitbread ; he animadverted in reply upon what he termed the overweening self-complacency with which Mr. Canning talked of the share we had had in giving a decisive turn to the aspect of affairs in the North ; it was the conduct of this country, he asserted, which had enabled Buonaparte to proceed as he had done in his unprin-

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Mr. Whitbread,

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cipled career: Great Britain had made Buonaparte, and he had undone himself. "If there were no broad and definite outline previously laid down," he said, "and firmly adhered to, as to the demands on the part of the allies, or the concessions on that of France, which were to form the groundwork of a general peace, he would venture to predict that before long some one or other of the allies would make a separate treaty founded on its own views or interests. And if we attempted blindly to push our advantages too far, he feared we should rouse the same irresistible power in France which in 1793 had repelled the combined attacks of all Europe, which had since led on the Emperor of the French to his conquests, and which might again turn the tide of success against us."

Militia allowed to volunteer for foreign service.

In pursuance of these opinions, Mr. Whitbread, when a bill was brought in for allowing three-fourths of any militia regiment to volunteer for foreign service, moved to insert in the preamble to the bill, that this was for bringing the war to a speedy and happy termination, and obtaining the blessings of peace upon terms of reciprocity, honour, and security, to all the belligerent powers. What he meant by reciprocity between some of those powers he would have found it difficult to explain;...but the proposed insertion was negatived as unnecessary, and Mr. Whitbread neither opposed the bill, nor the supplies voted for carrying into effect the engagements of this nation with its allies. Lord Holland approved of the confidence which was thus placed in ministers. "Although," he said, "great part of the happy results of this war might be justly attributed to a powerful popular impulse, and to that infatuation on the part of the enemy, which, thank God, always attended the long abuse of power, . . yet it must be felt that a great deal of the merit is to be attributed to the conduct of the government of this country. If the sentiments of an individual," he pursued, "are of conse-

Lord Holland.

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quence enough to arrest your attention, it must be in your lordships' recollection that I always approved of the interposition and interference of ministers in the cause of Spain. The merit of such policy appears, and ever has appeared to my judgement, quite indisputable, and must now indeed be universally admitted; for, aided by the uncommon genius of Lord Wellington, that policy has produced the most important results. It has driven the enemy from that country which he had so long and so unremittingly oppressed. It has presented a most encouraging and impressive example to Europe of what a people excited by oppression were capable of achieving. It has changed the whole character of the war, by making it a war of the people. But a still farther advantage has arisen out of this policy. A most atrocious calumny had become current in Europe, that the government of this country was always ready to distribute its subsidies with a view to embroil the nations of the continent, while it kept its own people aloof from the contest. No such impression can ever again prevail in Europe. The calumny has been effectually refuted by the policy we have pursued with respect to Spain; for there we have not only given our money but our men; there we have given our money, not to excite the people but to enable them to act, and we have seconded their exertions by a powerful army.

“ In declaring my approbation of ministers in consequence of their moderate language and conduct, that approbation is, of course, founded upon a hope and confidence, that the very different language which appears in certain publications has in no degree their sanction or countenance. Sounding a violent and barbarous war-whoop through the country, abounding in coarse, vulgar, virulent epithets, these publications complete their abominable character by excitements to assassination. Although the French ruler has rendered himself so odious by

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his conduct, yet it must be admitted that he is a great military commander, still at the head of a great nation; and is it fitting that the press of this country should become the means of advising the assassination of such a man, . . . nay, of exhorting to the deed? and what else can be meant by the repeated declaration, that no peace can be concluded while this individual lives? The French ruler is no doubt ambitious, inordinately ambitious; but if it were resolved that no peace should be made with France while it was under the government of an ambitious man, when, I would ask, could peace be expected? The meaning, however, of all the publications I have referred to may be to recommend the restoration of the Bourbon family; but the attempt at such a measure would be totally inconsistent with the professed moderation and policy of ministers. That restoration might be good; but it would be preposterous to look for the success of such an object through the intervention of foreign armies; and it would be opposite to the policy and principle of ministers to engage in any such undertaking."

Alluding then to the just remark of Lord Grenville, that one great advantage resulting from the recent changes on the continent was, that it afforded an opportunity for restoring the balance of power, "I must be allowed," said Lord Holland, "to say, that the re-establishment and maintenance of that balance can never consist in, nor depend upon, particular divisions of territory, so much as upon the existence of a general feeling among the European states, that it is the interest of each to preserve the independence of each and all. Such is the feeling which gave birth and cement to the present confederacy; and therefore I wish that such a confederacy may continue to exist in peace as well as in war. I esteem the principle of this confederacy, because it appears solicitous to preserve the interest of all, without gratifying the peculiar interest

of any one; and upon that principle I would rather leave France with such possessions as should make her feel an interest in the common object of the confederacy, than transfer from her to any other state any possessions which might be likely to withdraw that state from the general feeling which it is the interest of peace and Europe to improve and strengthen."

It was well for Great Britain and for the continent that Buonaparte was not contented with such terms of peace as the allies, with a generosity which had neither the character of wisdom nor of justice, would a little before this have granted him. Even when he had been driven over the Rhine, they would, according to their own declaration, have left France more powerful than she had ever been under her Kings, if he would have consented to give up Italy. Out of Germany and out of the Peninsula he had been beaten; but they would have allowed France to remain with the whole of the Netherlands, and with the Rhine for her boundary, if vain-glory and a blind confidence in his fortune had not still demented Buonaparte. But he declared that he would not under any circumstances abandon Italy; and they who ought not under any circumstances now to have negotiated with him, prepared to enter France. On his part he collected the largest force that that exhausted country could supply to resist the impending invasion; and as it thus became an object of great importance for him to bring to his assistance Suchet's army, and the troops who were shut up in the remaining garrisons in Valencia and Catalonia, he thought this might be effected by dictating a treaty to his prisoner, Ferdinand. Accordingly he sent the Comte de Laforest to Valençay, to negotiate with that poor Prince, saying, that under the existing circumstances of his empire and his policy, he wished at once to settle the affairs of Spain; that England was encouraging Jacobinism and anarchy there, for

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Terms offered by the allies to Buonaparte.

Buonaparte treats with Ferdinand.

CHAP. the purpose of destroying the nobility and the monarchy, and
 XLV. erecting a republic; that he could not but grievously feel the
 1813. destruction of a neighbouring state, connected by so many
 November. maritime and commercial interests with his own; that he
 desired to remove every pretext for English interference, and
 to re-establish those ties of friendship and good neighbourhood
 by which Spain and France had been so long connected; and
 therefore he had sent the Comte de Laforest under a feigned
 name, to whom his Royal Highness might give entire credit in
 all that he should propose.

*Conference
 between
 Comte de
 Laforest
 and Fer-
 dinand.*

The Count accordingly presented himself under the name of M. Dubois, in order that the negotiation might be kept secret, because, if the English were to discover, they would use every means for frustrating it. The Emperor, he represented, had done all he could in Bayonne to accommodate the differences which then existed between father and son; but the English had marred every thing; they had introduced Jacobinism into Spain, where the land was laid waste, religion destroyed, the clergy ruined, the nobility crushed, the marine existing only in name, the colonies dismembered and in insurrection, and, in fine, every thing overthrown. Those islanders desired nothing but to change the monarchy into a republic; and yet, to deceive the people, they put the name of his Royal Highness at the head of all their public acts. Moved by these calamities, and by the lamentations of all good Spaniards, the Emperor had chosen him for this important mission, because of his long experience, for he had been more than forty years in the diplomatic career, and had resided in every court; but, as there were so many persons who knew him, he requested that the Spanish Princes on their part would contribute to keep the affair secret. Ferdinand had at this time none with whom to consult, except his brother and his uncle, who were both as inexperienced in

business as himself. He replied, that so unexpected a proposition required much reflection ; he must have time for considering it, and would let him know the result. Laforest, without waiting for this, obtained an audience on the following day, and then said that, if his Majesty accepted the kingdom of Spain, which the Emperor wished to restore to him, they must concert means for getting the English out of that country. To this Ferdinand replied, that he could make no treaty, considering the circumstances in which he was placed at Valençay, and indeed could take no measures without the consent of the nation, as represented by the Regency. The old diplomatist made answer, it certainly was not the intention of the Emperor that his Majesty should do the slightest thing which might be contrary to the wish of Spain ; but in this case it would be necessary that he should find means of ascertaining it. Ferdinand then said that, during five years and a half, for so long he had been absent from his own country, he had known nothing more of the state of affairs than what he read in the French newspapers. Those papers, Laforest affirmed, exhibited the true state of things ; and he made a speech of some length to prove what Ferdinand was not so devoid of penetration as to believe. He concluded in words to this effect : “ He who is born to a kingdom has no will of his own ; he must be a King, and is not like a private individual, free to choose for himself that way of life which he may think most agreeable. And where is he who, when a kingdom is offered him, would not instantly accept it ? Yet, withal, if he who should be a King were to say, ‘ I renounce all dignity from this time, and, far from seeking honours, desire only to lead a private life,’ in that case the affair becomes of a different kind. If, therefore, your Royal Highness is in this predicament, the Emperor must have recourse to other means ; but if, as I cannot but believe, your Royal Highness thinks of receiving the sceptre, the

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CHAP. indispensable preliminary must be to settle the principal bases
XLV. of the negotiation upon which afterwards to treat, and for this
1813. purpose to appoint a Spaniard, one of those who are at this
November. time in France." Ferdinand calmly replied that this required
consideration. Upon this Laforest observed, that when a king-
dom was to be received, there was not much to consider, reasons
of state being the sole rule of conduct. But Ferdinand made
answer, that he was far from agreeing with him in that maxim ;
it was his belief that nothing required greater consideration,
and he would take time to deliberate upon it.

Ferdinand could not have acted with better judgement at this
time, if he had had the ablest statesmen to advise him. In fact,
the straight course was the sure one ; for, though he had been kept
in complete ignorance of all recent events, the very circumstance
of this proposal was proof sufficient that Buonaparte's fortune
had failed, and that his motive for giving up his pretensions to
Spain was that he was no longer able to support them. On the
morrow, he said to the ambassador that, having maturely reflected
upon what had been proposed, he must repeat that he could
do nothing, and treat of nothing, in his present situation,
without consulting with the nation, and of course with the
Regency. "The Emperor," said he, "has placed me here ; and
if he chooses that I should return to Spain, he it is who must
consult and treat with the Regency, because he has means of
doing this, and I have not ; or he must afford me means, and
consent that a deputation from the Regency should come hither,
and inform me concerning the state of Spain, and propose to
me measures for rendering it happy : any thing which I may
then conclude here with his Imperial Majesty will be valid.
And it is the more necessary that such a deputation should
come, because there is no person in France whom I could fitly
employ in this affair." Laforest replied at some length, endea-

vouring to persuade him that the English and Portuguese governed Spain, and that their intention was to place the house of Braganza upon the Spanish throne, beginning with his sister, the Princess of Brazil. He also pressed Ferdinand to declare whether, when he returned to Spain, he meant to be the friend or the enemy of the Emperor? This was presuming upon the weakness of the person whom he addressed; but Ferdinand was not wanting in presence of mind on this occasion. "I esteem the Emperor highly," he replied, "but I never will do any thing that may be injurious to my people and their welfare; and upon this point I now finally declare that nothing shall make me alter my determination. If the Emperor chooses that I should return to Spain, let him treat with the Regency, and when that is done, and I am assured of it, I will sign the treaty; but for this it will be necessary that a deputation should come here and inform me of every thing. Report this to the Emperor, and tell him, also, that this is what my conscience dictates to me."

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Ferdinand expressed himself to the same effect in a letter, which on the morrow he delivered into Laforest's hands. "I am still under the protection of your Imperial Majesty," he added, "and still profess the same love and respect of which you have had so many proofs. If your Majesty's system of policy, and the actual circumstances of your empire, will not allow of your conforming to this course, I shall then remain quietly and willingly at Valençay, where I have now passed five years and a half, and where I shall remain for the rest of my life, if God has so appointed it. It is painful to me, Sire, to speak in this manner to your Majesty, but conscience compels me to it. I have as much interest for the English as for the French, but, nevertheless, I must prefer the interest and happiness of my own nation to every thing. Your Imperial and Royal

Nov. 21.

CHAP. Majesty will see, I hope, in this nothing more than a new proof
 XLV. of my ingenuous sincerity, and of the affection which I bear
 1813. toward you. If I should promise any thing to your Majesty,
 November. and afterwards be obliged to act in opposition to it, what
 would you think of me? you would say that I am inconstant,
 and you would despise me, and dishonour me with all Europe."

When Laforest received this letter from Ferdinand, he observed, that his Royal Highness desired nothing but what was very just; but he asked whether he designed to treat with the Emperor before he had consulted with the Regency, or after? if after, it would occasion much delay; if before, when the business was once concluded with the Emperor, the Regency would instantly do whatever he thought fit. But if his intention in returning to Spain was to continue the war with France, the Emperor would choose rather to keep him in his power, and carry on the war upon its present footing. Ferdinand replied, that surely either the ambassador had not understood him, or he himself must have failed in expressing himself with sufficient clearness. "My declarations," he pursued, "amount to this, that I marry myself to neither power. If the interest of Spain requires that I should be the friend of the French, I will be so; but if it requires that I should be the friend of the English, their friend I shall be; and, finally, if this should not suit the Emperor, the Infantes and I will remain well pleased where we are at Valençay. In acting thus I do no otherwise than the Emperor himself would do were he in my place*." From this resolution Ferdinand was not to be dissuaded, and Laforest accordingly returned with this reply.

*Escoiquiz,
 Idea Sin-
 cilla, &c.,
 pp. 83. 100.*

* The particulars of this negotiation are stated by Escoiquiz upon Ferdinand's authority, and from that king's own papers.

Upon his return, Buonaparte dispatched the Duque de S. Carlos to Valençay to negotiate, on Ferdinand's part, with Laforest; and a treaty was easily concluded to this effect, that the Emperor of the French recognized Ferdinand and his successors as Kings of Spain and of the Indies, according to the order established by the fundamental laws of Spain; and that he recognized the integrity of the Spanish territory as it existed before the war, and would deliver up to the Spaniards such provinces and fortified places as the French still occupied in Spain: Ferdinand obliging himself, on his part, to maintain the same integrity, and that also of the adjacent isles and fortified places, and especially Minorca and Ceuta; and to make the English evacuate those provinces and places, the evacuation by the French and English being to be made simultaneously. The two contracting powers bound themselves to maintain the independence of their maritime rights, as had been stipulated in the treaty of Utrecht, and observed till the year 1792. All Spaniards who had adhered to King Joseph were to re-enter upon the honours, rights, and privileges which they had enjoyed, and all the property of which they might have been deprived should be restored to them; and to such as might choose to live out of Spain, ten years should be allowed for disposing of their possessions. Prisoners on both sides were to be sent home, and also the garrison of Pamplona, and the prisoners at Cadiz, Coruña, the Mediterranean islands, or any other depôt which might have been delivered to the English, . . . whether they were in Spain, or had been sent to America or to England. Ferdinand bound himself to pay an annual sum of thirty millions of reales to Charles IV., his father, and, in case of his death, an annuity of two millions to the Queen, his widow. Finally, a treaty of commerce was to be formed between the two nations,

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*December.**Treaty con-
cluded at
Valençay.
Dec. 11.*

CHAP.
XLV.

1813.

December.

*S. Carlos
sent to the
Regency.*

Dec. 8.

and till this could be done, their commercial relations were to be placed upon the same footing as before the war of 1792.

The next step was to notify this treaty to the actual government of Spain. Accordingly Ferdinand addressed a letter to the Regency, being the first communication which he had been permitted to hold with his own country since his entrapment. "Divine Providence," he said, "which in its inscrutable wisdom had permitted him to pass from the palace of Madrid to that of Valençay, had granted to him the blessings of health and strength, and the consolation of never having been for a moment separated from his beloved brother and uncle, the Infantes, Don Carlos and Don Antonio. They had experienced in that palace a noble hospitality; their way of life had been as agreeable as it could be under such circumstances; and he had employed his time in the manner most suitable to his new condition. The only intelligence which he had heard of his beloved Spain was what the French gazettes supplied; these had given him some knowledge of the sacrifices which the nation had made for him; of the magnanimous and unalterable constancy manifested by his faithful vassals, of the persevering assistance of England, the admirable conduct of its general-in-chief, Lord Wellington, and of the Spanish and allied generals who had distinguished themselves. The English ministry had publicly declared their readiness to admit propositions of peace, founded upon his restitution; nevertheless, the miseries of his kingdom still continued. He was in this state of passive but vigilant observation, when the Emperor of the French spontaneously made proposals to him, founded upon his restitution, and the integrity and independence of his dominions, without any clause which would not be compatible with the honour and glory and interest of the Spanish nation. Being persuaded

that Spain could not, after the most successful and protracted war, conclude a more advantageous peace, he had authorized the Duque de S. Carlos to negotiate in his name with the Comte de Laforest, whom the Emperor Napoleon had nominated as plenipotentiary on the part of France; and he had now appointed the Duque to carry this treaty to the Regency, in proof of the confidence which he reposed in them, that they might ratify it in their usual manner, and send it back to him after this necessary form without loss of time. How satisfactory," he concluded, "is it for me to stop the effusion of blood, and to see the end of so many evils! and how do I long to return and live among a people, who have given the universe an example of the purest loyalty, and of the noblest and most generous character!"

This letter seemed to leave the Regency no power of deliberation, but simply to require that they should ratify the treaty. But in fact, Ferdinand, if he had any such wish, had no such expectation; and he had penetration enough to see that the course of events which had compelled Buonaparte to treat with him upon such terms, must in their consequences restore him to his kingdom; even though the Regency should, as he supposed, refuse to ratify it, because of their engagement with the allied powers. He gave the Duque, therefore, secret verbal instructions to inquire into the spirit of the Regency and the Cortes; and if he should find them loyal and well affected to his royal person, . . . not, as he suspected, tainted with infidelity and Jacobinism, . . . he was then to let the Regency know, but in the greatest confidence, his royal intention that the treaty should be ratified, if it could be done without injury to the good faith which Spain owed to the allied powers, or to the public weal; but that he was far from requiring this if it were otherwise. Should the Regency be of

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1813.

December.

*Secret instructions
from Ferdinand.*

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 1813.
 December.

opinion, that without compromising these points, the treaty might be ratified, upon an understanding with England temporarily, and until his return to Spain should in consequence be effected, upon the supposition that he, without whose free approbation it could not be complete, would not ratify it when at liberty, but would declare it to have been constrained and null, and moreover as being injurious to the nation; in that case he wished them so to ratify it, because the French could not reasonably reproach him, if, having acquired information concerning the state of Spain, which had been withheld from him in his captivity, he should refuse to confirm it. But if the Duque should discover that the spirit of Jacobinism prevailed in the Regency and the Cortes, he was then simply to require that the treaty should be ratified; for this would not prevent the King from continuing the war after his return, if the interest and good faith of the nation should so require. This intention, however, was to be kept profoundly secret, lest, through any treachery, it should be made known to the French government.

Escoiquiz,
 108-10.

Macanaz
sent to Va-
lençay.

Jan. 8.

With these instructions the Duque departed, travelling under the assumed name of Ducós, that his mission might not be suspected. Laforest remained at Valençay, still under a false name, and keeping out of sight, in the same part of the castle which Ferdinand and the Infantes inhabited; and before the Duque's departure, Don Pedro de Macanaz was sent thither by Buonaparte to continue the conferences with this diplomatist. However much the Regency, or rather the Cortes (for the Regency was now the mere organ of its pleasure) might be surprized when the treaty was communicated to them, they were not unprovided for such an event. The Regency accordingly expressed in reply their joy upon seeing the King's signature, and being assured of his good health and of that of the

Infantes, and of the noble sentiments which he cherished for his dear Spain. "If," they said, "they could but ill express their own satisfaction, still less could they the joy of that noble and magnanimous people who had sworn fidelity to him; nor the sacrifices which they had made, were making, and still would make, till they should see him placed upon the throne of love and justice which they had prepared for him: they must content themselves with declaring to his Majesty that he was the beloved and the desired of the whole nation. It was their duty to put him in possession of a decree passed by the Cortes on the first of January, 1811; so doing, they were excused from making the slightest observation upon the treaty, in which his Majesty had the most authentic proof that the sacrifices made by the Spaniards for the recovery of his royal person had not been made in vain. And they congratulated him upon seeing that the day was now near when they should enjoy the inexpressible happiness of delivering up to him the royal authority which they had preserved for him in faithful deposit during his captivity." The decree which accompanied this letter was that by which the Cortes enacted that no treaty which the King might conclude during his restraint and captivity should be recognized by Spain.

Some delay had taken place in the Duque de S. Carlos's journey, owing to the removal of the Cortes from Cadiz to Madrid just at that time. In the interim, Buonaparte, who was now as desirous to withdraw his troops from the Peninsula as, in evil hour for himself, he had once been of introducing them there, sought to accelerate that object. He released Zayas and Palafox, who had been kept close prisoners at Vincennes, and sent them to Valençay. Escoiquiz soon followed them; and Laforest proposed that orders should be given by the Regency, immediately after the ratification, for a general

CHAP.
XLV.
1813.
December.

*Zayas and
Palafox re-
leased.*

CHAP. XLV. suspension of hostilities, humanity requiring that all useless expenditure of blood should be avoided. The Emperor, he said, had appointed Marshal Suchet his commissioner for executing that part of the treaty which related to evacuating the fortresses; and it now depended upon the Spanish government alone to expedite this business, and effect the release of prisoners; the generals and officers should proceed by post to their own country, and the soldiers be delivered upon the frontier as fast as they arrived there. This being assented to by Macanaz and Escoiquiz, on Ferdinand's part, it was determined that Palafox should be sent to communicate it to the Regency, bearing with him a duplicate of the Duque's commission, in case any accident might have happened to him upon the way; and also a letter, in which Ferdinand expressed his persuasion that the Regency had by this time ratified the treaty. But Palafox had secret instructions to see the English ambassador at Madrid, express to him how grateful the King felt for the exertions of the British government in his favour, and communicate to him, in secrecy, the King's real intention in thus negotiating with Buonaparte, in order that that government, far from resenting such a proceeding, should contribute to its fulfilment. The Regency replied to this second communication by referring to their former reply; they added, that "an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary had now been named, on his Majesty's part, for a congress in which the allies were about to give peace to Europe. In that congress, they said, the treaty would be concluded; and it would be ratified not by the Regency, but by his Majesty himself, in his own royal palace of Madrid, whither he would be restored to occupy, in the most absolute liberty, a throne rendered illustrious by the heroic sacrifices of the Spaniards, and by his own sublime virtues. And they expressed their satisfaction in the thought that they

1813.
December.

*Palafox sent
to the Re-
gency.
Dec. 23.*

*Reply of the
Spanish go-
vernment.*

1814.
Jan. 28.

should soon deliver up to his Majesty the authority wherewith they were intrusted, . . . a charge of such weight that it could rest only upon the robust shoulders of a monarch who, by re-establishing the Cortes, had restored to freedom an enslaved people, and driven the ferocious monster, Despotism, from the throne of Spain."

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XLV.
1814.

January.

The Spanish government would have acted thus far prudently in its communication with Ferdinand, if it had abstained from this empty language: but the *Liberales*, as the ruling party called themselves, were, some, vain of their talents, others confident in the uprightness of their intentions, and all alike ignorant of their weakness. If the abler leaders of this party had not proceeded so far as they desired and perhaps designed, they were yet conscious that they had proceeded farther than their functions warranted and than Ferdinand would sanction. They held, therefore, a secret sitting of the Cortes, and deliberated upon the measures to be taken in case the King should pass the frontiers. It was proposed, by a commission appointed to report upon this emergency, that he should not be considered as being free, nor should obedience be rendered him, until he should have sworn to the Constitution in the bosom of the Cortes; that the Generals on the frontiers should send expresses to the government with all speed, as soon as they obtained any tidings of his probable coming; that if he were accompanied by any armed force, that force should be repulsed, according to the laws of war; should it consist of Spaniards, they were to lay down their arms, and those who had been carried prisoners into France licensed to return each to his home; whatever General might have the honour of receiving the King being to supply him with a guard suitable to his royal dignity and person. No foreigner should be allowed to accompany him, not even as a domestic or servant; no Spaniard who

*Measures of
the Cortes.*

CHAP.

XLV.

1814.

January.

had filled any office, received any pension, or accepted any honour from Buonaparte or from the Intruder. The Regency should be charged to fix the route by which the King should proceed to Madrid; and the President of the Regency, as soon as he arrived in Spain, should set out to meet and accompany him with a proper retinue, and present him with a copy of the Constitution, that so his Majesty, having made himself acquainted therewith, might, upon full deliberation and with entire consent, take the oath which it prescribed. Having reached the capital, he should proceed straight to the Cortes, there to take the said oath, with all the ceremonies and solemnities enjoined: this done, thirty Members of that assembly should attend him to the palace, where the Regency should resign the government into his hands; on the same day the Cortes should prepare a decree for making known to the nation the solemn act by which, and in virtue of the oath which he should then have sworn, the King had been constitutionally placed upon the throne; and this decree should be presented to the King by a deputation, that it might be published with all due formalities. The opinion of the Council of State upon this proposition was required within four-and-twenty hours.

Feb. 1.

The Council was of opinion that the King ought not to exercise any authority till he should have taken the oath before the Cortes. They thought that a deputation should be appointed to meet him, and inform him concerning the state of affairs and of public opinion, both as to the eternal and sworn hatred of Napoleon, and the observance of the Constitution. One member of the Council advised that the deputation should consist of members of the Cortes, two of whom in rotation should accompany the King in his coach till he arrived at the palace; and also that all the soldiers who had been prisoners in France should be detained upon the frontier, and all the

King's attendants also, till they should have taken the oath. "It must be believed," said the Council, "that if Napoleon sends Ferdinand to Spain, it can only be for the purpose of laying a new snare for us, and making him the instrument of his iniquitous schemes, and rendering him, perhaps, odious to a nation which now longs for his presence, . . . it must be with the design of fomenting a civil war, in which he may be entrapped, seduced, and compelled to take a part; that the attention of the allies may thus be distracted, and the progress of their operations be delayed. Now, therefore, more than ever Spain stands in need of that energy which hitherto she has displayed against the common enemy; now it is that she must manifest to the King how much she has done for his sake, and how much she loves him; but at the same time how much she loves the Constitution, and abhors the tyrannical disturber of the world. And, therefore, it is now more than ever of importance that efforts should be redoubled for maintaining our armies upon a good footing, and co-operating more effectually for the destruction of that monster."

In this transaction Buonaparte acted toward Ferdinand with good faith, because he had no interest in acting otherwise; so he could extricate his garrisons he cared not now what might become of Spain. Ferdinand conducted himself with as much prudence and as little duplicity as could be expected in his situation. The Liberales miscalculated their strength; their measures implied a distrust of the King; and if he inferred from their language, that, under all its professions of respectful and affectionate loyalty, a defiance was couched there in case he should hesitate to recognize the new order of things, he was not mistaken in its purport and intent.

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XLV.

1814.

February.

CHAPTER XLVI.

PROCEEDINGS IN FRANCE. THE DUC D'ANGOULEME GOES TO LORD WELLINGTON'S ARMY. LERIDA, MEQUINENZA, AND MONZON RECOVERED BY STRATAGEM. PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR. BATTLE OF ORTHES. THE ALLIES RECEIVED AT BOURDEAUX. BATTLE OF TOULOUSE. SORTIE FROM BAYONNE. RESTORATION OF FERDINAND. CONCLUSION.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1813.

*Buona-
parte's
speech to his
council.*

BUONAPARTE had returned to France breathing vengeance. He sent before him two-and-twenty standards taken in the course of his German campaign; and he announced to his Council of State, in troubled and passionate language, the extent of his danger, and his determination of opposing and overcoming it by the most violent efforts. "Wellington," said he, "is in the south, the Russians threaten the northern frontier, Austria the south-eastern, . . yet, shame to speak it, the nation has not risen in mass to repel them! Every ally has abandoned me: the Bavarians have betrayed me! . . Peace? no peace, till Munich is in flames! I demand of you 300,000 men; I will form a camp at Bourdeaux of 100,000, another at Lyons, a third at Metz: with the remnant of my former levies, I shall have 1,000,000 of men in arms. But it is men whom I demand, full-grown men; not these miserable striplings who choke my hospitals with sick, and my highways with their carcasses... Give

up Holland? rather let it sink into the sea! Peace, it seems, is talked of, when all around ought to re-echo with the cry of war!"

CHAP.
XLVI.

Accordingly the obsequious senate placed, in official form and phrase, 300,000 conscripts at the disposal of the minister of war; they were to be taken from the men who had been liable to the conscription in former years, as far back as 1806, with an exception however in favour of those who should have been married prior to the publication of this decree; half this number were immediately to take the field, the others to be held in reserve, and brought forward in case the eastern frontier should be invaded.

1813.

November.
Proceed-
ings of the
French go-
vernment.

Comte Dejean, who addressed the senate upon this measure, said, that painful as it was thus to call upon classes who had formerly been free from the conscription, circumstances now required such a measure: by this means men would be ranged under the French eagles, who united strength with courage, and could support the fatigues of war; while the younger conscripts would have time in garrisons and in armies of reserve to acquire vigour for seconding the sentiments which inspired them. "The cry of alarm," said Regnaud de S. Jean d'Angely, "and of succour, sent forth by our sons and brethren in arms, still gloriously combating upon the banks of the Rhine, has resounded upon the Seine and the Rhone, the Doubs and the Gironde, the Moselle and the Loire, the mountains of Jura and of the Vosges, the Alps and the Pyrenees. All true Frenchmen are already prepared to meet the wants of their country, . . . to meet the dangers and sacrifices which must prevent other dangers and sacrifices far more frightful, both for their extent and for the humiliation which must accompany them. If the coalesced armies could penetrate beyond the Pyrenees, the Alps, or the Rhine, then the day of peace could not shine upon France; there could be no peace till we should repulse the enemy, and drive him far from our

Comte De-
jean.

Regnaud de
S. Jean-
Angely.

CHAP. territory. Noble sons of our dear France! generous defenders
 XLVI. of our glorious country! you, who close the entrance of France
 1813. against the English, the Russians, and their allies, you shall
 November. not be left without support in the holy and honourable struggle
 to which you have devoted yourselves. A little while, and
 numerous battalions of men, mighty in strength and in courage,
 will come to aid you in again seizing upon victory, and in
 delivering the French soil."

*Comte La-
 cepède.*

"Your Majesty," said Comte Lapepède, "who knows better
 than any one the wants and the sentiments of your subjects,
 know that we desire peace. But all the nations of the con-
 tinent are in greater need of it than we are; and if, notwith-
 standing the wishes and interest of more than 150 millions of
 souls, our enemies should think of presenting to us a sort of
 capitulation, their expectations will be deceived; the French
 people show by their devotement and their sacrifices that no
 nation ever better understood their duties toward their country,
 their honour, and their sovereign." To this Buonaparte made
 answer, . . . "It is but a year since all Europe was with us; all
 Europe marches against us now: this is because the opinion of
 the world is directed by France or by England. We should
 have every thing to fear, were it not for the energy and the
 power of the nation. Posterity will say that if great and critical
 circumstances offered themselves, they were not superior to
 France and to me." His heart was hardened, or he might now
 have made peace upon terms which would speedily have enabled
 him again to disturb the world; but his spirit was unbroken;
 and his abilities were never at any time so signally displayed,
 as in making head against the dangers which were about
 to beset him on all sides. It was no longer possible to keep
 the people in ignorance of the real state of things: the press,
 which hitherto under his tyranny had been employed in de-

ceiving them, was made use of now to excite them, by declaring the whole truth as respected the danger, but suppressing it upon all other points: the allies were charged with breach of faith and inordinate ambition, they were represented as all seeking their own aggrandizement; and the Emperor Napoleon as struggling alone against them, for the honour and the interests of France. He himself addressed the legislature to the same effect, . . . "Brilliant victories," said he, "have illustrated the French arms in this campaign; unexampled defections have rendered those victories useless. Every thing has turned against us. France itself would be in danger were it not for the energy and unanimity of the French. I have never been seduced by prosperity; adversity will find me superior to its attacks. Often have I given peace to nations when they had lost all. . . From part of my conquests I have erected thrones for kings who have abandoned me. I had conceived and executed great designs for the prosperity and happiness of the world. A monarch and a father, I know what peace adds to the security of thrones and of families. Negotiations have been set on foot. I hoped that the congress would by this time have met; but delays, which are not attributable to France, have deferred the moment which is called for by the wishes of the world." When Buonaparte said this, he had no hope of peace, no desire for it, no intention of making any such concessions as would render it possible.

As yet none of the other allied armies had passed the frontier; but Lord Wellington was established in France, where, taking into consideration the necessity of fixing the bases upon which the trade with the ports of French Navarre to the south of the Adour should be regulated, he published a proclamation, declaring that those ports were open to all nations who were not at war with any of the allied powers, and fixing a duty of five per cent *ad valorem* upon all articles, except grain and salt,

CHAP.
XLVI.

1813.

November.

*Buona-
parte's
speech to the
Legislative
Assembly.**British re-
gulations
for trading
with the
captured
French
ports.*

Dec. 18.

Dec. 31.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1813.

Jan. 14.

and stores for the use of the army. An order of council was also published in England, permitting British vessels to trade with these and such other French ports as might be under the protection, or in the military occupation of his Majesty's arms. To this then were the decrees of Berlin and Milan come at last! The tyrant who had endeavoured to shut the ports of all Europe against British ships and British merchandize, and at one time had well nigh accomplished his barbarous and barbarizing purpose, saw England now regulating the commerce of his own ports, and levying duties in France, . . not after his example, with blind and merciless rapacity, but upon those principles of moderation and equity, on which her power has been raised, and by which her prosperity is supported. Three years had not elapsed since the official journal of Buonaparte's government had said, that instead of defending Portugal and Cadiz, Great Britain's efforts would soon be required for the defence of Gibraltar; that Spain having been conquered foot by foot was on the point of being entirely subjected; that Wellington's mode of defending Portugal had been by abandoning the fortresses and laying waste the country, and God grant, said the *Moniteur*, that he may one day defend England in the same manner! "Our continental system," said the official journalist, "is completed; it diminishes your receipts by crippling your commerce, and increases your expenses by obliging you to keep armies in Lisbon and Sicily. In the meantime the French army, according to our fundamental law, lives on the country in which it is making war, and only costs us the pay which it would do at home." "The credit which sustained the colossal power of Great Britain," said Buonaparte to his Legislative Body in the summer of 1811, "is no more. Her allies are either lost or destroyed. She ruins all whom she would subsidize; she exhausts her own people in useless efforts. But the struggle against this modern

Carthage will now be decided on the plains of Spain ; the peace of the continent will not be disturbed ; England herself shall feel the evils which during twenty years she has inflicted on the continental nations. A clap of thunder shall put an end to the affairs of the Peninsula, seal the fate of her armies, and avenge Europe and Asia by terminating this second Punic war." With what feelings must Buonaparte now have reflected upon these bootless boasts !

CHAP.
XLVI.

1813.

December.

With as little satisfaction too could he reflect upon the result of that fundamental principle of his military system, by which his armies were made to live on the countries wherein they were making war. The principle of the British commander was to demand nothing from the inhabitants, and to seize nothing ; not a single ration was required from them ; they were paid on the spot for every thing which they brought, while Soult's army drained the adjoining provinces by its requisitions, and his soldiers were rendered at once formidable and odious to their own countrymen by the insolent and lawless habits which they had acquired in the Peninsula. The passage of the Nive had put the allies in possession of a large tract of country singularly fertile ; they obtained great part of their forage from it ; and the right wing by its position on the left of the Adour, commanded the navigation of that river, and often intercepted the enemy's supplies. In that deep soil, and in a season of continued rain, it was not possible for the army to advance, an individual indeed could with difficulty make his way any where but on the paved road ; .. it was hardly thought bad walking if the waters were not more than knee-deep. One of those unforeseen effects which frequently arise when man interferes upon a large scale with the works of nature, has rendered this country liable to inundations in winter and spring, and to drought in summer.

*Injury done
by destroy-
ing the
woods in this
part of the
Pyrenees.*

CHAP. About the middle of the seventeenth century a speculator *
 XLVI. undertook to supply the French government with ship timber
 1813. from the Pyrenees; to effect this it was necessary for him to
 December. increase the waters of the two rivers, or, as they are there called,
Gaves of Pau and Oleron; and by turning into them the course
 of numerous rivulets, he doubled the volume of the latter stream,
 and increased the current of the Adour so much that a 50-gun
 ship could cross the bar of Bayonne with less difficulty than
 before that time was experienced by a vessel with ten guns.
 He expended 300,000 crowns upon this scheme, succeeded in
 it, and ruined his family. But permanent evil was occasioned
 to the country: for when the mountains were clothed with woods,
 the snow which was collected there melted gradually under their
 shade, and fed the streams during the whole year; afterwards,
 when the snow was exposed to the sun and rain, the streams
 poured down in torrents, rendering the rivers destructive during
 the winter and spring, and scarcely supplying water enough in
 summer for navigation.

While the allies waited in their cantonments till the season
 should allow them to recommence their operations, telegraphic
 signal stations, to guard against surprize, were formed on the
 churches of Guethary, Arcangues, and Vieux Monguerre, and
 these communicated with one upon a high sand-hill, on the
 north side of S. Jean de Luz, near the entrance from the Bay-
 onne road: so that notice of any hostile movement might almost
 instantaneously be communicated to the head-quarters. Works

* The father of Baron de Lahoutan, in whose *Voyages dans l'Amerique Septen-
 trionale* (Amsterdam, 1709, t. i. 149.) these facts are stated: the consequences were
 related by M. Dufort, of the Gironde, in the Legislative Assembly, 31 Aug. 1814.

were thrown up in front of the left, as the most assailable part of the line, at Bidaut, at Arcangues, and almost on every knoll. On such occasions it was that unavoidable injury was done to the inhabitants. If a chateau unfortunately stood where it was deemed expedient to fortify it, every part was pulled down that did not serve for the purposes of defence; and all the noble trees around it were felled, while the owner looked on a sad and helpless spectator of the ruin. These were cases of individual hardship; nothing could be more honourable to the British character than the extreme care which was taken to prevent all avoidable injury, and this was acknowledged by the people with equal surprize and thankfulness. No army ever behaved better even in its own country than the British army at this time in France, and this was owing to Lord Wellington's regulations. There was another part of the British general's conduct which attracted the notice and commanded the respect of the French people; he regularly attended divine service, with all his staff, not in the church, but on the sandy beach, the brigade of guards forming a square there. The service of Christmas-day * was

CHAP.
XLVI.
1813.
December.

* As an instance of English character, it is worth stating in a note, that an honest butcher of Slough, near Windsor, Edward Shirley by name, sent Lord Wellington, as a Christmas present, the rump and sirloin of a famous ox. Government forwarded the present, and with the next dispatches Lord Wellington's letter of thanks arrived, and was forwarded to Slough from the secretary of state's office by a king's messenger. The letter was as follows:—

“ St. Jean de Luz. Jan. 19.

“ SIR,

“ I received the day before yesterday the sirloin and rump of beef, which you were so kind as to send me; which although it did not arrive in time for the new year's day, was a most welcome present for the queen's birthday.

“ I beg you to accept my best thanks for it; and to be assured that I duly appreciate the patriotic motives which induced you to avail yourself of an opportunity at the

CHAP. performed there, on a bright frosty day, not a breath of wind
 XLVI. stirring, and no extraneous sound but that of a high surf break-
 1813. ing at least half a mile from the shore, and flashing in the
 December. sunshine.

*Movements
 in the month
 of January.*

1814.

Towards the end of December the floods carried away the bridges which had been thrown over the Nive, but they were soon replaced. A detachment was sent towards Hasparren to clear the country in the rear of the right wing of the enemy's cavalry under Paris; and on new year's day a small island in the Adour, near Monguerre, was taken from the French without opposition. At this time Clausel was assembling a considerable force on the Gave de Oleron; on the third he drove in the cavalry piquets between the Joyeuse and the Bidouze, and attacked the posts of Major-General Buchan's Portuguese brigade on the former river, near La Bastide, and those of the third division in Bouloc. The enemy turned the right of the Portuguese brigade on the heights of La Costa, and established two divisions there and on La Bastide, on the Joyeuse, with the remainder of their force on the Bidouze and the Gave. The centre and right of the allies were immediately concentrated and prepared to move; Lord Wellington reconnoitred the enemy the next day, and would have attacked them on the ensuing, if the weather and the swelling of the rivulets had not

present moment of conveying to me your sense of the manner in which I have carried into execution his Majesty's commands, and those of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

"I have the honour to be, sir,

"Your most obedient, humble servant,

"WELLINGTON.

"To Mr. Edward Shirley, butcher,
 Slough, near Windsor."

occasioned a day's delay. But on the 6th the attack was made by the 3d and 4th divisions, supported by Buchan's Portuguese brigade of General Le Cor's division, and the cavalry under Major-General Fane; the enemy were dislodged without loss on our side, and the troops resumed their former positions. Mina was at this time with three battalions at Bidarray and St. Etienne de Baygorey, observing the movements of the enemy from St. Jean de Pied-de-Port. The people of the vale of Baygorey had distinguished themselves in the war of 1793 by their brave opposition to the Spanish troops; that spirit had been transmitted to the present generation, and it was called into action by their countryman Harispe, one of the most active of the French generals. They were the only peasantry who manifested any disposition to act against the allies; by their aid, with that of Paris's division, and such troops as could be spared from the garrison of St. Jean, Harispe moved against Mina, and compelled him to retire into the valley of Aldudes.

CHAP.
XLVI.
1814.

January.

Jan. 12.

These were the only military movements on this side during the month of January; and the state of affairs here was disguised as much as possible from the French people: Buonaparte persisting to the last in that system of falsehood by which he had so long flattered and deluded them. It could not, indeed, be concealed, that Lord Wellington's army was wintering in France, though by what train of events it should have arrived there the French were left to guess. But it was affirmed that he had been defeated in the actions before Bayonne with the loss of 15,000 men; that he now thought of nothing more than intrenching himself within his own lines; that Clausel had assumed an attitude which alarmed him;... that his situation was becoming more and more critical;... that the misunderstanding between the Spanish and English troops increased every day;... that the British commander began to fear lest the part of the French army which remained in the camp at Bayonne might cut off his

False reports circulated by the French government.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1814.

January.

*The Duc
d'Angou-
lême goes to
Lord Wel-
lington's
army.*

retreat; in fine, that the allies were filled with consternation, and that while they were suffering from want of provisions, their convoys were wrecked upon the coast of the Landes department, and supplied the French with beef and clothing, and with packages of pressed hay, which were sent to Bayonne, and there served out to Marshal Soult's cavalry.

But while the *Moniteur*, in its official articles, dwelt thus upon a chance shipwreck, and attempted, in its usual strain, to deceive the French people, that part of the nation who remembered what had been the state of France before its baneful revolution regarded the progress of the British arms with secret satisfaction, because it offered a hope of the restoration of the Bourbons, and of that peace and security which could be obtained by no other means. The Bourbons themselves thought it was now time for them to take advantage of the course of events, and remind France that by putting an end to their unmerited exile she might put an end to her own multiplied calamities. The Duc d'Angoulême, therefore, with the Duc de Guiche, Comte Etienne de Damas, and Comte d'Escars, sailed from England for Passages, and proceeded to S. Jean de Luz. But as the allied powers, whether wisely or not, had as yet held out no encouragement to the hopes of this royal family, Lord Wellington could receive him with no public honours. Many of the inhabitants, however, hastened to pay their court to him; and the mayor of this little town, expressing to him a hope that the calamities which France had so long endured would soon be terminated by peace, observed, that peace could no otherwise be guaranteed than by the word of their legitimate sovereign; and requested his Royal Highness to convey to the King an assurance of cordial allegiance from the municipality and people of that place. Deputations were also sent to him from the neighbouring communes; and, before his arrival, a circumstance had occurred which more unequivocally

manifested the disposition of the people. There was an emigrant officer in the British army whose family estates were in the neighbourhood of Pau; a native of that part of the country came to S. Jean de Luz charged by the tenants of those estates to tell him how much they wished to live again under their own old laws and customs, and how happy they should be once more to pay their rents to their old master. The Duc, under the name of the Comte de Pradelles, lived with the utmost privacy, as the circumstances required; but he addressed a proclamation to the French army, and agents were not wanting to circulate it. He called upon them to rally round the *fleurs-de-lys*, which he was come, he said, to display once more in his dear country; and he guaranteed, in the name of the king, his uncle, their rank and pay to those who should join him, and rewards proportionate to their services. "Soldiers," he said, "it is the descendant of Henri IV.;... it is the husband of a princess whose misfortunes are unequalled, but whose only wishes are for the prosperity of France;... it is a prince who, forgetting, in imitation of your king, all his own sufferings, and mindful only of yours, throws himself now with confidence into your arms!"

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1814.

January.

A movement such as this address was intended to excite had already begun, but it was among men who had been trained in better principles than the soldiers of the revolution. An agent of Louis XVIII. had arrived at Bourdeaux, and had found in that city the Marquis de la Rochejaquelein, whom it was part of his commission to see, and say to him that the King depended upon him for La Vendée. Rochejaquelein is one of the redeeming names that appear in the black and bloody history of the French revolution. The present Marquis had succeeded to the title, the principles, and the virtues of his brother, who, in the first Vendean war, had addressed his soldiers in these memorable words: "*Si j'avance, suivez-moi; si je recule, tuez-moi; si je meurs,*

*Rocheja-
quelein
comes to the
British
camp.*

CHAP. *vengez-moi* !* " If I advance, follow me ; if I falter, kill me ; if
 XLVI. I fall, avenge me !" He now went through Anjou and Touraine,
 1814. and awakened that spirit which the National Convention had
 not been able, even by its most atrocious barbarities, to suppress.
 January. A scheme was formed for delivering Ferdinand from Valençay ;
 but the person who was to have headed the enterprize died at the
 time when it should have taken place ; and, indeed, no advantage
 could have been derived from it then, if it had succeeded. Roche-
 jaquelein's designs were suspected, and M. Lynch, the Mayor
 of Bourdeaux, who was then at Paris, warned him by an express
 that orders were given for arresting him, and bringing him dead
 or alive before Savary, Buonaparte's worthy minister of police.
 He escaped to Bourdeaux, and, while remaining there in conceal-
 ment, heard that the Duc d'Angoulême was with the English
 army. Upon this he determined immediately to repair to
 him, and receive his orders ; but before he set out upon this
 most hazardous adventure, he requested an interview with
 M. Lynch, who was just then returned from the capital. That
 magistrate, who was always a loyalist at heart, foresaw the
 speedy overthrow of Buonaparte, and had already given his
 word to the Polignacs (then in confinement), that if Bourdeaux
 declared for the King, he would be the first to mount the white
 cockade ; this promise he now renewed to Rochejaquelein, and
 charged him to assure the Duc of his devoted services, and that
 he would deliver to him the keys of the town. After many
 difficulties and dangers, the Marquis succeeded in getting on
 board a ship bound, with a license, to St. Sebastian's ; and,

* After Buonaparte's return from Elba, the Marquis put himself at the head of the Vendéans, repeated these words of his heroic brother, and died, like him, in the same cause.

escaping from a storm by which several vessels were wrecked on the coast, he landed at Passages, and hastened to S. Jean de Luz.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1814.

When the Duc heard his report of the state of feeling in La Vendée, of the general opinion which prevailed in France, and of the disposition which there was to receive him in Bourdeaux, he declared that nothing should now make him forsake that country in which he had found subjects who were still so faithful.

January.
Lord Wel-
lington
refuses to
send an ex-
pedition to
the coast of
Poitou.

Without delay, accompanied by the Duc de Guiche, Rochejaquelein proceeded to Lord Wellington, who was then at Garitz; he assured him that Bourdeaux would declare for the Bourbons, as soon as a British force should approach it; and, as the means of effecting a powerful diversion in aid of that loyal city, he proposed that the British General should send one or two vessels and a few hundred men to land him by night upon the coast of Poitou, escort him some two leagues into the interior, and then leave him there: while they re-embarked and drew the attention of the troops, he would pursue his way alone, and raise once more that loyal race who had exerted themselves so dutifully, and suffered so severely, in the most frantic and ferocious times of the revolution. Lord Wellington listened with great interest to these representations; but he doubted whether the feelings of the people towards the royal family were what Rochejaquelein believed them to be; and he did not think himself authorized to detach even a small force upon an expedition such as was proposed, when he had no instructions from his own government, and moreover when he was on the eve of great operations, . . . for he was now preparing to pass the Adour.

Memoires de
la Marquise
de la Roche-
jaquelein,
pp. 513-28.

On the side of Catalonia, meantime, all went on favourably for the allies; for if they were too weak to obtain any advantages for themselves, the enemy was weakened to a greater degree,

Suchet fails
in an attempt
to surprise
a British
corps.

CHAP. in consequence of the progress of the war in other quarters.
XLVI. Marshal Suchet made one vigorous attempt in the beginning of
1813. December to surprize the corps at Villafranca, where the
December. British head-quarters were established. He made a forced
night march in this hope with about 15,000 men; but timely
information had been obtained. Sarsfield's division, which was
stationed there, retired across the country to the left; the
British cavalry and artillery fell back about eight miles along
the main road to Arbos, where there was a strong position, and
whither General Mackenzie moved his division to their support;
and Suchet, having failed in his intention, retired from Villa-
franca on the afternoon of the same day, and returned to the
Llobregat as rapidly as he had advanced. The wants of the
Spanish army had now become so pressing, that it was necessary
to send Sarsfield's cavalry to the rear, where it might be possible
for them to subsist, his infantry being sometimes upon the
shortest allowance, and without any sure prospect of even that
insufficient dole for more than two or three days. His troops
must from sheer destitution have quitted the field, had it not
been for the merchants of Villa-nueva, who at his earnest
persuasion, but on their own credit, and at their own risk,
supplied them with provisions from the imports which arrived
at that port. Not a murmur meantime was heard from the
men; nor did they evince the slightest feeling of discontent or
jealousy, when they saw the Anglo-Sicilian troops, forming
part of the same army, duly supplied, while they themselves
were hungered. Only if the greater strength of the British
soldiers appeared, when they were engaged together in the
public works, a Spaniard would sometimes quietly say, "Give
us your rations, and you shall see us work as well as you do."

After the Nassau battalions had passed over to Lord Wel-
lington's camp, immediate advice had been dispatched to Sir

William Clinton; and the information was with due secrecy communicated to the officer who commanded the Nassau troops in Catalonia; but this person preferring what he considered his military obligations to his national duty, delivered the papers into General Habert's hands, who had succeeded Maurice Mathieu in the command at Barcelona. The French would, perhaps, have been better pleased if he had followed the example of his better-minded countrymen; for that German feeling which the officer had renounced existed among the men, and it was deemed necessary to disarm them all, 2400 in number, thus weakening the army of Catalonia, and bringing upon it this additional inconvenience, that the men of whose services it was deprived were to be supported as prisoners, and guarded also. This officer was mortally wounded a few weeks afterwards in a sally from Barcelona.

Suchet's force was still farther weakened by the withdrawal of 2000 of his Italian troops; he then proposed to the French government, as a measure of expediency, that they should dismantle the city of Barcelona, and content themselves with occupying the citadel and Fort Monjuic, whereby 5000 of the garrison would be disposable for service; but his advice was rejected, the possession of Barcelona being deemed necessary for the support of the army in Catalonia. About the same time, two strong battalions of Spaniards were detached from the Anglo-Sicilian army, at the pressing request of General Roche, to assist him in blockading Murviedro. Tarragona had now been so far repaired as to be in a defensible state; but such was the exhausted condition of the province that no stores of any kind could be obtained from it for the Spanish authorities. While both armies were withheld from undertaking any important operation by the diminution of strength on both sides, and by the increasing difficulties of obtaining supplies on the

CHAP.
XLVI.

1813.

December.

The German troops in Barcelona disarmed.

Troops withdrawn from Suchet's army.

Failure of an attempt against the enemy at Molins del Rey.

CHAP. part of the Anglo-Sicilians, a plan was concerted between Sir
 XLVI. William Clinton and Manso for attacking the enemy's canton-
 1814. ments at Molins del Rey and the adjoining villages on the
 Llobregat: Sir William was to move with 8000 men upon the
 Barcelona road and attack them in front, while Manso should
 post himself upon the strong ground in the rear of Molins del
 Rey, close to the only road by which they could retire. Copons
 had assented to this project, and agreed to lend Manso and his
 brigade for this service, both the men and their commander
 being worthy of all confidence. The enterprize failed, because
 Copons, without making any communication to the English
 General, instead of sending Manso, chose to go himself with a
 larger force, set off two hours later than the time which had
 been agreed upon, and finally appeared on the right flank of
 the enemy instead of in the rear; meantime the force from
 Villafranca having arrived at the hour appointed, the French,
 who, if there had been the same punctuality on the other side,
 must have been taken by surprize, were able to effect their
 retreat over the Llobregat by the stone bridge near Molins,
 which was well fortified. Upon the first alarm, Suchet dis-
 patched troops to support General Pannetier who was in
 command there, and manœuvred in the hope of decoying the
 allies to a dangerous advance; but Sir William was too wary
 to incur any unwise risk, when the object of his movement had
 been disappointed. Had Manso been left to execute what had
 been concerted with him, Pannetier's division must in all like-
 lihood have been captured.

*Farther
 drafts from
 Suchet's
 army.*

A few days afterwards Marshal Suchet received positive
 orders from Paris to dispatch for Lyons with the least possible
 delay two-thirds of his cavalry, from 8000 to 10,000 foot, and
 fourscore field-pieces. He renewed his representations con-
 cerning Barcelona, saying, he should delay till the latest

minute his departure from the vicinity of that city, in the hope of farther instructions; and he advised that, as the mission of the Duque de S. Carlos had produced no good effect, Ferdinand should be sent to Barcelona, with an understanding that France put him in possession of the fortified places, in reliance upon his honour for sending the garrison home. Meantime he appointed Habert to the command of Lower Catalonia, the division of the Lower Ebro being under General Robert, who commanded in Tortosa; that General was assured that he should soon be delivered, either by succour, or by the conclusion of peace; but at the worst he was instructed, when his provisions should fail, which would be before the end of April, to make for Lerida, collect his troops there, and by a rapid march through the mountains proceed to Benasque, and so into France. No farther advices having reached him by the first of February, Marshal Suchet moved with the remains of his army to the neighbourhood of Gerona; and when, in the course of another fortnight, instructions came to act as he had advised with regard to Barcelona, it was too late, the allies having immediately upon his removal blockaded that city.

A greater mortification awaited him. Eroles, in the month of November, when confined by a dangerous illness at Manresa, received information from one in whom he had reason to place entire confidence, that a Spanish officer, by name D. Juan de Halen, who was then one of Suchet's aides-de-camp, was desirous of being restored to the service of his country, under his protection. Eroles replied that this was not to be hoped for, unless the officer could make some signal reparation for the injury which he had done to the Spanish name; but that in waiting till this could be effected, he might give proof of his sincerity and earnest of his intentions by communicating such

CHAP.
XLVI.

1814.

*January.**He retires
to Gerona.**One of his
aides-de-
camp opens
a corre-
spondence
with Eroles.*

CHAP.

XLVI.

1814.

January.

useful information as his situation about Suchet's person enabled him to obtain. Van Halen replied as if he felt himself wounded by being expected to act the part of a spy: there was not much difficulty in overcoming this objection; and he found means of transmitting intelligence from time to time, and, among other papers, a copy of Suchet's cipher. The more important communications were not intrusted to writing, but made orally, through the person by whom this correspondence was opened.

Van Halen.

Juan Van Halen, as may be inferred from his name, was a Spaniard of Flemish or Brabantine descent. He was a native of the Isle of Leon, and born in 1789. After some years of active service in the navy, he was employed in the engineers; and as an officer in that corps bore a part at Madrid in the tragedy of the 2d of May. Escaping from the capital, he joined Blake's army after the battle of Rio-seco, and was sent by him to Ferrol; when that place was surrendered, he took the oath of fidelity to the Intruder, and afterwards held a commission in his body guards. He had the good fortune subsequently to be employed in other parts of Europe, and was at Paris when Buonaparte's reverses in Germany rendered it no longer doubtful that the part in which he had engaged must finally be the unsuccessful one. A friend and countryman, who had come to the same unpleasant conviction, advised him to forsake the sinking cause; but Van Halen, in his own words, "could not think of prostrating himself at the feet of the throne and of his country, unless he could bear with him the testimony of some such service as might make him worthy of being received in the arms of Spanish generosity and gratitude, not in those of indulgence, or of strict justice." So getting leave from the then expelled Intruder to solicit employment in Spain, he obtained from the

*Restauracion de las
Plazas, &c.
p. 12.*

Duc de Feltre an appointment upon Suchet's staff, and provided himself with credentials to Eroles, and also with a letter of recommendation to Sir Rowland Hill. CHAP.
XLVI.
1814.

After carrying on a correspondence with Eroles for about two months, and arranging with him a plan for attacking some of the places which the French held on the left of the Llobregat, it was agreed that he should come over to the Spaniards and put the design in execution; and hoping both to render service to the cause in which he now embarked, and to conceal the fact of his own desertion, leaving Barcelona in the night, he led away with him from the neighbourhood of that city two squadrons of cuirassiers, to whom he produced a forged order of the Marshal's that they should follow him on a secret expedition. His intention was that Eroles should intercept them, and make them and himself prisoners: but the messenger, whom he had dispatched two days before to apprise the Baron of his movements, fell in with a party of hussars belonging to the Anglo-Sicilian army, who were scouring the road to Moncada, and was detained by them; and when Van Halen came to the place appointed, and found that the scheme had failed, nothing remained for him but to provide for his own safety by escaping as soon as he could. Thus his desertion became notorious, and all the plans which had been formed upon the supposition of keeping it secret were frustrated. January.
He deserts
from the
French
army.
Jan. 17.

But Van Halen's disposition was turned to perilous intrigues and enterprises: he now conceived a design of recovering some strong places by stratagem; and Eroles remembering the *Rovirada* by which Figueras had been surprized, and being himself of an adventurous spirit, entered readily into his views, and went with him to General Copons, whose head-quarters were then at Vich. Copons was not without difficulty induced to give his consent, and they then proceeded to Xerta, where His scheme
for recover-
ing certain
places.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1814.

January.

Don Josef Sans, who commanded the force before Tortosa, had his head-quarters. This place was so strictly blockaded that it was certain no tidings of Van Halen's desertion could have reached it: and to induce a belief in other quarters that he had left Catalonia, bills upon Madrid and other places at a distance had been taken up for him. He had possessed himself not only of Suchet's cipher, but of the handwritings which it was necessary to counterfeit; and letters were now written as from the Marshal, informing General Robert the commander, that the exigencies of the Emperor's affairs compelled him to withdraw all his garrisons from that side of the Llobregat; that Colonel D'Eschalard of his staff was gone to Tarrasa, there to conclude the treaty for evacuating them; and that he must be prepared to depart with his equipage and field-artillery as soon as orders to that effect should reach him. It was added, that the Emperor had been pleased to honour him with the grand-cross of the Imperial Order of the Reunion, and upon this the Marshal offered him his congratulations. An unlucky peasant was found, who undertook, in the character of a spy of Suchet's, to carry this forged dispatch into the town. So few communications, without a strong escort, escaped the vigilance of the Catalans, that whenever a single messenger was sent, the letter.. written in the smallest compass and in the fewest words.. used to be inclosed in lead, and swallowed by the bearer. Van Halen was well acquainted with all the details of such transactions. If the enemy sent a spy out from one of their fortresses, they usually made a sally, and thus brought him out unobserved, and set him on his way; but the messenger who was to make his way in, approached in the darkness, and made a certain signal with a flint and steel. The peasant, though carefully instructed upon this as upon all other points, forgot this important part of his instructions, and in consequence was wounded by the sentinel:

the first part of his errand, however, was not the less performed; the dispatch was delivered to General Robert, and no suspicion being entertained of the stratagem, the man was sent to the hospital, and there carefully attended. But the answer which he should have delivered into the hands of his employers was sent by another person, and consequently not received by those who were expecting it.

CHAP.
XLVI.
1814.
January.

Having learnt what had befallen their messenger, Eroles and Van Halen proceeded with their device. A Spanish officer was sent with a letter from Sans, saying he had just received a copy of a treaty signed at Tarrasa by the Spanish and French commanders-in-chief in Catalonia, agreeing upon an armistice of fifteen days for the evacuation of the places named in the treaty, Tortosa being one; he inclosed a letter with D'Eschalard's signature, which it was pretended had accompanied it, and in which it was stated that the chef d'Escadron, Van Halen, one of the Marshal's aides-de-camp, would speedily arrive with full instructions. The garrison were on the point of making a sally when the officer arrived: the news of the armistice spread; a free communication in consequence took place with the advanced posts of the Spaniards, and on the next morning General Robert sent out Colonel Plique to make arrangements for evacuating the place; at the same time he liberated some soldiers who had lately been surprized and made prisoners. The Colonel accordingly came at the hour appointed; Van Halen presented himself in his aide-de-camp's uniform, and the Spanish Captain Daura, as having accompanied him from the Llobregat, delivered a letter from Copons. Plique desired to be left alone with Van Halen, whose instructions he was authorized to receive, in case the Spanish commander should not permit him to enter the town. He inquired of him concerning the state of affairs which had reduced the Emperor to sacrifice these places, and Van Halen

*The deceit
tried at
Tortosa.*

CHAP.
XLVI.

1814.

February.

briefly related the series of reverses which rendered it necessary to withdraw from Spain 30,000 men, leaving only garrisons in Barcelona, Gerona, and Figueras. The Marshal, he said, was before Barcelona, waiting impatiently for their arrival, that he might begin his march: his desire was that no man should be left in the hospitals if he could safely be removed; that General Robert should bring away all the artillery he could, and include the public money with his own to avoid all difficulty upon that score: for himself, he added, he must proceed with the same orders to Murviedro and Peñiscola. Plique inquired if the English assented to the armistice, and was assured that they did. He then asked if the only favour which the Emperor had bestowed upon their garrison was that of granting the grand-cross to General Robert, the Marshal, he said, when he withdrew from Valencia, having promised to recommend several officers for promotion. Van Halen told him he had understood that two Generals of Brigade were made, M. Plique himself he believed being one, and M. Jorry, then at Murviedro, the other. The Colonel appears to have been completely deceived; but he was instructed to invite Brigadier Sans to a repast before the town should be evacuated, and to request that he would send officers of artillery to take possession of the magazines, and that he would allow the aide-de-camp to return with him into the town, and take up his quarters there. This, Sans said, he was positively enjoined not to permit; all he could allow was that M. Van Halen, accompanied by a Spanish officer, should present himself at the Puente de Jesus, and confer there with General Robert. When they reached the bridge, Robert did not come out, but he sent the chief of his staff, with several officers, and one company, and they renewed the request that Van Halen might enter; this of course was refused, and in case an attempt had been made to seize him, Eroles with a body

of horse was near at hand. A letter was sent in, inclosing a copy of the forged treaty, and the parties then separated. Van Halen suspected that the deceit had been discovered; still, however, he carried it on, and wrote to Robert, saying, that as the officers had urged him to do, he should have evaded the presence of the Spanish Colonel, had he not been strictly ordered by Marshal Suchet to do nothing which could tend to interrupt the good understanding during the armistice; and being now obliged to communicate without delay his orders in Murviedro and Peñiscola, he was deprived of the honour of seeing him. General Robert answered this by a letter to Sans, regretting that he had not accepted his invitation. Van Halen's letter, he said, gave him no satisfactory notion either of his proceedings or those of his government; and unless he conferred with Van Halen in the fortress, he should not observe the armistice, but renew hostilities that afternoon, and continue them till this aide-de-camp, whom he must see, returned from Murviedro.

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XLVI.

1814.

February.

*It fails
there.*

It was known afterwards that a spy during the preceding night had entered the town, and his letters made General Robert immediately suspect the stratagem: disappointed of getting Van Halen into his hands, and of taking the Spanish officers in a counter-snare, he took the only vengeance in his power, by putting to death the wounded peasant who had brought the first forged letter. Eroles, meantime, not discouraged by this failure, lost no time in trying the same artifice elsewhere. Mequinenza had hitherto only been observed by part of one regiment; and the garrison, though reduced in number, made incursions for many leagues round, by which means they had laid in stores of provision for eighteen months, and kept the surrounding country in continual alarm. Eroles, on his way

*Attempt at
Lerida;*

CHAP. from Xerta towards Lerida, sent his adjutant, Don Antonio
 XLVI. Mazeda, with Don José Antonio Cid, a member of the provin-
 1814. cial deputation of Catalonia, to raise the Somatenes, and by
 February. this means cut off all communication with the place; and he
 dispatched before them a peasant with such another letter as
 that which at first had imposed upon General Robert. He
 halted that night a day's journey from Lerida, having in his
 company Don Juan Antonio Daura who forged the signatures,
 Van Halen, and Lieutenant Don Eduardo Bart, who spoke
 French so perfectly, that he was able to personate a French
 officer. Here they parted company, the two latter making for
 Torres del Segre, a place on the river of that name, six leagues
 from Mequinenza, and three from Lerida; there they remained
 in secret, coming out only at night to confer with Eroles, learn
 from him the state of affairs, and copy such papers as were
 required, none of which were forwarded till they had been
 examined by each of the party most carefully. The Baron himself
 proceeded to the blockading force before Lerida, and appear-
 ing there as Commandant-General of the blockade of that place,
 Monzon and Mequinenza, he reviewed the troops, inspected
 their posts, and made dispositions for straitening the blockade;
 Feb. 9. meanwhile the forged orders were sent in by a trusty agent to the
 governor, General Lamarque. Hither the spy from Mequinenza
 returned, bringing with him the reply of Baron Bourgeois the
 governor, to Marshal Suchet, in which he acknowledged the
 receipt of his orders, said that he was preparing to obey, inclosed
 the returns of his force, the state of the military chest and the
 magazines, and thanked the Emperor for the grand-cross with
 which he had been pleased to honour him; the same messenger
 brought also a letter from Mazeda, saying that he had strictly
 blockaded the place. The reply from the governor of Lerida

was in like manner brought him, and he thus obtained the exact returns which he wished, and understood also that both commandants were ready to fall into the snare.

He then set out for Mequinenza, with 300 foot and 40 horse, including a company of Mina's division, which he met upon the way, and ordered to follow him. Van Halen was instructed to join him by a different road, which he did, in sight of the fortress, Eroles having first sent in dispatches, signed in D'Eschalar's name, and sealed with the seal of the staff, informing the governor of the pretended armistice, and stating that the two aides-de-camp, Van Halen and Captain Castres, would go round to the fortresses with the necessary orders; he accompanied this with a letter in his own name, announced the arrival of an officer from Marshal Suchet, and requested to be informed what number of officers the French Commandant would bring out to confer with this officer in his presence, that he might present himself with an equal number; coming himself, if the Commandant came, or deputing one of his chief officers, if General Bourgeois should think proper to act by delegate: in either case, his troops should be drawn out at an equal distance with those of the French from any central point which the Commandant might please to name. Time and place were accordingly appointed, and Van Halen in his French uniform, and Bart as his orderly, went to the conference without any escort, and with an effrontery which prevented all suspicion. Van Halen presented a letter as from Suchet, in which the Marshal was made to say how painfully he felt the circumstances which compelled him to give orders for evacuating places wherein, at the cost of so many sacrifices, they had planted their victorious banners. But unexampled defections had forced the Emperor to this measure; and his object now was, to preserve these brave garrisons, and place them once more in the first rank of his bayonets. His aide-de-

CHAP.
XLVI.

1814.

*February.
and at Me-
quinenza,
where it suc-
ceeds.*

CHAP.
XLVI.

1814.

February.

*Success at
Lerida.*

camp was charged with verbal communications. Van Halen acted his part perfectly; and having arranged every thing for the march of the troops, who were to evacuate the place on the following noon, Eroles hastened with his subtle agent to Lerida, there to repeat the stratagem.

The news that Mequinenza was recovered had already spread; but none of the circumstances were known, and the better to deceive the French, it was now necessary to deceive the Spaniards also. Eroles, therefore, issued an order of the day, stating that Mequinenza was that day to be evacuated, and that Lerida and Monzon were to be given up by the same treaty; and commanding the Spaniards not to molest the French during the twelve days' truce, but to treat them with that generosity which characterized the Spanish nation. He had approached the blockading force amid the rejoicings of the people, who gathered round him on his way. General Lamarque's suspicions were completely disarmed; and when he requested that Van Halen might be allowed to enter the place and confer with him, because his own orders did not permit him to go beyond a certain distance from it, Van Halen, relying upon his courage and his strength of countenance, ventured in. The governor met him on the bridge, and they retired into an adjoining house, where, after some searching questions, he produced a dispatch received, as he said, by an emissary who had recently arrived, in which the Marshal approved of some proposals for the farther security of the place, and held out a hope of succouring him in the course of a few weeks. Van Halen answered by a reference to the date of his own letter, and the recent events which had produced an alteration in the Marshal's views. The conversation turned upon the Spanish Generals, and the circumstances of the blockade; and Van Halen took occasion to represent that Eroles seemed hurt by the General's declining to commu-

nicate with him in person, when he, in proposing such a
 meeting, had gone beyond the line of his instructions from
 General Copons. The French General, upon this, not to be
 outdone in courtesy, sent to offer a meeting; and went accord-
 ingly beyond his own advanced posts with his treacherous
 companion. At this interview every thing was arranged, and
 three o'clock on the following afternoon was fixed upon as the
 hour for evacuating the city. Van Halen was invited to return
 with the General, and be his guest that night; but he pleaded
 the necessity of hastening to Monzon as his excuse, and thither
 he departed with a Spanish escort.

CHAP.
 XLVI.
 1814.
 Feb. 14.

Monzon had been besieged by part of Mina's troops since
 the end of September, to the great distress of the inhabitants,
 who were under the guns of the fortress. The besiegers
 attempted to mine the rock on which it was placed. There was
 but one man belonging to the engineers in the place, and he
 was a simple miner; but, being a man of great ability, the
 commandant and the garrison confided in him; and the works
 which were executed under his direction were so skilfully
 devised, that they baffled all the attempts of the assailants, and
 they had in consequence converted the siege into a blockade.
 Here Van Halen had two difficulties to overcome with the
 commandant: a report had reached him that there was a
 Spaniard at this time with Eroles who had served as aide-de-
 camp to Suchet; and, the place being held under the orders of
 the Governor of Lerida, he could not surrender it, without
 sending to receive his instructions. The suspicion which the
 report ought to have excited seems to have been removed by
 the confidence with which Van Halen presented himself. And
 the second objection was easily disposed of: the false aide-de-
 camp, though he might reasonably judge that the real purport
 was to discover whether or not there was any fraud in the

and at
 Monzon.

Suchet, 2.
 n. pp. 371,
 372.

CHAP. business, knew that Lerida had by this time been delivered up ;
 XLVI. he prevailed upon the blockading force, therefore, to let an
 1814. officer pass with this commission, and required the commandant
 February. to hold himself in readiness for marching as soon as he should
 return. The officer accordingly arrived before Lerida on the
 night after its surrender. Eroles affected anger when he heard
 his errand, and declared that, if there were any further delay,
 the treaty as it respected Monzon should be annulled, and he
 would march against it and reduce it to ashes. The officer,
 finding him in possession of Lerida, was confounded, made
 what excuse he could for his superiors, and faithfully promised
 that Monzon should be given up immediately on his arrival
 there ; and this was done.

*The three
 garrisons
 made pri-
 soners.*

Monzon was at this time stored for seven months, Mequi-
 nenza for eighteen, and Lerida for two years. By the recovery
 of these places, 40,000 inhabitants were saved from the miseries
 of a siege, and 6000 Spanish troops were rendered disposable for
 other service. The navigation of the Ebro, the Cinca, and the
 Segre was restored, the most fertile part of Catalonia delivered,
 Aragon secured, and a direct communication opened with
 Lord Wellington's army. The next business was to secure the
 garrisons who had been thus deceived, amounting to more than
 2300 men. As soon as Eroles had taken measures for pre-
 serving order in Lerida, which, under such circumstances,
 required extraordinary care, he set out with two battalions
 of infantry and 200 horse in the rear of the French, Colonel
 Don Josef Carlos having gone before them with an equal
 force. The intention was to intercept them in the defiles of
 Igualada ; but they made a forced march, and frustrated this
 part of the plan. Upon this, lest they should succeed in
 effecting a junction with the troops in Barcelona, part of the
 blockading army was sent for ; and when they arrived at

Martorell, they found themselves surrounded there. General Lamarque was then informed that he had been deceived by a stratagem of war; and that nothing remained for him but to lay down his arms, give up the public treasure, and submit to fortune. Eroles expressed his personal esteem for the General, and his sorrow that the misadventure should have fallen upon him; he promised that the officers should be sent to Tarragona, and receive every attention which could alleviate their imprisonment; and he observed, that the General himself could not but in his heart approve a stratagem by which so much bloodshed and misery was prevented, as must have attended the reduction of these places, whether by siege or by blockade. Lamarque upon this asked if Van Halen was a Spaniard; and Bourgeois remarked upon the answer, that in truth he had rendered a great service to his country. The former said he had been dreaming for the last five days, and hardly knew if he were yet awake*.

CHAP.
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Chagrined as Marshal Suchet was by the success of what,

* This statement is drawn up from the printed narrative by Van Halen, and from a manuscript one by Eroles. Marshal Suchet's brief account is erroneous in stating that Tortosa was the last place at which the stratagem was tried instead of the first. He says that Van Halen deserted, *monté sur un cheval dérobé, et laissant à Barcelone des dettes criardes*. (T. 2. 366.) Concerning the horse, it is not likely that in such circumstances the adventurer would be scrupulous; but as to his debts, he left a letter at Barcelona, saying, that there were the arrears of his pay to liquidate them, being more by one half than all that he owed amounted to.

Van Halen afterwards got into the Inquisition as a freemason and a liberal, got out of it, published his adventures in English, went to Brussels, headed the inhabitants in that insurrection the success of which they have had so much reason to repent, was suspected of treachery by the party whom he had served, thrown into prison, and after a while released. And there the drama of his unquiet life breaks off.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1814.

February.

*Suchet dis-
mantles
Gerona and
other places.*

*Suchet,
2, 374.*

though he might justly deem it treachery in the agent, he could not but consider to be an allowable stratagem on the part of an injured, enterprizing, and ever active enemy, . . . it was even more mortifying for him immediately afterwards to make overtures, by order of the minister at war, to General Copons for evacuating all the places which he yet retained, Figueras only excepted; and to find the allies so confident of speedily obtaining them unconditionally that his proposals were disregarded. In retiring from the vicinity of Barcelona he had destroyed his works at the bridge of Molins del Rey, and in the pass of Moncada, and at Mongat; he now found it necessary to demolish the fortified posts at Besalu, Olot, Bascara, Palamos, and other smaller places; and even to dismantle Gerona, evacuate it, and retire with the remains of his army to the neighbourhood of Figueras. Jaca, too, about the same time was compelled to surrender to a part of Mina's army.

*State of
Lord Wel-
lington's
army.*

On the Biscayan coast Santona was the only place which still remained in the enemy's power; the garrison were blockaded; but they contrived to get supplies by sea, sometimes by successful runners from the opposite side of the bight, sometimes by capturing traders that approached too near, for they had one or two armed vessels in the port; but more by means of smugglers, who ran in for the sake of a good market, and in the spirit of their illicit occupation cared not with whom they dealt. The British depôts had been removed from Bilbao and St. Sebastian's; and, notwithstanding the stormy season, the army was always abundantly supplied, except with fodder; when this failed, bruised furze was used; the horses ate it with avidity, and kept in excellent condition. The men, during this inaction, suffered more; some of the corps were very sickly; and one regiment, which lost many men by a

fever, was sent into the rear, both for change of air, and that it might be removed from intercourse with the rest of the army. The rain sometimes rendered it difficult to communicate with the more distant corps: a Portuguese brigade belonging to Sir Rowland was once four days without bread or meat, a rivulet, small at other times, being so swoln as to become impassable. But in general, money was the scarcest article: dollars, which were exchanged at so low a rate after the spoils at Vittoria, sold now for eight shillings each.

CHAP.
XLVI.
1814.

February.

The disposition of the French toward the Bourbons could at this time be so little doubted, that though the allies did not yet openly support their claim, dies were made to cut out fleurs-de-lys for scarfs, to be worn on the arms of those who might be willing to declare in favour of the old loyal cause. During the weeks of inactivity which the season occasioned, preparations were made for crossing the Adour, investing Bayonne, and carrying the war into the heart of France. The snow on the lower range of the Pyrenees had visibly lessened on the 6th, and in the course of a week it wholly disappeared. On the 14th of February, Sir Rowland put the right of the army in motion, drove in the enemy's piquets on the Joyeuse river, attacked Harispe's position at Hellete, and compelled him to retire with loss toward S. Martin. That General then took up a strong position in front of Garris, on the heights of La Montagne, where he was joined by troops from the enemy's centre, and by Paris with his division, who, having commenced their march toward the interior of France, had been recalled because of the danger in this quarter. On the same day the detachment of Mina's troops in the valley of Bastan advanced upon Baygorrey and Bidarrey, and blockaded St. Jean de Pied-de-Port, Sir Rowland having cut off the direct communication of the enemy with that fort. On the morrow,

*Operations
are re-
newed.*

Feb. 15.

CHAP.

XLVI.

1814.

February.

Morillo, after driving in their advanced posts, was ordered to move toward S. Palais, by a ridge parallel to that on which they had taken their position, that he might turn their left, and cut off their retreat upon that road by the bridge of S. Palais, while the second division under Sir William Stewart should attack in front. The day was far gone before the attack could be commenced, and the action lasted till after night had closed: the position, though remarkably strong, was carried without much loss on the first effort; many gallant attempts were made to recover it, and as gallantly resisted; the struggle was more obstinate in the darkness than it had been while daylight lasted, and the French being encountered in all their charges with the wonted resolution of British troops, more men were bayoneted than usual in proportion to the numbers engaged. The enemy at length gave up the contest, and retired with considerable loss, leaving ten officers and about 200 men prisoners; but they reached S. Palais before Morillo could arrive, and crossed the Bidouze during the night, and destroyed the bridges. The right of the centre made a corresponding movement with the right wing on these two days, and the allied posts were this evening on the Bidouze. The bridges were repaired; Sir Rowland crossed the next day, and on the following drove the enemy across the Gave de Mouleon. They attempted to destroy the bridge at Arriverete, as if it were their intention to dispute the passage, but time was not allowed them to complete its destruction; and a ford having been discovered above the bridge, the 92d, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, crossed there, covered by the fire of Captain Beane's troop of horse artillery, which was advantageously placed; this regiment made a gallant attack upon two battalions of French infantry in the village of Arriverete, and drove them out with much loss. The enemy retired in the night across the Gave

d'Oleron. Sir Rowland's posts were established on that Gave the next day; and the French took up a position in the neighbourhood of Sauveterre, where they were reinforced. The position was very strong, and covered in front by a broad and rapid river; but it seemed now as if no position, however advantageous, could give the French confidence; they had been driven during the last four days from a country of peculiar difficulty, where frequent rivers afforded them great opportunities for defending it; and when Marshal Soult understood with how little success it had been defended, he directed his whole attention to that side, destroyed all the bridges over the Adour which were not protected by Bayonne, left that place to its own resources, and, concentrating his forces behind the Gave de Pau, fixed his head-quarters at Orthes.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1814.

February.

Feb. 22.

During these operations the left wing of the army continued to observe Bayonne, with the 4th division, also, which occupied the heights of Monguerre, communicating with the left on the Nive, and resting its right on the Adour, and thus preventing the enemy from drawing any supplies for the fortress from that side of the river. Preparations had been made for passing that river, and for throwing a bridge over it, both below Bayonne, .. enterprizes so difficult, that though Soult had witnessed the passage of the Douro, he seems not to have apprehended that they would be attempted. His attention had now been withdrawn from that side by Sir Rowland's movements; the 4th division moved to the right to support that larger part of the allied army which was now assembled on the Gave d'Oleron; the 5th replaced it in the position of Monguerre, and was itself replaced by Lord Aylmer's brigade of the first, and the Portuguese under Colonel Campbell; thus making room for Freyre's Spanish division, which had been cantoned within their own frontier, and now, to the dismay of the inhabitants,

*Prepara-
tions for
crossing the
Adour.*

CHAP. re-entered France. The people lamented the departure of the
 XLVI. English, and dreaded the arrival of the Spaniards; and knowing
 1814. their vindictive spirit, and the long provocation which it had
 February. received, they expressed their earnest hopes that some English
 authorities might be left for their protection.

The Adour. Adour is like Gave, a name common to many rivers in the Pyrenees, both simply meaning water in some of those primeval languages, the remains of which are still widely preserved in the appellations of rivers and mountains. The greater and noted stream, into which the others are received, has its sources in the county of Bigorre, under the Pics du Midi and d'Espade, two of the highest mountains in the chain; it passes by Campan, Bagnères, Montgaillard, and Tarbes, and begins to be navigable near Grenade, a small town in the little county of Marsan; having been joined by the Douze on its right below Tartas, it inclines to the south-west from its junction, passes Acqs, and then holds an almost southerly course to meet the Gave de Pau, which brings with its own waters those of the Gave d'Oleron, into which the Gave de Mauleon has been received. The Adour is then joined by the Bidouze, and lastly by the Nive. Formerly it made a turn to the northward, after that junction, at Boucaut, below Bayonne, and held for about six leagues a slow and winding way, parallel with the coast, before it entered the sea at Cape Breton, its direct course having apparently been obstructed by an accumulation of sand. But toward the latter part of the sixteenth century, Louis de Foix, whose water-works at Toledo were then among the wonders of machinery, and who built the lighthouse at the mouth of the Garonne, (the Smeaton and the Telford of his age), opened the present channel, . . . an arduous undertaking, in which he was more than once foiled. His intent was, by erecting a dam across the river at its curvature, to force it into a straighter

line, and make it clear a way for itself through the sands: the river again and again swept away his embankments, but he, with a just confidence in his own theory, persevered in the attempt; at length, on the day of St. Simon and St. Jude, in the year 1579, such torrents poured down from the Pyrenees, that Bayonne was in danger of being destroyed by an inundation; the Adour took then, with its increased weight of water, a straight course, and the engineer was rewarded for all his anxieties by beholding the complete triumph of his art. The Bayonnese, however, ascribed the whole merit, not to him, but to the two joint Saints of the day, and appointed a commemorative thanksgiving to be celebrated annually from that time forth upon their festival. An excellent port would now have been formed in the Adour, if the constant tendency of the sea to throw up a bar at its entrance could have been overcome. With this view the French government constructed massive stone embankments on both sides, from Boucaut to the sea; it was hoped that by thus confining the stream, its current, which at ebb tide runs about seven miles an hour, would with its own force and weight of water keep always a clear channel; but the effect was only to remove the bar somewhat farther, without lessening the difficulty or the danger of the entrance. These were so great, that the enemy at this time relied on them. They had the Sappho corvette anchored so as to flank an inundation, which protected the right of their intrenched camp; they had many armed boats on the Adour, above the town, to protect the convoys of provision which came down the river, and sometimes succeeded in getting in; the mountain guns of the allies, which were the only ones that could be removed, now and then exchanged shots with these; below Bayonne they had some gun-boats in the bend of the river, by the village of Boucaut, stationed there, as it seemed,

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*Pierre de
Marca,
Histoire de
Bearn, p.
28.**Thuanus,
l. 80. T. 3.
p. 619.*

CHAP. XLVI. to strengthen their intrenched camp by a flanking fire ; but the
 1814. only precaution that the enemy had taken to impede the
 February. passage was that of removing the signal staff on the left
 bank, which marked the line for vessels to steer by, in making
 for the mouth of the river.

Passage of
 the Adour.

A number of Spanish *chasse-marées* had been collected at Socoa for forming a bridge ; materials also were ready for a boom to protect it. The naval part of the operation was under Admiral Penrose's direction, and the 21st was the day appointed for the attempt ; but the weather proved unfavourable, and it was not possible for the vessels and their convoy to get out of Socoa. Sir John Hope, however, would not delay his movement, and resolved to attempt the passage without naval co-operation ; the troops, it was thought, might be towed over upon rafts formed of pontoons, and carrying about 100 men each. On the evening of the 22nd, the troops were ordered to be in readiness for marching at midnight ; they had with them a brigade of 18-pounders, and a rocket detachment which had arrived at Passages a few days after the passage of the Nive. There was a prejudice in the army against this weapon, which had hitherto not been used in the field ; the opinion seems to have been, that if it had been an efficient means of destruction, it would sooner have been borrowed from the East Indian nations. Lord Wellington, however, was willing that they should be tried ; and some experiments which were made at Fontarabia gave reason for supposing that they might be found useful on the Adour. The direction of this new arm was assigned to Sir Augustus Fraser, but the trial was to be made under all the disadvantages of inexperience ; for the corps was composed of men hastily brought together, and entirely ignorant of the arm they were to use ; and the rockets themselves were equipped in five different ways, and consequently

liable to as many failures. Altogether the enterprize was one of no ordinary hazard; the entrance of the river was frequently impracticable, and always perilous; its width where it was to be bridged was 270 yards, and the tide and the ripple were there so formidable as to preclude the use of any thing smaller than decked vessels of twenty or thirty tons burthen; the navigation from Socoa was uncertain; and there were the corvette and the flotilla of gun-boats to assist a garrison which consisted of more than 10,000 men. Yet even those who fully understood the difficulties of the operation had nevertheless full confidence that it would succeed.

Soon after midnight the troops were in motion; when within a short distance of Anglet, they turned by a cross-road toward the coast, marching in strict silence along the skirts of the enemy's outposts. It was a dark night, the road narrow, deep in mud, and with ditches on either side; one of the 18-pounders was drawn too near the edge in the darkness, the side of the road gave way under its weight, and it sunk into the ditch, dragging the near horses after it. This delayed the march for some time, till, by the greatest exertions, the gun was drawn up out of the deep mud; but no ill consequence arose from this mischance; the enemy were not on the alert, and the troops arrived before daylight on the sand-hills which border the coast from the vicinity of Biaritz to the mouth of the Adour: the tract between these hills and the intrenched camp is almost wholly covered by the pine-wood called the Bois de Bayonne. At daybreak, two light battalions of the German Legion patrolled through the wood, and dislodged the enemy's piquets, which retired from thence, and from the village of Anglet, into the intrenched camp. The first brigade of guards, under Colonel Maitland, debouched from the wood near the place where the signal-staff, known by the name of the *Balise Orientale*, had stood,

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which was on a high sand-hill nearly opposite Boucaut. The ground here could not be reconnoitred till the enemy's piquets were driven in; and this of course was avoided till the last moment, that no alarm might be given. It had been supposed that the guns might be brought within 700 or 800 yards of the Sappho, and that they might sink her, lest she should be employed against the bridge; but, when they had been brought with great labour through the deep sandy ground, it was necessary to place them where they were sheltered from the guns of the intrenched camp, and this was in a situation 1500 yards from the corvette. There they were placed in battery, and the brigade was posted behind some sand-hills, close to the marsh which protected the front of the camp. Don Carlos d'España meantime made a demonstration on the heights above Anglet, to prevent the enemy from detaching any troops.

As soon as the French saw the brigade debouching from the pine-wood, they commenced a cannonade against it from their gun-boats. This had been foreseen; the rocket-corps had, therefore, been divided into three parties, one of which went, with the first division, towards the mouth of the Adour, and the other two accompanied the 18-pounders to be employed against the flotilla. There were twelve boats to assist the Sappho; but when a few rockets had been discharged, the terrified sailors took to their oars, and made all speed up the river; the effect, indeed, of these weapons was most terrific; they dashed through the water like fiery serpents, and pierced the sides of the boat, burning apparently even under water with undiminished force. The guns meantime opened upon the corvette, and fired about 400 rounds at her, some toward the conclusion with hot shot. This failed to set her on fire; and when the three-coloured flag was shot from the flag-staff, the enemy presently nailed it to the mast-head; but after some hours the French retired from the

*Batty's
Campaign,
p. 119.*

contest, under the protection of the citadel, their captain having been killed, and 34, out of a crew of 40 men, killed or wounded, .. sacrificed, as it should seem, in a display of courage which could be of no avail. The action had served as a spectacle for the inhabitants of Bayonne, who came out from the promenade which skirts the river to witness, and apparently to enjoy it, .. the day being remarkably fine, and the action itself, with all its circumstances, as described by an eye-witness, more resembling some festival display than the dreadful reality of war; the spectators, too, thought themselves at safe distance, till one poor fellow came rashly within range of the guns, and had his head carried off by a shot which passed completely through the corvette.

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*Batty's
Campaign,
p. 120.*

That vessel had not been destroyed, but the attack on it, and the other demonstrations in front of the intrenched camp, had the desired effect of occupying the enemy's whole attention; a bend which the Adour makes on the seaward side of the town, and the pine-wood, which extended almost close to its banks, prevented them from seeing the movements of the allies on that side, and they kept little watch there, because they apprehended no danger. But meantime the whole of the first division, except the brigade of guards which accompanied the artillery that attacked the Sappho, had marched to attempt a passage near the mouth of the river. With this force there were eighteen pontoons and six small boats, forty rocketeers, and an officer with a few artillerymen, destined to spike the guns of a battery on the enemy's side of the water. The intention was, to construct six rafts, each upon three pontoons, by which, in two passages, 1200 men might be passed across before the day should dawn; 1200 more being ready to follow, while these held their ground, supported by twelve field-pieces from the left bank. But, owing to the difficulty of getting the pontoons on,

CHAP. XLVI. it was found that only three of them could be brought to the water's edge before daylight; and therefore it was deemed advisable by the officers in command to withdraw the troops behind some sand-hills, where they were quite concealed, and collect the pontoons. Some of the officers, meantime, before day broke, examined the shore, to see where would be the most favourable points for putting the rafts into the water; the sentry on the opposite bank challenged them, but no answer was returned, and no alarm taken. Sir John Hope came to the spot at daylight, but afterwards sent orders to attempt the passage, at all hazards, when the tide would permit. A little before noon the river became passable, the tide, still running out, being nearly slack. At this time the fleet from Socoa was in sight, but at considerable distance, and with an unfavourable though not a strong wind, rather losing than gaining ground. The river at the point where the passage was to be attempted appeared to be about 200 yards wide at low water. The British made no show of men, and could only see a small piquet of the enemy's on the other side; this piquet appeared at a loss what to do, and as soon as the first boats were carried to the water's edge on men's shoulders, they fairly ran off, without discharging a single shot, the piece of their advanced sentry having missed fire. The six boats were soon on the water, each carrying only six soldiers; and the tide coming in soon increased the labour of the passage. A rope was passed from one side to the other, and three rafts were put together with all speed, each carrying from 50 to 60 men; but, after two or three passages had been effected, the tide came in with such force, that it was found impracticable to get the raft either backward or forward from the middle of the current, where it remained tide-bound, the united strength of all who were on board not being sufficient to haul with any effect upon the hawser. About five o'clock they

ceased working, the few seamen whom they had, and who were all Portuguese, being exhausted with fatigue. By that time 500 of the guards had been ferried across, the rocketeers having been the last, with Captain Lane of the artillery, who came out with them from England. All was at this time quiet, and apparently the day's work was done. But a little before dusk the enemy pushed down two regiments from the citadel; they came on with apparent spirit, beating the charge. Colonel Stopford posted the guards behind some low sand-hills, with their right on the river, and their left on a morass, the ground in their front being flanked by the artillery on the opposite bank; but a well-directed discharge of rockets made the French hastily retreat: the effect of this weapon was more terrible because they had never before witnessed it, and they retired with all speed into the citadel.

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The troops bivouacked that night on the ground which they occupied; those who were in the wood felled trees and kindled fires. As soon as the tide served more men were passed across, the pontoons being used as row-boats, carrying fifteen men at each turn: it was bright moonlight, the weather perfectly still, and there was no enemy to offer any opposition. The wind sprung up for the flotilla during the night, and at morning it was seen, . . . about threescore vessels, including boats of all kinds, some of them near the mouth of the river, standing off and on. The Admiral was in the Porcupine frigate: he had been apprized, through the naval agent at Socoa, how anxiously the entrance of the vessels for the bridge was desired. The surf had increased in proportion as the wind became favourable; and the bar, which extends from the right bank, nearly across the river, shifting with the change of wind and tide, and at all times dangerous, was at this time more than usually formidable. The agent, who set off in his boat from Socoa as soon as he received the last night's advices, had no pilot on board, and mistaking the chan-

*Entrance of
the flotilla.*

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nel where he should have entered the river, beached himself on a spit of sand; fortunate, however, in his mishap, for the boat cleared the sand by great exertion, and having been pulled, sails standing, over the spit, got into deep water. One boat, which had the principal pilot on board, and therefore was selected as the safest, led the way, and was upset, several of the crew perished, and most of those who saved themselves were dreadfully bruised. Captain O'Reilly, who had command of the flotilla, was on board, and Captain Faddy (who had charge of 50 artillerymen sent in five gun-boats), both with great difficulty escaped: a second succeeded in reaching the beach; the larger vessels then put off, to wait the chance of the next tide, it being, as the Admiral declared, scarcely possible that one in fifty could then have effected the passage. Some small boats, however, attempted it, and were swamped; what boats were on the river were sent to pick up those who were struggling for life, but without success; some who regained their own boats, and clung to them, were swept off into the sea, and only one man was saved.

Had the bar been smoother, the tide was now too low for vessels to attempt the entrance; but a pilot was landed to the south-west of it, that he might walk to the Adour, and make signals from within the bar, to guide the vessels into the safer parts, supplying thus the signal-staff which on that side had been removed, for from the sea there appeared only one long and heavy line of surf. Meantime the troops continued to cross as they could, about 100 yards above the mouth of the river, some on rafts, some in a pontoon-boat which carried only twelve at a time; and when the tide presented least difficulty, a few cavalry by swimming. When the tide had risen sufficiently, the vessels boldly stood in, the pilot who had been landed having set up a halberd, with a handkerchief fixed to it, as a signal for directing them. The master's mate of the *Lyra* led the way;

his boat was lost, and himself and the whole of the crew. Several vessels shared the same fate. One who was on the shore, close at hand, and who had been accustomed to fields of battle, declared that he had never beheld a scene so awful. The boats were so agitated as they attempted the passage, sails flapping, oars apparently useless, and all steerage lost, that it seemed as if each must inevitably be wrecked. Two vessels were stranded, but almost all their crews were by great exertion saved. A gun-brig also was driven ashore; Captain Elliot of the Martial gun-brig was swamped in his boat: his surgeon was picked up by this gun-boat, but upon her striking the ground the shock threw down a 24-pounder, which fell upon him and killed him. Three transport boats with their crews were lost; every exertion was made to save those who were struggling for life in the surf, literally within ten yards of their countrymen on shore; but though there were men with ropes tied to them on the beach, who spared no endeavour for assisting them, and who when the waves retired appeared as if they were close to them, not a soul could be saved: some who actually obtained footing on the ground were carried back by the receding surf, and swept away for ever. But the zeal and intrepidity of British seamen will overcome all obstacles that are not absolutely insuperable: officers and men on this occasion displayed gallantry which could not be surpassed, and skill which has seldom been equalled; vying with each other, they essayed the passage; and happily the wind towards evening gradually died away, and about thirty vessels got in.

The passage of the troops, meantime, had been continued; it was quite dark before the last party were ferried over, and the tide was then running out so rapidly, that the most strenuous rowing hardly prevented the boat from being drifted out to sea. The whole of General Howard's division, about 6000 in number, were then on the right bank. They bivouacked on the

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*February.**A bridge
carried over
the Adour.*

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sand hills where the enemy on the yester-evening had been discomfited by the rockets. On the morrow they advanced toward the citadel, their right flank resting on the Adour, the left extending to the great road leading from Bayonne to Bourdeaux. Closing in to the verge of a deep and marshy ravine, which separates the high ground about the citadel from the surrounding country, they cut off the enemy's communication with the open tract to the north of the river, and completed the investment of the fortress and its camp; a feint attack being kept up the while on the opposite side by Lord Aylmer's brigade, the 5th division, and the Spaniards. By great exertions the bridge was finished on the following day. The point fixed upon for it was near the village of Boucaut, where the river is 270 yards wide. It consisted of six and twenty *chasse-marées*, anchored each at the bow and stern so as to resist both the ebbing and the flowing tide; to many of these, as a substitute for anchors, the heavy iron guns were used which had been taken in the redoubts on the Nive. The vessels were lashed together both at bow and stern. Five cables were stretched by capstans across these vessels from shore to shore, and oaken planks were laid athwart upon these, and secured to the two outer cables, so as to form a platform strong enough to bear the passage of artillery, yet pliant enough to adapt itself to the motion of the vessels with the tide. On the right bank the cable ends were fastened to some of the heaviest iron guns which had been taken in the camp of the Nivelle; on the left they were wound round capstans, which were firmly fixed by large stakes driven into the ground; and by these the tension of the platform could be increased or lessened as the rise or fall of the river might require. A little way above the bridge a boom-chain was laid down for its protection; and above this the gun-boats were anchored, in readiness to engage those of the enemy, should

any attempt be made upon the bridge by sending them down the river. The piers on both sides were wide enough for carriages of all descriptions; and that on the right bank was used for the artillery, in a part where the water is admitted at flood through apertures, and where a road could not have been formed without great expense of labour and of time.

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Batty's
Campaign,
126, 127.

This bridge was of the greatest importance, not only as affording a communication between the troops upon both banks during the blockade and intended siege of Bayonne, but also because it opened a way to the *chaussées* on the right of the river, whereby the army in its advance toward the interior could be much more easily supplied than by the bad roads in the exhausted country along the skirts of the Pyrenees, and where the Gaves and other tributary streams of the Adour were to be crossed. The inhabitants of Boucaut and of the adjacent villages had been ordered to take up arms against the allies; they had refused; and in consequence, the French troops upon leaving them committed some excesses. The contrast indeed was so great between the treatment which they experienced from their own soldiers and from the allies, that the peasantry volunteered to repair the roads for their uninvited, but now not unwelcome visitors.

While Bayonne was thus being invested by the left wing of the army, the two divisions which had hitherto observed that place between the Adour and the Nive joined the main body; and Lord Wellington, as soon as the troops were closed up, continuing his operations to the right, made a general advance. Marshal Beresford, who had remained since Sir Rowland's movement with the 4th and 7th divisions and with Colonel Vivian's brigade on the lower Bidouze, attacked the enemy on the 23d in their fortified posts at Hastingues and Oyergave, on the left of the Gave de Pau, and made them retire within

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the Gaves.

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their *tête-de-pont* at Peyrehorade. On the 24th, Sir Rowland, with the light, the 2d, and the Portuguese divisions, under Baron Alten, Sir William Stewart, and Camp-Marshal Lecor, passed the Gave d'Oleron, by a ford near Ville-nave, without opposition. Sir Henry Clinton passed in like manner with the 6th, between Monfort and Laas; and Sir Thomas Picton with the 3d made demonstrations as if he would have attacked the enemy's position at the bridge of Sauveterre, upon which they blew up the bridge. Morillo at the same time drove in their posts near Navarreins, and blockaded that place, which was fortified strongly enough to require battering-artillery for its reduction. Immediately after the passage of the Oleron Gave, Sir Rowland and Sir Henry Clinton moved toward Orthes, and the great road leading from Sauveterre to that town; and the enemy retiring from Sauveterre across the Gave de Pau in the night, destroyed the bridges upon that river, and assembled their army near Orthes on the 25th. The allies continued to advance that day, and on the following Beresford crossed the Gave de Pau below its junction with that of Oleron, at some fords about four miles above Peyrehorade; these were not discovered till after some unsuccessful attempts, and the current there was so rapid, that the infantry of General Walker's division could hardly support each other against it, and for some minutes there was reason to fear that the column would be carried down the stream. The Marshal then moved along the high road from Peyrehorade toward Orthes, on the enemy's right. Sir Thomas Picton had found a ford below the bridge of Berenx, where he crossed with the 3d division, and Sir Stapleton with the cavalry as Beresford approached; the 6th and light divisions made a flank movement to support them, and Sir Rowland occupied the heights opposite Orthes, and the high road leading to Sauveterre, on the left bank of the Gave. His corps advanced directly

upon the bridge of Orthes, with the hope of forcing it; but, being without artillery, and finding the approach defended by loop-holed houses, and by a tower strongly manned against them, they desisted from their intent.

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Orthes.

Orthes, which before the territorial arrangement of France was revolutionized, was the capital of the Senechalry of the same name, is supposed by Scaliger to have been the ancient city of Bearum, the Beneharnus of Antoninus, and the Benarnus of writers in a later age; but this opinion seems to have been satisfactorily disproved. It stands upon the Gave de Pau, there a considerable river, and remarkable, because its accessible source is a waterfall, higher, except one in America, than any that has ever yet been measured; it springs from a height of 1266 feet, and being twice broken on the way by projections of the precipice, falls upon a bed of perpetual snow, under which it works its passage. Orthes was the residence of the Princes of Bearn during some 200 years from the middle of the 13th century, when Gaston de Moncada built the *Chateau Noble* there, upon the plan of his hereditary castle in Aragon, and in a like situation, on an eminence commanding the town, and overlooking a wide circuit of country. In that castle Froissart was entertained by Gaston Phebus, the twelfth Count of Foix, and Lord of Bearn, and there he was informed concerning the affairs of Castille, Portugal, Navarre, Aragon, Gascony, and England, Gaston himself communicating to him what he knew, and telling him that the history which he had undertaken to write would be esteemed above all others, because more marvellous deeds of arms had been done in the world within the last fifty years than in three centuries preceding. There the good old chronicler was as happy as splendid hospitality, and the diligent use of favourable opportunities, could make him; the thing which he most desired being to collect information for his great work,

Ramond's
Tr. in the
Pyrenees,
p. 92.

P. de Mar-
ca. Hist.
de Bearn,
L. 1. c. 6.
§ 4. 14.

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and having at his wish there, lords, knights, and squires, ready and willing to inform him. In this castle Gaston Phebus kept his treasure, and it is said to have amounted at one time to no less a sum than three million florins, raised by taxation, which was borne cheerfully, because he maintained order in his dominions; neither English nor French, nor robber nor rover, harassed his people; and he had the reputation of being as liberal as he was just, not heralds and minstrels only, but strangers who came there having cause to praise him for his bounty. Froissart had been in many courts of kings, dukes, princes, earls, and great ladies, but never in any, he says, that so well liked him as the Castle Noble of Orthes; and he had seen many knights, kings, and princes, but none like this Count of Foix for personage, nor of so fair form, nor so well made; for in every thing he was so perfect, that he could not be praised too much, loving what ought to be beloved, and hating that which ought to be hated. Yet so accustomed were men to the most atrocious actions, in that which was the brightest age of chivalry, that this very Gaston committed a murder in this Castle as much in violation of honour and of hospitality, as of laws both human and divine; tortured innocent persons to death upon mere suspicion, and with his own hands killed his own son at the close of a frightful tragedy, of which this castle was the scene; and the faithful historian who thus extols him has related all these things! The ruins of the *Chateau Noble* are yet to be seen, and the tower in which Gaston kept his treasure was standing in the last century. Orthes ceased to be the residence of the Counts in 1460, when they removed their court to Pau; and their removal was not compensated by the short-lived university which about a century after Queen Jeanne of Navarre founded there for the Huguenots, and endowed from the church property in her dominions.

Here Marshal Soult had taken a strong position, extending

about a mile in length along a range of tabular heights ; his right, under Reillé, resting on them upon the high road to Dax, and occupying the village of S. Boes ; the centre, under Drouet, taking the bend of a sickle, as the hill formed a cove, and being thus protected by the flanks ; the left, under Clausel, resting upon the town and the heights above it, and defending the passage of the river from Sir Rowland. Villatte's and Harispe's divisions, and Paris's brigade, were formed in reserve on high ground upon the road to Sault de Navailles. " Thus," in the words of a French historian, " from 35,000 to 40,000 French troops were collected at a point as favourable as the most skilful commander could have chosen for resisting the advance of an invading army." Lord Wellington's arrangements were, that Beresford, with the 4th and 7th divisions, and Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry, should turn and attack the enemy's right ; while Picton, with the 3rd and 6th, supported by Sir Stapleton with Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of horse, should move along the Peyrehorade road, and attack their centre and left. Baron Alten, with the light division, kept up the communication, and was in reserve between these ; and Sir Rowland was to force the passage of the Gave, and turn and attack their left.

The action commenced about nine in the morning. The 4th division, under Sir Lowry Cole, carried the village of S. Boes, after an obstinate resistance. Beresford then directed his efforts against two lines of the enemy formed on the heights above it ; but the troops had not room here to deploy for the attack, the only approach being along a narrow tongue of land, which had on either side a deep ravine, and was completely commanded by the enemy's guns. Sir Lowry's division led the way ; 15 pieces of artillery played on them diagonally with full effect ; in front they were opposed by the main line of the

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Orthes.

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Beau-
champ's
Narrative
of the In-
vasion, 2.
p. 52

CHAP. French infantry, and strong bodies were formed in the ravines
XLVI. on their flanks. Repeated attempts were made by Major-General
1814. Ross, and by Vasconcellos's Portuguese brigade, till at length
February. that brigade was completely broken, and the remainder of the
division, with a brigade of Baron Alten's that hastened to their
assistance, with difficulty covered their retreat: thus on this
point the attack totally failed.

Lord Wellington saw that it was impossible to turn this wing of the enemy by their right, without extending his line too far; he therefore ordered the immediate advance of the 3d and 6th divisions, and the 7th, with a brigade of the light division, to support them by attacking the height which the enemy occupied at the point of junction between their right and centre. The 52d regiment, under Colonel Colborne, led up the hill, supported closely by the other troops both on the right and left; and the artillery gained a knoll from whence it swept the whole line of the enemy's centre. It made such havoc among their reserve masses, that the French 21st hussars were provoked to a most daring movement for seizing it; they galloped round the hill, and, under a heavy fire of musquetry, charged and drove back one of the supporting battalions; then with equal courage fell upon the 42d Highlanders, but the Highlanders received their charge firmly, and the hussars suffered so much in it, that they gave up this brave though unsuccessful attempt. Meantime the allied troops were advancing steadily, under a destructive fire: Major-General Inglis's brigade distinguished itself now, as it had done on all occasions, and made a successful charge on the enemy's left; every regiment in the 3rd division was hotly engaged, they drove the French from every height where they attempted to make a stand, and in spite of all resistance gained at length the summit of the main position. There a severe struggle ensued; on no former

occasion had the enemy fought so well when opposed to British troops; it was the only action in which they came fairly to the bayonet; but the determination which brought them to that sure trial could not support them in it, and, giving up all hope now of a successful resistance, they began to retreat over the level ground in their rear in good order, by *echellons* of divisions, each successively covering the other, and supported by their cavalry, which, by a gallant charge on the 6th division, endeavoured, but in vain, to check the pursuit. The infantry rallied upon some rising ground, and attempted again to make a stand: the 9th hussars, under Colonel Vivian, made them again give way. They then formed into squares, and continued to retire still in admirable order; and, though warmly pursued, and suffering heavily from the British guns, they took every advantage of the numerous positions which the ground afforded.

Marshal Soult, in whom nothing was that day wanting which could be required of a commander in the field, was compelled to withdraw his wings when the centre had thus been forced, and to order a general retreat. The wings had comparatively suffered little; and this movement was as well conducted as all his former ones had been. But meantime Sir Rowland had forced the passage of the Gave above the town; and, seeing the state of the action, he moved, with the 2d division and with Major-General Fane's brigade of cavalry, for the great road to S. Sever, keeping thus upon the enemy's left, but in a direction toward a point in their rear which would have cut off their retreat on Sault de Navailles. Their movements quickened as soon as they perceived this danger; and as their march was accelerated, Sir Rowland quickened his, till the retreat became a flight; they ran, and the allies ran also, and the race continued till the French broke so completely, that no resemblance of a column was remaining.

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February.

It was the lively expression of an officer there present, that “ in the battle they met the charge like lions, but that the pursuit was like hare-hunting ;” prisoners were literally caught by the skirts as they ran. Could the cavalry have acted sooner off the great road, the French army must have been almost destroyed. They suffered greatly where any obstacle impeded their flight ; the enclosures and ditches were thickly strewn with their killed and wounded ; 2000 fugitives were picked up by the infantry, and 12 pieces of cannon taken, and many more prisoners upon the only opportunity which was offered for the cavalry to charge, when the enemy had been driven from the high road by Sir Rowland. The victory, complete as it was, might have been followed to more advantage, if Lord Wellington had not been struck on the pommel of his sword by a musquet-shot, and bruised so severely by the blow, that he was unable to cross this intersected country on horseback time enough to direct the farther movements of the divisions in pursuit : the most decisive victory would have been dearly purchased by his loss. When it became dusk, the army was halted in the neighbourhood of Sault de Navailles. The loss of the allies, in killed, wounded, and missing, was somewhat less than 2300, of whom about 600 were Portugeze ; no Spaniards were engaged that day. That of the enemy was estimated by one of their own writers at from 14,000 to 16,000, very much the greater part being by desertion after the rout ; for the conscripts threw down their arms, and took the opportunity of escaping from compulsory service. Foy was severely wounded, General Bechaud killed, and another General mortally wounded.

*Beau-
champ, 2,
p. 55.*

Feb. 28.

The main body of the French army continued its retreat during the night, and was joined at Hagetman by the garrison of Dax, and by two fresh battalions of conscripts ; it then halted behind the Adour, near S. Sever, to re-organize itself : the

allies followed them to S. Sever on the day after the battle, and the centre advanced in three columns with the hope of enveloping them. That which marched on the *chaussée* arrived at the appointed moment; but the flank columns could not proceed upon the unpaved roads at the pace which was required; and thus the enemy had time to move off in the direction of Agen, escaping an attack which they were in no condition to have withstood. Beresford then with the light division, and with Colonel Vivian's brigade, passed the Higher Adour, and occupied Mont de Marsan, the principal town in the department of the Landes, where he took a very large magazine of provisions. Here no resistance was attempted; but at Aire, where the enemy had other magazines, a corps was collected with the intention of making a stand to protect their removal. Against this place, which is on the left bank of the Adour, Sir Rowland moved upon the 2d of March; and when his advanced guard arrived within two miles of the town, the French were discovered strongly posted on a ridge of hills, with their right upon the river, thus covering the approach. Notwithstanding the strength of the post, Sir William Stewart was ordered to attack them with the second division along the road, and Brigadier-General Da Costa's Portuguese brigade about the centre of their position. The French force consisted of two divisions; and the Portuguese, when they forced their way up and gained the summit, found, which had not been expected, an extent of flat ground on the top, and a strong body of the enemy completely formed there to resist them; the Portuguese were so broken and confused that they could regain no formation, and must have suffered accordingly, if Sir William Stewart, having beaten back the enemy on his side, had not dispatched his first brigade under Major-General Barnes to their timely support. The enemy were then in their

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1814.

March 1.

*The French
driven from
Aire.*

CHAP. XLVI.
 1814. *March.* turn thrown into confusion by a vigorous charge, nor could they after many attempts recover the ground, but were driven from all their positions, and finally from the town, where the magazines fell into the conqueror's hands. Two divisions of the French were engaged in this affair, one of them was Harispe's, which had not been at Orthes; their loss was very considerable: that of the allies amounted to 20 killed and 135 wounded; among the former was the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Hood, of the general staff, an officer of great merit and promise.

*Soult draws
 nearer the
 Pyrenees.*

At this time the French were once more favoured by the weather. Heavy and continued rain fell during the beginning of the month, swelling all the rivulets so as materially to impede the progress of the allies, increasing in proportion the Adour, which was so rapid that pontoons could not be laid upon it, and rendering it more difficult to repair the numerous bridges which the enemy had destroyed in their retreat; yet till this could be done, the different parts of the army were without communication. Lord Wellington was therefore compelled to halt; and Marshal Soult, who after his defeat at Orthes had been forced by the movement of Sir Rowland's corps to retire in the direction of Bourdeaux, had leisure and opportunity to choose his course. The divisions which had been driven from Aire retreated up both banks of the Adour toward Tarbes, with a view, as Lord Wellington perceived, of being reinforced by farther detachments from Marshal Suchet's army. This direction Soult had resolved to take, because it was only from Suchet that he could look for any efficient aid; though it appears that there was not that concert and clear understanding between the two Marshals which might have been expected in men of such experience and great ability. By thus approaching the Pyrenees he left the way to Bour-

deaux open to the allies; he, however, supposed that Lord Wellington would not venture to advance upon that city, but of necessity must follow his movements. In the latter conclusion he was not mistaken; but he greatly mistook the disposition of the French people, who now looked to the English as their liberators, a disposition that was increased by his own conduct, and by the licentious habits of his troops. The loss of his magazines compelled him to impose heavy requisitions, as far as his power to collect them extended, to the ruin of the inhabitants, while their countrymen in other parts were enriched by the presence of an invading army, paying for every thing at the exorbitant prices that its own demand occasioned. His troops, therefore, in their own country were in want of every thing, and the English were abundantly supplied. The depredations and the enormities which his men committed, though not aggravated by that fiendish cruelty which had characterized the French in Portugal, were yet such, that they were execrated wherever they went; and the allies, in every town and village where they entered, were welcomed as deliverers and protectors. Many instances occurred in which our sick soldiers were taken in by some hospitable family, and nursed with the greatest kindness.

One of the enemy's columns having been cut off from the Adour by Sir Rowland's rapid march upon Aire, retreated in disorder toward Pau, the men throwing away their arms, the better to effect their escape and facilitate their desertion. The few who reached that place were driven out by a detachment which Lord Wellington sent thither under General Fane to occupy it; and there the allies established a hospital in which the *Sœurs de la Charité* attended upon the sick and wounded soldiers, after the manner of their exemplary order. Travellers are still shown at Pau the chamber in which Henri IV. was

CHAP.
XLVI.

1814.

*March.**Beauchamp,*
2. 61.
Batty's
Narrative,
139.*The allies*
enter Pau.

CHAP. born, and the tortoise-shell in which he slept as in a cradle.

XLVI. The gardens which had been his delight were remaining at the

1814. close of the 17th century; and the walks overarched with

March.

trees, the arbours, and the evergreens, though all neglected then, bore testimony still to the care with which they had formerly been dressed, and to the topiary skill which had been displayed there. Bearn, of which Pau was the capital in former times, was one of the most favoured parts of France, and indeed of the world, before the French revolution cut up the well-being of a whole generation by the roots; for the division of property, and the industry and manners of the people had combined there with all fortunate circumstances of soil, surface, and climate, to render the inhabitants contented and happy.

*Deputies
arrive from
Bordeaux.*

When the news of the battle of Orthes reached S. Jean de Luz, two deputies arrived at the same time from Toulouse, to assure the Duc d'Angoulême that the inhabitants of that city eagerly desired the restoration of the Bourbons. The Duc upon this repaired to Lord Wellington's head-quarters at S. Sever; Rochejaquelein followed him, and they were joined there by M. Bontemps Dubarry, who came from Bordeaux, charged by the better part of the citizens to invite the Duc, and to assure Lord Wellington that a British force would be received there as friends. Lord Wellington no longer hesitated; and as soon as Freyre's Spanish corps, which had been stationed in reserve near Irun, could be brought up, and every disposable body was closed to the right, he dispatched Marshal Beresford with three divisions toward that important city, to drive out its inconsiderable garrison, and give the inhabitants an opportunity of declaring for the exiled family if such were their wish, and they chose to venture upon a measure which might be so injurious to themselves, if Buonaparte should accept of the

*The Duc
d'Angou-
lême pro-
ceeds thither
with Mar-
shal Beres-
ford.*

peace that still was offered him. Lord Wellington still doubted of this, even after he had determined upon making the trial; and Rochejaquelein, when he went to receive the Duc's last order, before he set off with the advanced guard, found that the Duc himself seemed to entertain the same discouraging opinion. Upon this he requested permission to precede the English by six-and-thirty hours, and declared that if Bourdeaux did not declare itself, his head should be responsible for the failure. "You are certain then of your grounds," the Duc rejoined. "As certain," replied Rochejaquelein, "as one can be of any earthly thing!" The Duc then expressed his full confidence in him, and bade him go.

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1814.
March.

*Memoires de
la Marquise
de la Roche-
jaquelein,
p. 529.*

The sandy tract which extends from Bayonne to Bourdeaux is well known by the name of the Landes; so called, it has been supposed, because all other ground in the adjacent country had its proper appellation of field, meadow, marsh, wood, or other such terms according to its produce and uses; but this region was mere land and nothing else; it is a vast plain, perfectly level, in some parts covered with pine forests, in others only a wide waste of sand, where the trees are so thinly scattered in the sea-like circle, that in hot and hazy weather they have the appearance of ships at sea. The peasant stalks over the loose sand upon high stilts, which are found as useful here as racquets for the snow in Canada. Uncultivated, however, and thinly peopled as this extensive tract is, the pine forests yield a considerable revenue; the trees are regularly tapped for turpentine, pitch is extracted from them, and candles made from resin are in common use. While Marshal Beresford advanced without opposition over this remarkable country, Rochejaquelein having proceeded with the light troops as far as Langon, made his way to the house of one of his confederates at Preignac; and from thence was safely conducted, though the avenues were

The Landes.

*Gallia
Christiana,
T. 1. Gloss.*

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March 10.

then watched by detachments of soldiers and of *gendarmérie*, into Bourdeaux. He found that the secret council of the royalists there, contrary alike to his wishes and expectations, had just dispatched a messenger to Marshal Beresford, requesting him to delay his movement, that they might have more time for preparing the people, and bringing the royalists from the country round to the support of those in the town. This was at ten on the night of the 10th; his representations how impolitic it was to allow the timid time for considering the danger, and how desirable that at this crisis Bourdeaux should declare itself for their legitimate king by a spontaneous movement, inspired them with a braver spirit: and four of their confederates were then successively sent off to meet the Duc d'Angoulême and the English, and entreat them to expedite their march.

*The Buona-
partists
withdraw
from Bour-
deaux.*

The battle of Orthes had already struck fear into those persons from whom the royalists had most to apprehend; and no sooner was it known that a British force was advancing toward Bourdeaux, than the principal persons there who were in Buonaparte's service thought it hopeless to resist. The senator M. Cornudet, who was Commissioner Extraordinary in this department, ordered all the civil and ecclesiastical authorities to be dissolved, and every person in the employ of government to leave the city. He gave directions for destroying two frigates which were upon the stocks; and when it was rumoured that this would be opposed by the people, he set fire to them himself; and, taking with him the public chests, and as much gunpowder and saltpetre as he could remove in haste from the public stores, he withdrew. General Lhuillier, who had the military command, could not collect more than 2000 soldiers; he, therefore, withdrew also. But the Archbishop, as well as the Mayor, M. Lynch, remained and prepared to

receive the Duc d'Angoulême as the nephew of their lawful King, and the English as his allies. Instead of finding any force to resist him on the way, or any disposition for resistance, Marshal Beresford was met by royalists from all parts of Medoc and Guienne, who came in crowds to welcome the Duc. Long accustomed to adversity, the Duc himself was not elated by this fair appearance of returning fortune; he knew that, whatever might be the wishes of the allied sovereigns, they did not yet consider it their policy to espouse the cause of the Bourbons, and he requested the people not to endanger themselves by a hasty declaration; but, notwithstanding this expressed desire, the cry of "*Vive le Roi!*" was raised in the little town of Bazan when he entered it. Early on the morning of the 12th, the local authorities of Bourdeaux assembled at the Hotel de Ville. The English hussars were beginning to enter, when Rochejaquelein rode with all speed to meet Marshal Beresford, and requested him to withdraw them, that the royalists might declare themselves before he entered: of course this was instantly done. The municipality went out to meet him; the royal guard which had secretly been formed were instructed to assemble upon the road with arms concealed, and their officers followed in the magistrates' train. As soon as Beresford arrived at the bridge of La Maye, he sent Colonel Vivian to the Mayor, saying that he hoped to enter the city as a friend and an ally. The Mayor met the Marshal without the gates, and addressed him to this effect, that if he were about to enter Bourdeaux as a conqueror, he might possess himself of the keys, which there were no means of defending; but if he came in the name of the King of France and of his ally, the King of England, they should then be joyfully presented to him. Marshal Beresford replied, that his orders were to occupy the city and to protect it; that he hoped his message had been satisfactory, and that the city which

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XLVI.

1814.

*March.**March 1.**The Duc enters, and the white flag is hoisted there.*

CHAP. he was about to enter was the city of an ally inhabited by the
 XLVI. subjects of Louis XVIII. M. Lynch, upon this, exclaimed,
 1814. "*Vive le Roi!*" cast away his scarf, and put on the white
 March. cockade. At the same moment the white flag was displayed
 from the steeple of St. Michael's: those who were prepared with
 white cockades mounted them, those who were not supplied their
 place with paper; and when, about an hour afterwards, the
 Duc de Guiche arrived and announced the near arrival of
 Monseigneur the Duc d'Angoulême, Bourdeaux had never
 before witnessed so general or so generous a joy as was then
 manifested. Crowds pressed round him, if they might but
 touch his clothes or his horse; some cried, "He is of our
 blood; he was born a Frenchman, and feels like a French-
 man!" numbers fell on their knees and blessed him, and blessed
 God that they had lived to see this day; mothers pointed him
 out to their children and said, "Now we shall no longer lose
 all our sons in the war!"

It was nearly two hours before the Duc could make his way
 through the multitude to the cathedral. There the Archbishop
 at the head of the clergy awaited him at the great door, and
Te Deum was performed there amid the acclamations of the
 populace. M. Lynch issued a proclamation in a strain well
 pitched to support the feeling which had thus strongly been
 excited. "Inhabitants of Bourdeaux," said he, "happy cir-
 cumstances have called upon the paternal magistrate of your
 city to become the interpreter of your long suppressed wishes,
 and the organ of your interests, by welcoming in your name
 the nephew of Louis XVI., whose presence has converted into
 allies an irritated nation bearing the character of enemies till
 they reached your gates. It is not to subjugate our country
 that the English, and the Spaniards, and the Portugeze appear
 where they now are: they are come with united forces into the

south of France actuated by the same feelings as the nations of the north, to destroy the scourge of Europe, and supply his place by a monarch who will be the father of his people. The hands of the Bourbons are undefiled with French blood; the testament of Louis XVI. is their guide, and they renounce all thoughts of resentment: they proclaim that clemency and tolerance are the leading features of their conduct; and, in deploring the terrible ravages of that tyranny which licentiousness introduced, they forget the errors caused by the illusions of liberty. No more tyranny! no more war! no more conscription! no more vexatious taxes! are the concise and consoling expressions addressed to you by a Prince who has the daughter of Louis XVI. for his consort. I am proud that you are the first who have set an example to France. Every thing tends to assure us that our misfortunes are about to terminate, and that national rivalry will cease with them. It seems to have been decreed by Providence that the great commander, who so well deserves to be entitled the Liberator of Nations, should attach his glorious name to this glorious epoch, this memorable consummation of all my wishes. Fellow-citizens, such are the hopes and motives which have supported me at this trying period, and directed my conduct, and determined me, if necessary, to sacrifice my life for you. God is my witness, that I have no object in view but the good of my country. Long live the King!"

The Royalists, by whom this most important movement was prepared and directed, were none of those time-servers who take advantage of all changes to forward their own fortunes, and whose professed principles are always found to be in perfect accord with their immediate interest. When Rochejaquelein and the Bordelais set life and fortune thus upon the die, the Bourbons were wholly disregarded by the Allied Powers; those powers were still negotiating with Buonaparte, .. still

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*Failure of
the negotia-
tions at Cha-
tillon.*

CHAP. willing, and as it seemed desirous to conclude a peace with him
 XLVI. which should have left him the recognized Emperor of France.

1814. He, too, giving proof of greater military genius than could
 March. justly be inferred from his most brilliant career of success, had

made head against their invading armies with an inferior force ;
 and obtained advantages which raised the hopes of his admirers,
 and confirmed his overweening confidence in his own resources
 and strength of character. He flattered himself at this time,
 and endeavoured to persuade the French people, that the allies
 considered the scheme of invasion hopeless, that they were about
 to withdraw from the French territory, and to dissolve their ill-
 compacted league. The former conduct of those powers afforded
 some ground for such expectation ; but they had profited by expe-
 rience, and while the negotiations for peace were still pending at

March 1. Chatillon, concluded a treaty among themselves which might have
 wakened Buonaparte from his delusion. By this treaty, Austria,
 Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, formed a league offensive and
 defensive for twenty years, each binding itself not to treat sepa-
 rately with the enemy, and each to keep on foot an army of
 150,000 men, exclusive of garrisons, England reserving an
 option to subsidize other troops in place of her own, and agree-
 ing to supply five millions sterling, to be divided among the
 other powers for maintaining the war. Each of these contract-
 ing powers was fully supported in this energetic policy by the
 spirit of its people. But Buonaparte continued to act as if he
 had still only to deal with sovereigns whom he might cajole,
 and statesmen whom he might intimidate or corrupt ; and in

March 15. this temper he sent his *ultimatum* to the congress, demanding
 for himself the whole line of the Rhine, great part of that of the
 Waal, and the fortress of Nimeguen ; Italy, including Venice,
 for his son-in-law Eugene Beauharnois ; indemnities for that
 prince as having been Grand Duke of Frankfort, for Jerome

on the score of his kingdom of Westphalia, for Louis as Grand Duke of Berg, .. and for Joseph the Intruder, not indeed in compensation for Spain, but for Naples, .. from whence Buonaparte himself had removed him to Madrid! Such demands were at once rejected, and the congress was dissolved.

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This was subsequent to the declaration of Bourdeaux in favour of the Bourbons; and when the news of that declaration was known in England, some apprehensions were felt for its immediate consequences to the persons who were principally concerned. What mercy they might expect if Buonaparte should maintain himself upon the throne was plainly indicated in a proclamation addressed at this time by Marshal Soult to his troops; it was directed against the British General as well as the Royalists, and in the spirit of one who had served the tyrant in his schemes of iniquitous ambition, without scruple and without remorse. "Soldiers," said he, in this remarkable address, "there will be no repose for us till this hostile army shall be annihilated, or till it shall have evacuated the territory of the Emperor. It does not suspect the dangers which surround, nor the perils which await it; but time will teach this army, and the General who commands it, that our territory is not invaded with impunity, and that French honour is not with impunity insulted. The British General has had the audacity to incite you and your countrymen to revolt and sedition! He has dared insult the national honour: he has had the baseness to excite the French to break their oaths, and to be guilty of perjury! Yet a few days and those who have been capable of believing in the sincerity and delicacy of the English will learn to their cost that the English have no other object in this war than to destroy France by its own instrumentality, and reduce the French to servitude like the Portuguese, the Sicilians, and all the other people who have groaned under their yoke. Let these

*Marshal
Soult's pro-
clamation.*

CHAP. deluded Frenchmen look back upon the past, they will see the
 XLVI. English at the head of every conspiracy, of the overthrow of all
 1814. principles, of the destruction of all establishments, whether of
 March. greatness or of industry, for the sake of gratifying their inordi-
 nate ambition and their insatiable avarice. Is there a single
 point on the surface of the globe where they have not either by
 fraud or violence brought about the ruin of the manufactories
 which rivalled or surpassed their own? Soldiers, let us devote
 to shame and general execration every Frenchman who shall
 have favoured the projects of the enemy; there is no longer any
 bond between them and us! Our motto is Honour and Fidelity.
 Our duty is marked out: implacable hatred to traitors and to
 the enemies of the French name: interminable war to those
 who would divide in order to destroy us; as well as to the
 wretches who would desert the imperial eagles for any other
 standard! Let us have always in our minds fifteen ages of glory,
 and the innumerable triumphs which have rendered our country
 illustrious! Let us contemplate the prodigious efforts of our
 great Emperor, and his signal victories which will eternize the
 French name! Let us be worthy of him, and that we may
 bequeath to our posterity without a stain the inheritance which
 we have received from our fathers!"

This proclamation was more in accord with the moral than
 with the military reputation which Marshal Soult had established
 for himself. It ill became him as a great General to pour out
 coarse and angry invectives against his adversary; but the ran-
 cour with which he reviled and calumniated the English, the
 threat of interminable war to them, and of implacable hatred to
 the French loyalists, these were in the spirit of his councils and
 his conduct. For he had proved himself by his impassibility
 not less than by his talents, worthy of the confidence which
 Buonaparte placed in him, and of the service in which he had

been employed. But his exhortation to the French soldiers that they should be worthy of their Emperor was superfluous: Buonaparte's soldiers had long been worthy of him! To this Jaffa had borne witness; Madrid and Porto, Ucles and Tarra-
 gona were witnesses; the wrongs, the sufferings, and the curses of all Europe testified it; and the confederated nations, in whom the insolence and the excesses of those soldiers had roused a feeling which no ordinary war could have excited, and who were now moving from the Tagus and the Elbe, the Danube and the Moskwa against the general oppressor, . . . the common enemy, . . . the individual who, when he might have conferred greater benefits upon Europe than ever sovereign before him, in ancient or modern times, had deliberately chosen the evil part, and employed his mighty power to bring about the worst ends by the most flagitious means.

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But if some fears were entertained in England for the loyalists at Bourdeaux who had not waited to declare their loyalty till the danger would have been in delaying the declaration, a generous sympathy also was manifested. The militia availed themselves of the act which allowed them to volunteer for foreign service. The example was set by the Marquis of Buckingham and Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, and they sailed as soon as possible with 4000 men for the Gironde. Contrary winds impeded their passage: meantime Buonaparte had ordered a division under General Decaen to march against it by Perigueux, and Lhuillier collected what force he could to the north of the city. But Buonaparte and his Generals had now no force at their disposal strong enough to put down the spirit that had shown itself; the rich raised companies of cavalry, the artisans formed a volunteer guard for the Duc; and Lord Wellington was now so well acquainted with the disposition of the French people, that without any fears for Bourdeaux, he recalled Mar-

*Admiral
 Penrose
 enters the
 Gironde.*

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March 27.

shal Beresford with two divisions, thinking that Lord Dalhousie with 5000 men would secure it from any attempt that could be made against it. Admiral Penrose had hastened thither with the *Egmont*, the *Andromache*, and *Belle Poule* frigates, and some smaller vessels, and entered the Gironde without sustaining any loss from the fire of the forts and batteries at its mouth. There was more danger from the difficulty of the navigation, but this also was surmounted by the skill and the exertion of British seamen. The enemy had the *Regulus* line-of-battle-ship, three brigs of war, and some *chasse-marées* lying in the river, and the squadron chased them as high as the shoal of Talmont, where the French passed up through the narrow channel to the north, which had been buoyed for the purpose, and then took shelter under the strong batteries on each side of Talmont bay, the British squadron anchoring outside the shoal. Fort de Blaye still prevented the navigation of the Garonne; the mayor of that place would willingly have hoisted the white flag, but though he found means of letting the Duc know his own sentiments, he could not persuade the garrison to take that part. While the Admiral prepared to act against it, Lord Dalhousie, taking Rochejaquelein for his guide, crossed the Garonne, and pushed the enemy's parties under General Lhuillier, beyond the Dordogne; he then crossed that river at St. Andre de Cubzac, with a view to the attack of the fort, but learning that Lhuillier with 300 cavalry and 1200 foot had retired by Etauliers, he moved on that point, intending to turn back again upon Blaye if that General continued his retreat. Lhuillier however drew out his corps in a large open common near Etauliers, and occupied some woods in front of it: the woods were soon cleared; the enemy's horse and foot gave way and retired through the town, leaving scattered parties to shift for themselves; some 300 prisoners were taken, including

April 4.

about 30 officers, great numbers dispersed in the woods, and the conscripts took the desired opportunity of escaping. On the preceding day a detachment under Captain Coode of the Porcupine took or destroyed a numerous flotilla, which had been equipped in haste, and which before the arrival of the British squadron had threatened the coast of Medoc, and Bourdeaux itself. Among the prizes was a splendid barge designed for the Emperor when he visited that city, with his name on the stern, and his golden eagle on the prow; this the sailors humbly requested might be presented with their duty to the Prince Regent. Another corps of 600 seamen and marines under Captain Harris of the Belle Poule landed, marched more than fifty miles in six and thirty hours, reduced and dismantled five forts, destroyed 47 pieces of cannon and 17 mortars, and re-embarked without any loss. The Regulus and the smaller vessels which had sought protection with it, were attacked and burnt, and by the 9th of April the river was cleared as high up as Blaye. General Merle held out in that fortress till the 16th; when the news that had arrived induced the Admiral to agree to an armistice with him, and the Gironde was then opened from its mouth to Bourdeaux.

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Meantime another restoration, which once might have been deemed as little likely as that of the Bourbons in France, had taken place. When Ferdinand and his counsellors at Valençay found that neither San Carlos nor Palafox returned from their mission, they represented to Laforest that the best mode of removing all difficulties would be for the Emperor to let Ferdinand depart unconditionally, relying upon his honour to fulfil the treaty, if the obstacles to it should not be insurmountable. Suchet had given advice to the same effect, seeing that at that time, when there was no longer a hope of retaining any hold on Spain, it was of great consequence to withdraw from thence the

*Proceed-
ings at
Valençay.*

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garrisons, and that they could be extricated only by this means. If Ferdinand were honourable enough to restore them to their country upon being put in possession of the places which they occupied, the great and only advantage which was now desired would be obtained; if he should refuse to do this, or be unable to effect it, doubtful as it was what his authority might be, nothing would be lost, nor ever risked by the experiment. This the French government saw; and they were not without hope that the presence of Ferdinand in his own country might lead to a civil war, which would have the effect of at least embarrassing the English, and probably of impeding their operations in Gascony.

Ferdinand and his counsellors might have escaped from any imputation of bad faith in this transaction, if they had not themselves claimed credit for acting with duplicity. When they said the fulfilment of the treaty might be relied on, if there were no insurmountable obstacles, they well supposed that such obstacles existed in their relations to the allied powers; "but," says the Canon Escoiquiz, "not knowing this of a certainty, we had a right, when treating with so perfidious a person, to put it in doubt; and by this just dissimulation to obtain the object of our wishes, which was the King's liberty. Skilfully to deceive with truth a man so false was not an evil deed, but an excellent one; and this was our maxim*." They represented farther that an unconditional liberation was of all

* *Bien suponíamos que lo habria, por las relaciones con las Potencias aliadas; pero no sabiéndolo de cierto, teníamos derecho, tratando con hombre tan perfido, para ponerlo en duda y conseguir con este justo dissimulo el fin de nuestros deseos que era la libertad del Rey. Engañar mañosamente con la verdad á un hombre tan falso, era una obra no mala sino excelente: tal era nuestro maxíma. Idea Sencilla, 114.*

things most likely to conciliate Ferdinand's entire good-will; that it would moreover make the allied powers believe Buonaparte to be sincere in his desire of peace, and which was of more consequence, gratify the French nation, who had always indignantly regarded the war with Spain; that if Ferdinand should find it impossible to confirm the peace with France, it was not his interest that France should be dismembered, and to prevent any such danger he would only carry on an illusive war, merely to save appearances; that even if it were his desire to carry it on with vigour, he must of necessity be less able to do this than the Regency, because of the changes which his arrival in Spain could not but produce; finally, that his farther detention would occasion the Emperor a great and useless expense, and must also be a matter of some anxiety, when it was so possible that he might be delivered by the arms of the allies. Buonaparte, indeed, seems at one time to have been sensible either of the reproach which he had brought upon himself by his treachery toward Ferdinand, or of the likelihood that some successful plan might be formed for his escape; and it was once his intention to have shipped him off for Mexico, or for any other part of the Spanish colonies which he might have preferred, with Charles IV. and the Queen, the Infantes, his brothers, the Queen of Etruria, and as many other members of the family as he could collect, and to have given them large possessions there; but upon discovering that none of those colonies were at his disposal, as he had hoped them to be, and considering moreover that Ferdinand might easily from thence find his way to Spain, and there protest against the validity of his renunciation, he abandoned this project. At present, willing to be rid of him, knowing that his presence now could do him no hurt any where, desiring to get his soldiers out of Spain, which he had no hope of effecting by any other means,

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*March.**Idea Sen-
cilla, 78.*

CHAP. and perhaps also having a hope that Ferdinand's return might
 XLVI. create new troubles in that country, he readily assented to the
 1814. proposal; and Laforest was instructed by the first post after the
 March. receipt of his dispatch to inform Ferdinand and the Infantes,
 that they were at liberty to depart unconditionally, and that
 orders had been given for forwarding to them the necessary
 passports.

*Ferdinand
 is set at li-
 berty.*

Ferdinand had endured captivity as contentedly as if his
 patience had been the effect of philosophy or of religion.
 Nothing, however, could have rejoiced him more than this
 reply; and, as if believing that his return would be not less a
 matter of joy to the Regency, he determined that as soon as
 the passports came, Zayas should precede him by three or four
 days, and travel with all speed to notify his approach, that
 preparations might be made for receiving him. This hap-
 piness was but of six hours' duration; for on the evening of
 the same day, San Carlos arrived with the refusal of the treaty.
 To conceal this was impossible, the utmost publicity having
 been given to it by the Spanish press; and as it was likely to
 irritate Buonaparte, whose violent temper was well known to
 his ministers, Laforest proposed that San Carlos himself should
 be the first bearer of the intelligence, and present with it such
 representations as might tend to appease him, and if possible
 avert his displeasure. The Duque accordingly, who had come
 post from Madrid, set off without delay, and at the same speed
 for Paris. Buonaparte was then with the army in the neigh-
 bourhood of Troyes; the ministers at Paris had withheld the pass-
 ports till they should receive fresh instructions, and not allowing
 the Duque to proceed, sent him back to Valençay. Laforest,
 however, was of opinion that he should repair to the Emperor's
 quarters: San Carlos again departed; failing to find, and perhaps
 not being able to follow him in the rapidity of his movements,

he communicated his business by letter: the course which Laforest recommended coincided with the advice given by Suchet, in whom Buonaparte had great confidence, and the result was that orders were sent to Paris for forwarding the passports without delay. They reached Valençay on the night of March 7; San Carlos arrived on the 9th; Zayas set out for Madrid the next day. He bore a dispatch to the Regency, wherein Ferdinand said that their letter, which he had now received by Palafox, had filled his soul with satisfaction: he saw in it how anxiously the nation wished for his return, which he desired not less ardently, that he might devote all his powers to the good of his beloved subjects, to whom he was so greatly indebted on so many accounts. Then, after notifying his speedy departure, he said that the re-establishment of the Cortes, concerning which the Regency had informed him, and the other measures for the good of the realm which had been adopted during his absence, deserved his approbation, because they were in conformity with his own royal intentions. On the following Sunday, March 13, Ferdinand and the Infantes commenced their journey towards Perpignan.

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*Idea Sen-
cilla, 113,
119.*

Marshal Suchet received them in that city. His instructions from the minister at war were, that he should send Ferdinand to Barcelona, and cause all the places which the French still possessed in Spain to be delivered up, taking, however, securities and precautions for the return of the garrisons to their own country. Hence the Marshal concluded that there was not such entire confidence placed in this Prince as might otherwise have been inferred from the manner of his liberation. Both parties, however, were desirous of smoothing all difficulties, which may always best be done by fair dealing; and this was now the interest of both. San Carlos gave Suchet a full account of the temper of the Cortes, and their determination to control the King, or to resist

*Arrange-
ment with
M. Suchet.*

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XLVI.

1814.

March.

him, if he should be found refractory ; and he expressed his belief that the Generals, whether they were influenced by their fear or their opinions, would not acknowledge his authority until they received orders from Madrid. Ferdinand's desire was to proceed without delay, and not to enter Barcelona, but go on to Valencia ; and he promised to expedite as much as he could the deliverance of the garrisons in exchange for the places which they occupied. The Marshal frankly stated the difficulty wherein he was placed by his instructions, these being to conduct the King to Barcelona, and take securities for the deliverance of the garrisons ; he had written to Paris, he said, for farther explanations, and till these should arrive, it was agreed that the Infante, Don Carlos, should remain at Perpignan, and that the King should pass the frontier without delay. Accordingly, on the 22d, Ferdinand re-entered his own country. The rain had so swoln the streams, that he was detained two days at Figueras ; during this delay, the Marshal addressed a note to him, requesting that the treatment of the French prisoners might be improved, and pressing for the deliverance of the garrisons. An assurance was given that there should be an immediate alteration in the condition of the prisoners, and a promise was given respecting the garrisons, to which Ferdinand affixed his signature. This answer was returned from Figueras, where he was still in the hands of the French ; but, that it might appear more evidently his own free act and deed, he dated it from Gerona. Upon receiving this, Suchet immediately dispatched orders for letting the Infante, Don Carlos, proceed from Perpignan ; thus he conferred an obligation, by releasing a hostage whom it would have been useless to detain ; all questions concerning the fortresses and garrisons being, as by a tacit understanding, waived on both sides, there being a third party, without whose consent the

garrison of Barcelona could not be dismissed ; for Sir H. Clinton was then with the Anglo-Sicilian army blockading that city. A little before this time, instructions had been received by that General to embark one portion of his troops, including the Calabrians, for the coast of Italy, there to be employed in an expedition under Lord William Bentinck ; and with the remainder to march, by way of Zaragoza and Pamplona, into France, there to reinforce Lord Wellington. Sir Henry took upon himself the responsibility of not obeying these instructions : and his conduct in so doing was fully approved by Lord Wellington ; for, if that army had been withdrawn, the Spaniards in Catalonia could not have prevented Suchet from collecting and bringing off the whole of his remaining garrisons.

As soon as the waters permitted, Ferdinand proceeded towards Gerona. General Copons had been apprized of his coming. Marshal Suchet escorted him to the Fluvia. The French troops were drawn up in a semicircle on one side of the river, the Spaniards on the other ; and, having crossed it amid salutes of artillery, and the joyful sound of martial music, and the acclamations of the surrounding inhabitants, who had flocked thither from all sides, Ferdinand found himself then indeed free, . . in his own country, among his own people, and a King. There was no difficulty about his reception ; his retinue consisted only of Spaniards, among whom there were none to whom any exception could be taken, if Copons had been disposed to offer it. The General delivered into his hands the Regency's letter, and the documents which accompanied it ; and when Ferdinand came the same day to Gerona, he acknowledged them in a letter to the Regency announcing his arrival, saying that he should make himself acquainted with the contents of their papers ; meantime he assured them that his greatest wish was to give them proofs of his satisfaction, and of his lively

CHAP.
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1814.

*March.**Suchet, 2.
375-8.**March 24.
Ferdinand
writes from
Gerona to
the Re-
gency.*

CHAP.
XLVI.

1814.

March.

*Ferdinand
goes to Za-
ragoza.*

desire to do every thing which might conduce to the happiness of his subjects. It was a comfort indeed for him, he said, to see himself in his own country, in the midst of a nation and an army to whom he was beholden for a fidelity as constant as it was generous.

The Cortes had regulated Ferdinand's route ; and as it was understood that he would proceed by the line prescribed for him, which was straight by way of Valencia, the Governors of Barcelona, Tortosa, and Murviedro, received instructions to commit no hostilities when he should pass. But Ferdinand was in no haste to proceed ; he needed time for consideration, and for such rest as the critical position in which he now found himself would allow : he halted, therefore, a few days at Gerona. On the 30th, he passed through the blockading army in front of Barcelona, the enemy firing a salute, the allies receiving him with all honours, and the people with every possible manifestation of joy. It was believed that he was proceeding to Valencia ; but, altering his intention on the way, he made for Zaragoza, meaning to remain there till he should have determined how to act.

*Soult re-
sumes the
offensive.*

This restoration Buonaparte regarded at this time with indifference ; but there was nothing which he dreaded so much as the progress of that feeling which had manifested itself at Bourdeaux ; for peace, upon some terms, he thought himself always sure of obtaining, as long as the allies forbore to take up the cause of the Bourbons. Soult saw how likely it was that this feeling should spread from the Gironde to the Loire, and had resolved upon carrying the war back toward the Pyrenees, more with the view of occupying the English force at a distance from those parts in which he knew that the existing tyranny was borne with most impatience, than for the sake of the succours which he could draw from Catalonia. Not being acquainted

with the success of Marshal Beresford's movement upon Bourdeaux, he expected thus to frustrate it, and that Lord Wellington would find it necessary to recall all the detachments which he had sent in that direction. He had, indeed, written to the Minister at War, saying he did not think the British General would dare to weaken himself by sending a force against that city. With this intention, he resumed the offensive ; and, having sent most of his incumbrances to Toulouse, moved by Lembege to Conchez and Viella, on the right flank of the allies, drove in Sir Rowland's piquets, and made a demonstration as if intending to attack him with his whole force. Sir Rowland, upon this, took a position behind the Gros Lees, extending from Aire to Garlin, on the road to Pau. Lord Wellington quickly moved two divisions to his support, and prepared to concentrate the army in the neighbourhood of Aire. Marshal Soult did not then feel himself strong enough to venture upon an attack, and not finding his situation secure, retired in the night toward Lembege, keeping his advanced posts toward Conchez ; and on the 15th, he halted his main body in position near Burosse, covered by a strong rear-guard at Mascarras ; but, on the approach of a single brigade, they retired upon Vic Bigorre, not offering to maintain their ground, though in a country peculiarly defensible. The various detachments which Lord Wellington had sent out, and the reserves of cavalry and artillery from Spain, did not join him till the 17th. On the morrow the army marched ; the right by Conchez, the centre by Castelnau, the left by Plaisance ; and Sir Rowland drove in the enemy's outposts upon Lembege. The French retired in the night, but held a strong rear-guard in front of Vic Bigorre, posted in the vineyards that encircle that town, and extend for several miles around it. There they made a stand, with a show of resolution which was not supported ; for Sir Thomas Picton,

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March.

Suchet, t. 2.

Pièces

Justif.

pp. 530-2.

March 13.

*He retreats
upon
Tarbes.*

*Colonel
Jones's Ac-
count, 2.
262.*

CHAP. with the 3rd division and Major-General Bock's Portuguese
 XLVI. brigade, attacked them there, dislodged, and drove them through
 1814. the vineyards and through the town. The allied army then
 March. assembled at Vic Bigorre and Rabastens, and the enemy
 retired during the night upon Tarbes.

Further re-
 treat to
 Toulouse.

Buonaparte had rested in this city on his way to Bayonne in 1808, when the treachery which he had plotted for the usurpation of Spain was about to be consummated: a monument had been erected here in commemoration of this imperial visit; and now that journey had in consequence brought thither a victorious enemy's army. So different, too, were the feelings of the inhabitants toward him from what they had been, that when Soult sent General Maransin thither before him to raise a levy *en masse* throughout the department, they refused to take arms. Here, on the morning of the 20th, the French were found, having the advanced posts of their left in the town, their right upon the heights near the windmill of Oleac, and their centre and left retired, the latter upon the heights near Angor. The allies marched in two columns from Vic Bigorre and Rabastens; and Lord Wellington directed Sir Henry Clinton, with the 6th division, to turn and attack their right, through the village of Dour, while Sir Rowland attacked the town by the high road. Sir Henry's movement was completely successful: Baron Alten, also, with the light division, drove the enemy from the heights above Orleix; and when Sir Rowland had moved through the town and disposed his columns for the attack, they retired in all directions. The troops ascended the position which had been thus relinquished, thinking to pursue their advantage; but having gained the summit, they unexpectedly discovered a large portion of Soult's army, formed on a parallel height of great strength, and the body which had retreated before them, about 15,000 in number, ascending to join their comrades.

This new position could not be attacked without incurring severe loss ; and to preserve the advantages which had been obtained, it was necessary that the corps from Rabastens should move further forward. But before this arrangement could be completed, the evening closed, and Marshal Soult, once more taking advantage of night to cover his movements, retired toward Toulouse. There are two roads from Tarbes to that city, by S. Gaudens, and by Auch ; Soult retreated by the first, but having collected his troops at S. Gaudens, crossed the country from thence to Auch. He had previously sent off all his remaining incumbrances ; and marching with all possible celerity, that he might profit at Toulouse by the time which he gained upon his pursuers, and destroying the bridges as he went, he entered that city on the 24th, having suffered no other loss during the pursuit than that of some prisoners, taken by General Fane in an attack upon his rear guard at S. Gaudens on the 22d.

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Once more Lord Wellington's operations were impeded by heavy and continued rains ; he had to carry with him a pontoon train, as well as most of his supplies ; and it was not till three days after the French army had entered Toulouse, that the allies halted on the left of the Garonne, opposite that city. On the following day, Lord Wellington ordered a bridge to be laid at Portet, a village immediately below the junction of the Ariege, and above the city. The current was so rapid, that the sheer line could not without much difficulty be stretched across ; and when this was effected the distance was found to be twenty-six yards more than the pontoons would cover. It was desirable to obtain a passage above the city ; for in that case Soult must either abandon Toulouse, or lose the hope of being joined by Suchet, now, though late in his movements, on the march to join him ; . . a tardiness not imputable to that skilful commander, but to the unwillingness with which Buonaparte consented to

*Passage of
the Ga-
ronne.**March 27.*

CHAP. give up any object of his ambition. Three days after the
 XLVI. failure of the first attempt, a place was found near Roques,
 1814. where the river was not too wide, and the spot in other respects
 March. favourable; here, therefore, the pontoons were laid down, and
 March 31. Sir Rowland's corps crossed, and seized the bridge over the
 Ariege at Cintegabelle; but after an anxious trial of some
 hours, it was ascertained that from thence to Toulouse there
 was no way passable for an army; and that till finer weather
 should have hardened the roads, it would be impracticable to
 direct an attack from the upper side of the town. The corps
 therefore re-passed the Garonne; and it then became Lord
 Wellington's object to bridge the river below the city, and
 attack Soult in front before he should be reinforced. A
 favourable bend in the stream was discovered about two miles
 above Grenade, at a point where the Garonne skirts the main
 April 4. road: here some flanking batteries were established before day-
 break on the 4th; but owing to some accidental delay, it was
 five o'clock before the first pontoon was brought to the water's
 edge. A few of the enemy's cavalry were patrolling on the
 right bank, and their whole army was within a short march:
 the patrols retired, and it was expected every moment that
 some attempt would be made to oppose the passage. Marshal
 Soult, indeed, had assured Suchet that whenever the passage
 should be effected, he would march and give the allies battle,
 whatever might be the disproportion of his force; but of this
 he thought more wisely when the time came, and his whole
 attention was now engaged in strengthening a position so
 advantageous in itself, that with the labour and skill now em-
 ployed in fortifying it, he thought he might there safely defy
 even such an enemy as Lord Wellington. The river at this
 point was 127 yards wide, and exceedingly rapid; the bridge
 however was finished in four hours; and just before it was

*Suchet,
 Pièces Jus-
 tif. p. 536.*

completed the day became beautifully fine. The right bank is some fifty feet high, the other considerably lower; and on that side there was a plain of open wood, after a rise of about twelve feet. A few men had previously been sent over in small boats and posted in this wood. The cavalry passed in single files, the infantry by threes, the bands playing "British Grenadiers," and the "Downfall of Paris,"... not knowing that at that time Paris had indeed fallen, and the allied sovereigns were in possession of it. Unopposed as the passage was, it had the appearance rather of some festival display, than of an actual military operation; the people from the neighbouring villages had by this time collected to behold it,... with so little fear or dislike were the allies regarded by the inhabitants; and when the horse artillery crossed, the peasants volunteered their aid, and pulled the guns up the bank with all possible alacrity.

The more concerned spectators were not without fear for the bridge; it had been made fast by four stays to trees on either side, but the strength of the current was such that it was soon forced into the shape of a bow. Marshal Beresford passed with three divisions of infantry and some cavalry; but when Freyre's Spaniards and the light division should have followed, the river had increased so much in height and strength, that it was necessary to take up the platform. During the night, it rose two feet; the rain had also recommenced; and on the morrow the centre pontoon was removed, as a measure of precaution, and at length the whole were taken up. The army was thus divided, the main body being still on the left bank, and Soult, if he had thought proper, might have attacked either flank; but he had suffered severely for such an attempt in the battles before Bayonne, when he was more confident, and in greater strength.

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1814.

April.

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April.

Toulouse.

The extent of Toulouse is disproportionately large with respect to its population, being in length from north to south about two miles, and a mile and quarter in breadth from east to west; while the inhabitants were computed at not more than 60,000. It has little commerce, though most favourably situated for inland communication; but it flourished as a provincial capital: formerly it was second only to Paris in size. The houses, and even the cathedral, are built of brick, which is very unusual in France: the latter edifice, therefore, though remarkable for its magnitude, is neither beautiful nor grand; for a structure composed of such mean materials can produce no impression of grandeur, unless it be like the pyramids in size. That cathedral boasted of possessing the bodies of no fewer than seven Apostles, one of them being a duplicate of Santiago. The Dorade church derived its name from a gilt image of Notre Dame, the reputed work of St. Luke, who is better known in Roman Catholic countries as an artist in this line, or as a painter, than by his Gospel. The Dominicans exhibited a less doubtful relic in their church, the body of St. Thomas Aquinas, authenticated by himself in ghostly person, and brought to that city, after numerous adventures, with 10,000 lighted tapers, and 150,000 people in procession. Devout or curious persons were formerly indulged by a sight of the head, which had been fitted to a half-body of silver; upon opening a plate at the top, the real skull was to be seen, and, under circumstances of special favour, kissed by adoring lips. Few places in France afford more subject for reflective thought. It was the capital of a great Gothic kingdom, till the last of its Kings was overthrown by Clovis. The pulpit is still preserved there from which St. Bernard preached the crusade. Poetry flourished there in those ages when it stood most in need of patronage and culture; and the city, under its own Counts, was then the seat of religious liberty as well as of literature. Its

Floral Games may still remind us of the Gay Science of the Troubadours; but the freedom of opinion and the truths of religion for which Toulouse made so heroic and so virtuous a stand were succeeded there, as in the Catholic Netherlands, by that victorious bigotry of the deepest die which eats into the soul; and, down to the revolution, a festival was yearly observed there in commemoration of the destruction of the Albigenses. That name must ever bring with it painful reflections to an Englishman's mind, when he remembers the history of a papal crusade under an English leader: and, looking to much later times, never were blind superstition and legal iniquity seen in such accursed combination as here, in the case of Calas; never, in human history, was a judicial murder accomplished with circumstances of such peculiar barbarity and injustice, . . . circumstances so monstrous, that they could not be believed, if it were possible to deny or doubt them.

Marshal Soult had retreated upon Toulouse less for the sake of the abundant supplies which it afforded him, than because of the singular advantages that its situation offered as a defensible position. The canal of Brienne (so called after the Cardinal Archbishop of that name), and which is broad enough for several barges to lie on it abreast, connects the Garonne with the great canal of Languedoc about two miles from the town, the navigation of the river being impeded in that part of its course by a weir for the use of the corn-mills. The whole western side is protected by the river; on the east and north the canal covers it; and on the south, the only part which was not covered by the river, could be approached only by roads impassable for artillery, and was therefore so secure, that Soult, who omitted no means of defence, deemed it wholly unnecessary to erect any works on that side. There were formerly three bridges over the Garonne: the single one which

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XLVI.

1814.

*April.**Soult's position there.*

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1814.

April.

is left connects the city with the Fauxbourg S. Cyprien; and the enemy had fortified that suburb with strong field-works in front of the old walls. The walls were high, thick enough for defence in old times, and flanked by towers. The communication across the canal was covered by *têtes-de-pont*, defended by various buildings which had now been fortified for that purpose, and by artillery from the walls. East of the city is a range of bold heights extending along the space between the canal and the river Ers; over these heights all the roads from the eastward pass, and here Marshal Soult had taken his position, having fortified the summit with five redoubts, with various lines of intrenchment to support them, and to connect the flanks of the ground with the defences of the town. The left and centre being the points which he considered most assailable, were thus strengthened; toward the right, where the line approached the Ers, the river itself was sufficient defence. He flattered himself that his determination to defend Toulouse had astounded Lord Wellington, because four days elapsed after the passage of the river, and the allies had undertaken nothing. But the bad weather, he said, might have occasioned this delay; and, expecting an attack, not without an ominous feeling of its result, he wrote to Marshal Suchet, saying that, in case of being compelled to retire, he should draw nearer to him, and that it would be for the advantage of both, if Suchet would make a diversion by the shortest line upon the Upper Garonne.

Formidable as this position was, it was necessary to attack the enemy there; Lord Wellington had no alternative, the roads from Ariege being impracticable for artillery, and even for horse. On the 8th, the stream had subsided enough for the pontoons to be again laid down; the head-quarters then, and General Freyre with the Spanish corps and the Portuguese artillery, crossed the Garonne, and immediately moved forward

to the neighbourhood of the town. Colonel Vivian, with the 18th hussars, had here an opportunity of attacking some cavalry, which, though superior in number, they drove through the village of Croix d'Aurade, taking about 100 prisoners, and pursuing them so closely, that they had not time to destroy the bridge over the Ers, the only one which had been left standing, and by which it was necessary to pass in order to attack the position; Colonel Vivian was severely wounded in this charge. That attack was designed for the following day; but Sir Rowland's corps was on the left of the Garonne, in front of the suburb S. Cyprien; the pontoon bridge was too far off for that ready communication which might be required during the action; orders were therefore given for moving it a league higher up, near Ausonne. Some unexpected difficulties occurred in laying it; it was not completed till after midday, and the attack was, therefore, deferred till the following morning, being Easter Sunday: long will that Easter be remembered at Toulouse!

Lord Wellington's arrangements were that Marshal Beresford, who was on the right of the Ers with the 4th and 6th divisions, should cross that river at the bridge of Croix d'Aurade, gain possession of the village of Montblanc, and march up the left of the Ers to turn the enemy's right, while the Spaniards supported by the British cavalry should attack their front. Sir Stapleton was to follow the Marshal's movements with Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of hussars; and Vivian's brigade, now under Colonel Arentschild, was to observe the enemy's cavalry on both banks of the Ers, beyond the left of the allies. On the lower part of the canal, Picton and Baron Alten, with the 3d and light divisions, and the brigade of German cavalry, were to threaten the *tête-de-pont*, and so draw the enemy's attention to that quarter; and Sir Rowland was to do the same on the side of S. Cyprien.

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XLVI.
1814.
April.

*April 10.
Battle of
Toulouse.*

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The business of this dreadful day commenced about seven o'clock, when Sir Thomas Picton drove in the French piquets in front of Pont Jumeau, at the point where the canal de Brienne joins that of Languedoc; the action became warm here, and the enemy retiring, set fire to a fine large chateau, in the cypress avenues of which they had sought in vain to cover themselves. To the left of this division, the light division extended nearly to the road to Alby, by which road Freyre's army advanced, in two columns, and formed in front of Croix d'Aurade, near a hill on which Lieutenant-Colonel Arentschild's Portuguese guns, protected by General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, were advantageously placed to cover their movements. Marshal Beresford, with the 4th and 6th divisions, under Sir Lowry Cole and Sir Henry Clinton, advanced also by the Alby road, turned off to their left at Croix d'Aurade, toward the village of Montblanc, carried the village, and proceeded up the left bank of the Ers, in three open columns, along the foot of the heights, over difficult ground, which was much intersected with deep ditches and hollow roads. Upon their march they were exposed to a heavy cannonade from all the guns of the enemy's works; and those guns throughout the day were served with great spirit and correctness, Toulouse having been an artillery school since the Revolution. Beresford's artillery was left at Montblanc because of the badness of the roads; it was posted there on some low ground, in front of the village, and kept up a fire upon the works on the heights of Pujade. The Spaniards advanced in good order to assault these works, which formed the left of the enemy's position, and which Clausel and Villatte occupied with their divisions, having a brigade of cavalry in their front. They advanced across the valley with great bravery under a most severe fire: a brigade of their own

troops, and one of British heavy dragoons, had been formed in reserve in the rear, and Gardiner's troop of artillery was brought up to their left to answer the enemy's. At first they drove before them a brigade of French, but as they approached the intrenchment, a heavy fire of grape was poured upon them with full effect, and to escape it they pushed forward with inconsiderate speed, . . the nimblest outrunning their comrades, in such disorder, that before the first line arrived at a hollow road some fifty yards in front of the intrenchment, it was completely broken. The reserve, as if deterred rather than instructed by this error, fell into the opposite fault, and came on so slowly, as not to be near enough for supporting them, when the French advanced against them vigorously, and drove them down the hill, and in spite of the utmost exertions of Freyre and the superior officers, were on the point of seizing the bridge over the Ers, in which, if they had succeeded, Beresford's troops would have been isolated. But the 1st Portuguese *Caçadores*, forming part of Baron Alten's light division, moved opportunely to their left, and advancing through the flying Spaniards, rallied them, and caused the enemy to halt in their pursuit: a squadron of British dragoons, who were still more in their rear, turned others, by striking them with the flat side of their swords; and Lord Wellington himself, the moment he saw them give way, galloped to the spot, and by his personal exertions rallied about a company of them, near the cypress trees on the Alby road. They suffered greatly in their flight, and the consequences might have been worse if the enemy had followed up the advantage with spirit. The great exertions of General Freyre, and of the staff officers, Mendizabal and Barcena among others, formed them again sooner than might have been expected after such a failure, and they were again placed in position, from which they afterwards

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CHAP. moved to their left in support of the 6th division; but they were
XLVI. not again brought into serious action.

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This was not the only time at which the circumstances of the day turned in favour of the enemy. Picton saw that a great advantage might be gained at this moment by pushing across the canal, while the enemy were engaged so far in front: and thinking to profit by the opportunity, having driven them within their *tête-de-pont* at Pont Jumeau, he attempted, contrary to his instructions, to carry it. It was not till the assailants were on the counterscarp that they discovered the formidable nature of the works, which had been regularly formed, and with the greatest possible care; an assault, indeed, was impracticable; they were exposed to a heavy fire of musquetry in front, and to a numerous artillery in their flank, and nothing but a speedy retreat could have saved them from destruction. Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes was killed here, and Major-General Brisbane wounded.

Meantime Beresford was more successful. The 4th and 6th divisions moved on till they came opposite to the points of attack assigned them; there they halted, and formed in three lines. Sir Lowry advanced against the extreme right of the enemy's line, where General Leseur guarded the heights of Montaudran with one brigade, having General Berton's cavalry in his front, on the road to Bordes: and Sir Henry moved up, in front, to attack the redoubts on Mount Calvinet, which were occupied by Harispe's division, now considerably reinforced with the troops whom the repulse of the Spaniards had rendered disposable for this service. The face of the heights was irregular and steep, yet the 6th division steadily ascended under a severe fire of artillery, to which at every step they were exposed. A body of cavalry made many serious attacks on their right flank when they had gained the summit; the 79th formed into a square,

received the charge, and totally routed them; and the troops drove back every thing that opposed them, carried with the bayonet the principal redoubt on the right, and established themselves on the crest of the position. Sir Lowry on his part, though menaced by Berton's cavalry on his left, and opposed by infantry in front, made his way successfully up, and having driven the enemy from the heights beyond the right of the intrenchment, took up ground on the left of Sir Henry Clinton, just before noon.

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Two divisions of the allies were thus formed on the heights; but their artillery which had been left at Montblanc was not yet brought up, and the enemy meantime moved in force toward the points which were now threatened. The whole face of the hill is intersected with deep hollow roads; and the soil is a stiff heavy clay, in which at this time horses could with difficulty move out of a walk: the French, therefore, had laid planks from one of their works to another, on which their artillery could rapidly be moved wherever it was most needed. During the interval which elapsed before Beresford's guns arrived, they had time to effect this removal from their left, on the heights of Pujade, to those of Calvinet; and General Taupin's division was moved to the same point from the Fauxbourg S. Cyprien (where Reille commanded with Maransin under him) when it was perceived that no serious attack was intended against that suburb. The roofs and steeples of Toulouse were at this time covered with spectators, who, whatever their hopes and fears might be for the issue of the battle, execrated Marshal Soult for bringing the war thus to their own doors, and exposing a populous city to its horrors. About one Beresford was joined by his artillery; and the 4th and 6th divisions advanced steadily in line against the redoubts on the heights of Calvinet. Soult thought he could overpower

Précis Historique,
P. 2. p. 61.

Ib. p. 47.

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Sir Henry's division by a vigorous attack both in front and flank, before Sir Lowry's could come up to its support; with this view the French pushed forward beyond their works to meet the assailants, Clausel and Taupin against the front of the 6th division, Leseur's brigade and Berton's cavalry against its flank. They could receive no support from the fire of their intrenchments in this advance; it became, therefore, a trial of courage; and the brave movement was as bravely met: Sir Henry Clinton, instead of waiting to receive the attack, pushed forward and met it with the bayonet; and his charge was a most determined and successful one. General Taupin was killed. The French were not only broken but routed; and General Pack's brigade carried the two principal redoubts and fortified houses in the enemy's centre. They made a desperate effort from the canal to recover these redoubts; and a Scotch battalion, which was placed in the interior of one, was nearly exhausted in defending it, when a brigade came in good time to their assistance, charged the French, and drove them down the hill. The enemy then formed their two routed divisions and General Rouget's brigade in a line from the heights of Pujade to Pont des Demoiselles, a bridge over the canal on the Montaudran road; from thence they made a second attempt in great force to recover that redoubt, which they looked upon as the key of the position; and the English, seeing them approach, planted their colours on the parapet in defiance. The French soldiers never throughout the whole war displayed more courage, nor more of that intelligence, which is their peculiar praise, than on this day; and in no part of the action did they behave better than in this attack, where they knew that they had support at hand, and, if need were, a sure retreat. To that need they were driven by men who exceeded them in cool and patient courage, a courage depending less upon excitement than upon con-

stitution ; and after many and strenuous efforts they were finally repulsed with great loss.

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The victorious division continued its movement along the ridge ; and the Spaniards, brought into a serviceable position, though not into action, made a corresponding movement upon the front. The enemy did not wait to be assaulted in their remaining works : they withdrew from them gradually, and removed their artillery by the hollow road across the bridge over the canal. By four o'clock the action was at an end ; and the allies, having accomplished the object of the day, were with their artillery formed on the hills, looking down on the city ; the French occupying in strength an intermediate rising ground. Sir Rowland on his side had done all that was assigned him ; he had driven the enemy from their exterior works in the suburb, and made them retire within the ancient wall. This had had the intended effect of distracting them, and keeping one of their divisions employed.

The loss in this severe action was very great ; that of the British being in killed and wounded 2124, of the Portugeze 607, of the Spaniards 1983, in all above 4700*. The brunt of the action fell on the 6th division, which had 13 officers killed, and 88 wounded. General Pack was wounded, but remained in the field. Lieutenant-Colonel Coghlan was killed ; Mendizabal and Espalata wounded. The loss of the enemy was not known ; but from the circumstances of their position they

* French exaggeration has seldom been carried farther than in the accounts of this action. One account makes the loss of the allies 21,000 in killed, and nearly 15,000 wounded ! and the author of the *Précis Historique de la Bataille* takes credit to himself for moderation and candour in reducing the number of the slain to 17,000. —P. 3. pp. 32, 37.

CHAP. are believed to have suffered less than the allies: their dead
 XLVI. lay in full view of the city, and they asked leave on the
 1814. following day to bury them. General Lamorandiere was killed.
 April. Generals Harispe, Baurot, and S. Hilaire were wounded and
 made prisoners. Only one gun was taken in the position;
 the rest the enemy withdrew in time. Soult's force had con-
 sisted of not less than 36,000 men, that of Lord Wellington's
 was numerically little greater.

*Soult retires
 from Tou-
 louse.*

At night every post of the French was withdrawn within
 their intrenched line behind the canal. The only remaining
 bridge over the Ers was in possession of the allies, and the
 road from that over the Garonne was guarded by Sir Rowland:
 Toulouse was thus closed on three sides, and preparations
 were made for completing the investment. There was a want
 of ammunition, so much had been expended in the action; the
 reserve therefore was ordered up from Aire and Orthes; and
 shot were collected from the field of battle, the men searching
 for them at a fixed price. The inhabitants had now the
 miseries of a blockade before them, or the fear of having their
 lines forced, and the city at the mercy of an enemy's army.
 Above all they dreaded the rockets, which it was falsely re-
 ported would be discharged against the town; but so far
 was Lord Wellington from entertaining any such purpose, that
 though some heavy guns were fired from the ramparts, not a
 shot was directed against the city in return. It was said that
 Marshal Soult hesitated what part to take; whether to hold
 Toulouse, in the likelihood of obtaining some great advantage
 by bringing his forces out in a mass against any part of a line
 widely extended, and occupied by a force little more numerous
 than his own; or, retiring toward Carcassonne, to effect a
 junction with Suchet. General d'Armagnac is said to have
 advised this course, in consideration of the inhabitants, and

they blessed him for it; for Soult, whom they hated, and whom they openly accused of extortion and rapacity, followed the advice: a considerable body of his troops left the city on the night after the battle, leaving their wounded, 1600 in number, much of their artillery, and stores of all descriptions in large quantities.

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The allies entered Toulouse not as conquerors, but as friends and deliverers, amid cries of "*Vivent les Anglois !*" "*Vive le Roi !*" "*Vivent nos libérateurs !*" It was known officially at this time that the allied armies were in possession of Paris; and, though it was uncertain what measures might be taken with respect to the government of France, the wishes of the people were loudly declared, and the white flag hoisted. That same evening Colonel Cooke arrived from Paris to inform Lord Wellington that the allied Sovereigns had declared they would enter into no fresh negotiations with Buonaparte, because of his bad faith; that the Senate had passed resolutions declaring he had forfeited all right to the crown, and absolving the soldiers and the nation from their oaths of allegiance; finally, that he had submitted to their decree, and was permitted to retire to Elba, with the independent sovereignty of that island. Colonel St. Simon accompanied the British officer, charged with the same communication from the Provisional Government to Marshals Soult and Suchet. It was in the theatre that this news was published, for the theatre was not closed that night: the dead were lying all around the walls; the hospitals and many of the houses were filled with wounded, all of whom were not yet brought in: the inhabitants themselves had been, by the mercy of Providence, spared from the horrors of an assault, of a blockade which would speedily have caused famine, and from the evils of fire and sword which they had apprehended; and it was the theatre at Toulouse that was opened, not the churches! . . . But the play was altered, and Richard Cœur de Lion was represented, for the sake

The allies enter.

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*April.**Louis
XVIII.
proclaimed.**Sally of the
French
from Ba-
yonne.*

of its applicable passages and songs. Nothing could exceed the cheering at these passages, except the bursts of applause with which Lord Wellington was received and greeted whenever he moved: only those who know the French character, said one who was present, could imagine the excessive joy of the people; they shouted and wept, and shouted again. In the midst of this exultation, an unusual tumult announced something new; and a person in black, attended by many candles, and having a paper in his hand, appeared in one of the side boxes, struggling for room, and endeavouring to obtain a hearing. Many minutes elapsed before even the eagerness of their own expectation could still that vociferous audience sufficiently for the magistrate to make himself heard; nor was any thing then audible except that he announced the abdication of Buonaparte, and the proclamation of Louis XVIII.

Here it might have been hoped that the bloody account of this long war had closed; even this last bloodshed might have been spared if, through some great treachery or inexcusable neglect, there had not been either delay in sending off tidings of the cessation of hostilities, or in impeding them upon the road; for the courier, who was dispatched on the first of the month, ought to have arrived a week before the battle; indeed suspicions were expressed in the *Moniteur* that orders and dispatches had been intercepted, with the view of giving Marshal Soult an opportunity of retrieving the reputation of the French armies by fighting in a position which he thought inexpugnable. Colonels Cooke and S. Simon had passed through Bourdeaux, and advice was dispatched from thence to Sir John Hope before Bayonne, while they proceeded to Toulouse. As this advice was not official, Sir John did not think proper to notify it officially to General Thouvenot, till he should receive orders from Lord Wellington; but he caused it to be communicated to the

French officers at their advanced piquets, in the hope and expectation that it might prevent any hostilities in the meantime. The intimation seems to have produced a very different effect. On the night of the 13th, two deserters came from the town, and gave information that the garrison were to make a sortie in great strength early on the morrow. The first division, upon this, was ordered to arms at three in the morning; and in a few minutes afterward a feint attack was made upon the outposts in front of Anglet. But it soon appeared that the chief effort would be on the right of the Adour. Parties from the citadel crept up the hill on which the piquets were stationed, took them almost by surprize, and instantly two columns rushed forward with loud cheers, and by their numbers broke through the line of piquets between St. Etienne and St. Bernard; another strong column advancing at the same time against the former village. The line of outposts through this village, and along the heights toward Boucaut, was marked by a road worn in some places to a deep hollow way, and in others bounded by high garden-walls, so that it was not easy to get out of it, except where gaps at long intervals had been broken down for the passage of the troops. The piquets, therefore, were cut off from their supports; and, fighting with desperate animosity on both sides, heaps of slain were found here, both French and English, mostly killed with the bayonet. Sir John Hope, hastening with his staff, in the early part of the attack, to St. Etienne, entered this road, as the shortest way, not aware that great part of it was in the enemy's possession, and that the piquets of the right flank had fallen back when the line of outposts had been pierced. As soon as he discovered this, he endeavoured to retire; but, having been in front himself, with his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Moore, and Captain Herries, of the Quarter-Master-General's department, they were conse-

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*April.**April 14.*

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*Sir J. Hope
taken
prisoner.*

quently the last in retiring ; and before they could get out of this hollow way, the French came up within a few yards, and began firing. Sir John's horse was struck with three balls, and falling dead, brought his rider to the ground. Captain Herries and Lieutenant Moore dismounted to assist him, for his foot was under the dead horse ; but the first of these officers was instantly brought down himself severely wounded, and the latter had his right arm shattered ; the General was also wounded in the arm ; and the French coming immediately up, made them all three prisoners. As they were carrying them to Bayonne, Sir John received a second and severe wound in the foot, from a ball which was supposed to come from his own piquets. Major-General Hay was in command of the outposts for the night ; and, having just given directions that the church of S. Etienne should be defended till the last, he was killed shortly after the attack commenced. The enemy, having here a great superiority of numbers, got into the village toward the left, and obtained possession of the whole, except one house which Captain Foster of the 38th occupied with a piquet, and bravely maintained, though the greater part of his men were killed or wounded, till a brigade of the German Legion retook the village.

It had been supposed that the French would make it their main object to destroy the bridge, which would have been the only reasonable or justifiable object of such a sortie in that stage of the siege, when neither stores nor artillery were on the ground, nor the works commenced. To guard against this, Lord Saltoun had intrenched the convent of St. Bernard, and with great ability converted it into a respectable little fortress ; and Colonel Maitland now formed the first brigade of guards on the heights above it, to charge the enemy in flank, should he advance toward the bridge. But, though their gun-boats came

down the river, and opened a heavy flanking cannonade, no attempt was made on the bridge by water; and it was soon perceived that they had as little intention of attacking it by land, their efforts being wholly directed against the centre of the countervallation opposite to the citadel. Major-General Howard now directed Maitland to support the right flank, and Major-General Stopford, with the 2d brigade of guards, to co-operate in recovering the ground between that flank and S. Etienne; that officer was soon after wounded, and the command of the brigade fell to General Guise.

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The night was very dark; but the French from time to time sent up blue lights from the citadel, obtaining light enough thereby to direct their guns, of which nearly 70 were constantly firing to support their attack. Some of their shells and fire-balls fell upon the dépôt of fascines, and several houses also were set on fire by the same means. These partial illuminations made the darkness deeper in those places to which the light did not extend; and the guards when they approached the French line, could distinguish it only by the fire of musquetry from behind the hedges and walls. They were directed to lie down and wait till orders could be communicated to the Coldstream guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel Woodford, who were to charge simultaneously for recovering the old position in the hollow road. Meanwhile they kept close to the ground, for the eminence on which they were was so exposed to the citadel, that had they stood up for a few minutes they must have been nearly destroyed: but when the signal was given they rose and rushed forward; the Coldstream charged on the opposite flank at the same moment, and the contest on this part of the line was decided by this well combined attack: the French ran with all speed lest their retreat should be intercepted; and they suffered from a most destructive fire which both battalions poured upon them as they retired

*The French
repulsed.*

CHAP. over the glacis of the citadel. When also they were driven out of
 XLVI. St. Etienne by the German legion, a field-piece was brought to
 1814. bear on their columns, and thirteen rounds of grape and canister
 April. were fired at them with dreadful effect as they retreated down
 the great road into St. Esprit. The moon rose toward the close
 of the action; and, as day broke, French and English were seen
 lying on all sides, killed or wounded, and so intermixed, that
 there seemed to have been no distinct line belonging to either
 party. The loss was severe on both sides: on the part of the
 allies 143 were killed, 452 wounded, and 231 made prisoners;
 the loss of the French amounted to 913, of whom only twenty
 were prisoners.

Batty's
 Campaign,
 158, 165.

During the short truce which took place on the outposts
 when the engagement was over, the British officers expressed
 their regret that so many brave men should thus uselessly have
 been sacrificed; and they were justly disgusted at the heartless
 levity with which the French officers affected to treat the affair,
 saying it had been nothing more than a *petite promenade militaire*!
 Under all circumstances it seemed indeed to have been planned
 less in a military spirit than with a feeling of bitter enmity;
 made as it was when the French had reason to know that the
 war was at an end, . . . and when, if it had been otherwise, no object
 but that of the immediate slaughter could be effected, there
 being no works to be destroyed, no cannon to be spiked; and
 when whatever loss might have been inflicted could not have
 been so great as to prevent or delay the operations of the siege.
 Major-General Colville, on whom the command devolved,
 landed his guns, and made preparations upon a scale, which, if
 hostilities had been renewed, would, in all human probability,
 in the course of a very few weeks have added Bayonne to the
 British conquests. But no new conquest, no farther victories
 were needed for the honour of the British name. The reputation

of the English soldiers had not been higher in the days of the Black Prince, nor that of a British commander in the days of Marlborough.

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Colonels Cooke and S. Simon made no tarriance in Toulouse, but hastened on to inform Marshal Soult of Buonaparte's deposition, and the consequent termination of the war. The Marshal discovered no willingness to acquiesce in the new order of things; the information, he said, came to him without any character of authenticity, nevertheless, inasmuch as Lord Wellington seemed persuaded of its truth, he proposed an armistice, that he might have time to receive from the Emperor's government official advices, which might direct him how to act. When Colonel Cooke returned to Toulouse with this reply, Lord Wellington dispatched a second letter to Marshal Soult, saying, it appeared to him, that Colonel Simon had been sent to the French Marshal by the Provisional Government of France, just as Colonel Cooke had been to him by the British minister who was with the King of Prussia, both bearers of official intelligence; nor could the truth of that intelligence be doubted, nor did it require proof. Without requiring his Excellency to come to a decision, whatever that might be, he himself, he added, must not depart from the line of conduct which the allied sovereigns had pursued in their negotiations at Paris; but were he to consent to an armistice before his Excellency should have followed the example of his companions in arms, and declared his adhesion to the Provisional Government, he should be sacrificing the interest not only of the allies, but of France itself, whom it concerned so much to be saved from a civil war. Meantime Colonel S. Simon proceeded to Marshal Suchet, whom he found at Narbonne with about 12,000 men, all whom he could bring out of Spain. His last act in Catalonia had been to demolish the fortifications of Rosas; Denia and Morella had capitulated; he left

— April.
Suchet and
Soult ac-
knowledge
the new go-
vernment.

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garrisons blockaded in Figueras, Hostalric, Barcelona, Tortosa, Murviedro, and Peñiscola, in which latter place the governor with his staff, and many others, perished by the explosion of a magazine. Marshal Suchet was far from approving the latter movements of Marshal Soult, and from his own dispatches had been led to believe that he could surely have maintained himself at Toulouse. Upon Colonel S. Simon's arrival, he assembled his superior officers, laid the information before them, and with their unanimous consent sent in the adhesion of the army of Aragon and Catalonia. Soult had now no choice; the allies were moving against him ready to have acted if he had hesitated longer; yielding an unwilling consent, he then acknowledged the Provisional Government, and a convention for the suspension of hostilities was arranged.

Thus was the war concluded, happily for all parties, even for the French, whom nothing but such a series of defeats could have delivered from the tyranny which their former victories had brought upon themselves. It was by the national spirit which had first shown itself in the Peninsula, by the persevering efforts of Great Britain in the peninsular war, the courage of her troops, and the skill of her great commander, that Buonaparte's fortune had been checked at its height, and successfully resisted, till other governments were encouraged, and other nations roused by the example; and that power, the most formidable which had ever been known in the civilized world was then beaten down. The independence of Spain and Portugal had been triumphantly vindicated and secured; and if the civil liberties of both countries were not restored, and firmly established upon a sure foundation, the cause is to be found, not in any foreign influence exercised ill, nor in the perverse disposition, nor malignant designs of any individual or set of men, but in old evils which time had rendered inveterate,

for which there is no sudden cure, and which when it is attempted to remove them by the knife and the cautery must ever be rendered worse.

Ferdinand had returned from captivity with the belief in which he had been trained up, that by right of birth, and by the laws and customs of his country, he was an absolute King; and in this the great majority of the nation entirely agreed with him. But he had been accustomed to yield to circumstances which he could not control, feeling in himself neither the wish nor the strength to struggle against them; and had the general opinion been in favour of the new constitution, he would have submitted to it, as he had to his detention at Valençay, if with no better will, with the same apparent contentment, and the same convenient insensibility. Certain it is that he had no intention of overthrowing it when he arrived at Zaragoza: . . . “there are many parts of it,” said he, “which I do not approve; but if any opposition on my part were likely to cause the shedding of one drop of Spanish blood, I would swear to it immediately.” He soon found that this was not the national wish; that the people cared for the constitution as little as they understood it, that they execrated the *Liberales*, and hated the Cortes for their sake. That assembly, indeed, had acted toward all classes with such strange impolicy as to offend or injure all. The nobles, though the constitution gave them not that weight in the political scale, without which there can be no well-balanced monarchy, might nevertheless have submitted to it without repugnance, because they possessed no authority as an order under the old government: but their property had been attacked; and a sweeping decree had abolished those feudal rights and customs from which a large portion of their hereditary revenues was derived. The clergy might have acquiesced in the suppression of the Inquisition, if they had

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*Disposition
of Ferdi-
nand on his
return.*

*Impolitic
measures of
the Cortes.*

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not been required to proclaim the triumph of the *Liberales*,... a triumph whereby nothing was gained for toleration, death being still the punishment for any one who should dare dissent from the Roman Catholic faith. The monasteries might have been quietly reduced, as Pombal had begun to reduce them, without wrong to the existing communities, and without offence to the feelings or prejudices of the nation, simply by forbidding the admittance of new members: by suppressing them the Cortes not only made the monks and friars their enemies, but the people also, among whom the revenues of the former were expended, and over whom the latter exercised far greater influence than either the gospel or the laws. This measure, indeed, would have been impolitic, even if the whole expected profit to the treasury had accrued from it; but as a measure of finance it was worse than a failure. Purchasers could not be found for church property thus confiscated, in a country where the people revolted at this species of sacrilege; the estates, therefore, were administered for the government; and what with the excuses and opportunities which were afforded for mal-administration and speculation, it was generally found that the costs of management consumed the whole proceeds; whereas a regular impost might always have been levied upon the former possessors. The necessity of raising money to support the war was the plea for this suppression; yet the pay of the armies was always greatly in arrear; and it has been seen how much they suffered for want of proper clothing, and of sufficient food: such evils are always imputed to the government under which they exist; and as the Cortes had, in fact, assumed the government, the Cortes were as unpopular with the soldiers as with the great body of the people. Nothing but the army could support them if the King should refuse to take upon himself the yoke which they had prepared for him;

yet such was the infatuation of the *Liberales*, that one of their most influential members said the liberties of the country could never be safe if there were even four paid soldiers and a corporal in it; and another described the army as composed of privileged mercenaries and hired assassins.

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Yet this party courted popularity; and while they declaimed in the hall of the Cortes fancied that they enjoyed it. The galleries were filled with their admirers; and they had active partizans who could at any time raise tumult enough out of doors to carry violent measures by intimidation. The *Serviles*, as they contemptuously called those who disapproved the new constitution, either wholly, or in any of its parts, were kept silent, some by prudence, others by this system of terror. One deputy ventured to say that Ferdinand, as soon as he arrived, ought to be acknowledged as being born to all the rights and privileges of an absolute King, and that the constitution ought therefore to be annulled. The indignation of the *Liberales* burst forth at this, and of the galleries also, for the persons who attended there had always a potential voice; the president thought it prudent to close the doors, lest the liberal mob should be brought in to take summary vengeance upon the indiscreet member: a vote for expelling him was passed, and orders given for commencing a process against him, upon a law passed in the preceding summer, by which any person who should affirm, either by word of mouth or by writing, that the constitution ought not to be observed, was to be punished with perpetual banishment, and the deprivation of all offices, pay, and honours. Another law had been passed, on the same day, declaring, that whoever should conspire to establish any other religion in Spain than the Catholic-Apostolic-Roman religion, or to make the Spanish nation cease to profess it, should be prosecuted as a traitor, and suffer death, the established law con-

Feb. 3.

Aug. 18,
1813.

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cerning offences against the faith remaining in full force. It was only by thus consenting to the persecution of religious opinions that the *Liberales* could make the *Serviles* concur in a law which gave them authority to persecute for political ones!

“Happy,” said a journalist who spoke the sentiments of the ruling party, “happy will be the day when Ferdinand, having been restored to his faithful subjects, may be thus addressed: Here is your throne, preserved by the loyalty of your subjects; here is your crown, repurchased for you by the blood of Spaniards; here is your sceptre, which Spanish constancy replaces in your hands; here is your royal robe, purpled with the blood of thousands who have fallen that you might wear it! Peruse our history; inform yourself of all that the Spaniards have done for you, and never forget that to the Spanish people you owe every thing. Never forget that you are come to be the chief of a nation, the monarch of subjects who have abolished the vestiges of despotism! It is the law which orders; . . . the King is the executive magistrate. . . . But, that such a day of jubilee may arrive, King Ferdinand must return absolutely free, neither influenced by the tyrant of France, nor by Spaniards who are ignorant of the state of Spain, or who regard our institutions with dislike.” This was written before the overthrow of Buonaparte, and before Ferdinand’s enlargement, and perhaps before the *Liberales* themselves apprehended the consequence in which their own rashness must inevitably involve them. Indifferent spectators saw clearly that either the constitution must be modified, or that the King would make himself absolute again: and even now, if the *Liberales* had not been possessed with an overweening opinion of their own strength, such a modification might have been effected as would have given the Spaniards all the liberty which they were willing to receive, and, indeed, all the political freedom which those who had the

sincerest wish for their improvement and their prosperity could have desired for them. But when the last communication from Valençay was read in the Cortes, conciliatory as it was intended to be, and satisfactory as it ought to have been deemed, one member took a sudden exception to the word *subjects*: "We are not subjects!" he exclaimed. And another member, expressing his assent to the absurd exception, said, that the Spanish people were subjects of the law alone; but that the use of a word which he erroneously represented as being peculiar to the ancient despotism was accounted for by Ferdinand's long imprisonment, and his consequent ignorance of the new political phraseology of Spain! Meantime the most preposterous projects were started by those who saw that such language and such opinions were likely to occasion a struggle, and who saw no farther. Some were for assembling an army to defend the Cortes against the King; others were for setting him aside, and appointing his brother, the Infante Don Carlos, to reign in his stead: and it is said that there was a party in the Cortes who dreamed of offering the crown to Lord Wellington!

Some of the Guerrilla chiefs are said at this time to have tendered their services to the Cortes; and this is rendered probable by their subsequent conduct. The Cortes is supposed to have reckoned, also, upon Lacy's attachment to the constitution; but the enthusiasm with which Ferdinand was received by the troops might have shown them how little they could expect from any declarations of the military in their favour. When it was expected that he would proceed from Barcelona to Valencia, Elio, with the double purpose of rendering most honour to the King and affording most gratification to the soldiers, proposed a truce to General Robert, in order that the troops employed

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in the blockade of Tortosa might join their comrades, who were assembled at Amposta, to receive him on his way. When Ferdinand apprized them that he had changed his route, he assigned as a reason his desire of viewing the ruins of Zaragoza, and showing a mark of respect to that faithful city. But the season of festivity at Valencia was rather prolonged than retarded by this deviation; for the Infante Don Antonio proceeded immediately thither, and his arrival kept the inhabitants in a jubilant state till the King himself arrived. Ferdinand may have intended to gain time by this delay for making himself acquainted with the real state of public opinion; but the visit was probably suggested by Palafox, without any such view: he knew that it would be creditable to the King's feelings, and honourable to the Zaragozans; and what could be so gratifying to himself as to return under such circumstances to Zaragoza, where, with a devoted heroism which had never been surpassed, he had performed his duty to the uttermost, and won for himself a glorious name not to be stained by calumny, and not to be obscured by lapse of ages, while any remembrance of these times shall endure.

*Cardinal
Bourbon's
reception by
Ferdinand.*

After tarrying some twelve days at Zaragoza, Ferdinand set out for Valencia. On the way he was met by his uncle, Cardinal Bourbon, whom, as President of the Regency, the Cortes had sent to meet the King, but with a strict injunction that he was not to kiss the King's hand, because they deemed any such mark of homage inconsistent with their dignity. Ferdinand had been apprized of this; and, as a first and easy trial of his strength, when the Cardinal accosted him, he presented his hand, and commanded him to kiss it. The old prelate, who had weakly promised to obey the orders of the Cortes, which in his heart he disapproved, obeyed the King with better will than grace,

after he had shown a wish to avoid the ceremony ; but Ferdinand, having thus humbled him, turned his back upon him in displeasure, and presently deprived him of his archbishopric.

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The objection to the word subjects might have been imputed to the folly of the individuals who started and supported it ; . . but this refusal of a ceremony which was as old as the monarchy itself, was the act of the Cortes as a body, and might well be considered as one more proof that they, who had so preposterously assumed the title of Majesty for themselves, were resolved to leave the sovereign little but his bare title. But Ferdinand had seen the disposition of the people at Zaragoza ; he had seen that all classes heartily united in reprobating the measures of the Cortes, and that the re-establishment of the Inquisition was one of the blessings which they expected from his return ! The disposition of the army was distinctly declared by Elio, who met him at Jaquesa, on the frontiers of Aragon and Valencia, and addressed him in the name of the second army, that army, he said, which had shed most blood, and made most sacrifices for the deliverance of their country and their King. “ Your Majesty,” said he, “ arrived in a happy hour to occupy the throne of your fathers ; and the God of Hosts, who by such strange and wonderful ways has brought your Majesty hither to restore the monarchy of the Spains, which Nature has given you, may He give you all the strength of mind and body that are required for governing it worthily : then, Sire, you will not forget the armies which have deserved so well, those armies who, having moistened with their blood the land which they have delivered, find themselves at this day in want, neglected, and what is worse, outraged ; but they trust that you, Sire, will do them justice !” Elio then offered to resign his General’s staff ; and upon Ferdinand’s declining to receive it, and saying it was well placed in his hand, the General, with ready adulation, said,

*Elio meets
the King.
April 15.*

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*Ferdinand
enters Va-
lencia.*

“Take it, Sire, . . . let your Majesty grasp it but for a moment, and in that moment it will acquire new worth, new strength!” The King took the staff accordingly, and instantly returned it. Elio then requested permission to kiss his royal hand, and in a short but studied speech which concluded this ominous scene, he pledged himself that 40,000 strong right arms should be as they had been in the worst times, the support of his throne.

Ferdinand entered Valencia on the following evening, drawn into the city as he had been into every place upon the road by the joyous people who yoked themselves to his carriage, and who testified by every possible expression of word and deed their desire of taking the old yoke upon themselves and upon their children. An English traveller, who had the good fortune to be present on this memorable day, describes their enthusiasm as bordering upon madness; he had seen before the King’s deliverance the extreme unpopularity of the Cortes throughout Spain, but the feeling which was now manifested surprized him by its intensity and its eagerness, and by the sudden conversion of those who but a few days before professed fidelity to the new constitution; those very persons were now ready to shed their blood in Ferdinand’s cause, that he might be restored, they said, to the full enjoyment of all the rights which his fathers had possessed. “Long live the Absolute King!” was the cry, “and down with the Constitution!”

April 17.

On the morrow the King went on foot to the cathedral, to be present at a thanksgiving service for his restoration. The streets were lined with soldiers; the colours of the crown regiment were lowered as he passed, so as to be spread before him, that he might see they were stained with blood; and Elio, who had prepared this scene, said, “I have detained you for a sight worthy of you! The stains which you see upon this flag are of the blood of the officer who now holds it, and who, when covered with wounds,

saved it from the enemy at Castalla. The crown which this blood has died seems to say that the blood which the loyal Spanish army has shed is that which has recovered for you your crown ; and the blood which remains in all the Spanish armies they are ready to shed for securing you upon the throne in the plenitude of those rights which Nature has made your portion !” Ferdinand could not have performed his part better at that moment if he had studied it ; he stooped and kissed the flag, and announced to the standard-bearer, who had before received no promotion for his services, that he was now promoted. In the afternoon after the officers had been presented, and had kissed hands, Elio, in their name and presence, renewed for the army under his command the oath which the whole loyal Spanish nation had taken in the year 1808, when Ferdinand was acknowledged King : the constitution was not mentioned in his address, nor the Cortes ; “ this oath,” said he, “ they renew by me as their organ upon your royal hand (and he knelt and kissed the hand at this part of his speech), and they promise your Majesty that at the price of their blood they will preserve the throne for you with all those rights to which the heroic Spanish nation at that time swore.” Turning then to the officers, he asked whether these were the sentiments which animated them ? He was answered by a general acclamation of assent : many of them burst into tears in the strength of their emotion, and some cries were heard of death to those who did not hold such sentiments, and would not maintain them ! The time came when General Elio paid with his own life’s blood for this and other services to the absolute cause.

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*The officers
swear fidelity
to him.*

He was indeed an evil counsellor now, acting honestly and bravely, but upon an erring judgement. Unhappily there never was a time in which wise counsel was more needed ; for if the blind, unreflecting, generous loyalty of the nation had been rightly estimated, so as to call forth a generous but thoughtful feeling

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*April.**General
Whitting-
ham's ad-
vice.*

in return, it would be rash and presumptuous to say that things might have been settled upon a sure foundation, but certainly much evil might have been averted, much wickedness might have been prevented, and blood, and tears, and misery, might have been spared. General Whittingham, who commanded the cavalry and artillery in Aragon when the King arrived at Zaragoza, and who accompanied him by his express orders to Valencia, was asked in that city his opinion whether the King should swear to the constitution or not? He replied, that the constitution was too democratic to be in accord either with the habits and opinions of the Spanish people, or with the laws and customs of the Spanish monarchy; it must be modified therefore in many parts, or there could be no hope of its duration. Yet one of its articles forbade the slightest alteration during the space of eight years; and thus the King, if he swore to it, must either deprive himself of all possibility of amending it during that time, or be guilty of predetermined perjury. He delivered it therefore as his opinion, that the King under these circumstances could not swear to the constitution as it then existed; but, he added, that the Cortes had deserved well both of the King and of the country; that the King, unaccompanied by a single soldier, should in person dissolve the Cortes, should thank them for the service they had rendered the state, and say that it would gratify him to see them re-elected by their constituents as members of the Cortes which he was about to summon.

The British ambassador, Sir Henry Wellesley, had gone to Valencia to meet the King, and the advice which he gave was to the same effect, that he should modify the constitution, but not annul it. This indeed was the opinion which any Englishman who regarded the situation of Spain with a sincere wish for the peace and prosperity and improvement of a great and noble nation would then have formed; for this was the straight for-

ward course which at that golden opportunity it behoved the King to take. But there were few Spaniards who saw this, few who were in a state of sufficient equanimity to see it: inflamed by strong passions, or settled in strong prepossessions which no force of reason, no lessons of experience could shake, a small minority were bent upon violent change, a much more powerful and now more active party were resolved to resist all alteration, even such as was most needed; while the great majority of the people, looking back upon the tranquillity they had enjoyed before the war as to a golden age, desired nothing but to return to their old habits and their old pursuits, and relapse into their former state of happy indifference to all political affairs. The care of the nation they were for leaving to the government, the care of religion to the Holy Office, and the care of their individual consciences to the priest, as implicitly as they relied on Providence for the due return of the seasons; and it was with these who were the great body of his subjects, that Ferdinand, who would have been just such a subject himself, was in perfect sympathy. It is often seen that circumstances awaken dormant genius, and bring latent qualities into strong action: but no circumstances can raise an ordinary man to the level of extraordinary times, no circumstances can give strength to a weak mind; nor can any thing but the special grace of God call forth in the heart a virtue which is not innate in it.

The Cortes at this time repeated their solicitations that the King would proceed to Madrid, and establish the happiness of Spain; but they made a show of military preparations to support their own authority; and they took upon themselves, with singular indiscretion, to regulate the establishment of his household. But every day now diminished their numbers as well as their strength; and more than seventy of the members sent a deputation to Valencia to present a memorial, in which

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*Memorial
of the
Serviles.*

CHAP. they protested against the measures of the Cortes as having
 XLVI. been carried by force and intimidation, and professed for them-
 1814. selves and for the provinces which they represented fidelity to
 April. their ancient laws and institutions. Beyond all doubt they
 spoke the sense of the provinces. In most of the large towns,
 the *Plaza Mayor*, or Great Square, had been new named *Plaza
 de la Constitucion*, and a stone with these words engraven on it
 erected there; at Valencia this was removed one night, and in
 the morning what is absurdly called a provisional stone of wood,
 was set up in its place, with the words *Real Plaza de Fernando
 VII.*: this was publicly done; and the provisional stone was first
 borne under Ferdinand's window with military honours, in a long
 procession formed by the populace, with officers intermixed,
 carrying drawn swords, and bearing the royal flag. A stanza,
 composed* and printed for the occasion, was soon affixed to it,
 denouncing, in a ferocious spirit, vengeance upon any one who
 should profane it, and upon the liberal party.

Stone of the
 constitution
 removed.

The news of Buonaparte's deposition, and the consequent
 termination of hostilities, reached Ferdinand during his tar-
 riance at Valencia. Any perplexity which he might have felt
 (if he could be supposed to have felt any) concerning the
 treaty of Valençay was thus removed, and there was nothing to
 withdraw his attention from the immediate object of resuming

* Piedra immortal, que en gloria de Fernando

Hoy el brazo del justo aquí coloca,

En ti se estrelle el enemigo bando,

Qual se estrella la nave en dura roca:

Y si algun vil ideas abrigando

Contra el Rey, te profana ó te provoca,

Que muera; y que á cenizas reducido

Sirva de exemplo al liberal partido.

his absolute authority, and suppressing what he now regarded as a mere revolutionary faction. He was delayed a week by indisposition, which confined him to his apartment. The first thing he did, when he was sufficiently recovered to leave the house, was to visit all the nunneries, that the nuns might not be disappointed in their ardent desire of seeing him; and in these visits part of two days was employed much to the increase of his popularity, this being at the same time an evidence, it was thought, of good-nature, and of devout respect to the superstition of the country. When these visits were concluded, he attended an evening *Te Deum* in the cathedral, performed by the light of 20,000 tapers; after which he and the Infantes adored a chalice of legendary reputation which is venerated there. Hitherto there had been no avowal of the course which he intended to pursue; but on this day a declaration appeared, signed by the King and by Macanaz, as Secretary of State, with special powers for this peculiar occasion. In this memorable paper, Ferdinand, speaking in his own person, began by briefly touching upon his accession to the throne, and his imprisonment, at the commencement of which he had issued, he said, as well as he could while surrounded by force, a decree addressed to the Council of Castille, or, in defect of it, to any other chancellery or audience that might be at liberty, requiring them to convoke a Cortes which should employ itself solely on the immediate business of taking measures and raising supplies for the defence of the kingdom, and remain permanent for other emergencies. This decree had arrived too late; and when the Cortes of 1810 was assembled, the states of the nobility and clergy were not summoned to it, although the Central Junta had so directed; and the members, after taking the oaths, "whereby," said he, "they bound themselves to preserve to me, as their sovereign, all my dominions, on the very day of their installation, and for a commence-

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XLVI.
1814.

Breve Relación de los sucesos en Valencia.

*Ferdinand's declaration.
May 4.*

CHAP. XLVI.
1814. ment of their proceedings, despoiled me of the sovereignty which they had just before acknowledged, attributing it nominally to the nation, for the purpose of appropriating it to themselves, and then dictating what laws they pleased. Thus, without authority from province, place, or junta, and without the knowledge of those which were said to be represented by substitute members, they imposed upon the nation the yoke of a new constitution, wherein almost the whole form of the old constitution of the monarchy was changed; and, copying the revolutionary and democratical principles of the French constitution of 1791, they sanctioned . . not the fundamental laws of a moderate monarchy, . . but those of a popular government, with a chief or magistrate, their mere delegated executor, and not a King, although they gave him that name to deceive and seduce the unwary. They carried these laws by means of the threats and violence of those persons with whom the galleries of the Cortes were filled; giving thus the colour of the general will to what was in fact only the work of a faction. With the same want of liberty, the constitution was signed and sworn to; and it was notorious to all what had been the treatment of the respectable Bishop of Orense, and the punishment with which others had been threatened who refused to sign and swear to it."

He proceeded then to say in what manner revolutionary principles had been diffused in journals, some of which were edited by members of the Cortes; that king, and tyrant, and despot had been used as synonymous terms; that the army and navy and other establishments which used to be called royal, had been re-named national, in order to flatter the people, who, nevertheless, in spite of these arts, retained by their native loyalty the good feelings which always formed their character. "Of all this," he continued, "since I happily re-entered the kingdom, I have been acquiring faithful information, partly by my own observation,

and partly from the public papers, in which, up to this day, representations of my coming and of my character are circulated, so false and infamous in themselves, that even with regard to any other individual they would be heavy offences, worthy of severe exposure and punishment. Such unexpected circumstances have filled my heart with bitterness, which has only been tempered by demonstrations of affection from all those who hoped for my arrival, that my presence might put an end to these evils, and to the oppression in which those were held who preserved the remembrance of my person, and desired the true happiness of their country. True and loyal Spaniards, I promise and vow to you that you shall not be deceived in your noble hopes! Your sovereign wishes to be so for your sake; and in this he places his glory, . . . in being the sovereign of an heroic nation, who by immortal deeds have gained the admiration of all, and preserved their liberty and their honour. I abhor and detest despotism: the intelligence and cultivation of the nations of Europe do not suffer it now; neither in Spain have its Kings ever been despots, nor have its good laws and constitution authorized it, though by misfortune there may have been from time to time there, as every where, and in every thing human, abuses which no possible constitution can entirely preclude; and these were not the faults of the constitution, but of individuals, and the effects of melancholy but very rare circumstances which gave occasion to them. Yet to prevent them as far as may be by human foresight, preserving the honour of the royal dignity and its rights (for rights it has) and those which belong to the people, which are equally inviolable. I will consult with the *procuradores* of Spain and of the Indies, and in a Cortes, legitimately assembled, composed of both, as soon as they can be brought together, (order having been restored, and the good usages in which the nation has lived,

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CHAP. and which with its accord the Kings, my august predecessors,
XLVI. have established) every thing that can conduce to the good
1814. of my kingdoms shall be firmly and legitimately established,
May. that my subjects may live prosperously and happily under a
religion and a government closely united in an indissoluble tie,
wherein and wherein alone consists the temporal happiness of
a King and a kingdom bearing for excellence the title of Ca-
tholic. Immediate preparations shall be made for assembling
these Cortes. Liberty and security, individual and royal, shall
be firmly secured by means of laws, which, guaranteeing public
tranquillity and order, shall leave to all that wholesome liberty,
the undisturbed enjoyment of which distinguishes a moderate
government from an arbitrary and despotic one. This just
liberty all, likewise, shall enjoy to communicate their ideas and
thoughts through the press, that is, within those limits which
sound reason prescribes to all, that it degenerate not into
licentiousness; for the respect which is due to religion and to
government, and that which men ought mutually to observe
towards each other, can under no civilized government be
reasonably permitted to be violated with impunity. All sus-
picion, also, of any waste of the public revenues shall cease;
those which shall be assigned for the expenses required for the
honour of my royal person and family, and that of the nation
which I have the glory to govern being separated from the
revenues, which, with consent of the kingdom, may be assigned
for the maintenance of the state in all the branches of its
administration. And the laws which shall hereafter serve as
a rule of action for my subjects shall be established in concert
with the Cortes; so that these bases may serve as an authentic
declaration of my royal intentions in the government with which
I am about to be charged, and will represent to all, not a despot
or a tyrant, but a King and a father of his subjects."

He went on to say, that having heard complaints from all parts against the constitution, and against the measures of the Cortes, . . . considering also the mischiefs which had sprung therefrom, and would increase if he should sanction that constitution with his consent, . . . acting, moreover, in conformity to the decided and general demonstration of the wishes of his people, wishes which were just in themselves and well founded, he declared that he would not swear to the Cortes, but that he annulled it, and abrogated all such of its acts as derogated from the rights and prerogatives of his sovereignty established by that constitution and those laws under which the nation had so long lived. And he declared all persons guilty of high treason who should attempt to support them, and to excite discontent and disturbance in his dominions, whether by writing, word, or deed. The administration was to go on under the present system till the old one could be restored; and the political and administrative branches till the future Cortes should have determined upon the permanent order of this part of the government. But from the day on which this his decree should be published and communicated to the President of the Cortes, the sittings of that Cortes should cease; all their papers should be delivered to the officers charged with the execution of this decree, and deposited in the house of the *Ayuntamiento* of Madrid, and the room in which they were deposited be locked and sealed up; and whoever should obstruct the execution of the decree should be deemed guilty of high treason, and punished with death. All proceedings pending for any infraction of the constitution were to cease; and all persons imprisoned for such infraction to be set at liberty forthwith. "Such," the King concluded, "is my will, because the welfare and happiness of the nation require it."

By another decree of the same date, Ferdinand conferred upon

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CHAP. the capital, in testimony of his esteem and gratitude, and in
 XLVI. earnest of some more signal favour, the privilege of adding to
 1814. its appellation of the "right noble, loyal, and imperial town of
 Madrid," that of "heroic" also; and upon its *Ayuntamiento* the
 title of "excellency." In this decree, also, he ordered an
 hundred doubloons to be distributed in each of the parishes of
 Madrid, on the day when he should make his entrance; and he
 regretted that circumstances did not allow him to give greater
 proofs of his natural bounty. On the following day he de-
 parted for Madrid. Such were the multitudes who came from
 far and near to obtain a sight of their King, that one continued
 concourse of people lined the whole way from Valencia. Every
 village devised some means of displaying its loyalty; some by
 erecting triumphal arches, such as their abilities could afford;
 others by strewing the road with branches and flowers for miles
 together. The Cortes, as he approached, could no longer dream
 of resistance; the decree which abrogated their constitution
 and put an end to their authority was posted in the streets of
 Madrid, countersigned by General Eguia, as Captain-General
 of New Castille, and Political and Military Governor of the
 Province, now by the King appointed; and deputations from
 its Audience and its *Ayuntamiento* went to meet him at Aranjuez,
 where he halted two days, and where the rejoicing of the in-
 habitants, and the illuminations which they exhibited, and the
 confluence of visitors, contrasted strangely with the devastation
 that the French had committed there; for they had stripped the
 gardens of every thing which could be carried away, and had
 destroyed or mutilated the statues and the fountains.

*He enters
 Madrid.
 May 12.*

Such members of the Cortes as were marked for the King's
 displeasure were arrested on the night before his arrival by Ge-
 neral Eguia. On the 13th, Eguia went out with the grandees in
 procession, habited in the ancient costume, to meet him. The

Majorcan division lined the Prado, from the Puerta de Atocha, at which he entered, and the Calle de Alcalá to the Puerta del Sol, . . not to overawe the people (for a corporal and four soldiers might have repressed any discontent that appeared that day) but to increase the pomp and splendour of the festival. In the highest part of the Calle de Alcalá, . . and no scene could be better suited to such a pageant, . . a triumphal arch had been erected, as imposing in appearance as if it had been of durable materials. The balconies were hung with silk of various colours, fringed with gold and silver; and Ferdinand made his entrance amid the salute of cannon, and the sound of bells from all the churches, and the shouts and acclamations of an innumerable multitude rising above all. Their invaders had been totally defeated and expelled; their strong places were recovered; their national independence had been gloriously vindicated and established; the tyrant who had deceived, and outraged, and insulted them had been beaten from his throne; the Intruder whom he had set over them had been hunted out of their land; their King, . . their legitimate, their popular, their beloved King was restored! Greater joy could not have been expressed, greater happiness could not have been felt, if that King had been in all respects deserving of the generous enthusiasm which was that day manifested for his sake.

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If Ferdinand had now performed the promises which were distinctly made in his declaration, he might have averted much, if not all, of the subsequent danger which he incurred, and the just reproaches which will be attached to his name in history. It ought not to be said that in making those promises he had no intention of fulfilling them; for though he scrupled at no dissimulation when under duress, they were voluntary in this case, and the temper of the nation, then unequivocally declared, was such, that no purpose was to be gained by it. Ferdinand

*Subsequent
conduct of
the people
and of the
government.*

CHAP. was a person of narrow mind, and his heart seems to have been
XLVI. incapable of generous feeling; but he was not a wicked man;
1814. nor would he have been a bad King, if he had met with wise
ministers, and had ruled over an enlightened people. On the
two important subjects of civil and religious freedom he and
the great body of the nation were in perfect sympathy, . . both,
upon both subjects, imbued with error to the core; and the
popular feeling in both cases outran his. The word Liberty
(*Libertad*) appeared in large bronze letters over the entrance
of the Hall of the Cortes in Madrid. The people of their own
impulse hurried thither to remove it; they set up ladders, forced
out letter by letter from the stone, and as each was thrown into the
street, the spectators renewed their shouts of exultation. They
collected as many of the journals of the Cortes, and of the papers
and pamphlets of the *Liberales*, as could be got together; formed
a procession in which the religious fraternities, and the clergy
regular and secular, took the lead; piled up these papers in
one of the public squares, and sacrificed them there as a political
auto-de-fè, after which high mass was performed and *Te Deum*
sung, as a thanksgiving for their triumph. The Stone of the
Constitution, as it was called, was every where removed, and
replaced as it had been at Valencia. The people at Seville
deposed all the existing authorities, elected others in their stead
to all the offices which had existed under the old system, and
then required those authorities to re-establish the Inquisition.
In re-establishing that accursed tribunal by a formal act of
government, in suppressing the freedom of the press, which
had been abused to its own destruction, and in continuing to
govern not merely as an absolute monarch, but as a despotic
one, Ferdinand undoubtedly complied with the wishes of the
Spanish nation. He did these things conformably to his own
misguided conscience and weak judgement, as well as to his

inclinations; and for so doing he was, by the voice of the people, a patriotic and popular King. In all this he cannot justly be charged with any thing worse than error of judgement; fearfully injurious indeed in its consequences, but in the individual to be pitied as well as pardoned. But, in his treatment of the more conspicuous persons among the *Liberales*, whom he condemned to strict and long imprisonment, many of them for life, he brought upon himself an indelible reproach, and incurred the guilt of individual sin. Quintana, who, more than any other person, contributed by his eloquent writings to excite and sustain the national spirit, and awaken the sympathy of other nations, was one of the victims thus sentenced; and his life is said to have been not the only one which was shortened by severe confinement.

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But the peninsular war concludes with the return of Ferdinand to Madrid; and its history may best be concluded with the return to his own country of the General by whom it was brought to this triumphant termination. A dukedom was conferred upon Lord Wellington, £300,000 were voted by parliament for the purchase of an estate suitable to the dignity, and such an additional grant of income as made up the annual amount of his parliamentary allowances to £17,000. He had not been in England since he was raised to the peerage; and thus it happened that, when he was introduced into the House of Lords to take his seat, his patents of creation as Baron, Earl, Marquis, and Duke were all to be read on the same day. No ceremony of honour was omitted on this occasion; the Duchess his wife, and his mother, the Countess of Mornington, were present to behold it, being seated below the throne. After the oaths had been administered, and he had taken his seat, the Lord Chancellor Eldon addressed him for the purpose of conveying the thanks of the House, which had been voted to him on the preceding evening,

Lord Wellington returns to England.

He takes his seat in the House of Lords.
June 28.

The Lord Chancellor's speech.

CHAP. for the twelfth time. In performing this duty, Lord Eldon said,
 XLVI. he could not refrain from calling the attention of his Grace, and
 1814. of the noble Lords present, to a circumstance singular in the
 history of that House, . . . that upon his introduction he had gone
 through every dignity of the peerage in this country which it was
 in the power of the crown to bestow. These dignities had been
 conferred upon him for eminent and distinguished services ; and
 he would not have the presumption to attempt to state the nature
 of those services, nor to recapitulate those brilliant acts which
 had given immortality to the name of Wellington, and placed this
 empire on a height of military renown of which there was no ex-
 ample in its history. He could not better discharge the duty which
 had devolved upon him than by recurring to the terms in which
 that House had so often expressed their sense of the energy, the
 unremitting exertions, the ardour, and the ability with which
 the noble Duke had conducted the arduous campaigns of the
 Peninsula, . . . exertions and ability which finally enabled him to
 place the allied armies in the heart of France, fighting their
 way there through the blaze of victory. The glorious result
 of his victories had been to achieve the peace and security of
 his country ; while, by his example, he had animated the rest
 of Europe, and enabled her governments to restore their ancient
 order. The Lord Chancellor then expressed his own satisfaction
 in being the instrument of informing the Duke that the House
 unanimously voted their thanks for his eminent and unremitted
 services, and their congratulations upon his return to his
 country.

*The House
 of Commons
 congratulate
 him on his
 return.*

The House of Commons in voting their thanks had voted
 also that a committee of the House should wait upon his Grace
 to communicate the same, and to offer him their congratulations
 on his return. The Duke in reply signified that he was desirous
 of expressing to the House his answer in person. He was

admitted in consequence the following day; a chair was set for him toward the middle of the House: he came in making his obeisances, the whole House rising upon his entrance. The Speaker having informed him that there was a chair in which he might repose himself, the Duke sate down, covered for some time, the serjeant standing on his right hand with the mace grounded, and the House resumed their seats. The Duke then rose and uncovered, and addressed the Speaker thus: "I was anxious to be permitted to attend this House in order to return my thanks in person for the honour they have done me in deputing a committee of members to congratulate me on my return to this country; and this after the House had animated my exertions by their applause upon every occasion which appeared to merit their approbation; and after they had filled up the measure of their favours by conferring upon me, at the recommendation of the Prince Regent, the noblest gift that any subject had ever received.

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1814.

July 1.
He returns
thanks to
the House.

"I hope it will not be deemed presumptuous in me to take this opportunity of expressing my admiration of the great efforts made by this House and by the country, at a moment of unexampled pressure and difficulty, in order to support the great scale of operation by which the contest was brought to so fortunate a termination.

"By the wise policy of Parliament the government was enabled to give the necessary support to the operations which were carried on under my direction; and I was encouraged by the confidence reposed in me by his Majesty's ministers and by the Commander-in-chief, by the gracious favour of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and by the reliance which I had on the support of my gallant friends the general officers of the army, and on the bravery of the officers and troops, to carry on the operations in such a manner as to acquire for me those

CHAP. marks of the approbation of this House, for which I have now
 XLVI. the honour to make my humble acknowledgements. Sir, it is
 1814. impossible for me to express the gratitude which I feel; I can
 only assure the House, that I shall always be ready to serve his
 Majesty in any capacity in which my services can be deemed
 useful, with the same zeal for my country which has already
 acquired for me the approbation of this House."

*The
 Speaker's
 speech.*

Mr. Abbot, the Speaker, who had sat covered during this speech, then stood up uncovered, and replied to his Grace in these words: "My Lord, since last I had the honour of addressing you from this place, a series of eventful years has elapsed, but none without some mark and note of your rising glory.

"The military triumphs which your valour has achieved upon the banks of the Douro and the Tagus, of the Ebro and the Garonne, have called forth the spontaneous shouts of admiring nations. Those triumphs it is needless at this day to recount. Their names have been written by your conquering sword in the annals of Europe, and we shall hand them down with exultation to our children's children.

"It is not, however, the grandeur of military success which has alone fixed our admiration, or commanded our applause; it has been that generous and lofty spirit which inspired your troops with unbounded confidence, and taught them to know that the day of battle was always a day of victory; that moral courage and enduring fortitude, which in perilous times, when gloom and doubt had beset ordinary minds, stood nevertheless unshaken; and that ascendancy of character, which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival nations, enabled you to wield at will the fates and fortunes of mighty empires.

"For the repeated thanks and grants bestowed upon you by this House, in gratitude for your many and eminent services, you have thought fit this day to offer us your acknowledgements:

but this nation well knows that it is still largely your debtor ; it owes to you the proud satisfaction, that amidst the constellation of great and illustrious warriors who have recently visited our country, we could present to them a leader of our own, to whom all, by common acclamation, conceded the pre-eminence. And when the will of Heaven, and the common destinies of our nature, shall have swept away the present generation, you will have left your great name and example as an imperishable monument, exciting others to like deeds of glory, and serving at once to adorn, defend, and perpetuate the existence of this country amongst the ruling nations of the earth."

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With these honours was the Duke of Wellington received, and such honours were never more fully deserved. Since the peace of Utrecht, in which the interests of Europe were sacrificed by that party-spirit which is the reproach of England, our military reputation had declined. The American war contributed to lower us in the estimation of our neighbours ; for though the courage of our men was never found wanting in the day of trial, the circumstances of that contest were such that, after the first season for vigorous measures was gone by, success became morally impossible. This was not taken into the account. The war ended to our loss ; and the disgrace which should exclusively have attached to our councils affected our arms also. When the Duke of York was made commander-in-chief, our military establishments were in a wretched state ; boys held commissions literally before they were out of leading-strings ; there was not a single institution in Great Britain wherein tactics were taught ; and it was in France that young Arthur Wellesley learned the elements of war ! The Duke of York soon began a silent and efficient reform ; abuse after abuse was removed, defect after defect supplied ; but these improvements were known only to persons connected with the

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1814. army; and its military character suffered materially in the revolutionary war from causes which are neither imputable to the commander, nor to the soldiers under him: for then also, as in the American war, they were placed in circumstances which rendered success impossible. The evil, however, was done. The enemy insulted us; the continental nations were persuaded that we were not a military people; and we, contenting ourselves with our acknowledged maritime supremacy, were but too ready to assent to an opinion which in its consequences must have operated as a death-sentence upon national honour, national power, and national independence. It is not too much to say that our army would have sunk into contempt, if the expedition to Egypt had not thrown some splendour over the close of a most ill-fated and ill-conducted war. But the effect which that expedition produced upon public feeling soon passed away; and the French convinced themselves that our success had been owing to the incapacity of their commander, the disputes among their generals, and the universal desire of their troops to escape from Egypt, . . . any cause rather than the true one. A second war broke out; and while the enemy obtained the most signal victories, we had only the solitary battle of Maida to boast, which was upon so small a scale, and so nugatory in its consequences, that the continent never heard of it, though our disgrace at Buenos Ayres was known every where.

Meantime the French had persuaded Europe as well as themselves that Buonaparte was the greatest military genius of ancient or of modern times; that his generals were all consummate masters in the art of war; and that his troops were, in every respect, the best in the world. This opinion was more than ever prevalent when Sir Arthur Wellesley took the command in Portugal in 1809, and began a career which, when all

circumstances are considered, may truly be said to be unparalleled in military history. He entered upon that career at a time when the military reputation and the military power of France were at their greatest height; when a belief that it was impossible to resist the commanding genius and inexhaustible resources of Buonaparte had been inculcated in this country with pestilent activity, and had deeply tainted the public mind. Daily and weekly, monthly and quarterly, this poison was administered with the most mischievous perseverance in newspapers, magazines, and reviews. Never was there an opinion more injurious, more fatal to the honour, interest, safety, independence, and existence of the country; yet was it propagated by writers who were then held in the highest estimation, and they enforced it with a zeal which arrayed their passions, and seemed to array their wishes, as well as their intellect, on the enemy's side; and with a confidence which boldly affirmed that nothing but folly or madness could presume to doubt their predictions. Suicidal as the belief was, it was the creed of that party in the state to which these writers had attached themselves; and no effort was omitted on their part for deadening the hopes, thwarting the exertions, disgusting the allies, and encouraging the enemies of their country. Our government was not influenced by such advisers; but it was long before its exertions were commensurate with the occasion; and during four years Lord Wellington was crippled by the inadequacy of his means. Yet, even when thus crippled, he contended successfully against the undivided power of France. Every operation of the British army under his command tended to give the troops and the nation fresh confidence in their general, and to impress upon the enemy a proper sense of the British character. Wherever he met the French he defeated them; whenever he found it necessary to retire for want of numbers, or of food, or of co-operation in the Spaniards, it

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CHAP. was in such order, and so leisurely, as neither to raise the hopes
XLVI. of the enemy, nor abate those of his army, or of his allies.
1814. After the battle of Talavera, and the series of provoking misconduct by which the effects of that victory were frustrated, he distinctly perceived the course which the enemy would pursue, and, anticipating all their temporary advantages, (which yet he omitted no occasion of opposing and impeding,) he saw and determined how and where the vital struggle must be made. The foresight of a general was never more admirably displayed; and if there be one place in the Peninsula more appropriate than another for a monument to that leader whose trophies are found throughout the whole, it is in the lines of Torres Vedras that a monument to Lord Wellington should be erected. When he took his stand there, Lisbon was not the only stake of that awful contest: the fate of Europe was in suspense; and they who, like Homer, could see the balance in the hand of Jupiter, might then have perceived that the fortunes of France were found wanting in the scale. There the spell which bound the nations was broken; the plans of the tyrant were baffled; his utmost exertions when he had no other foe and no other object were defied; his armies were beaten; and Europe, taking heart when she beheld the deliverance of Portugal, began to make a movement for her own, ... for that spirit by which alone her deliverance could be effected was excited. Foresight and enterprize, meantime, with our commander went hand in hand; he never advanced, but so as to be sure of his retreat; and never retreated, but in such an attitude as to impose upon a superior enemy. He never gave an opportunity, and never lost one. His movements were so rapid as to deceive and astonish the French, who prided themselves upon their own celerity. He foiled general after general, defeated army after army, captured fortress after fortress; and,

raising the military character of Great Britain to its old standard in the days of Marlborough, made the superiority of the British soldier over the Frenchman as incontestable as that of the British seaman. CHAP.
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The spirit of the country rose with its successes. England once more felt her strength, and remembered the part which she had borne, and the rank which she had asserted in the days of her Edwards and her Henrys. Buonaparte had bestowed upon France the name of the Sacred Territory, boasting, as one of the benefits conferred upon her by his government, that France alone remained inviolable when every other part of the continent was visited by the calamities of war. That boast was no longer to hold good! Our victories in the Peninsula prepared the deliverance of Europe, and Lord Wellington led the way into France. A large portion of his army consisted of Portugueze and Spaniards, who had every imaginable reason to hate the people among whom they went as conquerors; they had seen the most infernal cruelties perpetrated in their own country by the French soldiers; and it might have been supposed, prone as their national character was to revenge, that they would eagerly seize the opportunity for vengeance. But such was Lord Wellington's influence over the men whom he conducted to victory, that not an outrage, not an excess, not an insult was committed; and the French, who had made war like savages in every country which they had invaded, experienced all the courtesies and humanities of generous warfare when they were invaded themselves. In Gascony, as well as in Portugal and Spain, the Duke of Wellington's name was blessed by the people. Seldom indeed has it fallen to any conqueror to look back upon his career with such feelings! The marshal's staff, the dukedom, the honours and rewards

CHAP. which his Prince and his country so munificently and properly
 XLVI. bestowed, were neither the only nor the most valuable recom-
 1814. pense of his labours. There was something more precious
 than these, more to be desired than the high and enduring fame
 which he had secured by his military achievements, . . the
 satisfaction of thinking to what end those achievements had
 been directed; . . that they were for the deliverance of two most
 injured and grievously oppressed nations; . . for the safety, honour,
 and welfare of his own country; . . and for the general interests
 of Europe and of the civilized world. His campaigns were
 sanctified by the cause; . . they were sullied by no cruelties, no
 crimes; the chariot-wheels of his triumphs have been followed
 by no curses; . . his laurels are entwined with the amaranths of
 righteousness, and upon his death-bed he might remember his
 victories among his good works.

This is the great and inappreciable glory of England in this
 portion of its history, that its war in the Peninsula was in as
 strict conformity with the highest principles of justice as with
 sound state policy. No views of aggrandizement were enter-
 tained either at its commencement or during its course, or at
 its termination; conquests were not looked for, commercial
 privileges were not required. It was a defensive, a necessary,
 a retributive war; engaged in as the best means of obtaining
 security for ourselves, but having also for its immediate object
 “to loose the bands of wickedness,” and to break the yoke of
 oppression, and “to let the oppressed go free.” And this
 great deliverance was brought about by England, with God’s
 blessing on a righteous cause. If France has not since that
 happy event continued to rest under a mild and constitutional
 monarchy, . . if Spain has relapsed into the abuses of an absolute
 one, . . if the Portuguese have not supported that character

which they recovered during the contest, . . it has been because in all these instances there were national errors which retained their old possession, and national sins which were not repented of. But the fruits of this war will not be lost upon posterity ; for in its course it has been seen that the most formidable military power which ever existed in the civilized world was overthrown by resolute perseverance in a just cause ; it has been seen also that national independence depends upon national spirit, but that even that spirit in its highest and heroic degree may fail . . if wisdom to direct it be wanting. It has been seen what guilt and infamy men, who might otherwise have left an honourable name, entailed upon themselves, because, hoping to effect a just end by iniquitous means, they consented to a wicked usurpation, and upheld it by a system of merciless tyranny, sinning against their country and their own souls : this was seen in the Spanish ministers of the Intruder ; and the Spanish reformers, more lamentably for Spain, but more excusably for themselves, have shown the danger of attempting to carry crude theories of government into practice ; and hurrying on precipitate changes, from the consequences of which men too surely look to despotism for protection or for deliverance. These lessons have never been more memorably exemplified than in the Peninsular War ; and for her own peculiar lesson, England, it may be hoped, has learned to have ever from thenceforth a just reliance, under Providence, upon her resources and her strength ; . . under Providence, I say, for if that support be disregarded, all other will be found to fail.

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My task is ended here : and if in the course of this long and faithful history, it should seem that I have any where ceased to bear the ways of Providence in mind, or to have admitted a feeling, or given utterance to a thought inconsistent with glory

CHAP. to God in the highest, and good-will towards men, let the bene-
 XLVI. volent reader impute it to that inadvertence or inaccuracy of
 1814. expression from which no diligence, however watchful, can always
 be secure; and as such let him forgive what, if I were conscious
 of it, I should not easily forgive in myself.

Keswick, 26th March, 1832.

Laus Deo.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

CONCERNING THE

PENINSULAR WAR.

INTRODUCTION to the History of the Revolution in Spain. By Alvaro Florez Estrada, Attorney-General of the Province of Asturias. Translated from the author's manuscript by William Burdon. 8vo.

Memoir written by General Sir Hew Dalrymple, Bart., of his Proceedings as connected with the Affairs of Spain and the Commencement of the Peninsular War. 8vo.

Proceedings upon the Inquiry relative to the Armistice and Convention, &c., made and concluded in Portugal, in August, 1808, between the Commanders of the British and French Armies. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed.

A Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army in Spain commanded by Sir John Moore, K. B., authenticated by official papers and original letters. By his brother, James Moore, Esq. 4to.

Narrative of the Campaigns in Portugal and Spain under Generals Sir Arthur Wellesley and Sir John Moore, from the landing of the troops in Mondego Bay to the Battle of Corunna; accompanied by all the official documents, and numerous engravings from drawings made on the spot. By Adam Neale, M. D., Physician to the Forces. 4to.

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Exposicion de los Hechos y Maquinaciones que han preparado, la Usurpacion de la Corona de España, y los medios que el Emperador de los Franceses ha puesto en obra para realizarla. Por Don Pedro Cevallos. Reimpreso en Malaga. 1808.

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Elogio a los Ilustres defensores de Zaragoza en sus dos sitios del año de 1808. Por un individuo de las Escuelas Pias. Madrid, 1815.

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Cataluña Atribulada suplica al Augusto Congreso de las Cortes, en 1811. Palma.

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Memoria de lo mas interesante que ha ocurrido en la Ciudad de Zaragoza con motivo de haberla atacado, el Exercito Frances. Madrid, 1808.

Traslado a toda la Nacion Española, y à los fidelissimos constantes aliados Portugueses é Ingleses, de la correspondencia oficial y confidencial del Teniente General Marques del Palacio, Capitan-General de los reynos de Aragon y Valencia, y general-en-gefe del segundo ejército, &c. con el Capitan-General de los reales ejércitos, y regente del reyno Don Joaquin Blake, &c. Cadiz, 1812.

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
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All that part of the present history relating to the events of which General Foy has treated, or to which the histories of Lord Londonderry and Colonel Napier have as yet extended, was printed before either of those works appeared.



THE END.


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
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
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